Customer Reviews

The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(5)

 

 

Here in New York, where you could literally taste the World Trade Center in your mouth for weeks and it seemed everybody had a harrowing story to tell, I noticed that people adopted one of several strategies for coping with their shock and grief. Some bolted into action, working on relief, recovery or joining the Coast Guard. Others withdrew into the trivia of normal, everyday life. A third group, which included myself, grabbed everything they could read that might help them make sense of the incomprehensible.

Benjamin's and Simon's "The Age of Sacred Terror," which was published in 2002, was one of the first books to appear after 9/11 that offered a thorough explanation of the origins of Islamic terrorism and traced America's intensifying response to it. Balanced and studious, it showed how the attacks did not come from "out of the blue," but from the depths of religious zealotry and historical grievance. It provided some comfort; the world may be crueler than you thought but at least it still followed the same logic of resentment, bigotry and violence.

"The Next Attack" is not comforting even in that limited sense. It is a shout of alarm and a warning. The authors can barely contain their anger at the Bush Administration for its marginalization of the government's intelligence bureaucracy and its consequent misconceptualization of the jihadist threat. To their credit, however, they do not descend into pure polemic and their arguments are well documented with 437 end notes. Their careful evaluation of some claims and counter-claims, such as the President's statement that "75 percent of known al Qaeda leaders have been brought to justice," is particularly appreciated by this reader.

Benjamin and Simon do not just think that the occupation of Iraq was poorly planned and mishandled, though they certainly make that case. They argue that the endeavor was misconceived to begin with and that by occupying Iraq the United States has played into the hands of its opponents. "It is unlikely that even in his most feverish reveries," they write, "Usama bin Laden could have imagined that America would stumble so badly and wound itself so grievously." The invasion and occupation of Iraq, they argue, has alienated our allies (that's rather obvious), confirmed the worst fears of Muslims about America's motives, and spurred recruitment into terrorist organizations. Although they acknowledge that in the short run the war may suppress terror acts in the United States as jihadists flock to Mesopotamia, they think that Iraq will prove to be an invaluable training ground for terrorists who will ultimately threaten the West directly, especially in Europe. Their discussion of Muslim immigration and alienation in Europe reads as if the civil disturbances in France had already happened when they wrote it.

The authors' analysis of the decision-making process leading up to the invasion adds to the growing evidence that, WMD or not, such momentous decisions must not be made as they were. They portray a clique of ideologues, lead by the Vice President and Secretary of Defense, who sought a pretext for a long-desired course of action and were disdainful of anyone who voiced misgivings, including, incredibly, the Defense Department's own counter-terrorism bureau. While much of the story is now familiar, Benjamin and Simon obviously maintain contacts with many current and former officials in the defense and intelligence communities, and offer some interesting details anonymously attributed to them.

The authors attempt to move the political debate beyond criticism of the Bush Administration's WOT, toward an alternative strategy for defeating Islamic radicalism and protecting Americans. Their suggestions are sensible but the chapters seem a bit hurried and are more of an outline of a policy than a full-blown plan. For example, they argue that recruitment into terrorist organizations would be minimized by "tamping down" regional conflicts in the Caucasus, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines and above all, Palestine. Who could argue with that? But the authors are vague on how to address those intractable disputes. The weakest part of their foreign policy formula, though, relates to Iraq. Whatever the case against the war and its planners, we're there now, and any plausible strategy must take that as a starting point. Benjamin and Simon only offer a bare-bones endorsement of an "Iraqification" program and don't really describe what specific steps need to be taken to limit our losses or, better yet, to turn the situation to America's advantage.

The portion of the book that is least persuasive is its conclusion, in which the authors argue that America's domestic politics, unduly influenced by our own religious fundamentalists, is incapable of producing a deliberate and effective response to Islamic terrorism. I disagree: the invasion of Iraq was an improbable American response to 9/11 and it's hard to imagine any other Administration, Republican or Democrat, that would have led us so directly into the present mess. If there is a structural problem, it is that the American public has not been sufficiently vigilant in evaluating its political leadership, probably because it hasn't yet had to pay a price for its inattention.

Its faults notwithstanding, this is an important book that should be read.

I am very surprised to not see other reviews of this book. While it lacks the intimate detail and the passion of Richard Clarke's book, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, it is the first book I have found in the years since 9/11 that satisfactorily reviews the bidding, provides a polite but hard-hitting critique of all we are doing wrong, and ends with reasonable recommendations for future action--recommendations that will most certainly not be adopted by the current Administration.

Most gripping, on page 159 of the book, is a quote from a TIME article in 2003 that I missed back then, but that today I find compelling--a quote that likens Al Qaeda and its off-shoots not to a snake, the analogy popular with the Administration, but to mold--toxic mold one might add.

The authors are to be commended for both their recognition that it is disruption, not destruction, that will cause the most pain to the West; and that most of our wounds are self-inflicted.

"Intelligence" qua spies and secrecy and espionage does not play in this book. Indeed, in a footnote, the authors wonder if future adversaries will have any respect at all for U.S. intelligence, and with good reason. The irrelevance of secret intelligence to this larger conflict lends added weight to the common-sense open source information observations of the authors. [My own first book, On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, with a Foreword by Senator David Boren (D-KS), today President of the University of Oklahomna, is the coffin I will use to redirect 80% of the secret intelligence budget back toward education and the only true national intelligence, the aggregate collective intelligence of We the People.]

This book is especially recommended for students and citizens that do not have the time or money to read very widely in the national security arena, but want one single book to "catch up" on all that we have failed to accomplish. The book might well have been sub-titled "How a Naked Emperor Pranced Past a Sleeping Public for a Second Term."

We are losing" - the first sentence in "The Next Attack." Inspired by Osama's boldness and outraged by America's actions, more Muslims are joining the terrorist movement. Meanwhile, the U.S., instead of taking a comprehensive view of radical Islam, uses only two indicators to show progress - the number of days since 9/11 without a catastrophic attack, and the number of terrorists captured or killed. Benjamin and Simon also believe that in destroying one of the most hated secular dictatorships that jihadists had been unable to dent, the U.S. has created an open field for radicals to raise havoc and provided them with Americans in close proximity for targets.

U.S. attacks in Afghanistan did serious damage to Al Qaeda - aided by the Taliban's straight-line trenches and high-tech weapons. On the other hand, Osama's ability to elude capture for a period longer than U.S. involvement in WWII has enhanced his image. Regardless, we now have the phenomena of "self-starting" groups that include highly educated Muslims capable of highly sophisticated acts (eg. the Madrid and London train bombings).

While it is impossible to provide credible estimates of the number of foreign fighters in Iraq, an Israeli's analysis of 154 foreigners who died in Iraq concluded that the vast majority had never taken part previously in violence. At the same time, a British bomb expert employed as a consultant notes that terrorist progress in Iraq has been rapid - a result of the pooling of experience from around the region (and the Internet).

The number of terrorist (mostly Muslim) Internet sites has risen from 12 in '98 to about 4,400. Uses include dispensing "how-to" information, showing evidence of recent acts (eg. IEDs exploding, beheadings) and fatwahs, and serving as recruitment tools.

Europe has had problems integrating and employing its rapidly growing Muslim community - for example a recent survey found that 41% of Britain's Muslims saw themselves as "Muslim" rather than "British and Muslim." The U.S. has yet to experience such problems - its Muslim population has an average household income and percentage with advanced degrees (1/3) greater than the general population (about 9%).

The authors then spend time rehashing the flawed march to war in Iraq, failure to adequately prepare for occupation, squabbling between U.S. agencies over Chalabi (eg. the CIA sees him as unreliable), and fighting between Defense and State over management of post-war Iraq.

Recommendations include encouraging Europe to better integrate its Muslims (hard to do with existing high unemployment and very high levels of Muslims in some areas), creating a better image for the U.S. (efforts to-date have floundered - how does one sell a "product" that is widely hated for its acts?), and improving homeland defense by focusing on top priorities (reality - the U.S. provides an infinite set of terrorist targets).

Benjamin and Simon offer a key new point about political compexity of U.S. actions - the growing strength of fundamentalist Christians who support Israel in hopes of bringing about the Biblically-foretold "second coming of the Messiah." These same groups presumably are also responsible for Rumsfeld failing to fire Gen. Boykin for his offensive (to Muslims) religious comments.

Contains some interesting new material, and also much already well-covered in the news or their prior book ("The Age of Secular Terror"). Not a "Must Read."

This well-researched book faults the Bush administration leading up to and after 9/11. When the authors state something they have the sense to them promptly cite where they received statistics and other data making their claim. They want this book to present their own case to the readers.

The authors argue that the United States has ultimately fed our Islamic opponents by being in Iraq. It wasn't just our recent stumblings which have upset them; the whole thing was a poorly-planned and conceived operation which shows us as 'greedy' and 'ruthless' conquerors. Furthermore, the region may now be even more unattainable as independent militant cells have a constant stream of recruits. These members are slipping under our government's tendencies to ignore whatever cannot be pigeonholed into existing epistemology, focusing on 'troops' as opposed to 'cells'.

No critique of current American policy inside the Middle East could go without mentioning "Weapons of Mass Destruction" but the authors want to instead promote their own foregin policy strategy. If they were advising the president, they would acknowledge that terrorism is happening from independent cells. After the heavy annotations in other parts of this book, I had expected similar detail with their "Iraqification" program and honestly was disappointed when I did not get it.

However, this is still an important book for people seeking substantive discussions about a current event. The authors believe we deserve the truth and can digest it.

This book begins with a rather alarming single sentence paragraph, "We are losing." What the authors are referring to is their belief that we are losing the war on terrorism because of the faulty strategy adopted by the administration of President George W. Bush. They contend that this administration has failed to understand both the nature of Islamic extremism and the terrorist movement(s)this extremism has generated. They agree that if truly democratic governments can be established in the countries of the Near East it would be a major deterrent to terrorism, but are much more pessimistic about the ability of the U.S. to do this than the Bush Administration. They join the growing chorus of critics who claim that Operation Iraqi Freedom has done more to encourage than to discourage the spread of Terrorist ideology. While this is a contentious argument, they provide a good deal of evidence to support their claim. They also debunk the claim that the terrorist movement al Qaeda is a state sponsored terrorist organization like Hezbollah. More importantly, the authors offer an alternative strategy which appears to be grounded in a much better understanding of both the terrorist movement and the vulnerabilities of the U.S. and Western Europe to terrorist attacks. The alternative strategy they propose is, in part, drawn from the partially successful strategy the U.S. used in Afghanistan and in part drawn a more realistic assessment of the terrorist threat to the U.S. and Europe.

A word of caution, both authors served on the National Security Council under President Clinton so they are hardly disinterested commentators on the present administration. Yet, I believe that on the whole they present an accurate picture of how America's Global War on Terrorism has failed and why. Their proposed strategy for this war makes a lot better sense to this reviewer than the Bush administration's present strategy.

The central core of this book is that the United States is 'losing' the War on Terror because, in a nutshell, the Bush Administration has no concept of either the enemy or the war that the US is actually involved in. The War that the US is fighting is actually aiding and abetting the real foe - Militant Islam.
Bush and his administration are fighting 'states' so the US invades Iraq and Afghanistan - set piece battles that the US excels at. But Militant Islam is basically everywhere now in enemy states (Iran and Sudan) friendly states (Pakistan and Egypt) and even old alles (Great Britain and Germany). So who does the US invade now?
In Iraq itself the US had simply provided a 'terror school' for equipment and methods (the book is very good here) - the Militants are learning quickly and spreading the information back to their home countries. Attacks in Spain, Great Britain, Indonesia show they are spreading the information very well.
The book also does a good job on Homeland Security - it is very disquieting to read that the US is probably less safe now. Intradepartmental squabbles, unclear priorities (and old boy cronyism)and wasted time and money leave the US vulnerable to the next 'big event' that Bin Laden and Al Queda is plotting.
The book is harshly critical of Bush and his chief advisors ( I imagine that explains the 'one star' reviews). But the book is far closer to the harsh reality of the war on terror that the US is presently engaged in.

In their bestseller The Age of Sacred Terror; Radical Islam's War Against America (2002), a widely hailed book that won the Arthur Ross Book Prize given by the Council on Foreign Relations, Benjamin and Simon warned about the threat of terrorism to the United States, a threat which they insisted we did not understand and failed to counter. Then came the September 11 attacks which made them prophets. In their new book the authors warn that more than four years later we still persist in misunderstanding our adversary, and that we face grievous consequences unless we change our thinking, our strategies, and our policies.

Not quite half way through their book the authors summarize: "It is simply no longer possible to maintain that the United States is winning the war on terror" (p. 126). Despite some limited successes, and the authors are careful to acknowledge these, we have failed at almost every critical juncture. First, in a failure of vision we have linked terrorism to rogue states, or almost exclusively to Al Qaeda, instead of understanding the dynamic of numerous independent non-state actors that function alone. Terrorism is more like a "deadly mold," to quote one analyst, rather than like a "deadly snake" that the administration claims it will behead. In a failure of strategy, we have militarized the problem and what we think is the solution, thinking that sheer force can annihilate the enemy. In their view we have already lost the even more important war of Muslim public opinion. Third, the Iraq war has been a monumental disaster in the authors's opinion. We have played right into the hands of the jihadists, confirmed their view of world history that infidels from the west want to occupy and control their land, created a recruiting bonanza for terrorists around the world, and with Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib we have caused Muslims to view us not only as infidels but as hypocrites who do not honor human rights, rule of law, or democracy. Fourth, the internet revolution has fueled jihadist rage and sense of epic heroism, much like television brought the Vietnam war into the living rooms of Americans. The video of the beheading of Nicholas Berg, to mention one gruesome example, was downloaded at least 15 million times. Technical know-how for bomb-making on the internet makes terrorist training camps almost obsolete. Finally, Benjamin and Simon point to trends in American culture at large that go beyond any single administration. In particular they point to conservative Protestants who have supported Bush en masse, supported Israel uncritically to the detriment of Palestinians, and made despicable and inexcusably disparaging remarks about Islam (cf. James Dobson, Jerry Falwell, Franklin Graham, Pat Robertson, Charles Colson, and many others), all of which has reinforced the radical jihadists' stereotypes of America and their view of global history that the pagan infidels of the west want to destroy them. The Madrid bombings on March 11, 2004, in which rogue jihadists detonated ten bombs simultaneously, show how vulnerable we have made ourselves with these multiple failures.

Why have we not been attacked since September 11? The authors give credit where it is due, but go on to argue that terrorists have no need to attack hard targets in America when they have a field day in Iraq and limitless soft targets in places like Madrid, London, Bali, and Chechnya. But, more ominous still, they believe they will strike here again, with their trademarks of patience and perfectionism, which makes their long section on our many failures in Homeland Security sobering reading. Our preoccupation with a military offensive has shorted the need for pre-emptive defense. Let us pray that Benjamin and Simon are wrong, but they were right in their first book, so let us pray that people listen to them more carefully this time.

The writers try to build a convincing case, and do that with lots of references. But adding lots of references doesn't make a good book.

It's very easy to point out what is wrong from the sidelines, which is exactly what the writers do. No real alternatives are given, and those that are suggested are extremely expensive. If an air attack would cause 50 billion worth in damages, spending 40 billion is okay according to the writers.

If you would want a book telling the Bush administration finds it difficult to tie their own shoes, look no further. This is the book you want.

What decided me to trash this book was the opinion of the writers that not only Turkey should join the EU, but joining Egypt wouldn't be a bad idea either. A clear proof the writers have absolutely no idea whatsoever about Europe. I rarely throw away a brand new book (bought this last week), but this goes in the rubbish bin. Pathetic.

I will be short and succinct in this review. The authors contend in this book that U.S. military interventions are jeopardizing the war against radical Islamists. They describe terrorists' use of the Internet to spread their ideology, the role of Christian evangelism in foreign policy, and the influence of Muslims in America.

The authors also share their opinion that there have been no more attacks in the U.S.A. because of the easier targets given to the terrorist in Iraq. But believe that they will strike America again as they share the many failures in Homeland Security. This lack of security in the U.S.A. may be sobering, but sadly not surprising.

A sober but devastating critique of the Bush administration's failures in combatting/prosecuting/preventing terrorism.