Customer Reviews

Notebooks, 1914-1916

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This book shows well the development of Wittgenstein's early thought. It is easier to see where his influences effected his thought. The metaphysical nature of his early thinking and his debt to Schopenhauer are clearer in this text than they are in any other. I have substracted one star only because I prefer his later thinking, and these notes, as the title states, are only from 1914 through 1916.

In 1950, Wittgenstein tried to have all of his old notebooks destroyed. Thankfully, three sets of texts escaped this unhappy fate. The first two are some of Wittgenstein's personal notebooks from August 1914 to October 1915, found at the house of his sister; these comprise the main content of this book. The third set consists of three texts from the collection of Bertrand Russell, which are printed as appendices. The first appendix is Wittgenstein's 1913 "Notes on Logic," which was his first attempt to formulate a comprehensive, proto-Tractatus. The second is a few pages of notes that Wittgenstein dictated to G.E. Moore in 1914, who came to visit while Wittgenstein was living isolated with his thoughts in Norway. The third appendix consists of extracts of Wittgenstein's letters to Russell.

In the second edition of this book, images of a few passages of Wittgenstein's symbolism are printed in a fourth appendix; these were omitted from the first edition because no one could make heads or tails of them. (As far as this reviewer knows, no progress has been made there.)

In a lovely preface to the first edition of this text, first published in 1961, the editors give expression to the role that this text can play for the students of Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, it was omitted from the second edition, and so I quote from it here:

"We publish this material as an aid to students of the Tractatus. Most of it is no easier than the Tractatus itself; it naturally shews development; thus when it appears to present views different from those of the Tractatus, there is no need to reconcile the two. It should not be used without more ado as evidence for particular interpretations of the Tractatus. It does shew clearly, however, what problems formed the context of Wittgenstein's remarks in the Tractatus; in this way it will serve to cut short some argument where wholly irrelevant contexts are supposed by an interpretation." (v)

Indeed, this book is simply invaluable to any serious student of the Tractatus; I cannot imagine studying one without the other. Passages in the notebooks are cross-referenced with similar or identical ones found in the Tractatus, and helpful comments are given in footnotes by the editors. Although not all of Wittgenstein's cryptic personal remarks shed light on his published work, many of them provide the blessing of context for propositions in the Tractatus that are otherwise maddenlingly opaque.

As for the extent to which the Notebooks might reduce some of the extensive dispute about how to interpret Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: that much remains, appropriately, in extensive dispute. But if you have ever tried to tackle what may be Wittgenstein's most difficult work, only to find yourself banging your head against the pages, I guarantee that you will find great satisfaction in reading this book.