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Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World

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I found this book a pleasure to read, since it deals with some fascinating history. Nixon's trip to China in 1972 was an iconic event. A brilliant diplomatic stroke, it melted decades of deep freeze between two of the world's great powers and realigned the geopolitical triangle with the Soviet Union. It was a savvy political move too, clinching Nixon's image at home as a foreign policy virtuoso and helping ensure his reelection later that year, despite his inability to solve the quagmire in Vietnam. Nixon's trip to China was one of those rare political coups that seemed utterly impossible beforehand and unavoidably logical afterward.

Yet more than anything, it was terrific theater. To see Nixon, that beady-eyed communist-hater, toasting the Mao suits in the Great Hall of the People, climbing the Great Wall and meeting Mao Tse-tung himself in the Communist Party's inner sanctum -- it was mesmerizing. No one cared that the visit was largely symbolic and light on content. It was great symbolism at play.

The scene was unforgettable: China, though still embroiled in a violent paroxysm called the Cultural Revolution, appeared serene and enchanting to American viewers. A gaggle of U.S. reporters followed Nixon to scenic spots and his meetingw with China's happy workers and smiling schoolchildren. The cast of characters was top-notch: Nixon, Mao, Henry Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai, each with his own individual brand of psychosis, paranoia and dastardly political skill. The intermingling of these four, in a complex diplomatic mating dance that could easily have gone wrong, is a historian's dream.

It's no wonder that the trip inspired an entire Western opera and a permanent place in our lexicon, as in "It was a Nixon-goes-to-China moment." What is a wonder is that it has taken until now for a general history to be written about this diplomatic milestone.

In "Nixon and Mao," Margaret MacMillan draws together the colorful strands of the drama, with all its inherent chanciness and tension. MacMillan is strong on diplomacy but weak on Chinese politics. The structure of her book, with a timeline that bounces around, is not optimal. Yet she's a fine writer, and she delivers an illuminating account.

MacMillan's previous book, "Paris 1919," is a history of the intricate negotiations involved in the peace treaty negotiations after World War I. She crafted a richly satisfying narrative that conveyed the far-reaching effects of those negotiations while giving a full flavor of its primary players, including Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau.

In "Nixon and Mao," MacMillan opens with the flight to Beijing. Nixon was anxious; he knew he was taking a big risk. If the trip failed, he could be blamed for making a colossal blunder. The draft diplomatic agreement between the two countries was still far from complete, and there was no guarantee it would be signed by the end of the trip. There was no commitment by the Chinese that Nixon would even meet Mao, who was said to be having difficulty getting out of bed or leaving his chamber.

Nixon had studied hard, as he always did, knowing that true diplomatic success would require a subtle understanding of the politics of the leaders he was meeting. He practiced using chopsticks so he wouldn't look silly at banquets. His advance team worked hard as well, to get the best camera angles for the U.S. media. MacMillan also shows us how Nixon was concerned with petty problems, like keeping his secretary of state, William Rogers, out of major meetings with Mao and Chou. Nixon worked better with Kissinger, who shared his love of stealth.

In fact, MacMillan shows us that Nixon and Kissinger insisted on secrecy at every step of planning for the visit. On Kissinger's previous trip to Beijing to lay the groundwork for the rapprochement, Mao and Chou -- no slouches in clandestine matters -- were baffled by American demands to keep all quiet. Nixon and Kissinger claimed that the right wing in Washington would sabotage their plans. Relying on interviews, research and newly available documents, MacMillan persuasively challenges this view: Nixon and Kissinger, she suggests, were just addicted to secrecy.

Mao was much like Nixon in his paranoia, his inability to make friends and his brilliant interpretation of history and politics. For Mao, deciding to open relations with the United States marked a sharp turn from his fanatical leftism and his ultra-isolationist foreign policy. MacMillan stumbles here. She sees Mao as a patriot, concerned with the good of his nation, when what he really cared about was the good of Mao. For decades, he missed few opportunities to destroy his country.

Mao drove foreign policy to meet the imperatives of his own domestic politics; in 1972, that meant restraining leftists in his midst. As chairman of the Communist Party, Mao was like a mob boss, appearing to be totally in charge but perpetually at work to keep his captains off-balance, lest one challenge him. It was precisely that fear that generated Mao's feud with his No. 2, Lin Biao, whose mysterious death offers a haunting backdrop to the time period when Nixon's trip was being planned.

Vietnam became a fascinating sideshow to the trip; leaders in Hanoi turned apoplectic at the sight of their main enemy shaking hands with their supposed patron in the north. In the months afterward, Mao was impatient with Hanoi and tossed its leaders a simple suggestion: Sign a peace treaty, regroup until after most Americans have left and then roll in. "That is, in effect, what happened," MacMillan observes.

It was Taiwan that presented the toughest impediment to a joint agreement on Nixon's visit. Kissinger labored to come up with language that would satisfy China's insistence that American support eventual reunification and still allow for a U.S. demand for peaceful change. It was treacherous diplomatic territory, and only on the final day of the visit did both sides agree to what became known as the Shanghai Communiqué.

In 1972, few could imagine that Taiwan would today be a thriving democracy, that China would enjoy one of the biggest economic expansions in world history, that the Soviet threat would be a distant memory, that Vietnam would be welcoming American investors. MacMillan does not do justice to all those historical dynamics, or fully explain just how Nixon's trip changed the world. Yet those dynamics, in varying ways and degrees, all grew from seeds planted the day Nixon's foot landed on Chinese soil.

Margaret MacMillan, a University of Toronto historian, is well-known for having written "Paris 1919," which explored some crucial moments following the First World War. Now she has produced another first-rate work of an event that changed the course of history. She is apparently a follower of the "great men" school of history which attaches central importance to the agency of a few key players. The dramatis personae of Paris 1919 as well as those of Beijing 1972 all had a strong vision of what they wanted the future to look like and all had the requisite egos to pursue those visions. What these events set in motion, however, was unforseen by most parties. In Beijing 1972, it was as Nixon said, "a week that changed the world," but in ways that he never imagined.

MacMillan's account focuses not only on Nixon and Mao, but also on Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. These two arch-realists worked behind the scenes to negotiate the terms of this new diplomatic understanding that later became the Shanghai Communique.

Memories of "ping pong diplomacy" and "playing the China card" are distant but Macmillan does an excellent job of resurrecting this period. She delves deeply into what motivated Nixon, a life-long anticommunist and red-baiter, to open diplomatic relations with China. It was a time when the US was mired in an unwinnable war in Vietnam, as well as dealing with race riots and antiwar protests at home; Nixon was looking for a dramatic gesture. A trip to China was an extremely risky political undertaking whose success was by no means guaranteed.

Mao was also desparately in need of a win; not only was China's economy in shambles due to his mismanagement, the country was also on the brink of war with the Soviet Union. MacMillan does not give a flattering portrait of Mao. He had turned a country with great potential into an isolated, impoverished, and paranoid state.

Looking back and applying the logic of the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the Sino-American diplomatic reconciliation seems like a natural step insofar as both were enemies of the Soviet Union. At the time, however, it was still unthinkable by many and due to its highly sensitive nature, many allies were kept out of the loop. It essentially reshuffled the Great Power relations that eventually led to the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of China as a superpower.

The new Sino-American friendliness certainly startled the Vietnamese, who were a Chinese client state of sorts. It also went a long way in silencing some of Nixon's critics at home and helped him get reelected that same year. The Europeans and the State Department complained loudly for not being kept informed.

What is interesting about this book is the new light it sheds on why Nixon and Kissinger were so secretive. The backroom negotiations that Kissinger had with Zhou Enlai already acknowledged that the US would eventually pull troops out of Vietnam in return for China getting the Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty. It was a classic exercise of moral unclarity for which realists are famous would have outraged the right-wing back home. In fact, William F Buckley, who was one of the entourage, but not involved in negotiations, was already disgusted by the friendliness that Nixon was showing toward Mao at the official gatherings.

And speaking of unforseen consequences, Nixon told Kissinger not to spend too much time negotiating trade issues, since it represented such an insignificant part of their respective economies - and at the time it did. But who would have predicted that this meeting would lead to a $250 billion annual trade deficit 25 years later? It was definitely a week that changed the world.

Margaret MacMillan, previously known for her book on the Paris peace negotations ending the first world war, has given us an interesting look at Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972.

The trip was only a week in duration, and hardly seems worthy of an entire manuscript unless the historian is able to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ramifications of Nixon's visit. MacMillan, however, does not provide us with this evaluation.

She writes a rich story, filled with wonderful images and colorful characters, but fails to fully analyze the significance of Nixon's journey. Her book provides us with a nice portrait of Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese leader whom Nixon met with (only once) during his journey to China, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, and Chou En-Lai, Kissinger's primary contact in Beijing.

MacMillan's details about the trip are amazing, and certainly indicative of strong research abilities - she profiles Nixon in such a way that his paranoia and self doubt are on full display (see chapters 1 and 2 for a nice discussion on how nervous Nixon was as he prepared for the meetings). She also throws in lively quips to remind us just how human the participants were (giving us an image of Nixon parading around his hotel room in his undergarments, or a request made by Nixon for the phone number of ladies in a black book - not for himself, but for Kissinger). This is the highlight of her writing, and she does a fantastic job of giving us the details that allow us to remember the participants as people rather than just politicians.

Overall, however, the book is incomplete - it just does not explain why the meetings changed the world in enough depth to justify the title ("Nixon and Mao: The Week that changed the world"). I recommend the book to anyone looking for a biographical evaluation of the participants in these historic talks, but if one is seeking a profound scholarly analysis of the topic, this is not the right book to read.

I'v been reading up a lot on what is going on in China these days, with the amazing economic performance and the political contradictions that brings with is (free-market system within a one-party non-democracy system). This book retells the origins of how the US and China opened the door to all this.

In "Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World" (404 pages), author Margaret MacMillan starts off with the actual arrival of Nixon in Beijing, only then to take that as a backdrop to paint vivid profiles of the 4 protagonists in this drama (Nixon and Kissinger on the US side; Mao and Chou on the Chinese side). Just as fascinating is how MacMillan retells the environment within which Nixon and Kissinger were trying to set up the meeting in China, with among others a complete distrust and disregard for the State Department. The practical details of how Kissinger was able to go to Beijing in secret for his first preparatory meetings with Chou En-Lai are incredible, and hard to believe, but then again that was 1971 (pre-internet and computer age). Frankly, I don't think it would be possible today. Last but not least the author also reminds us that those were very troubled and tense times, with the US mired in Vietnam, Taiwan being voted out of the UN to make room for the People's Republic, and the tensions between China and the USSR. Separately from the "big picture", MacMillan does a great job telling the going-ons of the actual events of that "week that changed the world".

In all, "Nixon and Mao" is a great book, bringing a much need historical perspective on how China and the US established diplomatic relations and opnened trade. MacMillan was able to access sources to bring an enthralling story of how the events were shaped that famous week in February, 1972. Highly recommended!

This is Margaret MacMillan's second book about an event that "Changed The World", and one hopes that she's going to find a new subtitle soon. How long before she runs out of signature 20th century events, and resorts to chronicling more frivolous historical footnotes like "Coolidge Goes To Havana"?

All kidding aside, MacMillan does a worthy job of recreating the mid-Cold War and late Vietnam era of President Nixon's first term, which is perhaps less well known than events that occurred in and after June 1972. "Nixon and Mao" takes place during Nixon's trip to China in February 1972, while frequently stepping back in time to chronicle four decades' worth of Sino-American relations, as well as goings-on in China, Indochina and the Soviet Union during the earlier decades of the Cold War.

The four principals here are Nixon and Kissinger on the U.S. side, and an ailing Chairman Mao as aided by the more vibrant Chou En-Lai for the Chinese. It's Chou who benefits the most from this analysis, and he's the most interesting character in this book: both beholden to and smitten with a failing political system, yet shrewd and quick-witted enough to arguably get the better of Kissinger, his U.S. counterpart, during the week-long debating sessions.

As a writer not from the U.S., MacMillan brings a different perspective than had this book been written by an American historian or ideologue. For example, her elevation of President Clinton as a model of foreign policy isn't necessarily wrong -- it's just not an idea that's going to catch on here in the U.S. until both the current set of prevailing political beliefs, and the overtly opinion-driven nature of current TV journalism, have a chance to evolve and turn over.

The book's structure is logical, and therefore a bit frustrating. The author can't tell her story in a straight timeline beginning with the Long March -- otherwise Nixon wouldn't get to China until page 250. Therefore, she chooses to open each chapter with a two-page description of events during Nixon's week in China, before jumping back in time for the rest of the chapter to explain how the two countries and their principals got to the that point. This means that it takes a long while to generate any momentum from the 1972 scenes. I wonder if MacMillan first tried to write this book in alternating chapters before settling on her final approach.

The book's conclusion is also perhaps a bit too quick, as the author touches on but doesn't really highlight China's ongoing emergence on the international and financial scenes. Spending more time on China in 2007 rather than on Nixon's well-chronicled disgrace would have been an effective counterpoint to the earlier scenes showing how technologically backward and ideologically stunted China really was in 1972.

However, there's little doubt that without Nixon's trip in 1972, China would not be where it is today. What forces would have prevailed in China had Mao and Chou both died before opening up their country to the West? MacMillan, amusingly, shows how much the world was changed by Nixon's trip, by concluding her narrative 500 years from now, with a quote from the post-Cold War science-fiction movie "Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country".

Ms. MacMillan, an eminent historian and gifted wordsmith, has written an illuminating and highly accessible account of Nixon's bold breakthrough to China 35 years ago. By the 1970s, Ms. MacMillan writes, a rapprochement between China and the U.S. was clearly in both countries' best interests, and events (Sino-Soviet hostilities; Vietnam; the India-Pakistan conflict, etc) made improved relations seem logical. Still, the gambit was a "delicate minuet" (in Kissinger's words) that, Ms. MacMillan says, might not have happened without the vision and determination of Nixon and Mao as well as the deft diplomatic skill of Kissinger and Chou En-Lai.

This reader, too young to recall these momentous events when they unfolded in real time, is struck by the degree to which both sides marginalized their foreign ministries throughout the process. When finally brought into the loop, the U.S. State Department nearly undercut the famous Shanghai Communiqué, just hours before its public release, over concerns about the implied abandonment of Taiwan. Another eyebrow-raiser for me was the amount of detailed U.S. intelligence on the Soviets that Kissinger readily shared with the Chinese.

I read part of this book on a flight from Chicago to Newark. Seated next to me was a 40-year-old native of China, who told me of his childhood memories of Nixon's historic visit: instructions to wear only your best clothes; store shelves stocked with food and goods, which the people were forbidden to purchase. Ms. MacMillan describes some of these scenes of false prosperity, as well as the efforts of both sides to stage manage events for television and the press, in her engaging, highly readable book.

Most of this book is background, useful only if you know little about the Nixon era. Omly about 15% of the book is devoted to Nixon's meeting with Mao. Even then some fascinating and significant stories are minimised or ignored--like Chou En-Lai's spontaneous visit to Secretary of State William Rogers' hotel room. Not to mention the Shanghai regional government's independent foreign policy, designed to sabotage Nixon's initiative! Better, quicker, and more enjoyable to track down a (VHS-only) copy of the PBS program, "Nixon's China Game", perhaps the best international-politics video ever made. Utterly absorbing to see these people live, and interacting.

Richard Nixon's trip to the Peoples' Republic of China in 1972, after nearly 25 years of silence between the US and Communist China, was a worldwide historic event. Of course, it started the long thaw between the US and the PRC, but it also had repercussions around the world: it worried the Soviets, who pursued SALT and détente with more interest in the aftermath, it terrified the leadership on Taiwan who rightly believed they were being abandoned by the US, it emboldened the North Vietnamese, who felt they had been betrayed by their ally. It raised Nixon's approval rating significantly and contributed to his landslide reelection in 1972.

It's also a story that has never been fully told because of security concerns in both the US and the PRC. But now we have Margaret MacMillan's detailed history of Nixon's visit with lots of historical context to make it understandable: the careers of Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou Enlai are profiled in some detail; the state of US opinion in the aftermath of WWII is described, and the history of China in the 19th and 20th centuries is explained. There's also a concluding chapter that follows the story after the visit through full normalization of relations with the PRC in the late 1970s and even beyond.

The author's research appears to have been very detailed, although of course the American point of view is more fully explicated, since access to Chinese source materials is still restricted.

I do have a few minor complaints: the book skips back and forth between Nixon's visit and the historical context repeatedly, making it hard to follow the logic of events in a few spots. And, the author seemed to repeat herself when describing the Chinese obsession with Taiwan, although the repetition did bring home the fact that Taiwan was far more important to the Chinese than Nixon and Kissinger believed initially.

Nixon has said that he will be remembered for 2 events: Watergate and his opening of relations with China. This is the book to read if you want to find out about the second of these.

An absolutely exhilarating read, due in tremendous part to the seriously fine writing of Margaret MacMillan. The Oxford scholar approaches the momentous historical event with no apparent bias, making for a significantly elevated reading experience, unlike historians who can't wait to insert their approximations. MacmIllan's style is calm, very much to the point, able to discern the important details, and as smooth as glass. The sparkling new details she provides about both Nixon and Mao during Nixon's time in China are remarkable, and are told with a true historian's novelist eye. The story of Chou En-lai's after the fact reference to Nixon as having 'asked' to come to China, like "a prostitute adorned and presenting herself at the front door" is only one example of this author's mesmerizing skill manipulating authentic atmosphere - she sees what's important and directs it delicately. I'd not read MacMillan before, but will definitely seek out her other work. Her clear mastery of English prose produces an hypnotic effect - think how vital THAT is to a book of history, and how rarely we find it. The vitals of that great China visit are here in force, in a magisterial read.

"Nixon and Mao, The Week that changed the World" takes the reader into the days of the early 1970s when the Cold War threatened the peace of the world and the slightest gestures between the leaders of superpower nations could have profound consequences. Margaret MacMillan presents an engaging view of the flawed genius, Richard Nixon, and his equally brilliant National Security Adviser, Henry Kissenger at the height of their powers. Only someone with Nixon's anti-communist credentials, (the solid conservative Republican, prosecutor of Alger Hiss, Vice President under Eisenhower, Khurshchev's Kitchen Debate opponent,) could have the political clout to stop referring to China as "Red China" and start calling it the "People's Republic" without being cut to pieces by the Left and the Right alike. Kissenger's subtle machination's to see a summit with China are presented in detail, as are his motives to play China off against the USSR. The visit is presented with a novelists eye for tension and drama, as when Nixon's party eagerly awaits word as to whether or not the president will meet with Mao face to face. In all, this is a very compelling read about an important chapter in Cold War history and illustrates the beginnings of America's current relationship with Communist China.