Customer Reviews

The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices

5 star:		(0)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This book stems from a three-year-long collaboration between the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Reves Center for International Studies at the College of William and Mary. Scholars studied eight countries currently committed to nonproliferation - Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - to determine what scenarios might make them change their minds. The objective was to study how the nuclear genie might get out of the bottle - but it also indicates ways to keep it contained. The book intentionally does not focus on proliferator states, such as North Korea or Iran. Even with that omission, we recommend it for the stark realities its research uncovers. One is that non-proliferating nations all look to the U.S. for reassurance that the world will stay safe for those without nuclear weapons. Another is that the world must stop Iran and North Korea's atomic ambitions, lest a tipping point occurs that would provoke other nations to conclude that their security requires swinging the biggest stick.

In the midst of headlines about possible nuclear weapons being acquired by rogue states, this recent book is quite timely. It addresses what is a slightly puzzling issue. Why, 60 years after the use of nuclear weapons, are there still relatively few nations armed with these weapons? Some projections made in the 1960s postulated that by now, if we hadn't blown ourselves up, there would be scores of nuclear armed nations.

Part of the book explains why this did not come to pass. But the more urgent analysis is devoted to suggesting how in fact it might still come to be. The politics of regional rivalries in east Asia, south Asia and the Middle East is studied. There are knock-on effects of one nation possessing such arms, triggering a frantic effort by its neighbours to also do so.

One thing to note is that the technical obstacles are less than ever before. While still exceedingly nontrivial, the case of Pakistan illustrates how a moderately sized developing country can develop such weapons, given sufficient will and resources.

To build an atomic bomb, you only need 1940s technology. Not only that, but as the book points out to many countries, a nuclear defence is cheaper than a conventional one. Many states like Israel's nuclear weapons give it a defence that it could never get from a conventional one. As the book further points out the world does not punish states going nuclear much. So why have so few states gone for a nuclear defense?

It is a fascinating issue. This book takes us through several countries and discussion that they had in this question. The important debates on getting nuclear weapons in most countries is hidden even in democratic countries. For example, few people in the US, Britain, France or Israel knew of their country nuclear weapons program until they had a bomb. So many of the debates, I felt were guesswork of what people were likely to say.

Two problems with the book, I though was looking at the physical weapon rather than many states today, which are virtual nuclear states. They could have a bomb in a few months if they wanted it. We probably have a more nuclear proliferation then they admit.

The second it did not discuss the vulnerability a state has to nuclear weapons, for example, Egypt with the Nile. A few conventual and nuclear weapon blasts and most of Egypt's water is cut off. Maybe the Egyptians' have sound military reasons to not have nuclear weapons.

Finally, the book does not fill me with hope. North Korea has a bomb, and it appears that Iran will have one soon. Both from reading the book will cause ripple effects in the neighboring countries if they doubt the US nuclear commitment to them.