The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis [Paperback]

Servando Gonzalez (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: October 22, 2002

The event known as the Cuban missile crisis, the greatest of all Cold War crises, is a milestone in the history of the Cold War. Some analysts even have concluded that what was called the Cold War ended in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis. Yet there is perhaps no single event in recent history as puzzling as this one. There are many questions that still remain unanswered. Why did Khrushchev risk so much? What was his ultimate purpose? Why did he withdraw so fast? Why did he not retaliate at other sensitive points, like Berlin? Why did President Kennedy not seize the heaven-sent opportunity to get rid of Castro? Why did the Americans permit the shootdown of a U-2 plane over Cuba without taking retaliatory actions? Who shot down the U-2, and under what conditions did it happen? Why did Kennedy allow the Soviet ships to leave Cuba without boarding them, to physically verify that the canvas-covered objects on deck were actually missiles and their nuclear warheads on their way back to the U.S.S.R.? According to the author, the main questions of the crisis have eluded satisfactory answers, first, because most of the analysts who have studied it have neglected the true Cuban role in the event, particularly the Russo-Cuban relations prior to the crisis; secondly, because a set of preconceived notions --like the one that assumes that Khrushchev was full of love for Castro-- have acted as a smoke screen, blurring the whole picture; and, finally, because the fundamental question about the crisis, namely, why Khrushchev installed strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba, has been erroneously formulated. Consequently, it has been impossible to find the right answer to a question, when the question itself is wrong.

Product Details

• Paperback: 432 pages
• Publisher: Spooks Books (October 22, 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0971139156
• ISBN-13: 978-0971139152
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,410,198 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Very Interesting Book, November 13, 2002

By A Customer

This review is from: The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Paperback)

I ahve been interested in the Cuban Missile Crisis ever since I saw the film, "Thiteen Days". I have so far read four books on the subject, and I have to say that Mr. Gonzalez' book is the best. Not only does he present a different view of the crisis which is totally lacking from the other three books which I read, but he also does it with style and he seems to avoid the boring, monotonous, style used by most writers of political history. His theory on the absence of nuclear warheads in Cuba is one which should be examined closely, because he has more than enough evidence to back it up. This isn't your usual run of the mill book on the cuban missile crisis, it is a work of great value that should be taken seriously whether you agree with Mr.Gonzalez' ideas or not.- John L. Madison

3.0 out of 5 stars Truth in falsity, May 4, 2008

By 

anotherreader (Wales) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Paperback)

Weird to see the author writing his own review of his book. He is quite correct in his idea that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba. He is wrong in claiming that this is the first book to show this: Amy Gdala's The Odds Are Even ( first written in 1989) makes exactly the same point. Gdala's book is based on close research of the memoirs of all the key players including the secret services as well as the ideologues like Acheson and the "stars" such as Kennedy and Kruschev. The two books should be read together as this one is thoroughgoing nonfiction while Gdala's is written as a novel and provides a wider perspective by locating the crisis in the context of the genesis of the Cold War itself.

It is interesting that subsequent material seems to conflict with the main conclusion of these two books, the thrust of this is really Castro's own claim at the anniversary seminar. If I had been in Castro's shoes at that meeting I would have made the same claim and had a good chuckle over it afterwards with my mates. Make no mistake the warheads were invented for political purposes, like the Soviet threat itself. Penkovsky was the whistle blower to whom we owe our lives.The Odds are Even (Probability Sequence)

1 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Different View on the Cuban Missile Crisis, November 20, 2002

By A Customer

This review is from: The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Paperback)

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The conclusions I have arrived at in this book differ substantially from most of the books written on the subject. Aside from my personal way of looking at historical events, the main reason for reaching such different conclusions reside in the application a new methodology I have developed. I call it "historical tradecraft." (tradecraft: the modus operandi of intelligence and espionage).

Some time ago I realized that, particularly when applied to recent events in which intelligence and espionage have played an important role, the traditional research and analysis tools of the historian were inadequate. Therefore, I created my own methodology, which consists of a fusion of the methodology of research and analysis of the historian with the approach and philosophy of the intelligence analyst. When applied to recent historical events this methodology produces remarkable results.

I began writing The Nuclear Deception twenty years ago -- I copyrighted it in 1982 -- and it was ready around 1987. But, after some meetings by ex-participants in the crisis took place, which apparently denied my main conclusions, I put the book aside for fifteen years. But, after realizing that most of the conclusions reached during these meetings were totally baseless, I added new chapters (the whole Part Two), and the result is this book.

The book is a first in many ways. In the first place, this is the first book about the crisis that provides overwhelming evidence indicating that the presence of nuclear warheads and strategic missiles in Cuba in 1962 has never been proved. Secondly, it is the first book that studies in detail Khrushchev's attempts to overthrow Castro by force around April, 1962, the same month the Soviet Premier allegedly decided to "help" Castro by sending nuclear missiles to Cuba -- a fact that proves that Khrushchev lied about his true motives (chapter 4). Third, it is the first book about the Cuban missile crisis that offers a critical analysis of the CIA's surveillance and analysis techniques during the crisis from the point of view of semiotics (chapter 10). Moreover, the book is the first to analyze from the point of view of intelligence and espionage the behavior of some American scholars who have published books about the crisis based on the above mentioned meetings. My conclusion is that their studies are totally slanted as a result of personal biases due to their wrong methodology (chapter 11), or because they have been compromised by Castro's intelligence services (chapter 12). Finally, I think that the book is valuable because, despite the obvious fact that intelligence and espionage played a key role during the crisis, this is the first book about the subject written basically from the point of view of intelligence and espionage.

Servando Gonzalez, author.