On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War [Paperback]

Harry G. Summers (Author)

Book Description

Release date: June 1, 1995

Summer's inspired analysis of America's war in Vietnam answers the most pressing questions remaining from that terrible conflict more than a decade before Robert McNamara's painful admissions.

Product Details

• Paperback: 240 pages
• Publisher: Presidio Press; Reissue edition (June 1, 1995)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0891415637
• ISBN-13: 978-0891415633
• Product Dimensions: 8.2 x 0.6 x 5.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 9.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (28 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #338,316 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

28 of 29 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars The single best accounting for the US failure in Vietnam. . . May 7, 2006

By Thompson

Format:Paperback

Summers doesn't even bother to examine the customary, bubble-gum explanations for the US failure in Vietnam (media backstab, anti-war movement, reliance on conventional tactics to deal with a guerilla enemy) that the general public has come to accept. Instead, he uses his experience in the military and his mastery of Clausewitzian war theory to explain, precisely, how our political and military leadership mismanaged the war. That's what the book is, really: a Clausewitzian indictment of the US political and military leadership. It's also what Summers finds most alarming about the US performance in Vietnam--we failed to abide by rules that we should have had committed to memory by 1965, and in ignoring them, we actually found the North Vietnamese beating us at our own game.

To my mind, the colonel hit on two themes that I found interesting and edifying as I tried to come to my own conclusions about why we lost in Vietnam. These are themes that I have not seen mentioned elsewhere, which is why I will cite them here.

First, Summers begins his book trying to convince his audience that the "National Will" to fight the war was impaired from the beginning. It's not that Americans didn't support the war at first--they did, but only as an afterthought (keep in mind that Vietnam was not front and center in 1965). But out of fear of losing his Great Society programs and possible re-election in 1968, Johnson made a deliberate decision not to mobilize the passions of the American people. A national will was never built. There was never a formal declaration of war. As a nation, we never announced our intentions to go to war. Instead, Johnson and his circle of advsiers crept into Vietnam, believing the war could be fought on a limited scale, by the military, without the full commitment of the American people. Because he never envisioned the kind of engagement we would find ourselves in after 1965, Johnson thought it was possible get in, get out a short time later, and then turn his full attention to his domestic programs.

But when the war began to run long, and as our policies shifted in response to an adversary that was vastly more determined than we had anticipated, the American public perked up. First it became annoyed, then deeply irritated, and finally lashed out against the political and even military establishment. Summers would exonerate the public completely, because, in his view, since the national will to fight was never built, it can hardly be said to have collapsed. I thought that was interesting.

The one great idea I take away from the colonel's book, however, is his thesis that the United States lost the Vietnam War primarily because it oriented itself on destroying the VC, which Summers says was a myth, a facade, a smokescreen, a secondary force that American forces exhausted themselves on. The heart of the enemy's strength was the North Vietnam conventional forces--the NVA.

The importance of this insight cannot be overstated, because it is indispensable to understanding the dissolution of the American homefront. The US thought it was pursuing the strategic offensive by organizing 'search and destroy' missions against the VC spread across South Vietnam. In reality, we had adopted the strategic defensive, since we were not taking the fight to the enemy's main force--the NVA. We mistakenly identified the VC as the enemy's center of gravity, spent years hunting the VC down as public support ebbed away, and in 1973 watched bitterly from afar as NVA tanks--not VC--overran Saigon.

Summers is saying we fought the wrong guys in Vietnam. This is remarkable all by itself, but it also (if true) invalidates the cacophony of criticism that disparages the US (and attributes our failure) for not incorporating more counter-insurgency tactics against the VC.

Thank you, Harry Summers.

31 of 34 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Tactical Victory -- Strategic Defeat July 6, 2000

By George R Dekle VINE™ VOICE

Format:Paperback

Summers recounts an exchange between himself and a former NVA officer some years after the war. It went something like this Summers: "You never defeated us in the field." NVA Officer: "That is true. It is also irrelevant."

I recently saw this bumper sticker on a Vietnam veteran's car: "I don't know what happened. When I left we were winning." To find out what happened, read this book. Summers gives an insightful critique of the strategic failure using the Nine Principles of War and the doctrine of Clausewitz.

I read this book a few years before the Gulf War, and as I watched that war unfold, I kept "On Strategy's" teachings in mind. It seemed to me at the time that those charged with the conduct of the Gulf War effort were applying "On Strategy's" doctrine chapter and verse. Read the book and review the Gulf War effort, and see if you don't agree.

25 of 29 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars for Colonel Summers April 17, 1999

By Stephen Thurston ([e-mail])

Format:Paperback

One of the enduring ironies of military history--and the history of military thought--is that the most profound analysis, clearest insights, and most enduring illumination of the principles and practice of warfare has been accomplished by military professionals of relatively modest rank.

To the distinguished list of Colonel Clausewitz, Captain Mahan, and Captain Hart, add Colonel Harry Summers.

ON STRATEGY is certainly the most important book on military theory to appear since WWII and is perhaps the most important work of this century. Potential purchasers need have no fear that this book will be out-of-print for the foreseeable future; the presses will keep running because ON STRATEGY will be required reading in every military academy in the world for many decades.

ON STRATEGY is "about" the Vietnam War in much the same way that Clausewitz is "about" the Napoloenic Wars or that Mahan is "about" 18th-century naval struggles between France and England. That is, Summers uses the Vietnam War as a vehicle for analysis and illustration of principles of war that apply universally.

Aside from the clarity of his thought, Summers' most remarkable achievement is his writing style: For all of its subtlety, this book is accessible and valuable for readers who may have little background in military affairs.

At the end of WW II, the United States created special five-star ranks to honor it most senior commanders for their contributions to victory.

A book review is a poor substitute for a richly-deserved star to reward extraordinary service to the nation. But for his brilliant analysis and articulate writing, pin Five Stars on Harry Summars' collar.

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The reviewer is a former military intelligence analyst.