No Choice but War: The United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific [Hardcover]

Roland H., Jr. Worth (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0786401419 | ISBN-13: 978-0786401413 | Publication Date: July 1995

In July 1941 the United States, after a decade of worsening economic relations, announced a total embargo against Japan. The embargo had actually begun in 1940 with a so-called moral embargo under which U.S. exports of planes and war material to Japan were barred. In early 1941 Washington squeezed the Tokyo government further by unofficially tightening exports of petroleum. By December 1941, over 90 percent of Japan's oil supply was cut off, as was nearly 70 percent of its overall trade. From contemporary source documents, this is a detailed look at the U.S.-led embargo and how it contributed to Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor and declare war on the United States.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"argues that the U.S. total economic embargo of Japan led directly to the bombing of Pearl Harbor" -- Reference and Research Book News

Product Details

• Hardcover: 248 pages
• Publisher: Mcfarland & Co Inc Pub (July 1995)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0786401419
• ISBN-13: 978-0786401413
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 1.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #4,562,115 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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6 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars A Disappointing Effort on an Important Historical Era, June 9, 2000

By 

T. Judd "booknut" (ALEXANDRIA, VA USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: No Choice but War: The United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific (Hardcover)

The premise of Roland Worth's study of the economic measures taken against the Japanese in 1940-41, is that the freezing of Japanese assets in July, 1941 resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The asset freeze, which effectively cut Japan off from American markets for oil, metals and cotton, was a tough measure taken in response to Japanese agression in Asia and her embrace of Germany and Italy in the Tripartite (Axis) Pact at a time when the United States was preoccupied with the war in Europe and aid to Britain. Mr. Worth concludes that Japan was thus placed in a desperate economic position and left with no choice but to go to war with the United States.

The author's conclusions are not based on sound evidence. He relies heavily on contemporary newspaper accounts and the Congressional hearings on the Pearl Harbor attack. Missing is a discussion of the impact on Japan's war economy in contrast to the civilian. Important events such as the planning for the Pearl Harbor attack, in progress for months prior to the freeze, and Japan's war aims embodied in the "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" are ignored. A more detailed analysis of the August, 1941 Imperial Conference, which made the decision for war, might have revealed important facts having a bearing on the beginning of the war.

Instead, Mr. Worth confers victim status on Japan. For example, he chides the United States for its support of the British Empire and wonders why we opposed Japan's acquisition of its own. He suggests that since France acquired Indochina by conquest, why is it so different for Japan to take Indochina from the French by coercion? He claims an unfair burden of the freeze and embargo fell on innocent Japanese civilians who lost jobs in the silk industry. The equally innocent civilians of Nanking or Shanghai would probably not agree.

The U.S. government decided that appeasement was not working and decided on a new course by which it was hoped that Japan would have to forego its aggressive behavior for lack of oil and scrap metals. It was a calcualted risk, but one that had to be taken when the Japanese began to move into areas that threatened American trade (rubber and tin)as well as the Phillipines. Surely, Japan knew the risk that it was taking and that the U.S. might tire of providing essential war materials to them. Mr. Worth has chosen to ignore these factors, and the book suffers greatly as a result. Any serious student of the immediate pre-war period can profitably pass ou the last chapter, "Conclusions" which contain some alternate history.