Customer Reviews

On Nuclear Terrorism

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The author takes a very systematic approach to the analysis of the task of obtaining and delivering a nuclear weapon and then looks at the vulnerabilities of the process which are the opportunities of the defender.

Sadly too much of what makes the press on the subject amounts to a keyhole view of a single element of the offensive or defensive process. In contrast, the book looks at the complexity of the process and the impact on the overall opportunity for success of a "layered" defense. The conclusion is that it is not a single impenetrable layer that offers the opportunity for reducing the threat but rather multiple layers.

What we fail to grasp on terrorist issues we intuitively understand every fall weekend as we watch football. When it comes down to the end of the game and time for one or two plays the defense has multiple opportunities to reduce the overall probability of of offensive success. A coach would be foolish to rush 11 players or have 11 players deep while giving the quarterback the flexibility to select the time and place of attack. Instead the defenders balance the defense to defend at multiple points as a strategy which reduces the overall probability of offensive success.

Like American football success in combating doomsday terrorist threats comes from not only multiple levels but also from surprise, communication, deception and hard work.

In defending against nuclear terrorism multiple, independently managed efforts from threat analysis to intelligence to field intervention to defending the attempted delivery can reduce the probability of success to a level that makes the effort "non profitable" from the terrorist standpoint.

Terrorists understand that detection of a seriously developed nuclear attack effort will change the rules of the game, forever. A high probability of success is needed to make the effort worth the risks to the cause ( assuming for the moment that the top leadership is willing to die as a consequence of the effort) . This is in stark contrast to the dispatch of suicide bombers who do not generate the massive change in the rules of the game.

Overall the book is excellent for both its content and its impact on changing the way most of us think about defending against the unthinkable. Highly recommended .

More information http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2978/catastrophic_terrorism.html?breadcrumb=%2Ftopic%2F2%2Fnuclear_issues

Michael Levi offers a unique perspective on the fear that drives the American psyche and political process these days-----nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist. While many experts exploit that fear to support expensive programs to counter nuclear terrorism, Levi takes an analytical perspective which describes in detail the series of difficult challenges which terrorists must overcome in order to accomplish the ultimate nightmare. His perspective as a physicist provides technological information not often found in policy pundits' consideration of this critical national and international security issue. Levi presents such technical information in a readable, but sophisticated form which enlightens those who seek to know more about the types of nuclear materials and weapons that a terrorist might seek. Additional technical information about detection and characterization technologies is also incorporated into this highly informative study. Casual readers will also benefit from Levi's unique approach-----looking at nuclear terrorism through the eyes of a terrorist planner. His message is a realistic, but hopeful one-----that nuclear terrorism is not inevitable, particularly if policy makers allocate resources to the obstacles that could make the ultimate nightmare only a figment of the imagination. Very Highly Recommended

This book sets forth what a finite band of non-supermen would have to do to mount an attack of nuclear terrorism. From this, it derives a systematic approach to making such an effort more difficult. The bottom line is that we can't make such an attack impossible, but most likely we can make it hard enough that they will try something else. After all, they have trade-offs, too. For example, the more skills they assemble, the harder it is to keep the operation secret. Not the final word, but a first class beginning, and a major contribution to the debate over the level of effort that should be expended to ward off a nuclear attack as opposed to other forms of terrorism.

I bought this book after hearing the author on the radio. His perspective on nuclear terrorism is unexpected: we normally think that the terrorists must only succeed once, while security services must be effective every time.

But while that may be true in the broadest sense, the author points out that the terrorists have to succeed at every stage of the incredibly difficult process, while the police only need to catch them once. It's hard for terrorists to be good at everything they need to do: though they may procure bomb-making materials, they may not be very good at planting bombs (e.g. - the doctors who attempted to blow up Glasgow Airport, but left their car bombs parked in a no-parking zone.) On the other hand, it's possible for the police to be effective at every level, from monitoring so-called "loose nukes" to detecting radiation in ports to tracking suspicious movements in cities.

It was a revelation to read this book, because the analysis is far more reasoned and realistic than what's typically found in the media.

The author discredits himself in the very first pages by relating a network news 'sting' operation whereby depleted uranium bypassed the portal monitors in several countries undiscovered. This is not surprising, fissile material portal monitors aren't designed to pick up the gamma rays from depleted uranium, they aren't that strong, unlike gamma signatures of enriched uranium, which have a pronounced peak at the 186 kilo-electron volt range. So, what was the point?

Also, the author only discusses nuclear terrorism in the context of a subnational group obtaining a nuclear warhead. That is not very plausible, but a Tom Clancy fantasy which in fact Clancy used as the plot in one of his books.

Really the nuclear terrorism threat comes from a subnational group sabotaging a nuclear power reactor in their enemy's country, and/or sabotaging the spent fuel storage area, and/or sabotaging a spent fuel reprocessing plant.

These nuclear terrorism scenarios are not even hinted at in this book, yet is highly plausible given the November 2007 breakin at South Africa's nuclear reactor, and November 2009 apparent deliberate contamination event at an Indian nuclear plant...

And while the author may be highly knowledgable of the academic aspects of nuclear terrorism, there is much better info on-line (check out the General Accounting Office doing a topic search for 'nuclear' and Project on Govt. Oversight doing a word search for 'design basis threat').