If a nuclear war between American and Soviet forces or the forces of their allies were to start, how would it end? This soberting analysis, one of the few published treatments of War termination, identifies the policies and strategic issues involved in the attempt to control and end a nuclear war should one ever start. The author presents both a comprehensive overview of the theory of war termination and a broad-based analysis of the specific aspects of the question. Throughout, the aim is to provide policymakers and students of military strategy with a tool for improved strategic war planning that emphasizes the importance of flexibility and durability rather than the current emphasis on damage infliction. Cimbala begins by discussing the compelling reasons for studying war termination, among them the potential deterrent value of such study. He then introduced pertinent issues in the literature of war termination, including the notion of an `agreed battle', escalation control, intrawar deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. The bulk of the study is devoted to a detailed discussion of specific aspects of nuclear war determination. Ih his concluding chapter, Cimbala integrates these aspects into a coherrent theory of nuclear war termination and assesses the potential implications of strategic defenses for American nuclear deterrence strategies.
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Editorial Reviews
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“A great deal of the literature on war focuses either on causes or on initiation. Now a theory is developed on how a nuclear war between superpowers might end. Cimbala sets out the concept that war is a conscious and rational policy carried out by a state's policymakers who take into account a set of goals or objectives that must be measured against the cost and the risks. Determining when a war--even a nuclear one--must be ended for it to be cost effective must be assessed. The author examines the entire theory of war termination and its effect on decisions to employ nuclear weapons. The Soviet views on war and deterrence are also examined, along with the various components of the American defense system, naval engagement, and missile systems. Cimbala concludes that too little is known to allow a sound forecast on how or when either of the superpowers might end a nuclear conflict. Nevertheless, the topic must continue to be studied. Because of the high level of abstraction and theoretical content, this book is best suited for upper-division undergraduate and graduate students of strategic planning or policy processes.”–Choice
“...Overall, Cimbala's work is an important contribution that specialists should read. It should be viewed as a supplement to his earlier work entitled Strategic War Termination (New York: Praeger, 1986)....”–The Journal of Soviet Military Studies
“The author's study of nuclear strategy and conflict termination throughout the 1980s resulted in a number of publications. This book appears to represent the maturation of his work. The author believes conflict termination is a 'study not only of interstate relations during conflict and war, but also of intrastate organizational behavior that might contribute to, or detract from, efforts to bring war to a conclusion.' He notes that the primary reasons for the study of conflict termination are to improve strategic war planning and to stop a war, should one occur, with as little damage as possible. He also believes the study of conflict termination may have some deterrent value and may acquaint leaders with the problems thay may face if deterrence should fail. This is an important subject, even during the present period when peace seems to be breaking out all over. The book is recommended to students of national policy and strategic studies as well as to their professional counterparts.”–Infantry
“Steven Cimbala's book provides a thorough analysis of war termination and identifies the political actors and strategic issues that control both conventional and nuclear conflicts.”–The Journal of Soviet Military Studies
“...Overall, Cimbala's work is an important contribution that specialists should read. It should be viewed as a supplement to his earlier work entitled Strategic War Termination (New York: Praeger, 1986)....”–
“The author's study of nuclear strategy and conflict termination throughout the 1980s resulted in a number of publications. This book appears to represent the maturation of his work. The author believes conflict termination is a 'study not only of interstate relations during conflict and war, but also of intrastate organizational behavior that might contribute to, or detract from, efforts to bring war to a conclusion.' He notes that the primary reasons for the study of conflict termination are to improve strategic war planning and to stop a war, should one occur, with as little damage as possible. He also believes the study of conflict termination may have some deterrent value and may acquaint leaders with the problems thay may face if deterrence should fail. This is an important subject, even during the present period when peace seems to be breaking out all over. The book is recommended to students of national policy and strategic studies as well as to their professional counterparts.”–
“Steven Cimbala's book provides a thorough analysis of war termination and identifies the political actors and strategic issues that control both conventional and nuclear conflicts.”–
About the Author
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University and teaches at its Delaware County Campus, Media, Pa.
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Inside This Book
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First Sentence:
The first component of any concept of war termination is the idea of an "agreed battle." Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
countercommand attacks, nuclear war termination, nuclear command system, nuclear command organizations, conventional retaliatory offensive, offensive sea control, agreed battle, command vulnerability, superpower nuclear conflict, escalation control, intrawar deterrence, protracted conventional war, nuclear decapitation, offensive retaliation, nuclear first use, inadvertent nuclear war, counterforce systems, nuclear surprise, launch under attack, strategic nuclear war, nuclear crisis management, nuclear operations, strategic retaliatory forces, horizontal escalation, declaratory strategy Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
United States, Soviet Union, New York, World War, Western Europe, Brookings Institution, International Security, Eastern Europe, Desmond Ball, Government Printing Office, Managing Nuclear Operations, Paul Bracken, Air Force, Central Front, North Vietnam, Department of Defense, Cornell University Press, Essence of Decision, Office of Technology Assessment, Pearl Harbor, President Kennedy, South Vietnam, Princeton University Press, Soviet Nuclear Operations, West Germany New!
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Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
The first component of any concept of war termination is the idea of an "agreed battle." Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
countercommand attacks, nuclear war termination, nuclear command system, nuclear command organizations, conventional retaliatory offensive, offensive sea control, agreed battle, command vulnerability, superpower nuclear conflict, escalation control, intrawar deterrence, protracted conventional war, nuclear decapitation, offensive retaliation, nuclear first use, inadvertent nuclear war, counterforce systems, nuclear surprise, launch under attack, strategic nuclear war, nuclear crisis management, nuclear operations, strategic retaliatory forces, horizontal escalation, declaratory strategy Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
United States, Soviet Union, New York, World War, Western Europe, Brookings Institution, International Security, Eastern Europe, Desmond Ball, Government Printing Office, Managing Nuclear Operations, Paul Bracken, Air Force, Central Front, North Vietnam, Department of Defense, Cornell University Press, Essence of Decision, Office of Technology Assessment, Pearl Harbor, President Kennedy, South Vietnam, Princeton University Press, Soviet Nuclear Operations, West Germany New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 100
books:
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1
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cites this book:
- Managing Nuclear Operations by Ashton B. Carter on 19 pages
- The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces by Professor Paul J. Bracken on 16 pages
- Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) by Desmond Ball on 10 pages
- Soviet Military Thinking by Derek Leebaert on 8 pages
- Conventional Deterrence (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) by John J. Mearsheimer on 8 pages
See all 100 books this book cites
- The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence by Stephen J. Cimbala on page 197
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