Customer Reviews

The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace

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This is the most thorough and fair account to date of the struggles in post war Iraq between 2003 and present. It documents the personalities, failures and political parties that have developed in the last few years. Large on the list are the major American mistakes following the liberation of Baghdad in 2003. This included the firing of the Iraqi army which caused 200,000 Sunnis with military training to have no jobs and thus boosted the insurgency. Another foul up was the lack of planning for the disintegration of the country into religious and ethnic factions and the lack fo planning for the way in which to deal with the large state monopolies.

A brilliant book, this exposes the ethnic tension and the rise of al-Sadr and Al-Queida. It has an insiders perspective and a true understanding of much of what is wrong with Iraq and the prospects for peace in the country. An immensely important and thorough and fair book.

Seth J. Frantzman

This book will be read by scholars of the Bush administration's Iraq disaster as the definite history of the Iraq tragedy. The pages of this book will make every American regardless of political affiliation angry and at the same time sad & disgusted that the whole Iraq tragedy from pre-invasion intelligence to post war occupation could have been handled so amateurishly by the greatest military and economic power in the world. This book is a testament to what happens when politicians pursuing a political agenda push aside the military men and try and take control of a war. Although the Bush administration must bear the blame for their own blunders, Iraqi's too must bear their share of the blame. The Bush administration handed them a priceless gift in 2003. Saddam Hussein was demonic dictator; a revolution to remove him could have killed many more than have died in the current war, Iraqi's could have made Saddam's removal at the hands of the coalition forces and with the ensuing high oil prices, their gain and Iraq could be thriving today. Arabs love to talk of Arab unity in the face of Israeli agression & in the name of Islamic brotherhood but Instead power hungry Shia clerics led Al-Sadr and his ilk & thirsty for revenge X members of Saddam's secret police have turned Iraq into a battlefield & made a mockery of so called Islamic unity leaving ordinary Iraqi's of all faiths stuck in the middle, most of whom are tired and exhausted and simply wish to live in peace. The author seems to have a good blueprint for peace but at the root of the problem are the radical Shiites and the x Baathists.

At the end of World War I, the UK and France divided up the Ottoman Empire between them with out much regard for the peoples who actually lived in the Empire. Iraq was born of this ill-informed and arbitrary division as a British protectorate. From its birth to the present, Iraq was never a viable nation state such as Iran or Egypt. It was and is more an assemblage of tribes and religious factions who happen to live in a geo-political region called `Iraq'.

In this excellent book, Ali A. Allawi, an Iraqi Shia, provides first of all a clear and concise summary of religious-political factions among the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations living in Iraq. He also discusses the equally important issue of tribal affiliation among these populations. As might be imagined, Iraq is a very complicated place and this book is complicated as well. Allawi provides the reader with three very useful readers' guides that greatly help following his multiple stories as they unfold: a list of the names of the key players; a list of acronyms; and a glossary of transliterated Arabic terms used in this book.

The core of the book is the story of the failure of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its head, Ambassador Paul Bremer, to rebuild Iraq as a viable nation with a free market economy, established democratic institutions, and the rule of law. Part of the problem facing the CPA was that the reconstruction strategy developed by the Pentagon was based on virtually no understanding of the geographical entity called Iraq but was informed by ludicrously optimistic beliefs that the various Iraqi peoples would view the U.S. as liberators, were anxious to embrace U.S. style democracy, and were ready to leap into the Global economy. Allawi wisely lets the comments of the principal architects of this strategy speak for themselves. He makes clear however that Ambassador Bremer and his CPA staff bought into that strategy in its entirety. In the end the CPA proved completely inept at executing this strategy and managing the various Iraqi reconstruction programs they did attempt to implement. Worse for its entire existence, the CPA proved incapable of understanding the complexities that formed the reality of Iraq and evidenced no interest in learning anything about the `real' Iraq. In what could be the summary of the Pentagon strategy failure in Iraq, Allawi notes that "'nuanced' thinking" was a "term of opprobrium" among senior U.S. policy makers. This inability to conceptualize a complex and often contradictory reality precipitated the invasion of Iraq and produced the failed reconstruction policies that followed.

This book represents a serious effort to write a comprehensive narrative of the Iraq war and occupation. The author is a western educated Iraqi expatriate who was active in Iraqi emigre politics and served as Minister in 2 post-war Iraqi governments. While parts are informed by Allawi's personal experiences, Allawi has made a strong effort to write an objective, balanced narrative. Allawi is particularly informative about the Iraqi aspects of the story. Prior journalistic accounts published here, even very good ones like the books of George Packer and Thomas Ricks, concentrate on American aspects of the story.

Allawi opens with an enlightening narrative of the Iraqi history and sociology and the events leading up to the invasion. Allawi is particularly good on the changing nature of Iraqi society during the Hussein period and the tremendous impoverishment and corruption that accompanied the Iran-Iraq war, the First Gulf War, and the postwar sanctions. He depicts Iraq as a society essentially ruined by the period of Baath party rule and consequently requiring almost complete reconstruction. In particular, he shows how a series of events magnified the Kurd-Sunni Arab-Shiite Arab divisions inherent in the Iraqi state. These divisions, driven to a large extent by emerging Shiite consciousness, occurred even within the emigre community. Allawi himself was involved in proposals to develop a federal Iraqi state with considerable autonomy for Shiites.

Allawi provides a lengthy, detailed, and quite devastating account of the occupation right up a few months ago. He documents the multiple shifts in American policy, the complete lack of forethought devoted to occupation policy, and remarkable incompetence of the American authorities. This is already a well known story but Allawi provides considerably more detail and provides a valuable, Iraqi oriented perspective. Of greater value, Allawi provides a detailed account of Iraqi governments and Iraqi politics during this period. This is a complex topic which Allawi handles well. While strongly condemning the incompetence of the American occupiers, Allawi does not shrink from stringent criticism of Iraqi politicians and governments, including those in which he served.

This is generally a well written book though parts are repetitive. Given the complexity of events, this is not necessarily bad. There is a useful table of acronyms, though these are not always used consistently. There is also a glossary of important individuals which should probably have included more detail. There are abundant footnotes but many of the references are to journalistic sources, reflecting the fact that this book is 'first cut' of events.

Allawi, grad of MIT with Harvard MBA, gives chapter and verse on the Iraq war fiasco. As both Minister of Defense and Finance in post-war Iraq he knows where all the bodies are buried. His main theme is that Iraq is primarily a tribal society, groups seething with revenge, and with little interest in western democracy or a unified nation. After the quick coalition victory, Iraq included once proud Sunni ripe for revenge, Kurds tasting independence, and various Shia groups anxious for power. The clueless, planless conquerors didn't understand any of this. They lifted the lid on this boiling cauldron and are getting scalded. Corruption is rampant.
As Allawi puts it on page 460, "The corroded and corrupt state of Saddam was replaced by the corroded, inefficient, incompetent and corrupt state of the new order. Bush may well go down in history as presiding over one of America's great strategic blunders."
The book also contains some excellent background on the diverse population and geography of Iraq.

Books about the Iraq war are plentiful to say the least and unfortunately, many of them add little to the debate. Even so, there are many books that do and it can be a bit intimidating to dive into the subject. There isn't a single definitive book on the subject and if you really want to understand the war and its aftermath, you'll need to devote quite a bit of time to that end. Ali Allawi's book is definitely worth the read, but it's hard to tell exactly where this book fits into the overall picture from the title alone. What you'll find in The Occupation of Iraq is primarily a narrative (from an Iraqi perspective) of the political process in Iraq after the U.S. invasion. Although Allawi is at times critical of the U.S., what you won't find in this book is a rant against the Bush administration or the U.S. in general, even though many people reviewing books like this like to say that it's somehow incontrovertible proof that Bush is a lying criminal etc.

As an Iraqi, Allawi provides a number of important insights that normally get left out of the discussion by American writers. One important piece of conventional wisdom is that Saddam Hussein's regime was secular and that the rise of Islamic extremism in Iraq is somehow America's fault, but Allawi correctly points out that in 1994, Hussein launched a faith campaign in order to enhance its authority and credibility. This more than anything the U.S. did planted the seeds of Sunni extremism. Another important, but often overlooked point involves the looting of the country that happened after the invasion. Allawi draws attention to the fact that the systematic looting of government buildings was not the work of random criminals, but rather by regime elements determined to dismantle as much of the state's infrastructure as possible, making in more difficult for the Americans and successive Iraqi governments and also to destroy as much incriminating evidence as possible. This never really gets discussed in other books on the subject, but it's an important point that makes a lot of sense when you think about it. As far as the criticism goes that Allawi was an exile, and therefore unqualified to really write about Iraq, the vast majority of the book is concerned with the post-invasion period, when he was part of the government. There is very little about Iraq before the war. These types of criticisms against Allawi carry little, if any weight.

Some things that stood out to me as odd though. One was that the preface was obviously written by someone whose first language isn't English, but the rest of the book doesn't come across this way at all. Maybe it was that the rest of the book was subject to careful editing while the preface was left alone. In any case, it seems like one person wrote the preface while a different person wrote the rest of the book. Also, there are severl times in the book where Allawi refers to himself, but it's in the third person. This adds to the impression that someone else wrote the bulk of the book. In most narrative accounts like this, a person involved in the story itself uses 1st person, not 3rd. Another odd thing about this book is that Allawi never capitalizes the words West or Western. Normally when writing about "the" West or "the" East, the words are capitalized. A subtle jab at the West by Allawi perhaps? Hard to tell, but odd nonetheless.

At 460 pages, The Occupation of Iraq is a lengthy and sometimes difficult read, but ultimately rewarding. To my knowledge, this is the only work of such depth written by an Iraqi involved in the work of rebuilding Iraq at the governmental level. Fiasco and Cobra II cover the story from the American military perspective, The Assassins' Gate and the Foreigner's Gift are more of an investigative journalism/extensive travel diary, and State of Denial is the ultimate insider's look at the Bush administration. These are all important angles and necessary ones to fully understand what's happened in Iraq. Allawi's contribution provides a much needed Iraqi government perspective and in many ways, he's just as critical of the Iraqi government's failures as most are of the Bush administration. This probably shouldn't be the first book about Iraq that someone reads, because I think it requires at least some prior knowledge about the country. Someone with no background will likely have a difficult time here, but the book is certainly rewarding for those well-versed in the subject.

Before one enters into any conversation, debate, or discussion as to what went wrong in Iraq, read this book. There is plenty of blame to go around on all sides of the issue, and Ali Allawi has done an excellent job of detailing the various blunders and missteps in the process, from inside the system, and with a view of all the facets. He does not discriminate or place loyalties to any given side, just states the facts as they are and backs them up with documentation.

If you read just one book about Iraq you need it to be this one. This book is the most comprehensive book out there. It provides a very in depth explanation of Iraq. The book focuses on the political angle of Iraq. He has a lot of inside information that the American press just misses. He has some good insight on American policy that is interesting. The author is Iraqi so he has such an insight that is amazing. You can't find this anywhere else.

I really loved reading this book. It gave a seemingly unbiased perspective of the war especially from an Iraqi's perspective which is very rare. It provided a very detailed account of the Iraq situation, before, during and after the war, relating issues to their historical origins and helping you understand why people who had lived side-by side for centuries suddenly decide to kill each other. I also found the writing flawless and the author a good storyteller. Towards the end of the book however, it got just a touch tedious as I felt the author had by then told me everthing I needed to know about the situation.

Highly recommended!

There is no shortage of accounts of Iraq's occupation by U.S. and British diplomats, military officers, and political appointees, but the voice of Iraqi participants has been nearly silent. In The Occupation of Iraq, Allawi, an activist in the Iraqi opposition who returned to his country after liberation to become Iraq's minister of trade, defense, and finance, remedies this. The result is a product far superior to that provided by instant experts and journalists.

Allawi begins his narrative in the Iran-Iraq war years (1980-88) from which he traces the evolution of both the London-based secular and Tehran-based Islamist Iraqi opposition. He offers often forgotten context, such as the political backdrop to the somewhat spurious Jordanian charges against Iraqi National Congress head Ahmad Chalabi in the Petra Bank scandal. He also acknowledges the CIA and MI6's patronage of Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National Accord. His explanations also elucidate post-liberation problems.

While Western critics might blame de-Baathification for difficulties co-opting the Iraqi bureaucracy, Allawi is more nuanced: Western intelligence services had underestimated the importance of patronage systems. U.S. officials did not realize that many ministries had turned into personal fiefdoms of ministers with employees more loyal to them than the Baath Party. These employees resented Saddam's fall and had little interest in modernization or reform.

Allawi is at his best on coverage of events during his ministerial tenure with valuable perspective about Iraq's reconstruction, the April and November 2004 battles against Sunni insurgents and Shi'i militias, the debate over elections, and the growth of corruption networks. Juxtaposing his account with U.S. newspaper coverage underlines the superficiality of the New York Times and Washington Post.

While Allawi is critical of how the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) functioned, his narrative frustrates with lack of examples. So, too, does his three-page coverage of the Governing Council, which represented Iraqi interests under the CPA. This, however, is still more ink than Allawi spends describing the militias' rise. More valuable are his coverage of the insurgency, a chapter on "The Enigma of Ayatollah Sistani," and detailed discussions of the formation of the Transitional Administrative Law, which served as the basis for Iraq's subsequent constitution.

Undercutting his account, though, is a somewhat lazy description of U.S. thinking and planning behind the war. Here, he is careless with sources, trusting that he both has a representative sample and that the conventional wisdom spouted by politicized journalists is accurate. He replicates the British obsession with the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, which he asserts--falsely--generated intelligence when, in reality, it served as a policy corollary to the State Department's North Gulf affairs directorate, and simultaneously, he ignores the more influential National Security Council and U.S. Central Command. His emphasis on the influence of political philosopher Leo Strauss is both bizarre and cheapens Allawi's works. Certain passages read as a highbrow version of Lyndon LaRouche or other conspiracy theorists. His footnotes enhance such inaccuracies, often expanding tangential narrative rather than providing source material. He disparages both Iraqi and U.S. officials--often without self-criticism or introspection--and warns that time is running out.

The Occupation of Iraq will be of value to historians, but its value to policymakers will be more limited, for while Allawi chronicles events, he does not suggest how either Iraqi or Western policymakers should move forward.

Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2007