Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North (Campaign) (v. 2) [Paperback]

Robert Kirchubel (Author), Howard Gerrard (Illustrator)

Book Description

Series: Campaign | Publication Date: March 20, 2005

Osprey's second title examining the events of Operation Barbarossa. Of the German Army Groups that attacked Soviet Russia, Von Leeb's Army Group North, tasked with seizing the Baltic States and Leningrad, was the smallest and weakest. General Kuznetzov's Northwestern Front, however, was in an even weaker state. Despite brave counterattacks and defense by the Soviet forces, the Germans smashed through the Dvina Line, then the Stalin Line, flooded into Latvia and pressed on to encircle Leningrad. This book examines the German offensive and also the courageous Soviet attempts to halt the German spearhead, defending every possible line against overwhelming odds.

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From the Publisher

Highly visual guides to history's greatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics, and experiences of the opposing forces throughout each campaign, and concluding with a guide to the battlefields today.

About the Author

Robert Kirchubel is a lieutenant colonel on active duty with the California Army National Guard. He has published numerous articles on military history. His three-volume study of the Barbarossa campaign is the product of several years work and research.

Product Details

• Paperback: 96 pages
• Publisher: Osprey Publishing (March 20, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 184176857X
• ISBN-13: 978-1841768571
• Product Dimensions: 7.3 x 0.2 x 9.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 9.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #985,582 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

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13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A Solid Summary, April 30, 2005

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R. A Forczyk (MD, USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North (Campaign) (v. 2) (Paperback)

Although there are numerous books already in existence on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, Robert Kirchubel's two volumes on Operation Barbarossa - the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 - are valuable summaries of current material on the subject. In this volume, Kirchubel covers the operations of the German Army Group North (AGN) in its efforts to capture Leningrad and link up with Finnish forces, in the period June-December 1941. Kirchubel's work is primarily a synthesis product rather than relying on much original research, but he is able to incorporate some of the better sources available.

Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North follows the standard Osprey campaign series format, with initial sections on the origins of the campaign, opposing leaders, opposing plans and opposing forces, as well as a campaign chronology. These sections are well written and informative, although the order of battle is rather basic (no mention of reinforcements) and lists Soviet air units, but not German Luftwaffe units. As usual, the quality of maps and color graphics is one of the main selling points for the Osprey campaign series and Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North is quite successful in this area. The author provides seven 2-D maps, four of which deal with operations in Finland: frontier battles; Operation Platinfuchs (drive on Murmansk); Operation Polarfuchs; Finnish attacks in Karelia; Tikhvin/Volkhov; strategic overview Finland; strategic overview, Army Group North. There are three 3-D Maps: Soviet attacks around Staraya Russa, August 1941; German assaults on Baltic Islands, September 1941; Battles on the Luga River Line and approaches to Leningrad, August-September 1941. There were probably too many maps on Finnish operations in this volume and not enough on the actual operations of Army Group North itself. I found it difficult to follow German operations in July, since the only map that covers this is a tiny strategic overview at the end of volume. No map depicted in detail the final German lines around Leningrad, which would have been interesting (you just can't see the Duderof Heights on the 3-D map, which must be about 1:1,000,000 scale). Just as an aside, the Germans normally depicted their operations on 1:300,000 scale maps and it would be nice if Osprey could keep that in mind.

The color battle scenes are also very good: the Soviet 8th Army attempting to breakthrough the LVI Panzer Corps at the Dunaburg bridgehead, 28 June; German 269th Infantry Division using captured anti-tank guns to destroy Soviet T-34 tanks, July 1941; Hans Ulrich Rudel sinks the battleship Marat at Kronshtadt, 21 September 1941. However, Kirchubel claims that Germans were using captured ZIS-3 76.2mm anti-tank guns in July 1941, which is very doubtful, since that weapon only went into very limited production in July 1941. Kirchubel appears to be confusing the ZIS-3 with the 76.2mm F-22 USV divisional gun or the 57mm ZIS-2.

Kirchubel's campaign narrative is fair, but it tends to wander. He starts out well on the frontier battles in June 1941, then gets sidetracked into about ten pages on the Finns, then falls into a lengthy discussion about the arguments between Hitler and the OKH army staff about objectives in the Soviet Union. By the time he gets back to what Army Group North was doing, particularly in July-August, it seems like a bit of an afterthought. We know a lot today about the arguments in the Fuhrer's headquarters thanks to the diaries of Generals Halder and Warlimont, but that doesn't mean that they are always that relevant; officers like Halder tended to exaggerate their impact because they were competing for control of the Wehrmacht with Hitler. Fact is, they lost that control before the war and their role steadily diminished, no matter what their diaries say. Kirchubel's coverage of the Finns and the OKH policy debates make for a more complete picture, but given the size restraints of an Osprey volume they probable take away more than they add.

Kirchubel does add many good details into his volume about armor operations, air operations, supply issues and terrain - it is clear that he has studied the existing secondary sources carefully (particularly David M. Glantz). I do wish that Kirchubel had made some mention of Army Group North's casualties and the Soviet Northwest Front's casualties in this period - the data is available. The author concludes that the Germans failed to take Leningrad because Field Marshal von Leeb, Army Group North's commander, "conducted a flawed campaign" in that he "refused to accept the risks essential to Blitzkrieg success" and that he "did not focus on a single decisive point." These conclusions appear correct, in that AGN spread its forces too thinly and lost the initiative in July. However, it is hard to agree with Kirchubel's opinion that the Germans had "gained some valuable tactical lessons from the 1940 Western campaign, but learned all the wrong operational and strategic ones." The Wehrmacht demonstrated time and again in 1941 that they were experts at operational maneuver (it was intelligence and logistics where they were awful), particularly against the cannon-fodder Soviet armies of 1941. As for strategy, Kirchubel never asks or answers, "how would Germany have benefited from capturing Leningrad in 1941 as opposed to merely blockading it, as they did?" Hitler ordered the city blockaded, not seized, and that is precisely what AGN accomplished. Since AGN was able to impose a 900-day siege on Leningrad, I'm not sure that their campaign was a failure in 1941 - they did everything they were ordered to do but link up with the Finns, and it does not appear that a link-up would have been strategically useful had it occurred. The "so what" test is a critical determinant for historical relevancy and it does not appear that von Leeb's "flawed campaign" of 1941 contributed in any large measure to the Wehrmacht's ultimate defeat in the USSR.

6 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Not Up Even to Osprey Standards, September 12, 2007

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Highlander (Albuquerque, NM USA) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North (Campaign) (v. 2) (Paperback)

Osprey clearly presents its Campaign series books as general overviews of usually complex subjects. The Campaign series all contain a standard format: an introduction, a chronolgoy, presentation of the opposing plans, a quick look at the opposing commanders and the opposing forces, and then the bulk of the text addresses the specific campaign. All well and good -- a structured overview is promised and that is usually what Osprey delivers. The quality of the product varies, but at least a cursory understanding of the campaign is realized.

Not for Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2) Army Group North.

The principle content of the book begins with a report of the frontier battles. One map, and only one map, is available to decipher the intitial German attack and a Russian counter attack. The author's approach to the events is to rapidly and tersely present a myriad of unit names, place names, geographical locations with general comments that the Germans were advancing either with difficulty or easily. Attempting to follow these movements on the single map is, at best, difficult or, often, impossible.

The next topic is the German drive north from the Dvina to somewhere. I'm not quite sure where the Germans went because no map was included to let me envision the movement. But again, quick sentences resembling -- "And then the 99th Division pushed through rough terrain to Strombolsky on the Luchina river where it seized a bridge somewhere in the area." -- were the norm. I have no idea where the drive north went.

The author does handle fighting in Finland and the Arctic much more clearly. Three maps provide considerable assistance, although, once more, the text and the map are not always coordinated.

Given the limited space available in an Osprey Campaign book, the author's choice to spend over two pages of text and a two page map on a sideshow conquest of several Baltic islands is puzzling. The space could have been much better used.

Next the fighting approaching and around Leningrad is recounted. More maps appear, but the fragmented approach to describing operations coupled with a lack of clarity on the basic movements and consequences to those movements continue to plague the text.

Finally, right before the conclusion, two maps providing a strategic overview appear -- about 88 and 89 pages too late.

I will credit the author with an impressive abilty to mix both the Germand and Russian high commands' perceptions and decisions, the logistics difficulties, the organizational challengers, and the consequences of the leader's personalities -- and to show the impact of that mix upon the fighting. That was quite well done.

However, I found that the text lacks a basic clarity, does not always distinguish between important issues and trivial ones, and can be haphazardly organized.

Even by Osprey Campaign standards, this is sub-standard. I'd look to another source to understand Barbarossa in the North.

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Hardly a comprehensive review, January 4, 2006

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AcornMan (Denver, CO) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North (Campaign) (v. 2) (Paperback)

Considering the extremely limited scope of this book (Army Group North during the first six months of the war against the Soviet Union), this book offers only a cursory overview of its subject, and lacks significant detail. I can't help but think that Osprey squandered a great opportunity here by failing to offer any new information that can't already be found in other sources. Compounding the problem is that the maps are disappointing and too few in number. The book gives an adequate overview of Army Group North's campaign through the end of 1941, but that feat was achieved by others long before this book was published. Fortunately it's a relatively inexpensive book though, so it may be worth adding to your library if you don't already have a book on this subject. Just don't expect much more than a broad overview of the campaign.