Customer Reviews

An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860

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This book may be accused of being biased but it's well worth reading nontheless as it provides an account that is invaluable in explaning the more recent civil war in Lebanon and in fact the roots of many Middle East problems as the Ottoman empire crumbled and led to increased European intervention. Fawaz is one of the main researchers in 19th century Social and Economic transformation in the Levant and is an excellent complement to fine general accounts by Roger Owen, Charles Issawi and Chevallier. Bias aside. Fawaz discusses the centralizing administrative reforms of the mid-19th century Syria and how these acted in conjunction with a unique combination of internal and external social and economic forces that collided to generate a violent civil war in the Lebanon and Damascus in 1860. The book analyzes the socio-economic conditions and circumstances that contributed to the civil conflict in Syria of 1860. It also considers the changes in the international economy in the mid-19th century and its effect in the context of Beirut and Damascus, European cultural, economic and political influence in the Syrian province and the changes in Christian-Muslim relations in terms of the application of the reforms. Ultimately it shows that while the 1860 Civil War in Syria was confessional in its manifestation, it was largely an expression of grievance against the rapid and widespread social and economic transformation that occurred in the first half of the 19th century.

Instead of being a fascinating account of a crucial period in the history of the Christians and Druzes in Mount Lebanon and Syria, the book appears to be an obvious attempt at demonizing the victims and justifying the massacres. It is disappointing that so much bias was camouflaged as an objective interpretation of historical events. On several occasions, the book gives the impression that the author's interpretations of events constitute the ultimate truth. At times, this is done without taking into consideration even the interpretations of the people whom the book uses as references. The only beneficial part of the book is the extensive bibliography, otherwise very disappointing.

The research is thorough, but the reader is lost in trivial details. There is an effort by the author to clarify the ottoman role in the massacre. This comes across as a feeble apologist stand. In some chapters the book reads like a newspaper article.

The author is clearly biased, she has tailored her research and the subsequent conclusions to idealize one side of the conflict while demonizing the other. On some occasions she dives into treacherous scholastic investigation, revealing the number of cows, pigs, and sheep slaughtered during a marauding but then makes blatant generalizations and oversimplifications on issues that matter greatly, most notably the issue of identities, narratives and historical oppression in the Mountain. On one occasion she writes something like: The Maronites are most likely (it could have been "probably") Arabs." Where did the analytical analyses go? It seems to me that such a fact is significantly relevant and might have warranted a bit more research which would have eliminated the uncertainty in her statement. She also gives way too much credit to the economical disparities in the Mountain which is indicative of her school of thought but fails to capture the spirit of the conflict. This is quite simply a bad book, aside from the biography it is worthless.

Like much scholarship on the modern middle east this book justifies terror by saying `it was popular action...and due to societal changes' as if just because society changes then people have a right to go on a racist rampage. In many ways the author seems to look at Lebanon as if it was the Post-Civil war south. In 1860 Lebanon was going through a foreign intervention of Europeans whose investments were enriching the Maronites and therefore `upsetting' the delicate ethnic balance between Druze and Maronite. The problem is that this `balance' had been based on Islamic supremacy, and that was the only thing the Druze would allow. Jealousy and a fear that the Druze might actually end up poorer then their Maronite neighbors led the Druze to go on a rampage murdering as many as a hundred thousand Christians, they were only stopped in their attacks by international intervention. In many respects the `popular action' of genocide in Lebanon presaged the Armenian massacres of 1915, the Assyrian massacres of 1920 and the Sikh massacres of 1948, each involved a community committing genocide against an ancient minority community, mostly due to the fact that the world wasn't watching and using societal upheaval and chaos as an excuse. Yet in Lebanon in 1860 the international community did notice and intervened. But in the end all this did was postpone the genocidal conflict until the 1980s when new terrorists would go on new rampages while the world ignored the conflict and the media in fact aided and abbeded the terrorists by calling it a `civil war' when their was nothing civil about it and the war entailed a superior majority rounding up a an unarmed minority and killing them all. This book, like so many of its ilk, is biased and flawed but it is one of the few on the subject.

Like much scholarship on the modern middle east this book justifies terror by saying it was popular actionand due to societal changes as if just because society changes then people have a right to go on a racist rampage. In many ways the author seems to look at Lebanon as if it was the Post-Civil war south where racist gangs went on rampages. In 1860 Lebanon apparently was going through a similar foreign intervention of carpet baggers in the form of Europeans whose investments were enriching the Maronites and therefore upsetting the delicate ethnic balance between Druze and Maronite. The problem is that this balance had been based on Islamic supremacy, and that was the only thing the Druze would allow. Jealousy and a fear that Muslims might actually end up poorer then their Christian neighbors led the Druze to go on a rampage murdering as many as a hundred thousand Christians, they were only stopped in their genocide by international intervention. In many respects the popular action of genocide in Lebanon presaged the Armenian massacres of 1915, the Assyrian massacres of 1920 and the Sikh massacres of 1948, each involved a muslim community committing genocide against an ancient minority community, mostly due to the fact that the world wasnt watching and using societal upheaval and chaos as an excuse. Yet in Lebanon in 1860 the international community did notice and intervened. But in the end all this did was postpone the genocidal conflict until the 1980s when new terrorists would go on new rampages and kill another 100,000 Christians while the world ignored the conflict and the media in fact aided and abbeded the terrorists by calling it a civil war when their was nothing civil about it and the war entailed a superior majority rounding up a an unarmed minority and killing them all. This book, like so many of its ilk, is biased and flawed but it is one of the few on the subject.