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One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War

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John Poole is a man with a mission-to raise the level of skill of American fighting units-and he has made me a disciple. Poole is well known in infantry circles for his thick manual of small unit technique called _The Last Hundred Yards: The NCOs Contribution to Warfare_. I have seen well-thumbed copies lying about in a battalion at Camp Lejeune, so I am not just taking the author's word for it.

This book, _One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War_, gives the ethical, religious, psychological, social, and professional military underpinnings of the above-mentioned practical handbook of ground unit technique. Gunny Poole is an original and an inspiration. I call him Gunny Poole in our e-mail and phone conversations, even though he left the Marine Corps for the first time at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He then re-enlisted as an enlisted man, retiring finally as a Gunnery Sergeant-a role and rank held in reference throughout the Marine Corps.

I need to tell you that Gunny Poole is a deeply religious Roman Catholic. The religious dimension of this book is probably its most significant and persuasive aspect. His religious teaching on military matters-which I agree with 100% coming from a different, but non-Catholic Biblical tradition-is that our religious ethics teach that the point of fighting in a just cause is *to win, not to kill*. Not only are the lives of our own service members precious, according to our religious teaching, but so are enemy lives, both civilian and combatant. The irreplaceable key to winning with minimum casualties, both ours and enemy, is SKILL. So small unit skill and small unit leader skill are religious imperatives. In almost any fight, especially one that goes on for a while, skill trumps technology. (See _Joint Forces Quarterly_, Summer, 1999.)

The author's other book, _The Last Hundred Yards: The NCOs Contribution to Warfare_, describes the elite-level small unit skills that ANY American unit can attain, if allowed to train properly under NCOs empowered to conduct this training. One More Bridge to Cross gives the maneuver warfare rationale for these practices that engage the intelligence and initiative of the lowest echelons. Poole puts before our eyes a vision of the lowliest infantryman as tactically expert in planning his moves for the next 50 meters as his battalion CO should be for the next 5,000.

I could go on and on singing the praises of these two books by John Poole, but far better for you to read and absorb them, than for me to convey the false sense that just by reading my review you get the "gist."

Jonathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D. Author of _Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character_ [in print as a Touchstone paperback] and _Odysseus in America_ [forthcoming from Scribner]. Dr. Shay speaks frequently to professional military audiences on cohesion, leadership, and training as the keys to preventing psychological and moral injury in military service.

One More Bridge to Cross is a must read for anyone interested in learning more about serious soldering at its most basic level. John Poole has very accurately broken down old military or for that matter conflict theories down to the level that does make a difference - the individual soldier and the things he fights for. When reading the book I kept nodding my head in consensus and admiration for the exact, precise and yet simple way Mr Poole discusses and tries to teach us common sense. Because that's what it is all about. No-nonsense and common sense. I as a captain in the Swedish Army recognize much of our (Swedish) way of training, leading and using our limited military assets in the Common-Sense Style. My current assignment is as an instructor at the Army Combat School. Therefore I will make this book mandatory reading for the young Swedish Army Cadets that I'm responsible to train in small-unit tactics.

I am convinced that in time every military institution will include John Poole's work in their teaching and training, just as well as we learn from Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz. He might even be one of our times great military theorists.

If you want to read a military book that many senior defense and defense-related leaders would not want anyone to read and openly discuss, then read this thought-provoking gem from John Poole.

This book is a well researched analysis of the American (western) approach to and conduct of war, and its moral, physical, and political consequences. Accurate and powerful historical examples complement this analysis. Poole argues that despite all the claims of American military superiority at all levels, the U.S. military has grown so dependent on technology and massive ammunition expenditures that it has let its individual and small-unit skills and experiences atrophy and be lost.

If you believe that the U.S. military is by far the best in the world, then Poole's perspectives will challenge your beliefs. Read what he has to say about our World War II adversaries, think about what he says happened to us in Korea, follow his logic about what happened in Vietnam, remember our approach to and conduct of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, reflect on his discussion about our efforts in Somalia in 1993, and then see if you notice any common trends extending into our operations in Afghanistan. Scary stuff.

Fortunately, Poole also gives some common-sense advice to reverse the dangerous course we are following to tactical inferiority. This advice is exactly what many senior defense and defense-related leaders fear the most, for it would shatter the status quo in which they rose to power and have fought so hard to maintain.

Poole packs a big and important message into a small book that is as thought-provoking to the American taxpayers as it is to the American fighting men and women.

In this another excellent work from John Poole, the author has chosen to examine the moral aspects of good soldiering by focusing on their application on a tactical level (although his suggestions might be equally well applied on the strategic level.) Don't be mistaken, however. This is not simply a theological tract. The author, a Roman Catholic, probably has more first hand knowledge of good solid tactics than any other "expert" going. He knows how to kill another man, another unit, and/or another tank. His interest, however, is in the proper aim of maneuver warfare: winning the war with an eye on what Liddell-Hart called "a better peace."

It's been over twenty years since the U.S. military formally outlined their emphasis on maneuver warfare (hastily summed up as "achieving our objective(s)") rather than attrition (again, hastily summed up as "destroying the enemy"), and yet our forces still seem bogged down in no-win attrition style wars. Were they to pay closer to attention to the evaluations of gentlemen such as Poole, they'd have a much easier time winning those "hearts and minds" we're always hearing about.

There are, of course, a multitude of religious undertones here, but even the most atheistic amongst us will have to recognize the strategic pragmatism of Poole's suggestions. The bombardment of a city by air may win you some rubble, but it doesn't win you a war. A wake of bodies doesn't make for a victory, and it doesn't lay the groundwork for "peace-keeping." As we've seen, it only encourages resentment and an insurgency.

If there's an intruder in your neighbor's house, you seek out and remove the intruder. You don't blow up the building. If your goal is to show an eastern peoples that you've come to remove an indiscriminately violent dictator, you don't use indiscriminate violence.

One More Bridge to Cross addresses something that often gets forgotten- the training of our souls and establishing a natural moral compass when engaged in combat will instinctively take over as chaos ensues. Fight or flight instincts take over on the battlefield. If training is not effective and becomes a part of ones character, it's left behind in lieu to what already exists in one's moral fabric. This book is about avoiding killing when the opportunity exists in order to minimize loss of life and limb. It's about applying only the appropriate amount of force in order to meet mission requirements. Before going into combat we train mentally and physically with a quick skim over the morality of war, and the mental, physical and moral costs of war without ever realizing what war actually may entail.

So what happens when human beings ignore training of the compass? We have incidences like Abu Ghraib, WWII soldiers say they were only following orders when exterminating Jews, Serbs and Muslims of the Balkans revenge killing each other, Palestinians and Israelis going tit- for-tat, Special Forces Operators being accused of needlessly killing detainees, news reporters concerned about getting stories out without considering their uninformed or biased approaches. All of the above named actions contribute to the continuation of war.

Service members who are not mentally prepared for this reality may become susceptible to mental and emotional illnesses i.e. Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. They may feel guilt ridden for something they have actually done correctly, but do not realize that they had taken appropriate measures because faith in themselves and their training were not reinforced.

Again, war is the ultimate clash of HUMAN WILLS. The ultimate clash of wills is highly emotional for people on the front lines of a battle fields. Unless one has been in a combat environment, one will never truly understand and will attempt to subjugate the importance of the human in combat vice the machine. People die, friends die, and this causes anger, pain and the desire for revenge.

Poole's book stresses the importance of maintaining a moral compass in combat. He is training the subconscious to contend with a reality that some hi-tech supporters of weapon systems do not understand. Killing is killing whether one pushes a button, or the other pushes a trigger. One kills people and calls some collateral damage and perpetuates the fight by providing the enemy a battle cry and information operation tool, the other engages face to face and knows he truly killed a legitimate threat. This is the bridge combatants are forced to cross.

As much as anything, this is a "how to" manual for warriors in the 21st Century. While some things have changed since this book was written in 1999, it is my contention that these much needed changes in ground force organization, training, and tactics were influenced greatly by this book and John Poole's recommendations. There is still a lot more to be learned from the thoughts and ideas this book, and it should be read by more than just warriors. This book would help legislators, parents, teachers, potential recruits, and ordinary Americans (voters and supporters) to understand what has happened to our military forces in the past 50 years and where we have to go to address the wars we are now fighting and those of the future.

John Poole provides a challenge to America's conventional military philosophy - In 1999, America's military leaders were not preparing the military for the current nature of war which some call 4th Generation War and others Asymmetric War and still others Irregular Warfare. In many respects, the reforms that John Poole calls for in One More Bridge are still not in practice. The price for not understanding what Poole has to say will be excessive casualties, disruption of indigenous populations, and erosion of their support for our military objectives. This is the very frightening and realistic picture that John Poole (a retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel and former Gunnery Sergeant) paints in One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War. John Poole is a recognized and noted expert on small unit battlefield tactics. He is the author of Phantom Soldier, The Tiger's Way, Tactics of the Crescent Moon, and The Last 100 Yards and has spent twenty-eight years leading and training Marines in small unit tactics, serving two tours in Vietnam.

His thesis is based on the history of the last fifty years from past wars. Poole stresses the need for radically different small unit decentralized training to prepare U.S. soldiers and Marines to fight the wars of the future (remember, this is 1999 that he wrote this). Poole states that change is needed in three areas: implementing effective decentralized light-infantry training, returning the moral quotient to the destruction of war by minimizing disruption of civilian life, and understanding and respecting the enemies' philosophy of war. This requires our military strategists to change their focus from attrition warfare to a more balanced approach with maneuver and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) as the counter. This idea is something that the military-industrial complex has been trying hard to ignore. If one looks at the guidance given to the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2005, however, that guidance seems to reflect a change in the old ways of thinking about how we fight. It is a decided shift toward what Poole was trying to tell us before 9/11.

Poole states that, "Attrition Warfare has become as much a part of American military thinking as apple pie." Modern warfare dictates that the military must add a new philosophy that enables America to win in many different environments in which attrition warfare will lose.

As this review is being written, some 30 Army artillery battalions are being transitioned to more appropriate types of units such as military police, military intelligence, and light infantry in recognition of the fact that our new enemies have neutralized attrition warfare, as Poole suggested. We are learning to adapt, but is it enough?

Poole's new military philosophy was based upon analysis of a new and different enemy, who is not obliging enough to sit still and face the military in massed formations to slug it out, where America's overwhelming firepower would prevail. Instead, he is a phantom living in the hidden jungle vastnesses, treacherous mountains, and maze-like cities, where he organizes his military into decentralized, small mobile elements. America, therefore, cannot destroy the whole country to get him. The French learned this in their defeats in Vietnam and Algiers. Americans saw the effect in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia and now Afghanistan and Iraq, but we have been late to adapt.

Poole explains how eastern warfare and military thought is very different. In the East, the decision maker takes everything as a whole and then proceeds with a comprehensive and intuitive bringing together of its every aspect. In the West, the decision maker divides a complex matter into its component parts, and then deals with those parts one at a time with the emphasis on logical analysis. For ground combat, the Eastern way of thinking may have more utility. The Asian large-unit commander is a bottom-up, holistic thinker. He briefs every subordinate (no matter how low ranking) on his overall goals and then encourages them to either make a contribution or get out of the way. As a result, his unit can more quickly adapt to the fragmented and ever-changing nature of modern battle. He exploits what his subordinates accomplish rather than dictating their every move. Does this even vaguely remind anyone of Osama Bin Laden?

In the West, the emphasis was, and still is in some respects, on long-range warfare and large-unit training, i.e., battalion and above. In the East, the emphasis is on short-range warfare and small-unit training, most notably, the individual, fire team, and squad. This means that the Asian soldier generally acquires more of the basic field skills he will need to survive in close combat.

In this book, John Poole tells us that American Soldiers and Marines have always been expert at using their equipment and following orders. Unfortunately, one must know more than that to survive against a loosely controlled and arms-poor but woods-wise opponent. Poole goes on to enumerate those areas where we need to train our grunts and all those who would participate in this kind of war.

Former Gunny Poole reminds us that those best qualified to develop the prerequisite procedures will be the non-commissioned officers (NCOs). By allowing his 30-40 NCOs to collectively design their own portfolio of tactical techniques up to squad level, the company commander will not only give his small-unit leaders tactical decision-making experience, but also he can ensure their non-predictability in war.

Until we reform our military philosophy, these new wars will be costly to our soldiers and the civilians that we are trying to win over to our cause. Read this book!

It's hard to know hwere to begin, there is so much value packed into the book. Working from the grunts on the ground he shows how we can achieve savings in our military but more importantly field a military better suited for the current challenges.

I do wonder how our recent achievements in getting current intelligence down to the squad level and to their artillery and air support changes some of this. On the far side of the world drone and satellite controllers are able to profice current tactical intellegence for a limited number of active operations. However, the resources are not unlimited and the unit going into the night must be prepared to operate without these assets if the are preempted by a "more important" operation

Notwithstanding the foregoing it's still up to the small unit and their resources, how they are dispatched , how they are supported, tha will make the ultimate difference in these wars.

Pool's a strong advocate in looking at what others are doing, seeing what they ae doing better and then improving on both your best and their best ideas.

For the armchair historian these are great reads and bring life to the study of military operations.

REcommended

I found myself smiling several times as I read this at how refreshing it was. Finally someone is articulating tactics that don't involve lining up and charging into machinegun fire as the best way to take an objective. "Bravery" doesn't have to travel with "foolish" any more. I also enjoyed learning about what actually happened to the British "Lost Battalion" at Gallipoli.

One More Bridge to Cross is an inside look at the Noncommissioned Officers contributions to warfare. By providing direct insight to the Noncommissioned Officer, the author allows the reader to gain a great deal of in-depth knowledge in a short time. He provides the reader with real life experience as well as researched facts that build upon one another and enlighten the reader. A definite read for anyone interested in military tactics and training.

One More Bridge to Cross takes a truly unique approach to studying warfare and military reform. One More Bridge to Cross offers a close look at the moral factors of war that John Poole examines so insightfully in his other books. Most great military theorists (including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and John Boyd) have emphasized the importance of moral factors. John Poole goes beyond theorizing about these moral factors and examines their importance in conflicts past and present. He shows how the United States has gained strength throughout its history by supporting worthy causes. He gives examples of how upholding moral standards in the conduct of war has contributed to ultimate victory. Finally, he shows how the United States has begun to loose the moral highground in recent times by practicing heavy-handed attrition style warfare. One More Bridge to Cross is particularly relevant to today's war against terrorism, where perceptions of values and morality can sway public opinion at home and rally new enemies abroad.