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Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origin of the Korean War [Hardcover]

Richard C. Thornton (Author)
3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)


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Book Description

May 15, 2000
ODD MAN OUT challenges the accepted wisdom and offers a startling reinterpretation of the events that led to the Korean War. It is a novel assessment of the motives, strategies, successes, and failures of Soviet, Chinese, and American leaders as they strugled to maneuver their countries into positions of advantage.

Professor Richard C. Thornton's books is a political history of the contentious American-Soviet-Chinese interaction during 1949 and 1950 that precipitated the Korean War and altered the shape of global politics from then to now. ODD MAN OUT is based on recently declassifed and previously unavailable documents from Soviet, Chinese, and U.S. archives. Thornton contends that the war was primarily the result of the machinations and and miscalculations of Stalin, Truman, Mao, and their respective advisors. Thus, the strife between North Koreans and South Koreans was secondary, and the was itself was avoidable.

Of particular interest is Thornton's documented contention that Stalin intended for North Korea's war plan to fail. Stalin did so in order that China would enter the war, thus halting Mao's efforts to end China's isolation, to establish relations with the United States, and to cease being subordinate to the Soviet Union. Mao fell for Stalin's ruse--and became the odd man out.

The Korean War was a painful debacle for every nation involved, but the war also had far-reaching and long-term consequences beyond the casualty lists. The Cold War became more intense, producing numerous other military conflicts, freuqent superpower crises, and an arms race that lasted for four decades.

The korean War also made the Cold War a truly global contest between East and West. Perhaps most significantly, the Uited States embraced its role as a superpower, and Communist China, emerging from years of internal division caused by civil war, demonstrated that it was a force to be reckoned with.

ODD MAN OUT puts the reader inside the American, Soviet, and Chinese decision-making processes during earth-shaking events that have been misinterpreted for decades. The new documentation available since the end of the Cold War, and the fitieth anniversary of the Korean War, make this a particularly useful reassessment.



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About the Author

Dr. Richard C. Thornton is professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. His major works include The Nixon Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy; The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order; The GFalklands Sting: Reagan, Thatcher, and Argentina's Bomb; and China: A Political History, 1917-1980. He lives in Arlington, Virginia.

Product Details

  • Hardcover: 448 pages
  • Publisher: Brassey's; 1 edition (May 15, 2000)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 1574882406
  • ISBN-13: 978-1574882407
  • Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.4 x 1.5 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1.7 pounds
  • Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,108,672 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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25 of 27 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars A Fundamentally New View of the Korean War, November 7, 2000
By 
"reemul" (Northern Virginia) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origin of the Korean War (Hardcover)
The conventional interpretation of the Korean War is that Kim Il Sung provoked the war, and forced a reluctant Stalin to support him, and that the United States was surprised both by the North Korean offensive of June 1950 and by the subsequent Chinese offensive of November 1950. In this important new book, Thornton offers a compelling argument for a re-examination of this version of events.

Thornton begins with a logical examination of the geopolitical interests of the principal actors: the USSR, the PRC, the USA, and North and South Korea. He shows that Mao wanted good relations "with all nations" - including the US - but needed Soviet assistance to seize Taiwan. Stalin, however, regarded a Sino-American rapprochement as his worst nightmare, and responded by unleashing North Korea against South Korea. Stalin calculated that this move would inevitably bring the US and China into conflict, and thus forestall his nightmare scenario. (In his discussion of Mao and Stalin, Thornton builds on such works as Goncharov and Lewis's "Uncertain Partners".) The US, for its part, wanted to keep Russia and China apart, and in late 1949 began backing away from support from Taiwan, which was of course the main obstacle to good US relations with the PRC. This policy was subsequently re-evaluated when Washington understood that the Soviets and the Chinese had reached an understanding of their own.

Thornton demonstrates that Stalin was the principal instigator of the Korean War, not Kim Il Sung - the tail did not wag the dog. The Soviets planned the June offensive, and supplied the North Korean Army with the weapons without which no attack could take place. Moreover, the Soviets controlled the timing, pace, and outcome of the North Korean offensive through their control of crucial resources: communications equipment, bridging equipment, anti-aircraft weapons, food, fuel, and ammunition. Without these resources, the North Korean offensive could NOT succeed, a fact that certain so-called experts in the field of logistics have utterly failed to understand.

Thornton shows that the development of NSC-68 tracks precisely with the evolution of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the Soviet decision for war in Korea. He argues that Truman deliberately left South Korea vulnerable to invasion (a "tethered goat") in order to invite the war that would cement public, political, and congressional support for the new strategy of containment. Thornton shows that the United States was aware of the Soviet arms buildup in North Korea and of North Korean intentions. Therefore, US action (and inaction) in response to this ample intelligence lead inexorably to the conclusion that the US did not wish to deter attack, but to entice it. Similarly, Thornton shows that Truman was not surprised by the Chinese attack in late 1950, but decided to accept war with China with a full understanding of the consequences. These consequences were, in Thornton's view, ultimately beneficial to the United States; Chinese intervention enabled America to construct a global position of considerable strength and advantage over the Soviet Union and its allies by the mid 1950s.

In conclusion, this work should be read by all students of the early Cold War, and particularly those who wish to understand the interplay of American, Soviet, and Chinese policy.

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5.0 out of 5 stars Truman was smarter than we thought, September 17, 2010
By 
William Meyers (Point Arena, California) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   
The great thing about this book is that it supplies so much detail from official records that you can decide for yourself whether you buy the thesis of the book. I think the case for President Truman and crew sacrificing Korea on the altar of the need for U.S. rearmament is fairly believable. Thornton's view that Stalin fell for Truman's trap because he wanted to force Mao and China into a war against the U.S. is not well documented, and strains credulity. Mao's reaction to Truman and Stalin is pretty well documented, as is Kim Il-sung's lack of competence or even control over his own nation.

However you read it, a lot of people died in the Korean war not realizing they were just pawns in the games of powerful men who wanted even more power. The Korean nation was left divided, and so was China. You can't replay history, so we will never know how communist China would have developed if Truman had not protected Chiang Kai-shek and instead had treated China as a friendly nation.
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5.0 out of 5 stars SOBERING, November 21, 2008
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This meticulously documented study by a history/political science professor at George Washington University shows that:

1). Mao Tse Tung wanted to invade either South Korea or - preferentially - Formosa, but needed Soviet naval and air power for the latter. The Russians wanted the attack to be in Korea. He opted therefore to support

2). Kim Il Sung, who wanted to invade the South, and was supported by

3). Stalin, whose goal in all of this was to prevent Mao from - like Tito - leaving the Soviet orbit. To accomplish this, he deliberately withdrew the Russian delegate from the UN security council so that a veto of UN support for resistance to the North Korean invasion, when it occurred, could not be cast (that is, the absence of the Soviet delegate was deliberate on the part of the Russians - not a faux pas as is commonly thought). There had been a real possibility that the British would recognize Red China diplomatically, but in this way Stalin ensured a united front of the West again the North Koreans and, more importantly, against Red China. The Red Chinese's only friend would be in Moscow.

4). Truman, on the other hand, realized that the American public would not support the costs of the necessary defense measures against the expansion of Communism without a stark illustration of this aggression. The US knew that the North Korean attack was coming - we had submarines off Vladivostok who watched the ships of armaments leaving and spies on the docks of North Korea who watched them arrive - but left the South Koreans vulnerable - without the arms, air and naval power they desperately requested - so that the attack could not be easily repulsed. In fact, the US planning in autumn, 1949 - the year before the invasion - envisaged a retreat to a Pusan perimeter and then a landing at Inchon! So much for MacArthur's brilliance.

Realpolitik!
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Inside This Book (learn more)
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First Sentence:
The fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War occurs as new data is being made public from Russian, Chinese, American, and, to a lesser extent, North Korean sources. Read the first page
Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
ciphered telegram, combat air support, amphibious envelopment, tank threat, wedge strategy, far eastern affairs, military advisory group
Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
North Korean, Security Council, Republic of Korea, State Department, Chiang Kai-shek, Secretary Acheson, Far East, Yalu River, Eighth Army, Han River, Mao Zedong, Northeast Asia, Communist China, Secretary Johnson, Zhou Enlai, Hong Kong, Seventh Fleet, Southeast Asia, Wake Island, Republic of China, Great Britain, General Walker, Outer Mongolia, Secretary of State Acheson, Ambassador Jessup
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