Customer Reviews

The Nuremberg Raid: 30-31 March 1944 (Penguin History)

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This is probably Martin Middlebrook's best-written account of an RAF Bomber Command Operation in the Second World War. Middlebrook wants the reader to believe that Air Marshal Harris, the commander of Bomber Command, was correcting in pursuing his night-time area bombing philosophy instead of trying to hit military or industrial targets with precision daylight strikes. Throughout, Middlebrook's sympathies and admiration for the brave RAF bomber crewmen that he knew from his youth are clear. Yet this book pushes a point of view that borders on religious or zealous faith, rather than a level-headed assessment of the facts. What pushes Middlebrook over the edge of reason here is the nature of his subject. While Middlebrook's other bomber books on Hamburg, Berlin and Peenemunde covered costly but successful operations (more or less), the raid on Nuremberg in March 1944 was an unmitigated disaster. RAF bomber command suffered its heaviest losses in one night of the war and inflicted negligible damage on the enemy.

Middlebrook begins with several very informative chapters that detail the bombing campaigns in Germany during 1939-1943, the composition of the bomber units that would take part in the raid and the German defenses. As usual, Middlebrook is very thorough and the order of battle is very detailed. However, shows a very profound bias toward area bombing throughout and it starts in assessing the three major raids just prior to the Nuremberg raid. Middlebrook makes a very important point when he states that, "even in non-cloud conditions the bombing results on Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Berlin had been poor ...bombing photographs indicated that not one aircraft released its load within the city's limits!" The point is that RAF Bomber Command did not have the capability to destroy cities because they couldn't hit them and that Air Marshal Harris knew this but continued on with an area bombing campaign that had degenerated into random killing. Wars are won by killing the right people at the right moment, not by killing randomly.

The pre-mission briefs to are covered in great detail and it appears that the intent was to deceive the crews about the nature of the mission, the strength of the enemy defenses and even the weather. The night chosen for the attack was poorly suited for infiltrating a 700+ stream of bombers across Germany due to the illumination from the moon and lack of cloud cover, but Harris ignored these facts and the crews were filled with overly-optimistic estimates. It is also significant that Harris chose an aim point in Nuremberg well away from the MAN tank plant (Middlebrook fails to mention that it was producing 100 Panther tanks per month at that time) and the SS barracks in the city and instead placed it in a residential area that he expected would burn well. The crews were told that the target was the tank plant and SS barracks.

Middlebrook follows the take-off of the massive bomber stream, all the supporting operations designed to help the raid and the massive German interception in great detail. Although the front of the stream made it past the German defenses, the Germans had perfected the "Tame Boar" method of intercepting streams before they reached their target and ripped apart the center of the stream. Visibility was excellent and the bombers were leaving contrails due to unusual conditions. About eighty British bombers were lost in a ninety minute period. The Germans had a very good night; Middlebrook notes that over thirty bombers were shot down by just eight night fighter crews. Two German lieutenants shot down seven and six bombers in one sortie! The flak gunners also had a good night - one battery shot down three bombers in five minutes with only twenty shells. All the while, the British crews watched in horror in the moonlight as bomber after bomber went down in flames. Nor were the British aware of the German "schrage musik" attacks from underneath with specially-modified cannon that fired into the bellies of the British bombers. It was one of the great aerial slaughters of all time. Nevertheless, the bravery of the British crews to press on to target in the mistaken belief that their actions would contribute to victory is sobering.

Compounding the heavy losses, the raid itself was a total failure. Nuremberg was heavily cloud-covered and most of the bombs fell well outside the city; only 60 German civilians were killed in the city, including 24 women and 8 children. Even worse however, was that 107 bombers missed the target by 55 miles and bombed Schweinfurt by mistake (and only succeeded in killing one woman and one child). A total of 110 German civilians and 19 Luftwaffe personnel were killed in the raid and about ten fighters were lost. Contrast this with British losses of 108 aircraft (96 bombers were shot down, the rest were crashed or damaged beyond repair) and of the aircrew, 545 of these brave men were killed and 152 captured. Middlebrook notes these cold-blooded facts but then concludes that the raid succeeded because it carried the war to the German people and "it was the German civilians who cowered for their lives in cellars and shelters while the English slept safely in their beds". Aside from this being an asinine "aim for the RAF", it ignores the German V-weapons campaign that was pounding England in 1944 without risking aircrews.

Finally, after all the excellent post-mortem analysis Middlebrook brings the reader to an emotionally biased watershed. Instead of realizing that the Nuremberg Raid clearly demonstrated that night area-bombing was not a cost-effective way to win a war, he launches into an impassioned defense of Harris' beloved area bombing. Middlebrook writes, "The morale of the German people never broke...but this does not mean that the theory was wrong: only that it had not been proved. What might have happened if Harris had been given the 4,000 heavy bombers [that he wanted]?" This completely ignores the fact that RAF Bomber Command could barely find major cities in the dark, except for the few targets in the Ruhr within range of OBOE. How would more bombers have changed this fact? More bombers missing the target still does not add up to victory. Even when RAF bombs hit cities, they tended to kill women, children and the elderly, not people likely to contribute much to Hitler's war effort. Middlebrook's assertion that the bomber raids caused the Germans to allocate thousands of anti-aircraft guns, searchlights and flak crews to home defense is also specious. First, anti-aircraft guns and searchlight cost a lot less to manufacture than four-engine bombers, and few of them were destroyed in battle unlike the 8,325 bombers the RAF lost. Second, the flak crews were often teenagers, women and Russian volunteers, all of whom required far less training than RAF bomber crews. Thirdly, Middlebrook ignores the huge investment that Britain had made into air defense of the UK and the fact that Britain did not have a free ride in this area even in 1944. Actually, it is apparent that RAF Bomber Command diverted far more resources from Britain's war effort than it did from Germany's.

This is a well-written and detailed account of one of the fiercer air battles of the Second World War. It should be on the bookshelf of anyone seriously interested in the air war in 1939-1945. However, the emotional bias of the author colors his assessment of the raid and serves to offer up a false conclusion. It is no disservice to the brave RAF crewmen who died on the raid, they did their best and they were heroes, but the raid was idiotic in intent and execution. Commanders like Air Marshall Harris would send brave men to their deaths for no reasonable purpose should not be excused for "having a bad day" or making a mistake. Unfortunately, the author cannot bring himself to this condemnation and it is up to the reader to make a less biased conclusion.

Mr Middlebrook has done more with this book than chronicle what was arguably the costliest raid the RAF staged during WW2. More importantly, it's a look at the daily operations of RAF and German aircrews late in the war. The RAF had standardized their tactics, and the Luftwaffe switched from a rigid to a fluid system of control for its nightfighters. Excellent first-person accounts illustrate the points the author makes throughout the work.

The original edition was published in the early '80s with a short update concerning rumors that Ultra revealed the raid was compromised; to protect this intelligence source the raid was allowed to proceed. This "conspiracy theory" is as untrue as the persistent myth that Coventry was destroyed for the same reason. In actuality there are a myriad of reasons why a mission might be cancelled; it's extremely unlikely that the Germans would have connected a cancellation of the Nuremberg Raid with intelligence concerning their defenses.

The only area where the book is wanting is the chapter(s) concerning "Butcher" Harris. Research since the book was written has shown that he was obsessively committed to bombing cities-to the point of insubordination on several occasions. Anyone else would have, and should have, been fired. The book doesn't address any of these issues. Contrary to what other reviewers have said, the Bombing Offensive was not "propaganda driven". Bomber advocates such as Harris, as an extreme example, felt that the sacrifice their crews were making would definitely shorten the war-maybe even end it without the need of invasion. Sadly, they held to these views even when events were showing that the offensive was not causing the damage expected, and a re-think of the entire bombing strategy was in order. Highly Recommended.

On the night of March 30/31, 1944, Bomber Command sent every available bomber to Nuremberg in an effort to destroy it once and for all. So determined was Arthur "Butch" Harris to have one less target to worry about, that he sent his bombers out in less than ideal conditions. The night sky was largely devoid of clouds--that is, until the target was reached--and the moon was bright. The conditions were therefore very much to the German's advantage, and the defending night fighters took a grievous toll on the bomber force. In the end, the raid was a complete failure: Nuremberg was hardly touched and Bomber Command ended up losing over one hundred bombers. As Middlebrook points out, the choice of Nuremberg has been somewhat controversial, so much so, that some have contended that the raid was conducted with the Germans having known full well what the night's target was. I have little hesitation in saying that the Nuremberg Raid is a superb book. Meticulously researched and loaded with detail, it draws upon numerous sources, including many personal narratives, to construct aa complete an account of one of Bomber Command's raids as one can expect.

Middlebrook dispassionately examines the British campaign to avenge the bombing of English cities begun by Hitler in 1940. By 1943, the tools available to 'Bomber' Harris were far more destructive than any used by the Luftwaffe. For all our moralizing, the war had entered a stage of revenge raids: 'you bombed our city with 100 tons- I will bomb yours with 1,000'. Due to propaganda, people demanded it. So each day's papers carried the box score: 900 bombers dropped 5400 tons and lost 24 planes doing it. What lies buried in this absurd score are the statistics; Airmen had less than a 25% chance of living through a tour. Their bombs often did not hit find any target; but when they did, non-combatants suffered and died. Thank God we live in a more enlightened age!

The Nuremberg Raid by Martin Middlebrook is an outstanding description of a British bombing raid against the city of Nuremberg. In telling this story, there are two major sections, the lead-up to the raid and the raid itself.

The section leading up to the raid tells the general history of British bombing in WWII, what drove the British to bombing at night, their track record bombing at night, and there recent targets. In addition, Mr. Middlebrook gives us a description of Bomber Command, it's men and their aircraft along with a similar description of the German forces.

The heart of the book deals with the actual raid itself. In these chapters, Mr. Middlebrook goes thru painstaking details about the bomber-stream and the events that occur to the bomber-streamer. In here, we learn about how this is the deepest penetration by the British, how the German night fighters responded to the raid, and how the raid was not compromised before hand. Mr. Middlebrook gives excellent details on the shoot down of most of the 96 bombers lost. Of particular interest was how British bomber pilots thought that the German had a gun that fired scarecrow shells (they exploded so as to look like a bomber being hit, in actuality, it was British bombers being hit by Schrage Musik). Also of interest was the British use of Serrate Mosquitoes to intercept the Germans.

This is an outstanding book. Once more, Mr. Middlebrook has hit a homerun. I'll give this one 5 out of 5!

Martin Middlebrook has written a truly excellent book on Bomber Command in England during WW2. This book deserves to be on the bookshelf of everyone who has an interest in military history, and especially air battles during the second world war. Special credit goes to the author for contacting 350 former members of bomber crews to get their thoughts about raids going on during 1944. Likewise, the author also includes personal reflections from Germans who flew night fighters and worked in air defenses at the time. These first-person accounts add a lot of flavor to the book and give the reader some great insights into what the real conditions were like during the bomber raids. Martin Middlebrook has adopted a professional and objective tone when describing the upper leadership at RAF Bomber Command, and especially Sir Arthur Harris. Personally, my own opinion of the man after reading this book is far less flattering. It is inconceivable that RAF leadership allowed so many fine aircrews to go to their deaths - especially on missions which often yielded very poor results (in terms of bombing accuracy). It is also inconceivable that the planes in the Nuremberg Raid should have been allowed to cross into Germany when moonlight conditions provided excellent visibility to the enemy. The author covers these developments, as well as several other screw-ups in the mission (plus countermeasures by the Germans) is a great deal of detail. In the end, you can't help but admire the courage and incredible sacrifice that was made by Allied aircrews during these bombing raids in Europe. This book is a definite MUST READ if you like military history!

"The Nuremberg Raid" is another of Martin Middlebrook's excellent, objective, and dispassionate documentaries on the airwar over Europe. Again, Middlebrook has spared no effort in identifying places, dates, and times, linking documents and personal accounts together in his mastery way. No glorification, no condemnation, just pure facts, given a personal face by eyewitness accounts. This, as well as great writing, are the key to Middlebrook's success.

Together with "The Battle of Hamburg," "The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission," "The Berlin Raids," and "The Peenemuende Mission" (some of which are out-of-print but worth every penny if you can get them), this book becomes another must in any serious library on the aerial bombing campaigns of World War II.

Middlebrook dispassionately examines the British campaign to avenge the bombing of English cities begun by Hitler in 1940. By 1943, the tools available to 'Bomber' Harris were far more destructive than any used by the Luftwaffe. For all our moralizing, the war had entered a stage of revenge raids: 'you bombed our city with 100 tons- I will bomb yours with 1,000'. Due to propaganda, people demanded it. So each day's papers carried the box score: 900 bombers dropped 5400 tons and lost 24 planes doing it. What lies buried in this absurd score are the statistics; Airmen had less than a 25% chance of living through a tour. Their bombs often did not hit find any target; but when they did, non-combatants suffered and died. Thank God we live in a more enlightened age!