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Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction

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If you ever thought you were important, you're wrong. In so many words, this is
one of the axioms of Brassier's "Nihil Unbound." In three parts and seven chapters,
Brassier sets up the argument that because extinction is nigh, there is no point in trying to
extract a meaning from the lives we perceive. As Brassier states in the book's
preface, "Philosophers would do well to desist from issuing any further injunctions about
the need to re-establish the meaningfulness of existence, the purposefulness of life, or
mend the shattered concord between man and nature."
Brassier defends nihilism as a necessity. No longer is nihilism thought of as the
bleak alternative to Meaning, but a necessary realization of imminent extinction. Brassier
calls nihilism a "crisis of meaning," with both the crisis and the concept of meaning
understood through the way that we have been historically conditioned to understand.
Whereas the nihilistic view of the past came from the acknowledgement that "God" is
beyond our understanding, therefore our lives fall short of any kind of substantial
Meaning, the nihilistic view of contemporary times comes from the fact that now we can
grasp the science from which nature and our universe is constructed. The more that is
known about science, the more a single point is driven in like a nail into the fibers of our
being: humanity is not important.
Each chapter of "Nihil Unbound" focuses on a different philosopher. Brassier's main focus in spotlighting each of these thinkers is to rail against any kind of human-centered philosophy. With extinction as imminent as ever, "philosophy should be more than a sop to the pathetic twinge of human self-esteem" (xi). The fatal flaw of philosophy is exposed: all philosophy is man-made, from the minds of humans who are trying to explain the conditions of being human. Brassier encourages us to stray from this with the path of nihilism. When humanity neglects its own self-interest, the root of philosophy can be centered around reality.
Without nihilism, we are trapped inside the box of our own understanding. If we are still to be tied to our idea of Meaning, we cannot imagine a world which we are not part of. In order to do so, we must accept that we are already dead. Brassier's brand of nihilism encourages just that. Philosophy should not affirm or justify human existence, but rather, allow us to overcome our existence.
Ray Brassier's thinking reminds one of a specific short story by Ray Bradbury. "Homecoming" tells the story of a boy named Timothy, who is the only mortal being in a family of mortals. He is treated differently by his siblings for his lack of immortality. Knowing that he will be outlived by everyone he knows forces Timothy to face his mortality every day. Timothy is nearing extinction. Unsure of his life's purpose, he is constantly on the search for meaning.
"Oh, to have strong teeth, with incisors like steel spikes. Or strong hands, even, or a strong mind...But, no, he was the imperfect one, the sick one. He was even--he shivered and drew the candle flame closer--afraid of the dark." (Bradbury, 10).
Timothy, like the rest of mankind tends to do when faced with extinction, revels in his own fears and loathes in the fact that his life is worthless.
The title, "Homecoming," refers to the family reunion that Timothy's family is preparing to attend. At the Homecoming, Timothy speaks with his Uncle Einar and confides in him his fear of death.
"Don't feel badly, Nephew Timothy. Each to his own, each in his own way. How much better things are for you. How rich. The world's dead for us. We've seen so much of it, believe me. Life's best to those who live the least of it. It's worth more per ounce, Timothy, remember that." (Bradbury 17).
Uncle Einar's words should serve as words of comfort to the entire human race. As we approach extinction, we are also steadily approaching a more precious life. Brassier calls life meaningless, and this is true. The only meaning that we can attempt to ascribe to our existence is the meaning that we create ourselves, meaning that has no value except to ourselves. Of course, mortality is a jarring idea, and the story ends with Timothy crying himself silently to sleep.
The concepts in "Nihil Unbound" are universal, and offer a strange comfort to anyone who finds their imminent mortality frightening or jarring. A background knowledge of the philosophers discussed is implied by the author, so I would not recommend it to anyone who is especially new to the field of philosophy. And like most philosophical works, "Nihil Unbound" tends to fall prey to unnecessary jargon and overly verbose language. I give this book 3 stars.

For disclosure: I am not a professional philosopher (an "amateur" at best!), and lack the requisite background to really judge Brassier's readings of Badiou, Laruelle, and a few of the other philosophers cited in this book. I skipped Part II (principally on Badiou and Laruelle), so this review pertains only to the chapters in Part I and Part III. I should also note that I picked this book up owing to Brassier's identification as a "speculative realist" - a label which has also been applied to the work of Bruno Latour, Graham Harman, and Jane Bennett. I have read and enjoyed several books by these other authors; but "speculative realism" is a very loosely applied label, and Brassier is pursuing a different project than these other authors.

I have two general criticisms of Brassier's book. The first is its presentation. It is fair to note that Brassier's writing style is dense and allusive. In itself this is not a bad thing; I am not one to judge a writer for being "difficult." Other readers should be aware of the Brassier's difficulty, however, especially given the fact that you cannot look inside the book on Amazon or the publisher website. More problematic is the way in which Brassier presents his overall argument. The individual chapters often do not clearly "link up": The chapter on Horkheimer and Adorno's "Dialectic of Enlightenment," for example, seems out of place and does not add to Brassier's argument. In other places, Brassier takes far too much space to make his point: his discussion of Paul Churchland's work, for example, can be summed up in a single sentence, but includes a diversion of several pages through the internal tensions of Churchland's philosophy. (In my reading, awareness of these tensions does not alter the general significance of Churchland's work.)

My second general criticism concerns the intended audience of Brassier's book. The general themes of the book are interesting and important: Brassier argues that science leads to a "disenchantment" of the world, and that this process of disenchantment leads ultimately to a form of nihilism. In Brassier's view, philosophy needs to live up to the challenge of a disenchanting scientific view of the world. How are we to think the meaning of "the human," and the relationship between human and world (or human and nature), in light of the "Copernican revolutions" of Galileo, Darwin, and cognitive science? Science has displaced humans from the center of creation, even from our own historically and culturally influenced sense of ourselves; but "post-Kantian philosophy" (Brassier's principal target) attempts to reserve a special place for the transcendental human subject. Brassier's book is in part a survey of attempts to get philosophy out from under the influence of Kant, and take science seriously on its own terms. This argument deserves a broad readership; I do not think it should not be relegated to specialists in recent continental philosophy. (Despite the frequent observation that Brassier draws on both analytical and continental traditions, the latter are heavily favored.) In depending so heavily on his readings of obscure continental philosophers, I think that Brassier in a sense undermines the general thrust of his argument. Rather than taking seriously the philosophical import of nihilism, I often found myself thinking "who cares?"

I really would prefer to give this book 3.5 stars. (My "score" at least will average out with the previous reviewer's 5 stars.) I give 4 stars for the insightful discussion of Meillasoux, and the readings of Lyotard, Nietzsche, and Freud in the last chapter; 3 stars for the criticisms.

I am writing this review for the same reason I read Brassier's book: it's for class. But it is a fun class and the book is just as good, so don't let that fact discourage you from reading the remainder of this review. Lets just say that I would much rather read Brassier for a second time than read something boring like Descartes or some other dead guy or even the remainder of this review for a first time. That is not to say that this is a bad review (or a review that is bad). If I were assigned to review my review of Brassier's book I'd give it a 3/5, good at times but overly self-aware and a bit off-topic. I would rather read Brassier than this review. And I would rather read Chapter 7 of his book six more times than read the whole thing twice.

Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction is dense in content and form. Brassier reads Paul Churchland, Adorno and Horkheimer, his colleague Quentin Meillassoux (if you haven't read much of this `speculative philosophy' stuff but want to continue I'd say you should definitely read Meillassoux's After Finitude), Alan Badiou, Heidegger, Deleuze, Nietzsche and some other names. He tries to acclimate you with the philosophers he critiques, but in some chapters I found myself wishing I were better acquainted with some of the primary literature. For example, I couldn't keep up with the chapter on Badiou to be honest. It was out of my range. There were certain parts in which I had to do that thing were you go back and reread a passage several times before concluding that you just don't get it. So it's not an easy read but it's well organized and very interesting.

The format is very simple for the most part. The majority of the chapters are just illustrations of `this is what philosophy is doing wrong,' so you can technically read one and skip to the third part of the book. But don't, because they are all pretty interesting. Chapter 1 drags on for longer than it should, particularly for something that just illustrates the main concept but doesn't advance it. But it's an important chapter because it sets up the whole frame of the book (hence why it is the first chapter. Like I said, it has good structure and organization). Brassier promotes a form of eliminative materialism but at the same time tries to find a niche for philosophy in a world that has moved on without it. He basically wants philosophy to promote the scientific image, because otherwise philosophy will continue to be as obsolete as it has been ever since Kant. Science has advanced; philosophy must catch up and find itself a useful job.

Here's a quick summary: Ray Brassier attacks the pervasive remnants of flawed human-centered ideology by delving into the consequences inherent in scientific calculations about the destruction of everything (including space-time). In other words, Brassier takes the prediction that the fabric of matter itself will eventually disintegrate and then investigates its implications on human self-understanding. His goal is to change the discourse of philosophy, a discourse that erroneously places consciousness and thought as the apex of all becoming. By looking at the inevitable implications of extinction he affirms the inconsequence of human existence.

Brassier criticizes mainstream philosophy discourses because they obstinately hold on to the notion that humans are of consequence in the universe. He ridicules this visceral human yearning for cosmic importance, and chastises philosophers for softening the news in order to console "the pathetic twinge of human self-esteem" (Preface xi). Brassier wants none of this baby stuff. He demands that metaphysicians push nihilism to its most obvious conclusion: that extinction retroactively annihilates all meaning. He pierces into the depths of the bleak void of nothingness, stares at it in the eyes, and returns to tell us that extinction has "always already occurred." We are already dead.
First of all reader, you must know that in "one trillion, trillion, trillion (10^1728) years from now the accelerating expansion of the universe will have disintegrated the fabric of matter itself, terminating the possibility of embodiment" (228). Not only does this imply that life, thought, space, and time will perish, it also logically proves that it has already happened. As Brassier puts it "everything is already dead" (223). The extinction of all has "retroactively" annihilated everything. This post-asymptopian state of "eternal and unfathomable blackness" already encompasses all diachronic events and forces us to confront implications that are far beyond them (228). Extinction pervades the present by encompassing "a future that has already been, and a past that is perpetually yet to be" (230). This eternal, ever-expanding nothingness is the only thing that exists. That is to say everything is already nothingness.

Brassier's nihilism does not reduce human existence to some sort of subjectivism. On the contrary, it strips it of all its clutter. Nihilism allows us to observe a reality that "is indifferent to our existence and oblivious to the `values' and `meanings' which we would drape over it in order to make it more hospitable" (Prefrace xi). It is this atavistic need to urgently hold on to the illusion of meaning that impedes intellectual progress, and it is only by accepting that extinction and its subsequent nothingness eternally pervade all reality that humans can frame their ponderings appropriately. It is the role of philosophy to clear the way for the advancement of science and to create a dialogue through which both can advance towards intellectual maturity.


<tl;dr>
It's a good book but it can be tough to read at times if you are not acquainted with some of the philosophers Brassier critiques. Chapter 6 & 7 are the best parts (particularly the sections on Nietzsche). Read it if you get a chance.

First, I would like to preface my review by saying I am in no way an expert on philosophy, though I have read other works in philosophy. In addition, most of my criticisms will come from the point of view of the layman, and how my experience with the book could help some novice philosophy readers get through the book.
The book is Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, written by Ray Brassier. Though Ray Brassier denies the claim, he belongs to the group of philosophers involved with speculative realism, which takes issue with what it calls "correlationism."
To effectively read this book, I would highly recommend reading the preface. Although this may seem to be a "no-brainer" to some, I jumped into chapter one without reading the preface; and if it had not been for my professor guiding me through the book, I would have been completely lost as to what Brassier's main point was. Of course, understanding his point within the chapters was not difficult to discern, however, the book may become repetitive and boring if an understanding of the direction of the book, which he describes in the preface, is not had.
Within the preface Brassier outlines two issues he will address. First that the disenchantment caused by the Enlightenment is not a diminishment of intellectual discovery, but rather an "invigorating vector of intellectual discovery." (xi) Brassier maintains that disenchantment of the world is not a terrible mark for the human race, but a sign of intellectual maturity. Second, he states that nihilism does not lead to "a pathological exacerbation of subjectivism, which annuls the world and reduces reality to a correlate of the absolute ego." (xi) According to Brassier, nihilism leads to a "realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality, which...is indifferent to our existence." (xi)
To reach these conclusions, Brassier uses several different works to explicate how within their own statements about advancing thought, the authors unwittingly retreat back into the very claims they wish to dispel. He divides the book into three parts: "Destroying the Manifest Image," "Anatomy and Negation," and "The End of Time." The first part, "Destroying the Manifest Image," begins with Brassier's critique of Wifrid Sellars, where he considers the difference found between the manifest image, the image man has seen himself by way of reflection, and the scientific image, the complex neurological patterns laid up within humans. Brassier goes on to explain how Sellars, in attempting to advocate for the scientific image of man, has unknowingly reinstated use of the manifest image. In this same manner, Brassier takes up and finds problems within works by Adorno and Horkheimer, Quentin Meillassoux, Alain Badiou, François Laruelle, Heidegger, Deleuze, and Nietzsche.
Brassier's writing style is long-winded and wordy; it is not for the faint of heart. In addition, I found that his detailing of the various claims made by the authors he criticizes were much too technical. He attempts to introduce the background material for each of his criticisms, yet, I feel that to fully understand the work he is commenting on, one needs previous knowledge of the material. His detailing lets the reader become lost, and at times, I felt it was unneeded and not helpful for his argument. It seems that the first chapter probably could have been shortened from thirty pages to around ten pages.
Even though Brassier does overload the reader with information, his points are clear, and in my opinion, the main point of the book is quite astounding. Brassier's claims that everything is dead already, since, extinction of consciousness eliminates the possibility that it could reflect back onto itself. Thus, since this is true, philosophy should refrain from ignoring this truth. He has attempted to push nihilism to its ultimate conclusion.
In my view, it seems as if this claim has been on the tip of my tongue, unable to articulate it. It sounds like the easiest concept to grasp, however, a human fear of meaninglessness has pervaded all of human thought, including those which are supposed to be on the forefront of thought: the philosophers. Please do not take this claim as face value from me, since Brassier make a much more convincing argument of it in the last chapter. Yes, the first six chapters were difficult to get through due to the repetitious style and wordy prose Brassier employs, but in the culmination of the seventh chapter, he hits you with a claim like a ton of bricks. For me, it was an "Aha!" moment, though it also felt like a "duh" moment as well. I would not recommend this book for the first six chapters; I almost wish there was an abridged version of the first six chapters available in their stead. However, the seventh chapter is worth all that I paid for this book.
I give this book four out of five stars for its not only convincing, but interesting insights. The only faults I can find are with Brassier's wordy writing style, and the repetitive design of his chapters. If you are a novice at philosophical readings like me, READ THE PREFACE, and try to get through the first six chapters. Everything will come together in the end.
'

A contemporary "speculative realist", Ray Brassier, believes that post-Kantian philosophical thought has been too preoccupied with humanity. For him, contemporary philosophy has relied heavily on viewing the world from the human perspective. This position, coined by Meillassoux as "correlationism", holds that knowledge is derived only through a correlate between thought and being. Thus accordingly, we can ever only partially know things apart from human perception, and we can never fully understand the world as it is 'in-itself'. However, Brassier's mission in Nihil Unbound is to show that we are in fact capable of understanding the world as it is; understand things apart from the confines of merely what it is "for us".


The book is composed in three parts in which Brassier methodically combs through the work of various renowned thinkers. As such, much of the book is a broad, yet in depth analysis and review of work from the likes of: Wilfrid Sellars, Quentin Meillassoux, Alain Badiou, Francois Laruelle, Sigmund Freud and so on. Brassier offers systematic interpretations, addresses strengths and weaknesses, and proposes modifications throughout. His critiques are exhaustingly comprehensive at times. Nonetheless, the exhaustive dissection performed ultimately intended to generate further support for his claim concerning the reluctance of philosophers to embrace nihilism.
Brassier's argument relies heavily on a more optimistic understanding of nihilism. He does not sugar-coat the assertions of nihilism: humans are not necessary for the world to exist, and thus life is relatively insignificant and worthless. Yet, he counters the loathing that has become attached to the concept of nihilism by insisting that embracement of our paltry mortality is requisite to separate thought from being. For Brassier, nihilism is the foundation upon which we are capable of thinking outside the human bubble; a gateway through which we can know the world itself, devoid of human interpretation or association. More specifically, acceptance of the inevitable, our extinction, serves as the keystone of his argument.


In short, Brassier says that we should consider ourselves dead. The mind-set of our extinction as having "always already" occurred is a counter by Brassier to the widely accepted notion that we "always already" mindfully perceive the world. The belief that our extinction has essentially already occurred forces us to face facts - we will all die and hence cease to exist. It's inevitable, so why not just accept the fact and come to terms with the implications? In effect, extinction for Brassier serves as the ultimate equalizer. This metaphorical counterbalance allows us an enlightened view of the world, which is unfiltered by human relation. He carefully construes this idea by leading the reader through each step of logic that he uses to reach his conclusion. Thus Brassier does not seem intent on damaging his audience's ego. He's not preaching what some might consider gloom and doom for the sake of demoralizing - that's simply not his motive. Rather, he is assessing the possibility of our assumed meaningfulness in the world as being a limiting factor of thought.


Brassier sets the stage for his argument in part 1. Brassier concludes part 1 in chapter 3 with an extremely thorough interpretation of Quentin Meillassoux's dispute against correlationism involving the "arche-fossil". The prospect of extinction for Brassier is similar to that of Meillassoux's arche-fossil, both pointing to a time devoid of thought. Though, Brassier notes weaknesses in Meillassoux's mathematic methodology by pointing to ambiguity in his answer to the arche-fossil. Brassier ultimately determines that Meillassoux's solution is vulnerable to counterarguments from correlationists. Instead serving as an attempt to debunk Meillassoux's claim, this analysis seems to be an overview of the multifaceted problem that Brassier tackles in subsequent chapters(Nihil, 49-63).


Brassier follows up on part 1 with an investigation of reality. Part 2 includes a detailed interpretation of Badiou's set theory and Francois Laruelle's work on "non philosophy". Brassier elaborates on each respective body of thought and uses the critiques to demonstrate support against the negative stigmas that he says taint the contemporary view of nihilism. Attempting to isolate thought as a thing exclusive from being, Brassier builds the foundation of his argument throughout part 2.


Brassier's argument culminates in part 3 as he proposes various applications of his logic thus far. With help from a revived view of nihilism from part 2, he explicates and expands on original works from Heidegger and Nietzshe. Part 3 concludes with an analysis of Sigmund Freud's "death-drive" theory. Brassier proposes parallels between Freud's theory and his own. For example, the death-drive theory is similar to the scientific phenomena of entropy: the idea that everything within the universe is moving towards a lesser degree of organization (Nihil, 235). Simply put, Brassier seems to suggest that Freud's death-drive could be considered the equivalent of entropy for humans. He points out that, according to Freud, certain eventual extinction is known only to our subconscious, while our conscious drive to live is merely a futile attempt to avoid the inevitable facts. The fact that Freud's theory coincides with Brassier's notion of nihilism helps to explain Freud's insistence on death being the driving force of life (Nihil, 236-239).


Though no definitive conclusion is reached by Brassier, he clearly sets his goal: think being, without thought. (Nihil, 223). The book is extremely deep at times due to the difficult nature of the works critiqued; however Brassier's focused attention to details helps to absolve any confusion. While sure to invoke critics, the reading should be interpreted as an inquiry into possibilities, and therefore a means if not an end. A probe into thought, full of original ideas, speculations, and implications; Nihil Unbound is philosophy at its best.

Nihil Unbound, written by Ray Brassier, is a fierce defense of pure Nihilism. As the title states, the Nihilism that Brassier will put forth is unbound. It is held back by nothing, it is limited by nothing, it is pure, cold, hard, (and maybe even cold-hearted), reason. This is Nihilism, as Brassier will argue, that is unheard of, unchecked and unlimited. What do I mean by all of this? Brassier says, "Philosophers would do well to desist from issuing any further injunctions about the need to re-establish the meaningfulness of existence, the purposefulness of life, or mend the shattered concord between man and nature. Philosophy should be more than a sop to the pathetic twinge of human self-esteem. Nihilism is not an existential quandary but a speculative opportunity" (p. xi) All of which to say, life has no Meaning. What this does not say is that one day when i receive my B.A it will be meaningless, or at least i hope not. At base it will mean that i graduated college. So in that sense there is meaning. But this is not the type of meaning Brassier is talking about. When Brassier talks about meaning he is talking about Meaning. Capital M, Meaning. He is talking about an ultimate Meaning to existence or some sort of universal Purpose in life. A cross-gender, cross-cultural, cross-continental Reason for why we, we people or we anything for that matter, are here.
Brassier views any and all attempts to formulate some sort of philosophy that would give life Meaning as pathetic, as i'm sure you noticed from the quote. But far from being some sort of snide remark, Brassier truly meant that when he said it and in fact the entire book is seemingly structured around proving that statement.
What Brassier does is simple. He begins by explaining the claim of each and every philosopher. And in most cases he goes in to great detail about what he likes about their particular philosophy. And as you might suspect Brassier finishes each chapter by destroying what that person said. But Brassier goes through this exact same process with everyone, and he does so systematically as well as teleologically.
What makes the book really predictable, however, is the fact that his problem or complaint with everyone is the exact same. Thirteen different philosophers and Brassier has the same complaint for them all. In the end everyone falls short of his radical standard. In their own particular way, each of these philosophers embrace and put forth nihilistic ideas. Some more than others, but all of them, at the last minute it seems, became afraid of where they were going and latched on to some idea or conception that one might find Meaning to existence in.
For the perfect example of what I am talking about I will briefly explain Brassier's problem with the "perfect Nihilist," Nietzsche. Nietzsche was all about Meaninglessness. He even tells this little anecdote that Brassier quotes, in full, before the beginning of chapter 7. The story can be summarized as such. 'There once was a planet full of ignorant beasts. These beasts thought that they were special because they had invented this thing called thought. But one day their sun exploded and their planet with them and they all died. The Universe, meanwhile, remained completely unaffected by the one time existence of the beast and continued on as if nothing had ever happened.' That was my version of the story, please read his sometime it is way better written than mine. But you get the point. And the point is that one day our sun will explode and then what about us. No really, what about us? Nothing, that's what. We aren't special, Nietzsche says. The sun will explode, our planet will be vaporized, or whatever, and everything that has ever called it home will die with it. Everything will die and none of it will ever have mattered.
Brassier reads this and says to himself, 'yes!' 'And anyone who thinks otherwise is pathetic.' But Nietzsche too fails Brassier in the end because of his, Nietzsche's, idea called the eternal occurrence. But i'll let you read that on your own. It's actually kind of interesting.
So what I have just provided is a skeletal structure, more or less, for what the book is about as well as give the formate for how Brassier attacks the issue. I didn't give you the how because I neither have the time to do it nor the brain capacity to do it justice. Also, if you are remotely interested in reading this book you will do so not because you care so much about the end result but because what you really want is the how. You want read how Brassier deconstructs the arguments.
And now a word about how I personally feel about the book. I am an unashamed and professing believer in Jesus Christ as both Lord and Savior. I believe in the Trinity, that Jesus is God, and that the Bible is the Infallible word of God. I'm also PCA for those who care. But with that said I agree with Brassier and his conclusion. I also absolutely love that rather lengthy quote of his that I gave at the very beginning of all this. But how can you say all that? Those are diametrically opposed beliefs and that makes you an idiot. One might say. So I'll clarify.
Brassier writes what he does based on the premise that there is no God. He doesn't explicitly state that but I think i'm treading in safe waters by saying this, Brassier does not believe in God. It also should go without saying that philosophy for the last 200 years or so has pretty much agreed upon the non-existence of God. And I for one, two if we count Brassier, am sick of hearing philosophers deny the existence of God and then try to hold onto or straight make up some sort of universal Meaning to existence. If the big bang, for example, brought about our existence, there is no Meaning. There is then no Reason for our existence. The idea that our lives have Meaning or Purpose can only be maintained and are only consistent with a belief in an almighty creator.
Fundamentally, I disagree with Brassier. I believe in God, he doesn't. I believe that there is Meaning and Purpose, he doesn't. And where Brassier insists that the Philosopher who is still looking for Meaning is a pathetic sop looking to boost their self-esteem, I insist that all people are looking for Meaning, God created us that way. But from a strictly philosophical perspective I find his logic compelling as well as consistent.

Nihil Unbound, by Ray Brassier, is a philosophical work that was published in 2007. Ray Brassier is currently a member of the Philosophy faculty at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon. He is commonly associated with the speculative realist movement. This movement includes philosophers such as Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman. Speculative Realism can be defined as the opposition to a post-Kantian philosophy identified as correlationism. Correlationism is the philosophical discourse which states that the relationship between the world and humans is necessary in order for either to exist. Brassier largely defends philosophical realism from the philosophies of correlationism, phenomenology, deconstruction, and post-modernism. Brassier supports the belief that the origin of reality is entirely independent of the concepts and practices of mankind. Brassier believes that truth exists in the relationship between a belief and reality. Philosophical realists like Brassier claim that current comprehension is merely an approximation of reality, and that new experiences draw individuals nearer to a true understanding of reality.
In order to understand Brassier's Nihil Unbound, it is important to have a general understanding of Brassier's beliefs as well as a familiarity with the term nihilism. Nihilism is the negation of meaningful aspects of life. It is most commonly discussed in terms of existential nihilism which claims that life is without purpose. Brassier is highly critical of contemporary philosophers whom he identifies as safeguarding the experience of meaning. Brassier criticizes Heidegger as a significant advocate of the centrality of meaning. Much of Nihil Unbound is devoted to Brassier's idea of the logic of disenchantment. Brassier advocates the disenchantment of humanity with its own centrality in regards to reality.
The preface provides a general outline of the book. It is divided into three sections. The first section concentrates on the theme of destroying the manifest image. Chapter one distinguishes manifest images of man from scientific images of man. Brassier explains that "the scientific image describes `what there really is,' it has an ontological purchase capable of undermining man's manifest self-conception as a person or intentional agent" (7). He argues against the discourse of folk psychology and suggests that the emerging science of cognition could potentially eliminate the concept of belief altogether. The elimination of belief would make the scientific image and subsequently truth, more accessible. Chapter two analyzes the relationship between reason and nature as demonstrated by Freud and Hegel. Brassier explains the concept of enlightenment through the evaluation of the works of Adorno and Horheimer. He explains that for Adorno and Horheimer, "enlightenment reason is driven by an inexorable drive to conceptual subsumption which subordinates particularity, heterogeneity, and multiplicity to universality, homogeneity, and unity, thereby rendering everything equivalent to everything else, but precisely in such a way that nothing can ever be identical to itself" (34). Brassier disputes this understanding of enlightenment because it instills inherent purpose through its discussion of individuality. However, he champions his own explanation of enlightenment as the ultimate path toward truth, understanding, and reason. Chapter three summarizes Quentin Meillassoux's critique of correlationism. Meillassoux challenges the Kantian emphasis on correlation between the object and the observer. He does so by presenting the problem of ancestrality. Meillassoux discusses a concept called the arche-fossil which he defines as the givenness of a being anterior to givenness. For the correlationist the arche-fossil is a contradiction; Rather than a contradiction, Meillassoux presents the arche-fossil as a paradox. The idea of ancestrality also presents the issue of thinking a time without thought. This problem foreshadows Meillassoux's discussion of the Kantian idea that it is unthinkable that the unthinkable be impossible. Brassier discusses potential correlationist rebuttals to Meillassoux's presentation of the arche-fossil. He then evaluates what he deems Meillassoux's three unexpected consequences from the absolutization of contingency: "First, that a contradictory entity is impossible. Second, that it is absolutely necessary that contingent entities exist. Third and lastly, that the laws of nature themselves are contingent" (69). Ultimately Brassier confronts Meillassoux's declaration of truth as guaranteed by its ontological referent.
Chapter four begins the second part of the book: "The Anatomy of Negation." Chapter four is a description of Alain Badiou's support for Quentin Meillassoux. Badiou is able to circumvent some of the contradictions of Meillassoux's argument by negating intuition. Brassier claims that Badiou's contention sacrifices intuition only to develop an equally disturbing contradiction involving inscription. Chapter five focuses on the debate of idealism. Brassier attempts to reconcile the idealism of correlation and the idealism of mathematical inscription and intuition. Brassier employs the work of Francois Laruelle, a French philosopher, in order to examine a speculative realism that operates on the basis of negation. Brassier explains that he interprets Laruelle's work not as a "non-philosophical suspension of philosophy but rather [a] uncovered non-dialectal logic of philosophical negation: viz., `unliateralization'" (120). Brassier references Laruelle in order to complete the tasks of the naming of the real and the evacuation of the real. At the end of chapter five, Brassier begins his discussion on space and time.
The final section of the book is titled "The End of Time.". Brassier evaluates the relationship between time and death in the works of Heidegger and Deleuze. Brassier claims that Heidegger, in his book Being and Time, has succumbed to the temptation to "simply deny the ontological autonomy of `time itself' and to reduce it to our temporality" (156). Brassier explains that Deleuze surprisingly endorses several ideas similar to that of Heidegger. Chapter seven cites Nietzsche's argument for overcoming nihilism. In an evaluation of the concept of the necessary being Nietzsche declares that appearances are worshipped and therefore, "the lie - and not the truth is divine!" (219). This quote supports Brassier's belief in nihilism. Lastly, Brassier acknowledges Freud's theory of the death-drive as the key to understanding "the will to know and the will to nothingness" (xii).
In conclusion, Brassier supports reason at all costs. He argues against philosophy as merely a method of enhancing the self-esteem of mankind. His main point involves the inevitability of extinction. Because extinction is inevitable, it has already occurred in logical time. Therefore, the subject of philosophy is already extinct and philosophy is ultimately the organon of extinction. For Brassier humanity has no intrinsic value. This explains his focus on nihilism. He advocates a philosophy that is completely void of sentimentality.
Nihil Unbound is largely a compilation of weighty philosophical texts. The authors of these texts are loosely related not through their beliefs, but rather through their individual radicalism. Nihil Unbound is not intended for the casual reader. Its audience includes the academically proficient, if not solely advanced philosophers. At the end of the book, Brassier has identified his goal of universal philosophical realism, rather than actually accomplishing it.