Normative Ethics (Dimensions of Philosophy) [Paperback]

Shelly Kagan (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: November 14, 1997 | ISBN-10: 0813308461 | ISBN-13: 978-0813308463

Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an act’s rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers.The first half of the book presents a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, focusing on controversial questions concerning the precise content of each factor, its scope and significance, and its relationship to other factors. The second half of the book then examines the competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics, theories that attempt to explain why the basic normative factors have the moral significance that they do.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy.

Editorial Reviews

About the Author

Shelly Kagan is professor of philosophy and Henry R. Luce Professor of Social Thought and Ethics at Yale University. He is the author of The Limits of Morality.

Product Details

• Paperback: 352 pages
• Publisher: Westview Press (November 14, 1997)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0813308461
• ISBN-13: 978-0813308463
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 6.1 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #168,755 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The Best Overview of Normative Ethics Available, November 7, 2011

By 

Donald C. Hubin "Don Hubin" (Columbus, OH United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Normative Ethics (Dimensions of Philosophy) (Paperback)

I have used Kagan's Normative Ethics, supplemented by several primary sources, for over a decade in my mid-level moral philosophy course that focuses on normative ethics. It is, in my opinion, the best overview of normative ethics available. It is not a moral problems text and it doesn't discuss metaethical issues except to clarify what they are and (largely) set them aside. It is relentlessly focused on normative ethical theory. The organization of the book is excellent, beginning the substantive discussion with theories of individual well-being. It is not just plausible forms of consequentialism that need to have an account of individual well-being. Commonsense morality, too, and many nonconsequentialist theories of morality take the promotion of individual well-being to be ONE relevant moral consideration. And deontological theories that impose a constraint on causing (or intending) harm, will need an account of harm, which (most plausibly) involves an account of well-being. So, this is a good starting place. The development from there can be seen as a very logically ordered discussion of a series of questions: Is individual well-being all that matters to the value of a state of affair from a moral perspective? If not, what other factors are relevant: equality in the distribution of well-being, preference for the benefit of those worst off, distribution in accordance with desert, merit, or entitlement? Then, is the promotion of what is valuable from a moral perspective all that matters in determining how we should act? If not, what else is relevant? Are there (non-value-based) constraints on promoting good outcomes--constraints against doing/intending harm, lying, breaking promises, etc.? If so, what is the "shape" of these constraints and how are they to be justified. If there is a standing moral reason to promote the good, within whatever moral constraints exist, does this lead to morality "demanding too much"? And, finally, then, Kagan turns his attention to moral foundations: how are we to justify whatever moral factors are relevant.

One extraordinary characteristic of this book deserves special mention. Some will find it a serious drawback; I find it a very attractive feature. In the body of the textbook, there is not one mention of any philosopher. Nowhere in the body of the book does one hear views ATTRIBUTED to Aristotle, Hobbes, Bentham, Kant, Mill, Rawls, etc. The book does, though, have a long annotated section on "Further Readings" that points students to the relevant literature. Those who want, primarily, to teach students the history of normative ethics will find this a serious drawback, though it can be addressed with supplemental reading. Those who want students primarily to engage with normative ethical theory directly, will find it an attractive feature of the book. I have students read a number of primary sources, including Bentham, Mill, and Kant. But I like the idea that the textbook that organizes our discussions is focused on the theory-space and the various arguments that can take place in that space, rather than who said what in the history of normative ethics.

I have had great success using this book and the student reception has been terrific. I routinely recommend it to new graduate students, or prospective graduate students, in philosophy who have a weak background in normative ethics.

15 of 23 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Not a good intro to ethics, December 27, 2005

By 

Rhadamanthus - See all my reviews

This review is from: Normative Ethics (Dimensions of Philosophy) (Paperback)

Shelly Kagan is a very clear, sensible writer and his book covers a lot of ground, but it is not a very successful introduction to normative ethics, certainly not for undergraduates, and one couldn't imagine a person not already interested in the subject who would be drawn to learn more about it from reading this book. The problem is that Kagan is excessively concerned with gerrymandering between philosophical positions rather than getting to the heart (or even near the heart) of any one of them. So the presentations are all of the "if you happen to think this, then you might think that" variety. He also has a hobby-horse, that the positions one adopts on the foundations of ethics or on the proper focal point for ethics (is ethical judgment directed essentially toward acts, rules, or aspects of character?) do not necessarily determine the position one will take about what the primary factor in ethical judgment should be. So, for instance, a person who thinks that the key to morality is securing the best outcomes (rather than, say, upholding a moral code) may nevertheless think that the best way to secure the best outcomes is through the upholding of rules. This point is repeated with astonishing frequency in just about every discussion. Kagan is an agile and scrupulous arguer who knows his field and does his best to convey the state of discussion on many issues up to a moderate degree of depth (though the discussion of moral dilemmas is especially thin and does not enter into the details of any particular dilemma). This book will be informative, though unsatisfying, to committed readers but few newcomers to philosophy will get through it.

12 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Great Intro to Moral Philosophy for LD Debaters, May 5, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Normative Ethics (Dimensions of Philosophy) (Paperback)

This book presents moral theory and the factors involved in an excellent format, without the distraction of constant references to other philosophers. Kagan's writing is easily accessible and explains ethics in a logical fashion. Terms are clearly defined and explained, and there is a complete index of references in the back once you're ready to move on to primary source philosophy. A must read for any LD debater, especially when debating resolutions concerning morality.