Customer Reviews

Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939

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Being in the French military since 1976, I have studied quite extensively the Soviets. It took me twenty years to find a book on Khalkhin Gol (the Soviet name for Nomonhan). Coox's book, though written almost exclusively from Japanese sources, showed great insight into the way the Soviet commanders were thinking at the time. Since the 90s, a number of reports have emerged, which tend to support Coox's analyses. One very good book on the subject is recent, and not a doorstopper ! It is written by a French scholar on Soviet matters, called Jacques Sappir, and the title is (in French) "La Mandchourie oubliée" (Forgotten Manchuria). Sappir elaborates on the evolution of Soviet military doctrine, and traces back the tremendous impact of BOTH Manchurian campaigns (1939 and 1945). So his work is not focused exclusively on that precise story, but it gives a much wider perspective. Coox is cited as a source. All this to say that Sappir, judging from a totally different perspective, shows how Coox was right, even despite a dearth of Soviet contemporary sources. Proof that, even without material evidence, sound analysis can supplement much missing information.

I therefore recommend reading BOTH books, probably Sappir first (for the wider picture, and because for most people who have some acquaintance with Soviet stuff, the point of departure will be more familiar). Then expand into Coox's work, to give the tactical story "as it happened", complete with great case studies of leadership, morale and propaganda, combined arms and air power, logistics, planning...

The best and almost the only book on the conflist at Nomonhan. This was an epic battle that took place in 1939 between Japanese forces and Russians under the command of Zhukov. In this conlfict it quickly became obivous that the japanese forces were vastly inferior to their russian counterparts. Although brave the Japanese Armor, and planes and weapons were inferior. Zhukov, a military genious, eventually routed the japanese army causing horrendous losses to an army that had hiterhto only known victory against the militarily inferior Chinese.

Russia gained a hero from this conflcit, Zhukov. He was able to test his theories regarding the goruping of armor, and his victorious tactics would later be used against the Germans.

Nomonhan should have ended the superiority complex of the japanee military. They should have taken these lessons to heart. Unfortunatly the only thing they learned was that they should not try a full scale invasion of russia(this is why they did not help Hitler in 1941). They should have learned that America would have even better technology then the russians and a war with America would be disastrous.

Nomonhan is a fascinitating story of two imperial countries facing off for months of brutal fighting in which thousands perished and yet neither country declared war oin the other. This mirrors the confrontations between Russia and China in the 60s and the confrntatiosn between China and India in the 50/60s when it became apparent that the Indians were no match for the Chinese(thus shattering Nehrus nerves).

A very long book, very detailed with easy to read amps detailing the campaigns. The classic and sure to be the staple on this subject for decades to come. The other 'Nomonhan' book by Colvin is weak and inaccurate. This 'Nomonhan' is written mostly from the Japanese point of view, thats its only downside.

If you're interested in the engagement at Nomonhan, this is an EXCELLENT source and by far the most comprehensive. However, be warned that it definitely is not "light reading" with some 1,250 pages in the soft cover edition. The only real objection I have with this book is that fact that it draws almost exclusively on Japanese records. Since it was published in the early/mid 80s before the fall of the USSR, I'm guessing Dr. Coox didn't have access to the Soviet records. As a result, one must learn to sometimes "read between the lines" and look past the "pro Japanese" slant toward the description of the battle. Still, in no way let this discourage you from checking out this book if you even have a passing interest in the subject. The detail is absolutely incredible!

At the end of a thousand pages about the 'little war' at Nomonha/Khalkin Gol, Alvin Coox asks what lessons were learned.

For the Japanese, the answer is one word: Nothing.

In one sense, the 20th century was created by a series of wars entered into by people who could have had no rational expectation of winning: Austria in 1914, Germany in 1939, Japan in 1941, the Arabs in 1967. Of these (and I could adduce a few others, including some in which the underdogs did win) only the Japanese and the Arabs got the chance to run a preview, which ought to have inspired them to peacefulness but didn't.

One reason to spend so much time with 'Nomonhan' is that Coox nails down that the Japanese were inferior in every way -- and in ways that no sane person could mistake. Except one. The endurance and bravery of the Japanese soldiers was outstanding.

But they were poorly armed, poorly fed, poorly led. The battlefield at Nomonhan was scarcely 100 square miles in extent, but the division (later, Sixth Army) commanders seldom knew where their units were, and the colonels of the 4 infantry regiments were usually not in touch with each other.

It beggars belief that men, in Tokyo or Hsiking (the HQ of the Kwantung Army), thought they could engage in war over a quarter of the world's surface when they could not manage their army in an area the size of a township.

As Coox says, the Japanese went into Nomonhan assuming that their experience in China was relevant to warfare with anyone else. It is also true, though Coox does not say so, that in its brief existence, the Imperial Japanese Army never prevailed against a first-class opponent.

At Nomonhan, the Red Army was not first-class (although Richard Overy, in 'Russia's War,' gives it that status). The Red Army was, then, only an emerging second-class army, but it did have first-class doctrine: combined arms used in a massive fashion -- the strategy that won its war against Germany.

Even if the Japanese had had sane leadership, Japan simply didn't have the economic base to play in the big leagues. The nation's leaders were not, by any rational standard, sane. Nomonhan, and the Pacific War, were fought by men with medieval minds and modern weapons.

This is a phenomenon not restricted to the Japanese, and the best reason to read 'Nomonhan' is to understand, in the 21st century, how much damage that combination can do to the world. And what to do about it.

You cannot negotiate your way out of it, as the Russians discovered.

I do have a few problems with Coox's book. The maps are inadequate and poorly designed. The claims of battle damage are not credible. Only occasionally does Coox express (usually in the endnotes) any skepticism about the claims.

This is particularly troubling in the air force claims. We know, from after-action studies, that in, say, the Solomon Islands fighting, the aerial claims of each side were vastly inflated. Coox is in a pickle here, as he has no alternative to reporting what's in the unit reports, but he should have flagged their unreliability.

I also am doubtful about his conclusions that, in the end, the Japanese and Russians suffered roughly equal casualties. The Russians, in general, and Zhukov in particular, did not worry excessively about own casualties, but the description of the fighting shows the Russians either relying on defense in depth or, on offense, making probing attacks without pressing them home against intact Japanese units. Neither tactic generates the kind of casualties that the Japanese tactics of headlong frontal assault do.

Even assuming that the Russians were not very expert (a good assumption for that year of 1939 and several more years), I doubt the Russians came anywhere near Japanese casualty levels.

Although this book is indeed long, it does not seem long because it is very well written. The subject is fascinating as well, deepening and clarifying one's understanding of the causes and conduct of WWII. The fact that this was a modern military campaign fought in the heartland of the former Mongol Empire adds to the interest. The Japanese were a long way from home at Nomonhan.

His description of the hardships of the Japanese troops is very poignant. A particularly important point foreshadowing the conduct and course of the Pacific War was the assumption by the officer corps that the bravery and endurance of Japanese troops would make up for grave deficiencies in their equipment and supply. The Japanese troops were of course profoundly brave, going to great lengths to rescue pieces of regimental flags, in a manner reminiscent of 18th century warfare, and attacking and defeating Russian tanks with cider bottles filled with gasoline. Coox notes that in the later phases of the campaign the Russians used diesel powered tanks, which negated the effectiveness of the "Molotov cocktail" attacks. This forshadowing of the attitudes and tactics of the Japanese Army alone makes the book well worth reading for any student of American military history.

Perhaps a more important point, one that really isn't made in Coox's book, and a piece of the puzzle only put together for me while recently reading Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin by George Kennan, is that this campaign occurred at the same time as the Munich debacle in Europe, and was one of the factors motivating Stalin to reach an accomodation with Hitler in the notorious Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Stalin was well aware of Soviet military weakness and was desperate to avoid simultaneous war with Germany and Japan.

Several reviewers commented on the lack of coverage of the Soviet side of the campaign. I don't consider this a deficiency, if it is understood at the outset that this is a description of the Japanese side. The Soviet side of the story has yet to be told, so far as I know. One can hope that whoever eventually tells it will tell it half as well as Coox has told the Japanese side.

The definitive account in English of the near war on the Manchuria/Mongolia frontier in 1939. The account is drawn primarily from Japanese sources and thus provides a full view of the chaos of battle from that perspective. The Soviet side is made to seem perhaps too orderly and well controlled by the very lack of detailed information. The strength of the Soviet command, particularly Marshall Zhukov, is also somewhat glossed over. These are, however, minor objections to what is an excellently organized presentation of a very complex set of events.

Why should anyone care? The aims and methods of the Kwantung Army are extensively documented, a matter of major importance for any study of China. The policies of both the Guomindang and the Gongchandang are much easier to understand after reading this book.

Few in the west knew or cared that Japan and Russia fought a short but major war on the Siberian border in 1939--before the invasion and dismemberment of Poland pitched Europe into WWII.

Nomonhan had great meaning for the U.S., because it diverted Japan from its desire to fight Russia and turned it south instead toward U.S., British, and Dutch interests.

Very much worth the effort to read it.

This book is the authoritative work on the Nomonhan, or Khalkin-Gol battles of 1939. The book is well-written, with excellent battlefield maps. Coox was a Japanese scholar, so it is not surprising that his material leans heavily on Japanese sources. This is a problem in the sense that at the time of publication, there was very little material available from the Soviet side of the conflict, other than Marshal Zhukov's memoirs and a few other similiarly suspect works.

However, if you are interested in this little-known but extremely important series of border engagements (the Japanese defeat here strengthened the Navy's 'go south' policy, with disasterous consequences for the European colonial powers) then there is no better reference work than Coox.

This book finally gives the answer to the queston, "Why didn't the Japanese attack Russia in WWII?" The answer is that they tried at Nomonhan in 1939 and got their teeth kicked in for their troubles. This book was well researched (as well as could be expected considering the fact that the Russians didn't open thier archives until after the book was written and many Japanese records were destroyed in WWII). The author has many oral histories in his book which give some idea of the conditions the soldiers faced. The book has many informative maps which appear nowhere else. It fills a very important hole in the understanding of the Japanese stategy and the overall outcome at the war.

Dr. Coox has left nothing uncovered. His use of numerous personal interviews and extensive research offers the reader details found in no other work covering this period of Japan's history. A must read all those interested in Asian history.