Customer Reviews

Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North (Campaign) (v. 2)

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Although there are numerous books already in existence on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, Robert Kirchubel's two volumes on Operation Barbarossa - the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 - are valuable summaries of current material on the subject. In this volume, Kirchubel covers the operations of the German Army Group North (AGN) in its efforts to capture Leningrad and link up with Finnish forces, in the period June-December 1941. Kirchubel's work is primarily a synthesis product rather than relying on much original research, but he is able to incorporate some of the better sources available.

Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North follows the standard Osprey campaign series format, with initial sections on the origins of the campaign, opposing leaders, opposing plans and opposing forces, as well as a campaign chronology. These sections are well written and informative, although the order of battle is rather basic (no mention of reinforcements) and lists Soviet air units, but not German Luftwaffe units. As usual, the quality of maps and color graphics is one of the main selling points for the Osprey campaign series and Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North is quite successful in this area. The author provides seven 2-D maps, four of which deal with operations in Finland: frontier battles; Operation Platinfuchs (drive on Murmansk); Operation Polarfuchs; Finnish attacks in Karelia; Tikhvin/Volkhov; strategic overview Finland; strategic overview, Army Group North. There are three 3-D Maps: Soviet attacks around Staraya Russa, August 1941; German assaults on Baltic Islands, September 1941; Battles on the Luga River Line and approaches to Leningrad, August-September 1941. There were probably too many maps on Finnish operations in this volume and not enough on the actual operations of Army Group North itself. I found it difficult to follow German operations in July, since the only map that covers this is a tiny strategic overview at the end of volume. No map depicted in detail the final German lines around Leningrad, which would have been interesting (you just can't see the Duderof Heights on the 3-D map, which must be about 1:1,000,000 scale). Just as an aside, the Germans normally depicted their operations on 1:300,000 scale maps and it would be nice if Osprey could keep that in mind.

The color battle scenes are also very good: the Soviet 8th Army attempting to breakthrough the LVI Panzer Corps at the Dunaburg bridgehead, 28 June; German 269th Infantry Division using captured anti-tank guns to destroy Soviet T-34 tanks, July 1941; Hans Ulrich Rudel sinks the battleship Marat at Kronshtadt, 21 September 1941. However, Kirchubel claims that Germans were using captured ZIS-3 76.2mm anti-tank guns in July 1941, which is very doubtful, since that weapon only went into very limited production in July 1941. Kirchubel appears to be confusing the ZIS-3 with the 76.2mm F-22 USV divisional gun or the 57mm ZIS-2.

Kirchubel's campaign narrative is fair, but it tends to wander. He starts out well on the frontier battles in June 1941, then gets sidetracked into about ten pages on the Finns, then falls into a lengthy discussion about the arguments between Hitler and the OKH army staff about objectives in the Soviet Union. By the time he gets back to what Army Group North was doing, particularly in July-August, it seems like a bit of an afterthought. We know a lot today about the arguments in the Fuhrer's headquarters thanks to the diaries of Generals Halder and Warlimont, but that doesn't mean that they are always that relevant; officers like Halder tended to exaggerate their impact because they were competing for control of the Wehrmacht with Hitler. Fact is, they lost that control before the war and their role steadily diminished, no matter what their diaries say. Kirchubel's coverage of the Finns and the OKH policy debates make for a more complete picture, but given the size restraints of an Osprey volume they probable take away more than they add.

Kirchubel does add many good details into his volume about armor operations, air operations, supply issues and terrain - it is clear that he has studied the existing secondary sources carefully (particularly David M. Glantz). I do wish that Kirchubel had made some mention of Army Group North's casualties and the Soviet Northwest Front's casualties in this period - the data is available. The author concludes that the Germans failed to take Leningrad because Field Marshal von Leeb, Army Group North's commander, "conducted a flawed campaign" in that he "refused to accept the risks essential to Blitzkrieg success" and that he "did not focus on a single decisive point." These conclusions appear correct, in that AGN spread its forces too thinly and lost the initiative in July. However, it is hard to agree with Kirchubel's opinion that the Germans had "gained some valuable tactical lessons from the 1940 Western campaign, but learned all the wrong operational and strategic ones." The Wehrmacht demonstrated time and again in 1941 that they were experts at operational maneuver (it was intelligence and logistics where they were awful), particularly against the cannon-fodder Soviet armies of 1941. As for strategy, Kirchubel never asks or answers, "how would Germany have benefited from capturing Leningrad in 1941 as opposed to merely blockading it, as they did?" Hitler ordered the city blockaded, not seized, and that is precisely what AGN accomplished. Since AGN was able to impose a 900-day siege on Leningrad, I'm not sure that their campaign was a failure in 1941 - they did everything they were ordered to do but link up with the Finns, and it does not appear that a link-up would have been strategically useful had it occurred. The "so what" test is a critical determinant for historical relevancy and it does not appear that von Leeb's "flawed campaign" of 1941 contributed in any large measure to the Wehrmacht's ultimate defeat in the USSR.

Osprey clearly presents its Campaign series books as general overviews of usually complex subjects. The Campaign series all contain a standard format: an introduction, a chronolgoy, presentation of the opposing plans, a quick look at the opposing commanders and the opposing forces, and then the bulk of the text addresses the specific campaign. All well and good -- a structured overview is promised and that is usually what Osprey delivers. The quality of the product varies, but at least a cursory understanding of the campaign is realized.

Not for Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2) Army Group North.

The principle content of the book begins with a report of the frontier battles. One map, and only one map, is available to decipher the intitial German attack and a Russian counter attack. The author's approach to the events is to rapidly and tersely present a myriad of unit names, place names, geographical locations with general comments that the Germans were advancing either with difficulty or easily. Attempting to follow these movements on the single map is, at best, difficult or, often, impossible.

The next topic is the German drive north from the Dvina to somewhere. I'm not quite sure where the Germans went because no map was included to let me envision the movement. But again, quick sentences resembling -- "And then the 99th Division pushed through rough terrain to Strombolsky on the Luchina river where it seized a bridge somewhere in the area." -- were the norm. I have no idea where the drive north went.

The author does handle fighting in Finland and the Arctic much more clearly. Three maps provide considerable assistance, although, once more, the text and the map are not always coordinated.

Given the limited space available in an Osprey Campaign book, the author's choice to spend over two pages of text and a two page map on a sideshow conquest of several Baltic islands is puzzling. The space could have been much better used.

Next the fighting approaching and around Leningrad is recounted. More maps appear, but the fragmented approach to describing operations coupled with a lack of clarity on the basic movements and consequences to those movements continue to plague the text.

Finally, right before the conclusion, two maps providing a strategic overview appear -- about 88 and 89 pages too late.

I will credit the author with an impressive abilty to mix both the Germand and Russian high commands' perceptions and decisions, the logistics difficulties, the organizational challengers, and the consequences of the leader's personalities -- and to show the impact of that mix upon the fighting. That was quite well done.

However, I found that the text lacks a basic clarity, does not always distinguish between important issues and trivial ones, and can be haphazardly organized.

Even by Osprey Campaign standards, this is sub-standard. I'd look to another source to understand Barbarossa in the North.

Considering the extremely limited scope of this book (Army Group North during the first six months of the war against the Soviet Union), this book offers only a cursory overview of its subject, and lacks significant detail. I can't help but think that Osprey squandered a great opportunity here by failing to offer any new information that can't already be found in other sources. Compounding the problem is that the maps are disappointing and too few in number. The book gives an adequate overview of Army Group North's campaign through the end of 1941, but that feat was achieved by others long before this book was published. Fortunately it's a relatively inexpensive book though, so it may be worth adding to your library if you don't already have a book on this subject. Just don't expect much more than a broad overview of the campaign.

Colonel Kirchubel has done an outstanding job of synthesizing the extremely complex German invasion of the USSR. His latest book for Osprey, Army Group North, builds upon the success of the earlier Army Group South. Thousands of pages have been written on Barbarossa, so covering the massive assault in three books of 100 pages each is ambitious. One can only assume that with the anticipated completion of the trilogy we will have a good overview of the entire campaign.

Kirchubel gives valuable introductory information on the geo-political background, each side's plans, commanders and armies. However, where other authors have wasted space on generals like Wilhelm Keitel (a staff politico who didn't command anybody), Kirchubel describes in human terms the various leaders actually involved. In the heart of the volume, the actual campaign, he adroitly works within Osprey's size constraints to present a good mix of operational and tactical combat and maneuver. I found the anecdotes of small-unit actions, for example the Germans' initial difficulty defeating new Soviet armor or fighting in the land of the midnight sun, very representative. Of course Osprey is known for its graphics and Army Group North does not disappoint. Kirchubel provides a good selection of German and Soviet point-of-view photographs, artwork and maps. My favorite is the battlescene depicting Stuka ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel sinking the battleship Murat: artist Howard Gerrard brings to life a scene I'd only read about in Rudel's memoirs.

One of Army Group North's strengths is its treatment of the fighting in Finland. This is a theater often neglected in other Barbarossa histories which act like the Russian front terminated at Leningrad. Also interesting was the description of the German's joint operation against the Baltic islands-a little-known action. It is clear, however, that Kirchubel's main interest is the command and control aspect of Barbarossa. Military history amateurs (and some professionals) are guilty of idolizing German military leadership. However, among other things, Army Group North makes it clear Hitler failed to keep a tight rein on his generals, Halder was a behind-the-scenes schemer and Leeb was totally unsuited for high leadership during Barbarossa. A caveat: Readers uncomfortable with an author squarely giving credit or criticism of a general's conduct of operations my find Kirchubel a bit too willing to call a spade a spade.

On a related matter, I have no idea who comrade academician Forczyk is, but for someone who seemingly makes an avocation of trashing Osprey books he knows little about the product. Forget for a moment the unprofessional, speculative and personal-attack nature of Forczyk's reviews (describing Kirchubel as "unaware," "ignorant" and "apparently confused"). He believes eight pages on opposing armies is "insufficient:" the exact word count allowed for each section is strictly controlled by Osprey. He also wants all reinforcements mentioned in the order of battle (also subject to Osprey limits) in a campaign where OBs changed daily-a subject that could justify an entire book. However, Forczyk's shot against Osprey's "slip-shod editing" is well aimed.

With so many Osprey Campaign Series books dealing only with battles and engagements it's good to read about a real campaign. I for one look forward to Kirchubel tying together the story of Barbarossa with the final volume on Army Group Center. Army Group North¬, meant to supplement, not supplant, the "hallowed texts" of Glantz, Ziemke, et al, is a necessary addition to the library of historian and hobbyist alike.

Robert Francis