Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) [Hardcover]

David Stahel (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0521768470 | ISBN-13: 978-0521768474 | Publication Date: October 16, 2009 | Edition: 1

Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began the largest and most costly campaign in military history. Its failure was a key turning point of the Second World War. The operation was planned as a Blitzkrieg to win Germany its Lebensraum in the East, and the summer of 1941 is well-known for the German army's unprecedented victories and advances. Yet the German Blitzkrieg depended almost entirely upon the motorised Panzer groups, particularly those of Army Group Centre. Using previously unpublished archival records, David Stahel presents a new history of Germany's summer campaign from the perspective of the two largest and most powerful Panzer groups on the Eastern front. Stahel's research provides a fundamental reassessment of Germany's war against the Soviet Union, highlighting the prodigious internal problems of the vital Panzer forces and revealing that their demise in the earliest phase of the war undermined the whole German invasion.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"thought-provoking and valuable. It dispels any illusions that the first months of Operation barbarossa were a pushover for the Wehrmacht; Stahel documents in detail, from German war diaries and letters, the heavy fighting and the high casualties." -Evan Mawdsley, The English Historical Review

"...a thoroughly researched, comprehensive, and convincing analysis of Barbarossa...Any still-lingering notions of a German 'genius for war,' as opposed to skill in some aspects of warmaking, is unlikely to survive this intellectually-disciplined, archivally-documented analysis of one of history's most misbegotten, mistakenly executed campaigns." -Dennis Showalter, Journal of Military History

"Stahel paints a convincing portrait of a Germany army whose shape edge was already well into the process of being blunted during the first weeks of the fighting. [...] This is a serious book and a welcome contribution to the military debate over Operation Barbarossa." -Robert M. Citino, Central European History

"The author's research is impressive. [...] Stahel's clearly written and accessible account convincingly questions the competency of the German planning for Barbarossa. [...] all will profit from reading this fine work." -Howard D. Grier, The Journal of Modern Histor

"Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East will undoubtedly stand as a standard work on the first phase of Operation Barbarossa for a long time to come. [...] The staggering amount of detail offered ensures this is an invaluable addition to Eastern Front literature and Operation Barbarossa in particular." -Yan Mann - Global War Studies

Book Description

A fundamental reassessment of Germany's 1941 campaign against the Soviet Union - a key turning point of the Second World War. This 2009 book highlights the enormous internal problems of the vital Panzer forces and reveals that their demise in the earliest phase of the war undermined the whole German invasion.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 500 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (October 16, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521768470
• ISBN-13: 978-0521768474
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (17 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #469,300 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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57 of 62 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Must Read for all serious students of the Russo-German War, November 9, 2009

By 

Dave Schranck "Dave" (Anaheim Ca) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) (Hardcover)

David Stahel, a contrarian and advocate of Clausewitz theory has written a book that will probably be contested in the historian community. This book written partially using the findings of an exhaustive study by the Bundesarchiv-Militarachiv in Freiburg Germany claims the German momentum didn't first lose steam at Kursk or Stalingrad or even in front of Moscow in Dec 1941. The main theme of his book is not to present the tactical events of Barbarossa per say but to suggest that the Germans lost all chance of defeating Russia by mid August 1941, after the strenuous battle at Smolensk. The Smolensk campaign also includes coverage of the nearby cities of Yartsevo, Dorogobuzh, Yelnya and Roslavl. The author does skimp on coverage and ramifications of Guderian's run to Kiev.
Mr Stahel is very deliberate and meticulous; he doesn't begin the battle action until page 153. In his introduction, he describes the major research project the Germans performed in reassessing the war and describes his manner of research. He moves on to discuss a number of current theories by authors, showing good points and bad points of each. He makes special note of Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzers East" as being flawed. I thought Stolfi's book an interesting read but he failed to convince me of his position. Mr Stahel on the other hand presents a convincing case of his position and backs up his position with hundreds of primary source statements. The planning stage is next and the author spends a lot of time here describing the faulty thinking that went into the planning. Marcks, Lossberg and Paulus play major roles in the plans but all three were influenced by the distorted thinking of Halder. (I thought Halder was a puppet of Hitler but in the beginning he had influence on the dictator and plans were constructed to Halder's expectations on how he wanted the war prosecuted and not on reality. All variations of the plans were for a short war and many things were ignored.)

The author doesn't discuss the entire Operation Barbarossa but restrains himself just to Army Group Center under von Bock. He also limits himself to just three battle campaigns: the Minsk pocket, the battle for the Dvina-Dnepr River line and the Smolensk pocket. His attention is primarily on the Panzer Corps that were the spearhead of the invasion and the biggest reason for German success but the author will involve the infantry on a secondary level when their support was needed but were many miles to the rear.
It would not be apparent to the combatants or the world but by mid August, the Germans would no longer have a fighting apparatus capable enough to compete with the Russians in a long war of attrition. The main reason for its early success was it panzer spearhead and attack technique but by August panzer attrition was so severe combined by low tank production that would prevent the German army from ever having sufficient strength to destroy the Russians. Also Germany didn't have the huge pool of reserves or resources that Russia processed.
The Minsk operation occurred within two weeks of the start of the war but it clearly shows several major shortcomings of the Germany Army. The panzers arrived first and created a pocket around the Russian forces but without infantry the panzers were at risk and not strong enough to hold the Russians. Not having nearly enough transportation, the infantry were days behind the front line. By the time Smolensk was under control, the German Army was a shell of itself. A summary of each of these campaigns would involve pages so a summary of the errors of commission or judgment will be listed (The author clearly shows numerous examples of these faults being committed.):

Insufficient panzer divisions
Insufficient motorized divisions to carry infantry with the panzer spearheads.
Insufficient production capacity. Throughout the war Germany would lag far behind the Russians in production.
Insufficient human reserves.
Insufficient natural resources, especially oil.
Lower technology than the enemy. Russia's new tanks, the KV1s and T34s were much better and more powerful than the German Mks.
The attitude by panzer commanders, like Guderian, that were obsessive on forward movement without clearing Russian resistance continued to produce disastrous results to rear area units, supply columns.
Extremely poor coordination between panzer and infantry divisions.
Hitler's obsessive and relentless drive to continually over extend his forces, putting them in jeopardy to counterattack.
No long term strategy. Hitler would shift directions with the wind.
Poor coordination with the commanding generals. Each general had his own style and agenda that often worked against the others. Kluge was cautious while Guderian was reckless. They were always fighting.
Complete underestimation of the Russian soldier.
Savage treatment of civilians produced a lethal partisan reaction that killed many German soldiers plus destroyed communications with the front.

The narrative is completely German-centric. The pros and cons of the Russian army capabilities in 1941 is not specifically included in the author's calculations when this turning point occurred but the author has to be influenced by knowing how the war ended to make these conclusions. The level of resistance the Russian Army could exert as well as the quality of tanks surprised the Germans and is mentioned by the author. Through inference the author uses this condition in his calculations but the primary basis for his conclusions is based on Germany's insufficient ability to recognize and correct the deficiencies mentioned above. By mid to late August it would be too late for the Germans to make corrections in their war doctrine, improve the capacities of their panzer and mobile units and increase production to a point that could compete with the Russians on a long term basis.
There are few photos and 16 maps. The maps looked very familiar; upon checking it turns out the maps were made by David Glantz. The maps are good, showing detailed dispositions of the troops on almost a daily basis. The daily change in closing the Smolensk Pocket is intense, glaring. The fighting in the Yelnya Salient is also noteworthy. The book also has many footnotes and a impressive Bibliography if further research is wanted.

In addition to the author's logical presentation of facts, he inserts hundreds of communiques, and diary entries to help support his position and to give the reader a better understanding of what the German command was experiencing and the level of apprehension that had been generated as the battle moved into August. While Hitler and Halder continue to think of ways of expanding the war, the field commanders like Strauss, Schweppenburg, Hoth, Guderian and others feared their forces wouldn't be able to hold the Soviets back. They were also clamoring for more fuel, ammo, engines and reinforcements but little would arrive.
The Germans would continue to have victories like Kiev, Uman, Vyazma, Bryansk and Rzhev but with each campaign the life blood of the German Army was being drained and it didn't have the capacity to replenish itself but because it did not experience a terrible defeat it was not apparent that Germany no longer had the capacity to defeat the Russian Army. This would be proven at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Vitebsk (1944).

In the area of tactical problems of the Wehrmacht when facing the Soviets, Mr Stahel concentrates much of his presentation on the AGC sector. By expanding his attention to the rest of the line, additional evidence could have been provided that would have bolstered his position but I believe the author presents sufficient evidence to prove his thesis but even if you're not convinced, he clearly shows the weaknesses of the German Army and presents critical reasons for their eventual failure and for this reason alone the book is worth reading. His discussions of the key German commanders and the friction generated from within were also interesting and it helps you understand the early war. The profiles of Hitler, Halder, Bock, Kluge and Guderian were of special interest. This book has much merit and I hope the author will treat us with coverage of another campaign. This book is highly recommended to all serious students of the war.

21 of 23 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A New Thesis to Why & When the Germans Lost the War in Russia, January 8, 2010

By 

Antonio J. Munoz - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) (Hardcover)

This book, which is the first in a new series of academic studies on warfare and is edited by the highly acclaimed author and professor, Hew Strachan, is destined to become an instant classic. I must admit to the reader here at the beginning, that initially I purchased David Stahel's work simply because he referenced one of my studies in his bibliography (call it pride of authorship). However, once I actually read the work, I realized that it is a very well researched piece of scholarship. Having been published by Cambridge University Press, one does not expect anything less than stellar studies. This one is a gem.

With great detail, Stahel weaves the fabric pattern of history that was Germany's 1941 summer campaign. Many times describing the seemingly insignificant details of the campaign, which make sense when one takes a step back and sees the entire tapestry of this titanic and cataclysmic event called the Russo-German War. The book is sure to appeal to both the most fastidious academic historian as well as the casual reader. Therein lies the secret to Stahel's successful study - that this book has been written in such a manner that it will appeal to a wider audience than academic studies usually do.

His thesis - that Germany lost the war in 1941 during the summer campaign in central Russia, especially in August 1941 during the battle for Smolensk. No other author of late has made such a bold statement. To date I can only think of Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzers East" - although his thesis (to me anyway) appeared to be flawed. Given the magnitude of Stahel's work, it's not surprising that he keeps his description strictly on the events which occurred in the region of Heeresgruppe Mitte.

Stahel does not merely rehash old material like a dime store WWII author. An example would be the following: everyone knows that Hitler reduced the TO&E strength of each panzer division immediately after the fall of France, from an average of 300 armored vehicles to 150 in order to double the size of his panzer divisions. However, no one up till now has actually described the losses which each panzer division incurred and the terribly deficient low percentage of strengths that Hitler's armored strike force possessed before, during, and after the Battle for Smolensk.

Another reviewer states that the pros and cons of the Red Army were not included in the author's calculations, but Stahel actually does go into some detail about armor. His study of the performance of the new tanks being received in the summer of 1941, in addition to detailed descriptions of how many Red Army units resisted bitterly, costing the Germans time and troops - the two "T's" which they did not have in sufficient abundance for such a campaign, is explosive and ground-breaking.

The study of the Red Army which, up until now, would have received a perfunctory "D" or "F" performance for its summer 1941 campaigning season, is turned on its head. On the contrary, with irrefutable evidence, Stahel describes how the Red Army fought far better than has been depicted. An example is the amount of detail and attention that he pays to the newly arriving armored vehicles of the Red Army. Although few in number and having teething problems like lack of sufficient crew training or organization, he describes the huge impact that the medium T-34c and heavy KV-1 tanks had on the Wehrmacht.

I could go on "ad infinitum," but I digress....This study is a great addition to anyone's WWII library and especially their Eastern Front library. Panzer enthusiasts may not like the fact that Germany's doom in the east may have been sealed just two months and a week into the campaign, but there will certainly be enough material for argument and discourse from this ground-breaking study for years to come. Buy it!

30 of 35 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories), December 8, 2009

By 

William Carlson "Ostfront Reviewer" (Fort Worth, USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) (Hardcover)

David Stahel has written a very detailed book about the first few months of the German-Russian titanic clash of World War 2 Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories). The information is very specific and very detailed - I discovered many things at the divisional and regimental level that I did not know previously.

His prose is well crafted that keeps the pages turning as you proceed through list of divisions, corps, armies, and commanders.

The perspective is one of the new style of writers that does not seem to be a propagandist for either the German or Soviet camps. For example if you read a book by John Erickson you will receive information from the Russian perspective or Paul Carrell you will receive information that could have been written by OKH. Stahel does a nice job of keeping his focus neutral.

To me one of Stahels main points in "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East" is that you should revisit your opinions about the summer of 1941 in the East. In laborious detail Stahel attempts to persuade the reader that the astounding German victories at Minsk and Uman are more than offset by the delays at Smolensk and Yelna. After reading Stahel's account of the battles in June and July - I came out wondering if maybe Germany lost them?

The mind boggling victories yet to come at Vyazma, Kharkov, and in the Crimean would seem to say that the war's unfavorable conclusion for Germany was not a foregone conclusion at the end August 1941 as it seems that Stahel proposes.

I like books that make me think and challenge the generally accepted conclusions and David Stahel has done just that. I recommend the book.