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One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990
 
 
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One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990 [Paperback]

George Baer (Author)
5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)

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Book Description

July 1, 1996
This is a history of how the Navy responded—in doctrine, strategy, operations, preparedness, self-awareness, and force structure—to radical changes in political circumstance, technological innovation, and national needs and expectations.

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Customers buy this book with Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Woodrow Wilson Center Press S.) $12.26

One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990 + Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Woodrow Wilson Center Press S.)


Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

Baer (U.S. Naval War Coll.) takes what could have been a dry topic-the policy history of the U.S. Navy-and turns it into interesting reading. He reviews the development of, and the problems inherent in, the policy decisions that shaped the U.S. Navy and, in turn, other naval powers. The book follows navy policy makers as they decide what the principal focus of the U.S. Navy will be and then determine the proper makeup of the fleet in order to ensure that the policy be carried out. One fascinating section involves the struggle to determine which branch, the Air Force or Navy, would control the nuclear weapons carried onboard navy vessels. With the strong focus on the policy history of the navy, this book would be valuable for libraries with strong naval sciences and history collections.
Terry Wirick, Erie Cty., Lib. System, Pa.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Review

“A fine book: meticulous, judicious, incisive. It is a book to which the conventional exaggerations—“must” reading, relevant, if you’re only going to read one book on the subject, etc.—actually may be said to apply. . . . It is a study of the interactions of technology, bureaucracy, politics and culture, of how an institution adapts, or fails to adapt, to changing conditions. As such, the book belongs on a lot of desks at the Pentagon.”—Washington Times


“Baer takes what could have been a dry topic—the political history of the modern U.S. Navy—and turns it into interesting reading.”—Library Journal


“This is clearly one of the two or three most important works in American naval history published in the last decade; it has the potential to become a classic in the field. Well researched and carefully nuanced, it provides a distinctive perspective on the evolving historical relationship between national interest and national politics on the one hand and naval power on the other. Not only is this a significant contribution to scholarship—one that will critically influence how historians and political scientists think about American naval power—it is an enormously readable work. Baer writes beautifully, and he has organized his material effectively. The book is fully accessible to anyone interested in naval history.”—Edward Rhodes, Rutgers University


“A valuable book that stimulates reflection, reconsideration, and debate.”—International History Review


“Policy makers will benefit greatly from reading Baer’s erudite review of the navy’s previous successes and failures in developing strategy. . . . In seeking to educate both the naval and the non-naval communities, Baer admirably fulfills the special obligation of a public historian to convey to several audiences his special understanding of the institution he serves.”—The Public Historian

Product Details

  • Paperback: 568 pages
  • Publisher: Stanford University Press (July 1, 1996)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0804727945
  • ISBN-13: 978-0804727945
  • Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 1.3 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1.8 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #978,046 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars Ruling the Ocean Waves, February 2, 2009
This review is from: One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Paperback)
This book is a history of the U.S. Navy between 1890, when Alfred Thayer Mahan published "The Influence of Seapower Upon History," and 1990, when the Cold War ended. "The central thesis of this book, that the Navy, as any other agent of the government, is the instrument of national policy, its junior partner in every regard, and to dissociate itself from the broad national proposition is to disassociate itself from the source of its purpose and its strength" (p. 415).

The problem, as Baer explains, is that the political leadership--particularly in the first half of these hundred years--often failed to provide any guidance. The admirals of the USN muddled on as best they could, deducing policy from public statements of their civilian masters. War Plan Orange, a document that was constantly revised during the first half of the twentieth century, was the plan for going to war with Japan. Although it is easy to misinterpret the War Plan as a master blueprint for World War II, it was a USN document and developed without consulting the U.S. Army. It was not part of any national security strategy. That it ended up influencing the outcome of the Pacific Theater is a testament mainly to the analytical impact the document and related war games and other exercise had on the service.

Baer's account is broad. Most of his focus is on years of peace and the strategic application of sea power: roughly one-third focuses on events prior to World War II, another third to that conflict, and a final third to the Cold War years. He understands the nuance of strategy, foreign policy, and technological advances. The battleship dominated interwar planning not because of some linger sentimental attachment on the part of senior officers, but because it was the best and most accurate way of delivering firepower across big stretches of water. The aircraft carriers were still weapons systems in development at this time and the U.S. Navy turned to them in desperation only after December 7, 1941. In fact, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the stronger service during most of the 1930s and U.S. naval officers warned--with good reason--for that decade and as late as 1941 that they could very well lose to the Japanese. The USN got stronger only as the American economy grew recovered from the Great Depression, which gave the service the additional ships and men that it needed to fulfill its mission. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State were more concerned with political issues, than these operational matters, and were basically writing checks that the United States could not cash, at least for a year or two.

When war came Roosevelt was trying to do as much as was possible, but the Japanese were in a position to win the war had they had a better understanding of the indirect ramifications of seapower. Their mistakes, as much as American actions, were responsible for the outcome of the war. Baer gives proportional focus to naval operations in the Atlantic and is even more critical of German efforts, but does not forgive U.S. admirals for making mistakes about convoy protection that gave the enemy some easy victories.

Despite this massive victory, the USN lost its way during the Cold War years. Admirals thought the need for a strong navy was self-evident and were unable to coordinate the Navy's missions to national security strategy. The service was out of step with each succeeding administration. The number of ships shrank dramatically in the late 1960s and 1970s and the USN made a modest comeback at best during the Reagan years before the Cold War ended.

Baer's analysis and writing are impressive. This book is a serious one that many, many people interested in naval history and national security strategy should read, but the author's skills as a writer make it an enjoyable experience as well.
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5.0 out of 5 stars A excellent book on US Naval History, October 30, 2009
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This review is from: One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Paperback)
This book describes how threats, world events, and politics created the Navy we have today. The book explains why the US created a large Navy, why various weapon systems were pursued, and the perceived threats during the 21st century. The book also details the rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy (after reading this book it appears the USAF posed a bigger threat to Navy than the Soviet Union). Our naval leadership created a navy that was the only force that could respond quickly in large numbers anywhere in the world. The book does not go into details describing battles, or tactics during the various wars, but it is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the US Navy. After reading this book you will begin to discover that few political leaders understand what the Navy can provide and you will have a greater appreciation of our past naval leadership.
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5.0 out of 5 stars How it Happened, Why it Happened and Where You Get the Shirt., January 14, 2009
By 
cdrikari "cdrikari" (Port Orchard, WA United States) - See all my reviews
This review is from: One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Paperback)
This is one of the most thorough and comprehensive (modern) American Naval Histories in existence to date. At ~550 pages, obviously little is covered in great detail, but Prof. Baer does an effective job of covering the periods in question with a deft hand that provides enough background to make the how and why of what the Navy did at the time make sense.

The most valuable part of this book however, is the fact that it is exhaustively noted and these notes and the index literally take up the last 90 pages of the book, making it _the_ guide to determining what primary sources and other histories should be your next stop for any subject, battle, commander or time period you are interested in exploring further.

Read it for a course, have already ordered a copy for my professional library. Highly recommended.
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Inside This Book (learn more)
First Sentence:
Before 1890 few Americans thought that the United States was a maritime nation dependent for its security and its prosperity on control of its sea approaches or that the country needed an offensive battleship fleet. Read the first page
Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
offensive sea control, maritime strategy, offensive navy, dual advance, attrition campaign, finite deterrence, strike carriers, balanced fleet, naval revolution, antisubmarine campaign, naval diplomacy, navy thinking, atomic strategy, attack carriers, strategic plans division, naval concentration, naval planning, strategic independence, horizontal escalation, naval strategy, riverine force, fleet engagement, navy planning, general nuclear war, battle fleet
Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
United States, Soviet Union, General Board, Far East, Marine Corps, Pearl Harbor, War Plan Orange, North Atlantic, Royal Navy, Atlantic Fleet, President Truman, State Department, Iwo Jima, New Guinea, Seventh Fleet, Washington Conference, Korean War, Leyte Gulf, Manila Bay, Coral Sea, Great Britain, South Pacific, Combined Fleet, Naval War College, South Vietnam
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