One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict [Paperback]

Benny Morris (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 23, 2010

“What is so striking about Morris’s work as a historian is that it does not flatter anyone’s prejudices, least of all his own,” David Remnick remarked in a New Yorker article that coincided with the publication of Benny Morris’s 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. With the same commitment to objectivity that has consistently characterized his approach, Morris now turns his attention to the present-day legacy of the events of 1948 and the concrete options for the future of Palestine and Israel.

The book scrutinizes the history of the goals of the Palestinian national movement and the Zionist movement, then considers the various one- and two-state proposals made by different streams within the two movements. It also looks at the willingness or unwillingness of each movement to find an accommodation based on compromise. Morris assesses the viability and practicality of proposed solutions in the light of complicated and acrimonious realities. Throughout his groundbreaking career, Morris has reshaped understanding of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Here, once again, he arrives at a new way of thinking about the discord, injecting a ray of hope in a region where it is most sorely needed.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“Morris is one of the most authoritative historians of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In his new book, he presents and up-to-date interpretation and suggestions for its solution.”—Walter Laqueur

(Walter Laqueur )

"What is so striking about Morris's work as a historian is that it does not flatter anyone's prejudices, least of all his own."—David Remnick, New Yorker

(David Remnick New Yorker )

“I urge you, in the strongest terms, to read ‘One State, Two States.’ . . . I very much hope that it will ignite a freer, more honest, radically different conversation on the left, one informed by historical knowledge and current realities rather than the fantasies—alternately sentimental, infantile and grandiose—for which such a high price has been paid by all sides.”—Susie Linfield, TruthDig.com
(Susie Linfield TruthDig.com )

"gloomy, concise, and spot-on"—Commentary

(Commentary 20090801)

"Morris details the various proposals for a "one-state" or "two-state" solution to the conflict that should have followed the UN General Assembly division of the territory and termination of the [British Mandate]. In a final chapter, he considers correctly that neither solution is practical or realistic. The best option, he feels, would be a West Bank-Gaza-Jordan confederation with Israel. . . . Recommended."—W. Spencer, Choice

(W. Spencer Choice 20100201)

"A rich and persuasive account of just how deep-seated and historically rooted the antagonism is between Israelis and Palestinians."--Ira Smolensky, Magill's Literary Annual 2010

(Ira Smolensky Magill's Literary Annual 2010 )

From the Author

A conversation with Benny Morris

 

Q: What do you see as the relation between this book and 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War?

A: In a way, One State,Two States follows through on 1948. That is, 1948 is still with us, both in the sense that a two-state solution for the Palestine problem is what the international community and the Israeli left and center still want, and in the sense that the refugee problem, created in that year, remains with us and is the main motor force of Palestinian revanchism.

 

Q: Last year, you stated that if Palestine were to accord Israel legitimacy, this conflict would be soluble but that, at present, the Palestinian mindset makes this impossible. How can this mindset be changed?

A: Mindsets can be changed over the long term through education and gradual osmosis. But this doesn’t seem to be happening among the Palestinians or, for that matter, the Arab world in general. Rather the opposite—these peoples are growing increasingly radicalized, making the requisite change of mindset even less probable in coming decades. Alternatively, mindsets can be changed at a stroke, albeit a very violent stroke, in a critical instant in history—as German and Japanese mindsets changed almost overnight around 1945. Perhaps a similar trauma would do it for the Arab world. Perhaps.

 

Q: Are you now more hopeful about the possibility of resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict?

A: No, I do not hold out high hopes for the future, believing that the Palestinian national movement has never accepted, and continues to reject, in its innermost being, a two-state solution, while most Israeli Jews, 99 percent of them, do not agree to a one-state solution and most Arabs will not agree to sharing government in a one-state solution based on parity, so neither solution will come about. So, no, I am not optimistic.

 

Q: What impact do you hope your book will have?

A: I hope it will propel readers to think about the problem and its possible, or impossible, solutions. And to think about the Jordanian option, which I believe should be resurrected as the only, albeit slim, avenue toward a brighter future.

 

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 256 pages
• Publisher: Yale University Press (March 23, 2010)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0300164440
• ISBN-13: 978-0300164442
• Product Dimensions: 5.5 x 0.7 x 8.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 8.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #792,790 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

37 of 43 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars Well Argued But Not Entirely Coherent July 17, 2009

By R. Albin TOP 500 REVIEWER

Format:Hardcover

This is an interesting polemic on the always controversial topic of the relative status of the state of Israel and a Palestinian state. The author is the talented Israeli historian and former journalist Benny Morris, the author of a number of fine books on the state of Israel. The subtitle, "Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict," is misleading as Morris has little to say about escaping from the present morass. Most of this book is a well argued polemic against the "One State" concept of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is the idea, developed by some American and European intellectuals, and some Palestinian advocates, that the present impasse could be resolved by the formation of a secular, democratic state incorporating the present state of Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. The model is clearly the type of pluralistic state seen in some of the more diverse states of the US, provinces of Canada, or some parts of Europe.

Morris opens with a brief exposition of the One State idea and history of its recent support in America, Europe, and among some Palestinians. The meat of the book follows with a history of how both Jews-Zionists-Israelis and Palestinians thought about statehood from the 1930s to the present. Like much of Morris work, this is a well written piece of exposition. The gist of Morris' conclusions is that from the late 30s to the present, the Jews-Israelis were/are willing to accept some form of partition and a two state solution and that the Palestinian's, despite multiple defeats and social catastrophe, were/are not. Morris argues that the Palestinians are not only unwilling to accept a two state solution but essentially unwilling to tolerate substantial numbers of Jews in Palestine.... Morris sees Palestinian claims for a plural, democractic state as largely window dressing and that window dressing is being abetted by a group of credulous westerners. Morris points to prior Palestinian behavior from the rejection of the proposed (1937) Peel commission partition and rejection of the proposed (1948) UN partition to Arafat's rejection of the Barak-Clinton overtures to the behavior of contemporary Palestinian leaders. Morris bases his conclusion on the relative historical immaturity of Palestinian society (a theme in some of his prior work), the catastrophic effects of the Nakba, and the inimical effects of Islam, which he sees as fundamentally anti-semitic and undemocratic. One needn't share his feelings about Islam to recognize that the popularity of a highly nationalistic and politicized form of Islam, among both Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, and the rise of Hamas specifically, undermines the possibility of a plural, secular, and democratic single state. Morris acknowledges frankly that Israeli society would not accept a single state.

Morris' argument is developed well but he is not entirely consistent. He acknowledges but tends to slide over the recent behavior of the settlement movements, rightist dominated Israeli governments, and their desire to dominate all of Palestine west of the Jordan. He points correctly to Palestinian intransigence on the topic of the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees and their descendents but never discusses the analogous "right of return" in Israeli law for Jews. Morris is very concerned about the demographic effects of high Palestinian (and Israeli Arab) birth rates but never mentions that the biggest demographic change of the last generation was the immigration of approximately 1 million Jews from the former Soviet Union. He provides a close analysis of official Palestinian statements but makes much of the unofficial opinions of Israeli politicians.

Having quite successfully attacked the One State concept, Morris turns briefly to the Two State concept. Morris is no more enthusiastic about this idea. He states briefly that Gaza and the West Bank are probably too small to be economically viable and expresses concern that such a mini-state will be irredentist and a chronic threat to Israel. The background here, which he discusses only briefly, is that the unsuccessful withdrawal from Gaza discredited both the ideas that relinquishing autonomy to the Palestinians would lead to poltical progress towards a Two State solution and that the Israelis could retreat behind a security barrier with impunity. Morris' preferred solution, which he admits is not practical, would a larger Jordan incorporating Gaza and the West Bank. Essentially, he wishes to transfer the burden of policing the Palestinians to the Jordanian Army. Even if the Palestinians and the Jordanians were willing to accept this solution, there would be a good chance that it would lead to the type of Palestinian dominated irredentist state that he fears.

The only choice left in Morris' analysis is a continuation of the present morass. And this is precisely where Morris fails to address the arguments of the most intelligent One State advocates. In the present stalemate, Israel exercises some degree of authority over Gaza and the West Bank. Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank already form a de facto single state but one in which the rights of inhabitants vary greatly. This is a very difficult position for a democracy like Israel. Read more ›

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars interesting take on this hot issue December 25, 2011

By Mati Shoshani

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

Benny Morris is most likely the best authority on Israeli palestinian history among current day scholars. He offers a great balance in his report, and does it with great skill.

If you are looking for a comprehensive expose on the topic, and want to hear the truthful facts, This is the book for you. I have noticed that many other scholars take a very obvious side in their writing, to the extent of ignoring facts that they themselfs present. (Stay away from Rashid Halidi, he does exactly that).

The only downside- Dr. Morris is not an easy read, it takes focus to catch all that he throws at the reader, but it's definetly worthwhile.

39 of 58 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars The True Nature of the Arab-Israeli Conflict May 11, 2009

By givbatam3

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

When Yitzhak Rabin shook Yasser Arafat's hand at the White House ceremony that marked the signing of the Oslo Accords that were peddled to the world as signalling the end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and, by extension, the beginning of the end of the whole Arab-Israeli conflict, Rabin's wife Leah spoke about how happy she was the the two sides were "overcoming their misunderstandings" in order to supposedly make peace. The problem was that there was no "misunderstanding". The Arabs themselves are quite clear and lucid in their views about Israel and Zionism. The problem was on the Israeli side. Here, Leah Rabin was expressing the illusions that "dovish" Israelis along with well-meaning people throughout the world have held for decades....that if only Israel would be willing to give up the territories capture in 1967, specifically Judea/Samaria and Gaza, then the Arab world would be willing to end the state of hostility with the Jewish State. However, these deluded people eventually convinced themselves that this illusion was reality because they failed to listen to what the Arabs themselves were saying. The Arabs, in both their internal propaganda, as well as that directed to the outside world, have made it clear that they will not accept ANY Jewish state of ANY size, and that the problem is NOT 1967 (Israel's conquest of Judea/Samaria and Gaza), but really 1947 (The UN Partition Plan to create both a Jewish state and a Palestinian one) in addition to 1917 (the Balfour Declaration where Britain agreed to support the creation of a National Home for the Jewish People in Palestine) and finally in 1897, when Theodore Herzl created the political arm of Zionism, the World Zionist Organization). Why did the Israeli "doves" fall into this delusion?... Several reasons, among them a feeling that "you can't really believe what Arabs say, what they really think is the same as what I think...I am 'reasonable' and want peace, so, deep down, they want the same think in spite of their incendiary rhetoric) or possibly a psychological state of denial in which they refuse to accept the fact that there isn't going to be peace for the foreseeable future.
Benny Morris outlines in this fine book attempts by Jews, starting with the beginnings of the British Mandate in Palestine to reach some sort of accomodation with the Arabs, perhaps if not by partitioning the country into two separate states, then a single state that would have a power-sharing system between the Jews and Arabs, similar to that in Lebanon (we see how well that worked out!). With only a few exceptions, no Arabs were willing to seriously discuss such plans (and those exceptions had no real standing in the Arab community). The Arabs leadership, both "moderate" (the Nashashibis) and the "extremists" (the Husseinis, under the Mufti) was not willing to consider ANY power sharing with the Jews, they insisted on a unitary state under Muslim/Arab majority rule.
It was on this basis that the Palestinians turned down their first chance to receive a state which was offered to them by the 1947 UN Partition Resolution. The Jews were willing, reluctantly, to accept a partition. The Arabs attempted to strangle the Jewish state at birth and failed, leading to the Palestinian Refuges "problem" that is plaguing the world to this day. Morris then outlines how the Arab world, particularly Arafat's FATAH-Palestine Liberation Organization, modified their rhetoric over the years in statements to the outside world, when it was realized in the 1960's that saying they were "Going to throw the Jews into sea" didn't sell well in the West. Thus, their propaganda then shifted toward having a "secular democratic Palestine" for both Jews and Arabs, although their internal propaganda never reflected this. They even drew up a Palestinian National Covenant which never mentioned a "secular democratic" Palestine, but rather one that would use Muslim Sharia law as its basis for its legal system.
Finally, with the Oslo Accords, it seemed to many that the PLO and FATAH had finally reconciled themselves to partition (the "2-state solution). But as Arafat made clear in a speech in Johannesburg right after the signing ceremony, he never intended to honor the agreement and he would never recognize and make peace with Israel, no matter what was writtin in the Oslo Accords. Morris points out that when Arafat was offered a state again by Ehud Barak in 2000 and 2001, he turned it down flat (the refusal was called "acceptance with reservations" but their letter indicating the "reservations" showed they really didn't accept any of the terms.
He was hailed by Palestinian public opinion for his refusal.
Morris then shows how the Islamic movement HAMAS even more explicitly rejects any compromise with Israel (other than the possibility of temporary lulls in the violence). He quotes the extremely antisemitic clauses in the HAMAS charter which shows that it is hatred of Jews and "not just Zionism" which is their core belief (this public expression of hatred of Jews goes back to the very beginning of Jewish immigration to Palestine and is not merely a product of "the occupation" or "the refugee problem"). HAMAS outright won an election to get control of the Palestinian Authority which shows that these extreme, uncompromising views are agreeable to the Palestinian public at large.
Thus, Morris comes to the conclusion that it seem virtually impossible to see how any contractual peace based on partition can be achieved. Most Israelis, even those who supported the Oslo Agreements have now come around to this point. If Obama's Administration thinks it can impose such a partition, it is sadly mistaken, and it would only cause an increase in extremism. Morris has performed a major service by showing the root causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict (together with his book "1948") come from the Arab/Muslim inability to grant any legitimacy to Jewish historical and religious claims to the Land of Israel (or "Palestine" as the Arabs call it.) This is deeply rooted in their culture and, more importantly, in their religion whose influence has been strong during the whole duration of the conflict, and which is only growing strong at the present time.
The one major weakness of the book occurs at the very end. As the title of the book indicates, Morris feels obligated to provide a "solution" to the conflict. After convincingly showing that the "one state solution" can't work because the Jews are mostly Westernized, democratic and technologically oriented, the Arab societies are largely corrupt, inefficient, repressive (particularly to minorities) and autocratic, and the "two state solution" can't work because Israelis concessions are withdrawals that would be required to implement it would simply encourage the most radical elements in the Arab/Muslim world and would leave Israel open to armed attack, as happened with the Oslo Agreements and the destruction of Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip, Morris seems to end up in a state of despair. It is important to remember that Morris, although he is definitely as Zionist, is most definitely NOT a "Right-winger" in Israeli terms in that he strongly opposed the settling of Jews in Judea/Samaria and Gaza, even to the point where he went to jail for refusing to do army reserve service there. This leaves him with hoping that somehow, Jordan and the Palestinians will come to some agreement which will amalgamate the two into a single state or strong confederation. He says that Jordan's large empty spaces would allow the Arabs to leave overpopulated Gaza and move there. The only problem was that this was tried once, during the period from 1948-1967 and it didn't work. The Palestinians resented Hashemite rule from Jordan then and today it is even less likely to work because the Palestinians have been exposed to Israeli ideas (as much as they say they reject them as "Western" and "Jewish") and they would want to dominate that state. In addition the idea of moving Gaza Arabs to Jordan is unrealistic because Gazans are despised by both the Palestinians of Judea/Samaria and Jordan (they speak Arabic with a distinctive Egyptian accent and stand out in a crowd). Thus, I differ with Morris as to the possibility of this "Jordanian option" as being a solution.
This does not mean that the situation is hopeless. Israel grew and thrived long before there was any (abortive) peace process. The people of Israel just have to realize what the true situation is, and stand firm on the principle of security for Israel's citizens in addition to the Jewish People's rights to live anywhere in Eretz Israel (The Land of Israel) and that the outside world must understand the true nature of the conflict. Read more ›

2 of 3 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars An important perspective on a complex issue November 4, 2009

By Van Isle Rev

Format:Hardcover

I offer a recommendation of this volume in "fear and trembling", certain that there are those who will detest this book and anyone who chooses to commend it on the Amazon website, or anyplace else for that matter. Nevertheless, I think it appropriate to highlight the virtues of Benny Morris' "One State, Two States", representing, as it does, a significant contribution to ongoing dialogue around the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Such a commendation need not presume that Morris' book represents the "last word" on the subject, nor need it pretend that the book is "bias-free". It is clear, almost from the first sentence, that Benny Morris writes as an Israeli; his perspective is shaped both by his essential sympathy with the Israeli "narrative" and by his affirmation of Israel's right not only to exist but to exist as a Jewish state. In this reader's judgment, however, those sympathies and loyalties do not prevent Morris from offering critical assessments of Israeli government actions in those instances in which he sees those actions as wrong-headed, nor does it prevent Morris from recognizing some of the particular challenges (and they are sobering challenges, indeed) that would face the Palestinian people were they to attempt to build a functioning state on the two small parcels of land currently available to them: the West Bank and Gaza.

And so one commends this small volume as one particularly well-written "testimony": a well-researched historian's testimony concerning the genesis of the Israel/Palestine conflict, at the same time a thoughtful citizen's not entirely despairing testimony concerning possible roads into the future: roads that just might initiate a process by which this tragic conflict may one day be resolved.