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Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness

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This is an excellent, albeit esoteric, treatise on German ground forces opposing the Allied campaign in Normandy. It covers the period June 6 through August 22, 1944. Geographically it covers the area delineated by the base of the Brittany peninsula, the Loire River, the line Tours - Vendome - Nogent le Routrou - l'Aigle - Lisieux, and the English Channel. This was the scene of widespread desperate combat that ultimately broke the back of organized German resistance in France. It is steeped in detail about the German forces -- not only their composition, but their status, capabilities, time on the battlefield, losses, and movements. It presumes some prior knowledge of the campaign and the forces involved. Much of it confirms conventional wisdom, but it is not without controversy. For example, Zetterling strongly challenges the view that the Germans had numerical superiority and that it was only the inherent superiority of the Allied soldier and his massive weight of materiel that led to Allied victory. He presents compelling evidence that in fact it was the Allies that had numerical superiority, in men, planes, tanks, artillery tubes, and so forth.
His order of battle information is amazing. He includes non-divisional formations (including corps and army-level units) and an incredible amount of information on tank strength and losses for each unit, by type of tank. The book also contains a excellent collection of photographs, tables, and organization charts. If you're a wargamer or just into OB type of stuff, or just like a lot of detail on a pivotal World War II campaign, this book has it. (You should also see his Kursk 1943 ~ A Statistical Analysis, written with Anders Frankson; Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.)

Niklas Zetterling's _Normandy 1944: ..._ prompts this reviewer to ponder an unanswered question: who should accept the lion's share of the blame for a poorly organized finished product: the author, or the publisher? Zetterling had several irons in the fire with this work. It appears some professional guidance would have been in order to keep the author focused to pursue one goal for one book, not many.In Part 1: "Campaign Analysis" (pp. 1-113), Zetterling presents a competent scholarly study of German combat efficiency during the Normandy Campaign. The author introduces several contentions: the effects of Allied Air power were more of a nuisance to German movements and decision making, rather than destructive; German casualty figures were grossly inflated in Allied participant memoirs, and by western historians; the Allied forces did not enjoy numerical superiority over the Germans, as previously thought; and, collectively, the German units deployed in Normandy performed better than their Allied adversaries. Zetterling stresses throughout that gleaning data from surviving German archival material only (a practice most historians do not do), supports his conclusions. Along the way, Zetterling argues, more accurately, broadsides the works of other historians, most notably: Stephen Ambrose and Peter R. Mansoor. Zetterling tends to digress into other campaigns such as The Battle of the Bulge, and those on the Russian Front. This is more than comparative in nature, to the point where one almost forgets this is supposed to be a book about Normandy. Still, with some polishing, this first part could have emerged as a book length publication, or at least a good series of scholarly articles.In Part 2. "German Combat Formations" (pp. 117-392), the author presents an order of battle reference of German combat units in Normandy. Zetterling focuses mostly on artillery, infantry, and armor formations, but also includes miscellaneous units such as: airborne and Luftwaffe field divisions. Zetterling presents organization and movement information, but little else.The research extends down to battalion level in most cases, to the exclusion of details relating to higher headquarters such as Army and Corps. I was disappointed to find nothing more than mere mention of the German LXXXIV Armee Korps, a headquarters I am particularly interested in. Zetterling's data is extensive, but suffers the same maladies as other order of battle studies. Like Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr.'s _Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II_ (1985), there is no combat narrative. A brief overview for each unit's time in action, on the model of Shelby L. Stanton's _Order of Battle U.S. Army World War II_ (1984) would have been a nice touch. Again, Part 2 could have been a separate reference work. W.J.K. Davies' old standard _German Army Handbook 1939-1945_ ( 1973) is much more user-friendly, however.The third part of the book contains Appendices containing data, sometimes repeated, that could have been put to better use elsewhere. The full-length rebuttal to Trevor Dupuy's thesis by the historian Christopher A. Lawrence belongs in a scholarly journal, not here. The book is a nice package, printed on thick, high quality glossy paper. Many never before seen photos are sprinkled throughout, but as R.A. Forczyk (Amazon reviewer) has noted, the work contains neither an index, nor maps. Normandy 1944 should be a lesson to writers contemplating whether to write a polemic, or a reference work. When too many ingredients are thrown in the broth, an unsavory stew results. This is one book I would check out of the library before purchasing it.

Normandy 1944 provides a highly detailed look into the organization of the German Wehrmacht and SS units that fought in the Normandy Campaign in June-August 1944. The author has compiled an enormous amount of information on German order of battle by utilizing German strength and loss reports from the German military archives. Be advised, this book is only for the serious military historian and will be absolutely useless to anyone seeking a general history of the German army in Normandy.

The book consists of two parts: one is a campaign analysis and the other is a detailed description of all German combat formations in the campaign. The first part has chapters on sources used, German reports terminology (which is actually crucial to this work), German unit organizations, the number of soldiers employed in Normandy, the effects of Allied airpower, German tanks used, German losses, German combat efficiency and unit movements to Normandy. It is obvious early on that the author has revisionist inclinations and the data that is presented is used to support revisionist conclusions, such as stating that the Anglo-Americans enjoyed a larger numerical superiority over the Germans did than the Soviets had on the Eastern Front. By and large, the author's revisionist positions appear sound, at least with the facts presented. The author also affects an attitude of moral superiority based upon his research efforts and tends to swing data with all the dexterity of a meat cleaver. For example, the author makes a major effort to prove that Allied airpower inflicted only modest battlefield damage on German units and he uses partial facts and extrapolation to estimate losses; "Allied air power caused great destruction to the French rail net. The destruction of the bridges over the Loire and the Seine was also a great hindrance to road movements. Otherwise it seems that the destruction caused by air power was modest." Curiously, there is no mention of Field Marshal Rommel being badly wounded by Allied fighter-bombers on 17 July 1944; was this just a fluke? The major increases in German unit-level anti-aircraft protection and fear of the dreaded "jabos" do not seem likely reactions to a modest threat. While airpower advocates have frequently exaggerated their ability to win or shape campaigns, there is little doubt that the Allied efforts in Normandy hinged on air supremacy. Indeed, there would have been no Second Front with Allied air superiority in Normandy, so it was decisive. On German losses however, the author does make valid points that many divisions were not as "destroyed" as other accounts would suggest.

The chapter on German combat efficiency is weird and worthless, beginning by using chunks of Stephen Ambrose' s D-Day as a whipping boy. The author then shifts to Trevor Dupuy's quantitative models of combat efficiency and then shifts back to idiotic generalizations: "..it could be concluded that 100 Germans would make an even fight against about 150 Allied soldiers." However, as Napoleon said, "in war, the moral to the material as three is to one." Combat effectiveness is based upon intangibles such as morale, leadership, training, doctrine and experience far more than mere numbers. Most German combat units in June 1944 had a core of combat-experienced officers and sergeants, whereas few British or US units had prior combat experience. The Germans also benefited from a proven tactical doctrine, tough realistic training and dependable weapons, while the US units were to learn through the school of hard knocks. Yet both sides had elite units and not-so-elite units; the US Rangers and 82nd Airborne were certainly better than most of the battered, ill-equipped German infantry divisions in Normandy. While the US 29th Division might have lacked combat experience it was fully equipped and certainly superior to a thread-bare "static" division like the German 709th Infantry Division, which in addition to lacking combat experience, was equipped with a mix of Czech, French and Russian weapons.

The heart of this book lies in the second section, which covers each German division and separate unit in great detail. However, the detail is more impressive at first glance than after carefully reading through the entries. There are odd omissions, such as a failure to list who the unit commander was in most cases or to provide a detailed organization chart for the German 7th Armee and its subordinate corps. There is not even a section on German commanders in Normandy or on defensive doctrine which shaped organization. Yet one of the greatest omissions is the lack of any maps, which makes it difficult to determine where units were actually located in Normandy. Although the author consulted the German daily situation maps, his failure to present any graphic depictions is a serious flaw. If a researcher tries to utilize this volume, as I did, you will quickly run into the realization that this volume is not optimized for research (there is not even an index). For example, when I tried to assess probable German losses in Operation Jupiter on 10-11 July 1944 it quickly became apparent that only the roughest guess would be possible using this source. The book is particularly vague about German units and losses in the first few days of the campaign, which frustrates any attempt to assess the effectiveness of Allied airborne operations.

This could have been a superb book, because the author was clearly willing to spend the time to gather a huge amount of data. Unfortunately, Zetterling has too many axes to grind against other authors and it has blinded him to his task at hand, which is to make this data available without distortion. This book belongs in any serious Normandy collection but it is far from definitive and not user-friendly.

This book fills a hole as a serious and detailed statistical analysis of the German order of battle for the Normandy campaign. It is not intended as potted history of the campaign,and really requires an existing knowledge of this period to be of use. It is going to appeal to the serious military student.
The bulk of the book is taken up with detailed TOE information (if you don't know what TOE stands for - don't buy this book) for all German Divisions, GHQ units,and Artillery in Normandy, which is extremely accurate and impeccably researched.
The earlier chapters attempt to establish a number of interesting new(ish) theories concerning German performance and and losses in the campaign. These are very well supported and are extensively footnoted. Subjects include establishing how grossly inflated battlefield casualties from aircraft were (though the author constantly stresses how crucial airpower was to the allies in a broader sense),how some previous historians have mis-read German sources,resulting in confusion over both the numbers of troops in Normandy and the casualties recieved by them there. These chapters could indeed form the basis for an entire new book, Though I suspect, given the authors attention to detail, we might still be waiting for it. Some of the information here might be unpalatable to dyed-in-the wool adherents of Allied superiority, though the author backs all this up with facts and (at times possibly selective) statistics rather than the vague assertions found in many English language works. The chapter on German combat effectiveness really requires previous familiarity with T.N.Dupuy's work. This is not a one-stop book for the Normandy campaign and it was never intended as such. For narrative information you need to look elsewhere to the thousands of other books on the subject.

With all of the popular books written with the American or English view point this book provides a refreshing looking into the German military organization, combat power and organization effectiveness. Many unsupported myths regarding German troop strength and casualty figures are discussed and analyzed. One of the most comprehensive statistical guides on German strength for the Normandy campaign. This book is an absolute "must read" for any serious student of the Normandy Campaign.

This is my go to reference if I need to have an idea who was where in the Normandy campaigns.
I'm sure there are more detailed publications dealing with individual units but this covers a lot of ground in one book.

The very useful book for all who is interested as Normandy, and German army and Waffen-SS in 1944. The author has done the large research work, that has allowed him to write the very important and original book!

This book is well-researched and excellent and let us know deeply what German formation and their strength(manpower, gun and armored vehicles)in Normandy. It is much better than some other book vague description of battle of Normandy because all is based upon German document and facts by figures. I hope the author will write some other topic in this format eg. Barbarossa 1941 or Byelroussia 1944 or Salerno landing 1943.

NORMANDY, 1944: GERMAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION, COMBAT POWER, AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
NIKLAS ZETTERLING
J.J. FEDOROWICZ PUBLISHING, 2000
HARDCOVER, $46.00, 464 PAGES, PHOTOGRAPHS, MAPS, TABLES, CHARTS, APPENDICES


As World War II moved into 1944, the Germans faced the problem of opposing an almost certain Allied landing in Western Europe with diminishing resources in both men and material. The Allies wanted to force a decision in the West as well as to establish a front in Northwestern France to relieve pressure on the Soviets in the East. In November, 1943, the Germans started to reverse their previous trend of weakening the defenses in Western Europe in favor of other locations and they started to rebuild in the West. The German OKW believed the war would become hopeless if the Allies were able to establish their new front in the West. The German strategic objective was to prevent an Allied landing by reinforcing the existing defensive structure, and, failing that, to push the Allies back into the sea after a landing. The Atlantic Wall, a chain of fortifications stretching from Norway to the Spanish border, was to be the backbone of the German defenses. The plans called for anaverage of fifteen to twenty bunkers for each kilometer of coastline, tied in with major fortifications at all harbors. The plan, however, was too ambitious. By the time the landings actually took place, only the coast of the Pas de Calais was fortified to the point it was almost unassailable. This remainder of the coast had only a thin string of linear positions, without sufficient depth for a successful defense. The Germans didn't know the exact time and place of the Allied landings, which made their own preparations more difficult. Based on the assumption that the attack would come in the Pas de Calais area, the Channel coast and the German 15th Army were given the top priority for the buildup. The best units and the strongest fortifications of the Atlantikwall were located there. The main landing was expected in that area because it was the shortest path to the German industrial region of the Ruhr. Despite the important harbor of Cherbourg, the Germans generally considered a landing on the Normandy coast unlikely for operational reasons. The coastal terrain and the Normandy landscape played a decisive role in the Allied landings and the German defense. Normandy, especially the Calvados coast and the area south of it, is one of the most beautiful countrysides in France. Numerous fields fenced in by bocages (hedgerows) are typical of the area. From a tactical standpoint, each bocage is a limited area, easy to defend. Several fields can make up a defensive position echeloned in depth. The bocages constituted a major obstacle for the Allies, particularly in their ability to move with tanks. In addition to the bocages, the terrain in Western Normandy consists of numerous swamps within a network of small rivers, ditches, and dams. When the Allied assault did come, Normandy became the scene of the largest series of landing operations in military history. More than 2,000,000 troops on both sides fought for a decision in a few weeks' time and in a confined space. In the north, Normandy is almost surrounded by the English Channel, and in the south by the Atlantic. West of the Cotentin Peninsula are numerous islands-Guernsey, Jersey, and Alderney-which were also in German hands. This single-source reference book accurately presents the German field forces employed in Normandy in 1944 and their losses for the first time. Chapters include: German Combat Organization, Number Of Soldiers Employed, Effects Of Allied Airpower, German Armor In Normandy, German Losses In Normandy, Combat Efficiency, and Unit Movements. The author provides a sobering analysis of the German Army in Normandy while putting to rest a number of popular myths concerning the campaign. Dr. Zetterling has done a masterful job in knitting together a variety of primary sources that provides for the first time the definitive account of the Normandy Campaign from the German perspective. This outstanding text is supported by many charts, tables, footnotes, and appendices.


Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard
Orlando, Florida

First of all, what this book is not; it is not a campaign history and of course you will not find here, first-person accounts, etc. The book is divided into 3 parts:

# Campaign analysis(german terminology, unit organization, number of soldiers employed, air power, tanks, losses, combat efficiency, unit movements)

#German combat formations - (general headquarters artillery formations, misc gen. headquarters formations, infantry divisions, armoured divisions)

# Appendices - with many further excellent discussions such as:
tooth-to-tail ratios, allied armour strenght, calculations on armour-piercing capabilities, comments on other books, etc.

Not many historians who write about world war II are objective, specially since most of them are either american or british. To add insult to injury, most of them are simply sloppy. They should spend more time at the archives instead of just copying from each other. Mr.Zetterling is the real thing and he collects for this book a tremendous amount of raw data and it is also carefully annotated. The notes themselves are excellent and very informative.
Many readers might me surprised to find out that german casualties in Normandy were in fact only a fraction of what one usually finds in most books. I was not because i had had a chance to look at some of the german reports. KIA + WIA are usually given as 240,000(based on inflated allied estimates) and in sir Keegan's "6 armies.." even "a quarter of a million dead"(where did he get that from???)!!! I own a copy of this garbage and I was shocked when I reached keegan's ridiculous conclusion chapter. The obvious thing is that when you write about a certain campaign and want to know about casualties you pay a visit to the archives of the participants, INCLUDING THE ENEMIE'S! This is what mr.Zetterling does here.

I totally disagree with the other reviewer(mr.Forczyk) when he says "The chapter on German combat efficiency is weird and worthless, beginning by using chunks of Stephen Ambrose' s D-Day as a whipping boy." I think it is excellent, it is supported by the evidence and the author is not the only one(far from it) who advances the chapter's conclusion. Also the criticism of Ambrose, Brown and others is entirely justified and they are deservedly debunked. I understandt however, that american readers might hate seeing their flag-waving and biased champions beign spanked a little bit in the book's pages.

For me, the only topic in the book i would call 'revisionist' is the one on air-power. It is very thought provoking and it could very well be a correct assertion. The author however, says that more detailed study on this has to be done. It is possible that allied air supremacy was much more decisive indirectly(troop movement delays, etc) than directly(casualties, destroyed armour,etc). Reading the excellent "Sledgehammers" one finds out for instance that the germans lost 60 Tiger tanks to direct or indirect fire in Normandy and 13 to air attacks. This goes in the direction of supporting mr.Zetterling's contention.

The second part of the book, deals with the many german formations that saw action at Normandy. It is very good but i would have liked more details.

A nit-pick: as noted by other reviwers the book does not contain an index and that sucks.

In conclusion, i'd say that in spite of a few shortcomings and a steep price, this book is a gem and should be on the shelves of any serious student of the campaing.