Customer Reviews

Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility

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Nuclear Deterrence Theory is a very important work for students of strategy. Unfortunately, the book was published near the end of the Cold War when interest in nuclear strategy was waning. Consequently, it is not remembered as the important work that it is.

During in the Cold War, there was a very large debate amongst students of strategy and national security about how to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Numerous books were published on topics like brinkmanship, MAD, limited retaliation, and first strikes. In many ways, Nuclear Deterrence Theory is the culmination of this literature and the answer to many of questions posed within it.

In Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Powell uses game theory to address the topics listed above. His analysis shows that there are widespread misconceptions regarding some of these topics. Moreover, the use of game theory provides insights into new dynamics within nuclear strategy. In general, although this may not be his aim, Powell causes the reader to appreciate how much warfare has changed since 1945 and how new ways of looking at strategy are needed.

Some readers might worry that the use of game theory, and the accompanying mathematical formulas, would be drawback to the book. However, Powell's writing is sufficiently explanatory to enforce his points and make the game theoretical analysis clear.

This book was literally a steal! Despite being used, and having some writing in the first few pages, everything else about the book is in pristine condition!