Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory [Hardcover]

Adrian R. Lewis (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 080782609X | ISBN-13: 978-0807826096 | Publication Date: December 3, 2000 | Edition: 1ST

The Allied victory at Omaha Beach was a costly one. A direct infantry assault against a defense that was years in the making, undertaken in daylight following a mere thirty-minute bombardment, the attack had neither the advantage of tactical surprise nor that of overwhelming firepower. American forces were forced to improvise under enemy fire, and although they were ultimately victorious, they suffered devastating casualties.

Why did the Allies embark on an attack with so many disadvantages? Making extensive use of primary sources, Adrian Lewis traces the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy to explain why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were.

Although blame for the Omaha Beach disaster has traditionally been placed on tactical leaders at the battle site, Lewis argues that the real responsibility lay at the higher levels of operations and strategy planning. Ignoring lessons learned in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, British and American military leaders employed a hybrid doctrine of amphibious warfare at Normandy, one that failed to maximize the advantages of either British or U.S. doctrine. Had Allied forces at the other landing sites faced German forces of the quality and quantity of those at Omaha Beach, Lewis says, they too would have suffered heavy casualties and faced the prospect of defeat.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

While the U.S. First Infantry's invasion of Normandy was ultimately successful, the division suffered terrible casualties notoriously so even compared to battles in the 55 years since. Retired U.S. Army Major Adrian R. Lewis, assistant professor of history at the University of North Texas, combs primary source material for Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory, and finds that most of the leaders on the ground opposed the plan, which was then imposed on them from higher up. A dual Main Selection of the History Book Club, this clearly written, carefully argued and well-researched account offers a still-valid lesson in the importance of communication up and down the chain of command, and on bravery.

Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal

Lewis (history, Univ. of North Texas) argues that the D-Day invasion of Omaha Beach was an extremely costly victory for the Allies. Most of the previous "lessons" of amphibious operations were disregarded, while some were not even considered. The British had previous experience with the Dieppe raid, and even the United States had several invasions under its belt by this point in the war. Yet the assault on Omaha did not take these experiences into account, and, as a result, many men were needlessly sacrificed. While local commanders have traditionally been blamed for the heavy losses at Omaha Beach, the author provides convincing evidence that the blame should rest on the shoulders of the strategic planners. He has built a very strong case by using primary evidence, such as army archives and memoirs of the commanders involved. Historical specialists and scholars will be interested in the book, but it may not have the wide appeal of such previous invasion books as Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day: June 6, 1944. Recommended for both public and academic libraries. Mark Ellis, Albany State Univ., GA
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 400 pages
• Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press; 1ST edition (December 3, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 080782609X
• ISBN-13: 978-0807826096
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6.4 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (21 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #987,018 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

21 of 22 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Absolutely essential reading for the serious student of WWII, June 13, 2001

By 

Charles Vekert "Chuck Vekert" (Highland, MD USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Hardcover)

This book asks why Omaha Beach was so close to a defeat, and provides the first new answer in 40 years, and the best answer ever. Lewis's analysis will, I think, become part of the "conventional knowledge" of 21st century history, and has throughly refuted many earlier attempts to explain why we nearly lost.

In one sentence, the D-day plan was a poor compromise between British and American seaborn invasion methods, cooperation between army and navy was less than outstanding, and there was over reliance on airpower to soften the beaches, a job for which it was untrained, untested, and unenthusiastic. At Omaha, the bombs missed the targets entirely.

The book also has many lessons for a manager in a large organizations, if one is willing to think about the larger implications of planning in large organizations.

One reviewer stated that the book seemed poorly researched. I couldn't agree less. Lewis has thoroughly researched the "paper trail" leading to D-Day--much more so, I suspect, than anyone before him.

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A good book that few will read, June 18, 2004

By 

Michael Licari (Cedar Falls, IA United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Hardcover)

Omaha Beach is a book that anyone interested in D-Day should read. Unfortunately, since it focuses on military doctrine and planning, rather than the actual battle, few people will actually read it. Lewis, in this extensively researched book, analyzes the planning of the Normandy assault, specifically looking to discover why the landings at Omaha Beach were nearly a failure. To do this, Lewis discusses the abilities and defects of the various generals involved in the overall planning (Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley). He also analyzes the different beach assault doctrines of the Americans and the British, and how those doctrines factored into the decisions the three leaders made. Lewis clearly shows that by the time these three had thoroughly screwed up, generals Gerow and Huebner (commanders of the II Corps and 1st Infantry Division, respectively) had very limited ability to make changes. They were, in fact, handed a flawed plan and commanded to carry out essentially a suicide mission.

Lewis shows that beach assault doctrine for the British and Americans differed substantially. The British, who controlled operational planning in the Mediterranean and Western European theaters, preferred landings that maximized surprise. Thus, they conducted landings in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy at night with minimal shore bombardment. The Americans, on the other hand, preferred a direct daylight assault that maximized their firepower advantage (learned the hard way at Tarawa). Thus, by 1944 and 1945, landings in the Pacific used shore bombardments that lasted not minutes or hours, but days. Both doctrines produced successful landings. So what happened at Omaha Beach?

Lewis argues that the near-failure occurred because new doctrine based on improper expectations was invented by Montgomery and allowed to be put in place by Eisenhower. Bradley compounded the problem by refusing to listen to the objections of Gerow and Huebner. This new doctrine was a bad blending of American and British doctrines. As a result, the planning produced a daylight assault intended to achieve tactical surprise. Essentially, two incompatible features of American and British doctrines were melded. This was particularly a result, Lewis argues, of Montgomery's over-reliance on airpower. It was assumed that a long naval bombardment was not necessary since heavy bombers would blast beach defenses and obstacles away in one quick bomb run. This would preserve surprise, but of course would require daylight landings.

Since airpower in World War II was hardly accurate, it is no surprise that the bombers did not hit a single thing on the beach. Coupled with bad intelligence and other serious planning disasters, the landings at Omaha Beach nearly failed. The reader is left wondering how such incompetence at high levels was allowed, but is also left wondering in amazement at the achievement of the men who landed on that beach. Lewis shows that they stormed ashore after literally 99% of the landing plan had completely failed, yet they were still able to make it.

This is a good book, one that demonstrates very well the difficulties of planning and coalition warfare. It also takes a lot of the shine off of the records of the top commanders in Europe. Many of the honors in the records of Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley are certainly well-deserved, but this book shows that some weren't, and that the successes of D-Day were due far more to tactical leadership (division HQ and down) and the sheer willpower of the ordinary soldiers. It certainly seems that the "top brass" set them up to fail.

16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Demolishes Omar Bradley's reputation, July 2, 2002

By 

1. "John Henninger" (Littleton, CO United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Hardcover)

Lewis strongly critizes Omar Bardley's conduct during the planning for Operation Overload. Bradley did not allow enough commandos or air strikes to destroy the German beach obstacles on Normandy Beach. Bradley also ignored General Pete Cortlett's advice that the pre-invasion bombardment should be longer than planned. The invasion was planned in the early morning which made the invasion force easy targets for the German defenders. Bradley refused to plan the landing to place at night because he thought that airpower would neutralize the German defenders. But the aircraft used to disable the German defenses were heavy bombers which were inaccurate rather than smaller tactical aircraft more suited for the task. To make matters worse Bradley placed newly trained soldiers in the first wave while the veterans were in reserve. I would highly reccomend this book to anyone interested in the often overlooked flaws of commanders such as Omar Bradley.