9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Very fine book on the most dangerous event of the Cold War, May 5, 2004
If you are interested in finding out what the Cuban Missile Crisis was actually about and how it was conducted and resolved, this is a fantastic book. Not only do we get the context of what went on during the Eisenhower administration when Castro came to power, but we get the context of what was going on in the Soviet Union as well.
I did not know that Raul Castro was the committed communist who advocated closer ties with the USSR. That Fidel was anti-US was always clear, but it was most interesting to read about how the connection between Cuba and the USSR developed and its limitations because of Fidel's undisciplined and independent nature.
The back-channel diplomacy was also very interesting to read about and why we didn't learn about the Jupiter missile removal from Turkey until much later was another story I wanted to understand. For me, the most useful things I learned were the lurching and stumbling nature of the way the USSR and the US played off of and against each other. Not only were both sides trying to balance the other side, each side was also trying to be provocative as well.
The book also notes that the Soviets saw the Kennedy assassination as the work of a far right wing conspiracy led by H.L. Hunt, although they had no real evidence but the word of journalist Paul Ward. They refused to believe that the President's security services could have allowed a lone madman to shoot the President (as was actually the case).
The book ends with a brief discussion of coup that removed Khrushchev and put Brezhnev in power.
The book is written very well and has a rich supply of notes and documentation backing up the story the authors report. I think it is a fascination and important book from the most dangerous period in the Cold War.
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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Most Detailed account of Cuban-Missile Crisis, October 15, 2006
Two Harvard scholars, Russian Historian Aleksandr Fursenko and American Historian Timothy Nafatali expose the missing gaps to one of the Cold War's most pivotal episodes - the Cuban Missile Crisis. In their 1998 book One Hell of a Gamble, they convincingly argue that the Post-WWII episode was an international dilemma. Contending that "no one person or government created the mix of interest, power, and fear that nearly exploded in 1962," the authors develop a sound narrative that illuminates the finer details of the crisis. They succeed marvelously, with minor exceptions, at explaining the Soviet and American nuances of the dramatic history involved in the early 60's. Beginning with the rise of revolutionary leader Fidel Castro and ending with Khrushchev's demise, the work chronicles the delicate balance of power that tilted back and forth between the superpowers and Cuba.
The authors masterfully handle Soviet archives, and American sources, but the authors somewhat clumsily rifle through Cuban historiography. The opening chapters, however, do correctly portray Castro's budding relationship with the Soviet Union, and his diminishing alliance with the United States. And the failed Bay of Pigs operation coupled with Kennedy's campaign promise to "not be soft" on Cuba, did indeed solidify Castro's motivation to ally with the Soviets. In contrast, one of the chief frailties of the work lies with the somewhat unclear portrayal of Castro's image and relationship with key confidants. Granted, the authors lacked access to Cuban archives, but the absence of corroboration leaves room for question. For instance, the authors portray Castro as having a "privileged background" in his early years and offer little evidence to substantiate this claim. This description of Castro, however, contradicts most scholarship on the dictator's earlier years. Ernesto Betancourt, Washington Representative to Castro in the late 50's, noted that Castro was "one of the illegitimate children of the house servant sired by his father." Betancourt further noted that Castro was embarrassed about his childhood and disillusioned by not being allowed to utilize the "facilities established for American staffers at the United Fruit Club." The club, which in part was established by the profits of his father's sugar plantation, created a wedge of indifference between the young Castro and the Americans. According to Betancourt, the aforementioned facts led to the complex that feeds Castro's "inferiority against the Cuban upper classes . . . [and] . . . the United States in general." The author's portrayal of Castro's image as a young man was incomplete and somewhat misleading. With a minor lapse in scholarship, the authors quickly change academic gears and advance a sound narrative on the Soviet historiography of the crisis.
Utilizing a trove of recently accessible Soviet archives, the Harvard scholars introduce new behind- the- scene details of how the crisis unfolded. The Soviets, of course, capitalized on America's failed overthrow of Cuba. Khrushchev estimated that the deployment of nuclear warheads ninety miles from America's coastline would tip the strategic nuclear balance in the Soviet's favor and would support the Cuban revolution. Moreover, he projected that the deployment of warheads could be kept secret until it was too late for the U.S. to act. This, of course, was an error in judgment - as U-2 reconnaissance planes quickly determined the presence of missiles in Cuba. Formerly, scholars ascribed to the belief that hard-liners in the Kremlin forced, or highly encouraged, Khrushchev to place Soviet warheads on the island nation. However, the evidence presented by the authors discounts this premise - and strongly suggests that Khrushchev's acted alone in this decision.
After the American discovery of warheads in Cuba in October of 1962, the two superpowers engaged in active diplomatic negotiations. In previous histories of the crisis, it was thought that only official and public channels were utilized for communications between the countries. Utilizing a partially transcribed collection of the Kennedy ExCom (Executive Committee) tapes, we learn for the first time about a small network of back channel communications - which proved to be vital in the continuing negotiations for peaceful resolution to the crisis. For instance, Aleksandr Alekseev, the Soviet Ambassador to Havana, provided an informal communication channel between the Cubans and Soviets. Similarly, Georgi Bolshakov a Soviet Intelligence officer, relayed messages between the Soviets and Americans via Robert Kennedy and American journalist Frank Holeman.
Ironically, the authors reveal that Kennedy provided private concessions to the Kremlin via Bolshakov during the critical thirteen days of the crisis. Most importantly, Kennedy agreed to remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey - a revelation that was not publicized to the media.
Interestingly, only bilateral sources, namely known intelligence officers and journalists, were noted in this work. The authors, however, fail to mention the GRU spy, Oleg Penkovsky, who allegedly provided the CIA with detailed information on the Soviet missile capabilities and locations at the time. In The Spy Who Saved the World, Penkovsky was given credit for relaying crucial intelligence reports to the Kennedy Administration, which allegedly contributed to his decision for a quarantine of the Soviet naval fleet. It remains unclear why Fursenko and Naftali omitted this fact; perhaps they had no detailed evidence that the U.S had legitimate clandestine sources. Of course, de-classified intelligence archives from both the CIA and KGB may have been sanitized; and therefore, may have limited the author's ability to understand and synthesize intelligence sources. Whatever the case, the Penkovsky exclusion limits the intelligence scholarship of the missile crisis. One question the authors may have raised, was whether Kennedy fully utilized intelligence provided by unilateral human sources, such as Penkovsky, during the crisis?
Thankfully for mankind, the careful deliberations between Kennedy and Khrushchev resulted in a peaceful compromise that averted a thermo-nuclear war. The authors concluded that after the missile crisis "Khrushchev and Kennedy were now willing to take risks for better relations." Their efforts established a détente between the two superpowers - but one that was brief. Unfortunately, the short-lived prospect faded after the November 1963 Kennedy assassination and the October 1964 coup that removed Khrushchev from power.
One hell of a Gamble is a tremendously detailed work that exceeds previous scholarship on the post-WWII crisis. The authors offer compelling evidence that the crisis came closer to spinning out of control than once thought. We discover that Castro, Khrushchev, and Kennedy were "ultimately driven by a sense of what was best for themselves, and for their people." Moreover, the authors convincingly demonstrate that Cuba became the pivotal pawn in the Cold War chess match between the Soviets and the Americans. So persuasive was their story, that film director Ronald Donaldson used the context of their work for the film Thirteen Days - which depicted the crucial two weeks of the missile crises. Although an unexceptional account of the crisis on the American and Cuban fronts, the authors do offer an authoritative interpretation on Soviet historiography during the 1962 crisis. Cold War scholars should pay careful attention to this work, which highlights some of the missing details of an especially tense period during the Cold War.
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