Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility [Hardcover]

Robert Powell (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 30, 1990 | ISBN-10: 0521375274 | ISBN-13: 978-0521375276

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict

Book Description

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 240 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (March 30, 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521375274
• ISBN-13: 978-0521375276
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,615,691 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Too often overlooked, May 23, 2001

By 

Carter A. Malkasian (Huntington Beach, CA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Hardcover)

Nuclear Deterrence Theory is a very important work for students of strategy. Unfortunately, the book was published near the end of the Cold War when interest in nuclear strategy was waning. Consequently, it is not remembered as the important work that it is.

During in the Cold War, there was a very large debate amongst students of strategy and national security about how to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Numerous books were published on topics like brinkmanship, MAD, limited retaliation, and first strikes. In many ways, Nuclear Deterrence Theory is the culmination of this literature and the answer to many of questions posed within it.

In Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Powell uses game theory to address the topics listed above. His analysis shows that there are widespread misconceptions regarding some of these topics. Moreover, the use of game theory provides insights into new dynamics within nuclear strategy. In general, although this may not be his aim, Powell causes the reader to appreciate how much warfare has changed since 1945 and how new ways of looking at strategy are needed.

Some readers might worry that the use of game theory, and the accompanying mathematical formulas, would be drawback to the book. However, Powell's writing is sufficiently explanatory to enforce his points and make the game theoretical analysis clear.

5.0 out of 5 stars Nuclear detterence, June 27, 2011

By 

ToXiC - See all my reviews

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Hardcover)

This book was literally a steal! Despite being used, and having some writing in the first few pages, everything else about the book is in pristine condition!