Customer Reviews

Obama's Wars

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In the author's personal note to this book, Bob Woodward thanks his assistant Josh Bock with words of such kindness that I was completely taken aback by the grace that this man possesses. Many writers wouldn't take the time, or interest to be so encouraging to someone else.


Woodward's writing has the poet's touch. It is elegant, straightforward, and of such compelling interest that this book like many others he has written, is a page turner. You start it, and you just keep going until you are finished.


First we must discuss his sources and methods. This author doesn't publish unless he has confirmation of what he is being told by an additional 3rd party. His interviews are recorded, transcribed and then checked for errors. He sometimes revisits the same interviewee 4 or 5 times. He works with notes, documents and recollections.


Although a person being interviewed may request that it be background only, once Woodward gets the same story from another independent source, the story is no longer background. Many people have talked to Woodward on the basis of background in an effort to remain anonymous, and control him. It just doesn't remain that way. You are not going to fool this man.


When you read Obama's Wars, you realize that you can't obtain this much great information if you read a year's worth of the New York Times. You are getting the real deal here, and you don't get it anywhere else. Let me illustrate:



* When meeting President Bush's intelligence officer and hearing what he had to say prior to the election, then Senator Obama responds that he was worried about losing this election, now he's worried about winning the election with the information he is being told.



* Woodward confirms for us that Pakistani intelligence, the so called ISI has been giving aide to the Taliban, while taking $2 billion a year in cash from us.



* During the first half of 2008, the US made only 4 Predator strikes in Pakistan. Pakistan made the US warn the ISI ahead of time before a strike could be made. The ISI in turn would warn the Taliban and the bad guys would head for the hills prior to the strike. Once American got wise to the setup, we only gave the ISI simultaneous warning, and frankly we waited until the Predator was ready to fire its missiles before giving that warning. Where are you going to get information like this? I don't see it in the Washington Post, and certainly not the NY Times.



* President Obama was informed that 35 countries do not require Visas prior to coming to the United States. Terrorists are now coming to the US through those countries and forming cells. Our worst nightmare may be yet to come.



* Iran will have a gun-type nuclear weapon between 2013 and 2015 which will be demonstrated in the desert. Saudi Arabia will immediately notify Pakistan that you help us develop a nuclear weapon, or we cut off oil supplies to your country.



* Then Senator Obama was the victim of a cyber attack on his campaign by the Chinese government that copied his documents and files. The greater danger was what would happen if they destroyed the files as opposed to just copying them. The same thing happened to Senator McCain and his campaign.



* But Wait - there's more. Senator Obama was then told that every day both the Bank of NY and Citibank handle $3 trillion a day in funds transfers, whereas the entire economy is equal to $14 trillion in gross domestic product. Other countries now have the capability to interfere with those transactions through cyber war. The resulting financial chaos would be exponentially worse than the World Trade Center destruction. We do not have a cyber defense yet.



Woodward is at his best when discussing personalities. His discussion of Hillary Clinton's reluctance, then refusal and finally acceptance of the Cabinet position of Secretary of State is absolutely fascinating. Senator Clinton did not want the position, but Senator Obama's people sensed the door was still opened, so they told her to sleep on it over night. During the night Senator Clinton consulted Mark Penn, the Clinton pollster who basically asked her if she was crazy. Take it, "you will have an unmatched record of public service." He also reminded her that you are weak on foreign policy and national security, and now you will have absolute bonafides in both, and it didn't hurt that you she will finally show independence from her husband.



Yes, there's Richard Holbrooke the egotist, and General Petraeus comes through looking great. No one lays a glove on the General. The Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gets very high marks in the book. Over and over again, when you read Woodward, you recognize that the story you are reading is not something that is covered anywhere else. You are a part of the decision making process. You are involved. You know who makes sense and who doesn't, who's brilliant, and who's all talk, and no show.



I have given you pieces here and pieces there, a flavoring of a giant ice cream Sundae. Every page has a great story, and there is nothing superfluous in this great read. This book gets five stars. If you love politics, a good story, history, and reading what a great author operating at the peak of his powers can do, read Obama's Wars, and thank you for reading this review.


Richard C. Stoyeck

Woodward's latest book presents a treasure trove of information about a young presidency still in progress. Yes, it's too early for a comprehensive history or evaluation of the Obama administration, and that's not what this book purports to be. The focus of this book is the first 18 months, beginning with many of the discussions that took place while Obama was President-elect. As the title suggests, this book covers the decisions behind the war in Afghanistan and the related al Qaeda and Taliban activity into Pakistan. A September 22, 2010 Washington Post article also suggested another meaning for "war" in this book's title is the conflict among the president's national security team. Woodward has done his homework, and the results are marvelous.

Reading this book is quite educational. Woodward incorporates many characters into this book, including some that are probably unknown to those who don't regularly follow the news. Prior to reading this book I wasn't aware of the extent of Biden's influence, and I didn't fully understand the gravity of the Mumbai bombings or exactly how important Pakistan is to the war on terror. This book gave me a much better understanding of both the similarities and differences between al Qaeda and the Taliban, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Karzai and Zardari.

For those who have read recent Woodward best-sellers such as "State of Denial" or "The War Within," the feel of this book will be familiar. His writing style is far from elegant prose. Some passages are borderline robotic; this is often due to directly paraphrasing or selectively quoting sources.

Woodward successfully avoids any partisan slant, despite what some other reviewers have implied. The amount of information Woodward has here is amazing. As time goes by we will have a much more complete picture of what is currently happening, but for a present-day look at the Obama administration, this book would be very hard to beat. A page-turner!

Woodward has crafted one of his best books yet. This book is informative and well researched. As you read it, you cannot help but realize WHY certain news stories appeared at specific times. The debate about troop numbers is captured in a clear and concise manner, yet you will shake your head as to why it had to take place in such a public forum. Woodward's portrayal of GEN McChrystal is especially useful given the bad press surrounding his departure. An insiders viewpoint of events that most of us at the time had to rely on the media to learn about. Woodward does a fine job counteracting a lot of the Washington Spin by providing unparalleled insight behind the scenes.

For those wondering if "Obamas Wars" covers both Iraq and Afghanistan, I would opine that it does not. Obama arguably inherited a war and a drawdown when he took office. As I read the book, I felt that the use of "wars" plural referred to the ongoing Afghanistan conflict, the "war" within the White House over what policy to back, the "war" within the Department of Defense over what military options to exercise, the "war" between US foreign policy and domestic political concerns as the latter seemed more important to Democrats while Republicans preferred to emphasize the former, and the "war" - percieved or not - between military and civilian authorities, in this case a President who did not feel as if his wishes were being carried out to the letter. The book ends in July 2010 around the time when Woodward interviewed President Obama.

This is at least the sixth book by Bob Woodward that I have read, and I continue to be amazed at the access he gets and the subsequent direct quotes from private and confidential conversations and classified documents. He is a reporter's reporter (and a very pedestrian writer - he's more Dragnet than Gay Telese). There is just not a very gripping story here. There is no Deep Throat; there is no smoking gun; there is no big reveal. It is, essentially, 400+ pages of the same meeting taking place over and over and over and over again, over the course of several months.

The focus of this book is the complicated process that led to President Obama to increase the level of U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan in support of the so-called "surge strategy." Like all of Woodward's previous books this book is apolitical and contains minimal analysis and commentary. It is a chronological compilation of quotes and paraphrases that Woodward has selected to demonstrate how the decision making process in this case actually worked. Woodward is a respected journalist and has a track record of accurately reflecting White House Deliberations.
Woodward makes it clear that President Obama's concerns with Afghanistan so often articulated in his run for the Presidency were genuine and unfortunately well founded. The military and political situations in Afghanistan were rapidly deteriorating to the point of endangering the U.S. position there. The President wanted to formulate a new strategy that would neutralize the threats posed by al Qaeda still operating on the Afghan-Pakistan Border, the Taliban insurgency, and transform Afghanistan into stable country that would not serve as a host to al Qaeda. To do this, he sought to obtain at least three or four strategic alternatives that he could choose from rather than simply going with the military centric strategy option that was already on the table.
The military centric option was favored by Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), General Petreaus (USA) Chief of CentCom, and General McChrystal (USA). General McChrystal strongly argued that the Afghan security forces could be quickly brought up to such a level (400,000!) and that an all American Force of 40,000 troops (four brigades) could easily seize, hold, and transfer key population centers over to Afghan Security Forces. Although his optimism was at variance with actual conditions in Afghanistan, Admiral Mullen and General Petreaus supported McChrystal's argument.
Still President Obama wanted to be able to review other options before committing so many troops to a failing state like Afghanistan. He also was aware that any Afghan solution would by necessity involve a Pakistani solution. The all powerful Pakistani Military had a very complex relationship with the Taliban movement and, it was suspected, al Qaeda. He therefore sought to develop a strategy that would recognize this.
In one sense this book is a chronicle of the President's efforts to pry alternative strategies from the National Security Council (NSC). Saving for Vice-President Biden's "counter-terrorism" strategy which would require considerably fewer troops than the counter-insurgency plan he was unsuccessful in obtaining any real alternatives to the surge strategy. In the end the President simply caved into the military and accepted General McChrystal's counter-insurgency strategy even though it offered only an Afghan centric and an unrealistic military solution to what was and is a much more complex regional problem. Woodward's account of how the President got to this point is quite fascinating.

Bob Woodward has become the go-to guy to chronicle the inside story of how Washington operates. His latest book, OBAMA'S WAR, details how President Barack Obama presided over a year-long study that led to an expansion of the American war in Afghanistan.

It is a convoluted, fascinating read that gives the reader unique insights into Obama and the leading characters of his Administration.

Woodward paints a portrait of Obama that is generally positive. He describes the young president as a thoughtful chief executive who maintains his cool among the hotheads that he has surrounded himself in the White House. And like most White House administrations there is considerable infighting among Obama's aides.

Woodward gives us a gossipy version of how Obama arrived at his decision to send an additional 30,000 American troops to Afghanistan. We get the mindset of the principal players, including Vice President Joe Biden (a chattering nabob who serves as a brake on some of the other hawks on the White House staff); national Security Adviser Gen. James Jones, a well respected military chief who seems to be in over his head politically; Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who is a loyal, if cautious adviser to Obama, and chief of staff Rham Emanuel who is a profane, rambunctious lieutenant who cracks the whip with a hair trigger in an effort to get things done. Richard Holbrook, the man who would be Secretary of State under a Hilary Clinton Administration, loses the confidence of Obama as he (Holbrook) fails to resolve the enigma of a Muslim Pakistani nation that is trapped by its fear of India.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates comes off as a wily, practical politician who remains faithful to his command structure and the troops in the Afghan theater of war. Army Gen. David Petraeus is depicted as a cautious, but media savvy, politic military commander who successfully walks a high tension wire between his bosses at the Pentagon, the White House staff and the political heavy weights in Congress. Woodward describes Gen. Stan McCrystal as probably the best field commander for the war in Afghanistan - but who stumbles over his inability to keep his mouth shut.

Woodward also gives the reader useful insights into the politics of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the intricacies of the geopolitical framework of the Middle East.

Woodward always amazes with his ability to wring information out of the key players in Washington. Clearly everyone from Obama on down talked to Woodward. He quotes frequently from Jones' private notebooks, for example, and his extensive verbatim quotes from all the key players indicate he had virtually unfettered access to the White House and the Pentagon.

An unexplained mystery is who gave Woodward the copy of McCrystal's top secret, highly restricted assessment of the war in Afghanistan? After considering the likely culprits, this reviewer suggests that the culprit was either Petraeus, DOD chief Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Mike Mullen, or most likely Richard Holbrook. Whoever it was, Woodward couldn't wait for publication of his book and published a page 1 story in the Washington Post nearly a year ago. The details of how Woodward and his editors at the Post negotiated publication of the report with the White House team are fascinating.

While Obama comes off reasonably well in this book, his legacy of course will depend on the final outcome of his war in Afghanistan. The reader should remember that in his four books on the Bush war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Woodward also gave George W Bush high marks early on, but in the final book, THE WAR WITHIN, Woodward described Bush as "intolerant of confrontations and in-depth debate.... he never got a handle on it and over these years of war, too often he failed to lead."

Even ace reporter Bob Woodward can be fickle, it seems, and while OBAMA'S WAR is a fascinating read, it is by no means the final word on a very difficult war in a far-off land that has never been permanently conquered. While Woodward successfully connects the dots thus far, the full story of hte AfPak War remains elusive -- and will remain so for a long time in the future.

As a fan of Bob Woodward, I eagerly anticipated this new release. However, I believe the book falls short in several areas. Woodward continues with his traditional fast-paced writing and the reader clearly feels as if they too have the same "insider" status. The topic however made me feel as if Woodward was simply rushing to get a book out as opposed to being more thoughtful about writing something people actually want to read. In other words, I would have wanted to see Woodward write about Obama's handling of the financial crisis upon entering his presidency much more than the commitment of troops to Afghanistan. The entire book centered around one topic: How many troops to commit to the effort. 40,000, 35,000, 20,000. Up and back and up and back. I don't see a huge rush to get this book.

I was anxious to read Woodward's new book,therefore I pre-ordered. Obama's War is long on explaining the endless meetings that led to Obama's war decision. It is detailed, requires close reading. Now a fast read. The book goes into the detailed thoughts, changing opinions among the principals involved in making the Obama war decisions. It reveals decisions, revisions and disagreements and their role in Obama reaching his decision/and or policy. The book is very concentrated on one area--war decisions. I had anticipated a broader look at Obama's administration, and a far easier read. Woodward took a lot of time explaining what took place,on one issue--the war and it's future. At times I felt I was reading a text book, rather than what I had come to expect from Woodwards past books. Not an easy read,very concentrated.

But, I pre-ordered it, without knowledge of its title. Book more inclined to those seeking detail on Obama's decisions regarding war stategy, and how those around him helped make it. Again, not an easy read.

Not what I had come to expect in a Woodward book-- average reader may be disappointed. Book also was written about an ongoing policy--the whole story is yet to be told.

Obama's War is a real page turner. It reads like a suspense novel. Woodward did a great job of simply presenting the facts, thoughts and expressed feelings of others, while himself remaining neutral -- good old fashion journalism without an agenda. The book isn't preaching right or left, and lets the reader decide. It's amazing how he manages to gather the information he does.

This is an attempt at objectivity by a pro-American Brit with no partisan agenda. Those who criticise Woodward in terms of political analysis are missing the point. His books should not be read as analysis, but simply as the best-sourced description of Washington's decision making process that we are likely to get for a few years. Journalism is only the first draft of history, but it is all we have for the time being. The most interesting thing about this particular book is how it compares with Woodward's similar work on the Administration of George W Bush. It seems to confirm that the basic difficulty with American foreign policy is the same whether the President is Obama or Bush, Democratic or Republican: the subtlety and flexibility necessary to deal with problems on the ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan is not best served by the clash of giant bureaucracies at the highest level of the US government. The whole system is dysfunctional. Since this structural weakness is a constant factor, it is interesting to see how the dissimilar leadership styles of the two Presidents have led to similar policies - and problems. Both men are intelligent - their detractors who claim otherwise are themselves almost wilfully ignorant - but their minds work in different ways. Woodward shows how Obama has a fine lawyer's brain, but his lawyer's ability to ask the right questions and his skill at spotting the hole in an argument are gifts that can undermine the will necessary to take the initiative, because they make it easier to come up with reasons not to do something than to do it. By contrast, not even Bush's worst enemy can really say that his problem was indecision: indeed, his choice of title for his memoirs, "Decision Points", shows how he prides himself on being "The Decider". Whether his decisions were the right ones is, of course, a matter for debate - but this is not the place for that debate: here the only point being made is that Obama's caution and Bush's decisiveness seem to have had broadly similar results, so just to blame one or the other for the current mess may be simplistic and unfair. The most legitimate criticism of both men is that they have failed to grasp the need for structural reform. That failing is not unique to them, for it applies to almost every member of the political Establishment, but, as the leaders of that Establishment, Obama and Bush must share a higher level of blame. America needs a President who takes a lead in slimming down the bloated structure of policy-making. There needs to be decentralisation: as much as possible, decisions should be made by people on the ground - experienced people who are aware of local conditions - not ignorant politicians and naive staffers in Washington. The President also needs to take the advice of the great Prussian strategist Count von Moltke, who said that a Commander-in-Chief should have only one military adviser, because a multitude of opinions leads only to paralysis. Obama, perhaps because he felt it necessary to project strength after being elected on an anti-war platform, appointed a large number of generals among his advisers, not just in their proper place in the Pentagon, but also in the National Security Council, the Embassy in Kabul, and, most recently, the Central Intelligence Agency. As a result, a President without military background or knowledge has become subject to conflicting military advice. It is therefore not surprising that, although Obama has a very clear view of what he does not want, he has, on the evidence here, no clear view of what he does want, let alone how to achieve it. So America drifts with no real sense of direction, and her Allies with her. Von Moltke said that "an audacious decision can be arrived at by one man only", and America and her Allies need some audacious decision-making if we are to break free of the current morass. More than ever, America needs a Teddy Roosevelt - or better still a Teddy Roosevelt with a Winfield Scott or a George Marshall as his adviser and sufficient confidence in him to listen to his opinion over all others.