Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Hardcover)

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Few would contest that the U.S. occupation of Iraq is a clear example of just how fraught a military occupation can become. In Occupational Hazards, David M. Edelstein elucidates the occasional successes of military occupations and their more frequent failures. Edelstein has identified twenty-six cases since 1815 in which an outside power seized control of a territory where the occupying party had no long-term claim on sovereignty. In a book that has implications for present-day policy, he draws evidence from such historical cases as well as from four current occupations--Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq--where the outcome is not yet known.

Occupation is difficult, in Edelstein's view, because ambitious goals require considerable time and resources, yet both the occupied population and the occupying power want occupation to end quickly and inexpensively; in drawn-out occupations, impatience grows and resources dwindle. This combination sabotages the occupying power's ability to accomplish two tasks: convince an occupied population to suppress its nationalist desires and sustain its own commitment to the occupation. Structural conditions and strategic choices play crucial roles in the success or failure of an occupation. In describing those factors, Edelstein prescribes a course of action for the future.

From the Back Cover

"If only we had had this book before the invasion of Iraq! David Edelstein lucidly and compellingly explains why successful military occupations have been so rare in history and what conditions are needed for them to succeed."--Jack Snyder, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations, Columbia University

"In Occupational Hazards, David M. Edelstein offers a simple, clear argument about the question of why occupations succeed or not. This theory and policy question is a timely one, and Edelstein has researched it well."--Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 235 pages
• Publisher: Cornell University Press; 2nd edition edition (March 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801446155
• ISBN-13: 978-0801446153
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #728,988 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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1 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Dukes of Hazard, July 7, 2009

By	Dmitri Ulinov (California, USA) - See all my reviews

Choice magazine rates this book as an "outstanding academic title." Great. But what about the rest of the book? Does the title stand up to the content? Winning a war is easy. Over 65% of the parties in a two-state conflict end up winning the war. But then comes the difficult part -- figuring out how to occupy a nation where insurgents could possibly whip up sentiment against the occupying force. Edelstein problematizes this issue well, but ignores the larger issue of what to do with zombies. Hordes of flesh-eating dead could potentially complicate one's ability to return sovereignty to the occupied force. And killer clowns. Where does this author address the issue of killer clowns? Yeah, come on over to our planet, spray us with toxic cotton candy and man-eating popcorn kernels, but then what? You eat us all up and you just occupy the world? I think not. That would be hazardous, as this author points out. The only thing that could save us would be baby geniuses. And if baby geniuses could save us from killer clowns, why weren't they deployed to help us figure out how to deal with the US occupation of the Netherlands in 1975? I would guess that these issues will be dealt with in the sequel.