Customer Reviews

Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories)

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David Stahel, a contrarian and advocate of Clausewitz theory has written a book that will probably be contested in the historian community. This book written partially using the findings of an exhaustive study by the Bundesarchiv-Militarachiv in Freiburg Germany claims the German momentum didn't first lose steam at Kursk or Stalingrad or even in front of Moscow in Dec 1941. The main theme of his book is not to present the tactical events of Barbarossa per say but to suggest that the Germans lost all chance of defeating Russia by mid August 1941, after the strenuous battle at Smolensk. The Smolensk campaign also includes coverage of the nearby cities of Yartsevo, Dorogobuzh, Yelnya and Roslavl. The author does skimp on coverage and ramifications of Guderian's run to Kiev.
Mr Stahel is very deliberate and meticulous; he doesn't begin the battle action until page 153. In his introduction, he describes the major research project the Germans performed in reassessing the war and describes his manner of research. He moves on to discuss a number of current theories by authors, showing good points and bad points of each. He makes special note of Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzers East" as being flawed. I thought Stolfi's book an interesting read but he failed to convince me of his position. Mr Stahel on the other hand presents a convincing case of his position and backs up his position with hundreds of primary source statements. The planning stage is next and the author spends a lot of time here describing the faulty thinking that went into the planning. Marcks, Lossberg and Paulus play major roles in the plans but all three were influenced by the distorted thinking of Halder. (I thought Halder was a puppet of Hitler but in the beginning he had influence on the dictator and plans were constructed to Halder's expectations on how he wanted the war prosecuted and not on reality. All variations of the plans were for a short war and many things were ignored.)

The author doesn't discuss the entire Operation Barbarossa but restrains himself just to Army Group Center under von Bock. He also limits himself to just three battle campaigns: the Minsk pocket, the battle for the Dvina-Dnepr River line and the Smolensk pocket. His attention is primarily on the Panzer Corps that were the spearhead of the invasion and the biggest reason for German success but the author will involve the infantry on a secondary level when their support was needed but were many miles to the rear.
It would not be apparent to the combatants or the world but by mid August, the Germans would no longer have a fighting apparatus capable enough to compete with the Russians in a long war of attrition. The main reason for its early success was it panzer spearhead and attack technique but by August panzer attrition was so severe combined by low tank production that would prevent the German army from ever having sufficient strength to destroy the Russians. Also Germany didn't have the huge pool of reserves or resources that Russia processed.
The Minsk operation occurred within two weeks of the start of the war but it clearly shows several major shortcomings of the Germany Army. The panzers arrived first and created a pocket around the Russian forces but without infantry the panzers were at risk and not strong enough to hold the Russians. Not having nearly enough transportation, the infantry were days behind the front line. By the time Smolensk was under control, the German Army was a shell of itself. A summary of each of these campaigns would involve pages so a summary of the errors of commission or judgment will be listed (The author clearly shows numerous examples of these faults being committed.):

Insufficient panzer divisions
Insufficient motorized divisions to carry infantry with the panzer spearheads.
Insufficient production capacity. Throughout the war Germany would lag far behind the Russians in production.
Insufficient human reserves.
Insufficient natural resources, especially oil.
Lower technology than the enemy. Russia's new tanks, the KV1s and T34s were much better and more powerful than the German Mks.
The attitude by panzer commanders, like Guderian, that were obsessive on forward movement without clearing Russian resistance continued to produce disastrous results to rear area units, supply columns.
Extremely poor coordination between panzer and infantry divisions.
Hitler's obsessive and relentless drive to continually over extend his forces, putting them in jeopardy to counterattack.
No long term strategy. Hitler would shift directions with the wind.
Poor coordination with the commanding generals. Each general had his own style and agenda that often worked against the others. Kluge was cautious while Guderian was reckless. They were always fighting.
Complete underestimation of the Russian soldier.
Savage treatment of civilians produced a lethal partisan reaction that killed many German soldiers plus destroyed communications with the front.

The narrative is completely German-centric. The pros and cons of the Russian army capabilities in 1941 is not specifically included in the author's calculations when this turning point occurred but the author has to be influenced by knowing how the war ended to make these conclusions. The level of resistance the Russian Army could exert as well as the quality of tanks surprised the Germans and is mentioned by the author. Through inference the author uses this condition in his calculations but the primary basis for his conclusions is based on Germany's insufficient ability to recognize and correct the deficiencies mentioned above. By mid to late August it would be too late for the Germans to make corrections in their war doctrine, improve the capacities of their panzer and mobile units and increase production to a point that could compete with the Russians on a long term basis.
There are few photos and 16 maps. The maps looked very familiar; upon checking it turns out the maps were made by David Glantz. The maps are good, showing detailed dispositions of the troops on almost a daily basis. The daily change in closing the Smolensk Pocket is intense, glaring. The fighting in the Yelnya Salient is also noteworthy. The book also has many footnotes and a impressive Bibliography if further research is wanted.

In addition to the author's logical presentation of facts, he inserts hundreds of communiques, and diary entries to help support his position and to give the reader a better understanding of what the German command was experiencing and the level of apprehension that had been generated as the battle moved into August. While Hitler and Halder continue to think of ways of expanding the war, the field commanders like Strauss, Schweppenburg, Hoth, Guderian and others feared their forces wouldn't be able to hold the Soviets back. They were also clamoring for more fuel, ammo, engines and reinforcements but little would arrive.
The Germans would continue to have victories like Kiev, Uman, Vyazma, Bryansk and Rzhev but with each campaign the life blood of the German Army was being drained and it didn't have the capacity to replenish itself but because it did not experience a terrible defeat it was not apparent that Germany no longer had the capacity to defeat the Russian Army. This would be proven at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Vitebsk (1944).

In the area of tactical problems of the Wehrmacht when facing the Soviets, Mr Stahel concentrates much of his presentation on the AGC sector. By expanding his attention to the rest of the line, additional evidence could have been provided that would have bolstered his position but I believe the author presents sufficient evidence to prove his thesis but even if you're not convinced, he clearly shows the weaknesses of the German Army and presents critical reasons for their eventual failure and for this reason alone the book is worth reading. His discussions of the key German commanders and the friction generated from within were also interesting and it helps you understand the early war. The profiles of Hitler, Halder, Bock, Kluge and Guderian were of special interest. This book has much merit and I hope the author will treat us with coverage of another campaign. This book is highly recommended to all serious students of the war.

This book, which is the first in a new series of academic studies on warfare and is edited by the highly acclaimed author and professor, Hew Strachan, is destined to become an instant classic. I must admit to the reader here at the beginning, that initially I purchased David Stahel's work simply because he referenced one of my studies in his bibliography (call it pride of authorship). However, once I actually read the work, I realized that it is a very well researched piece of scholarship. Having been published by Cambridge University Press, one does not expect anything less than stellar studies. This one is a gem.

With great detail, Stahel weaves the fabric pattern of history that was Germany's 1941 summer campaign. Many times describing the seemingly insignificant details of the campaign, which make sense when one takes a step back and sees the entire tapestry of this titanic and cataclysmic event called the Russo-German War. The book is sure to appeal to both the most fastidious academic historian as well as the casual reader. Therein lies the secret to Stahel's successful study - that this book has been written in such a manner that it will appeal to a wider audience than academic studies usually do.

His thesis - that Germany lost the war in 1941 during the summer campaign in central Russia, especially in August 1941 during the battle for Smolensk. No other author of late has made such a bold statement. To date I can only think of Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzers East" - although his thesis (to me anyway) appeared to be flawed. Given the magnitude of Stahel's work, it's not surprising that he keeps his description strictly on the events which occurred in the region of Heeresgruppe Mitte.

Stahel does not merely rehash old material like a dime store WWII author. An example would be the following: everyone knows that Hitler reduced the TO&E strength of each panzer division immediately after the fall of France, from an average of 300 armored vehicles to 150 in order to double the size of his panzer divisions. However, no one up till now has actually described the losses which each panzer division incurred and the terribly deficient low percentage of strengths that Hitler's armored strike force possessed before, during, and after the Battle for Smolensk.

Another reviewer states that the pros and cons of the Red Army were not included in the author's calculations, but Stahel actually does go into some detail about armor. His study of the performance of the new tanks being received in the summer of 1941, in addition to detailed descriptions of how many Red Army units resisted bitterly, costing the Germans time and troops - the two "T's" which they did not have in sufficient abundance for such a campaign, is explosive and ground-breaking.

The study of the Red Army which, up until now, would have received a perfunctory "D" or "F" performance for its summer 1941 campaigning season, is turned on its head. On the contrary, with irrefutable evidence, Stahel describes how the Red Army fought far better than has been depicted. An example is the amount of detail and attention that he pays to the newly arriving armored vehicles of the Red Army. Although few in number and having teething problems like lack of sufficient crew training or organization, he describes the huge impact that the medium T-34c and heavy KV-1 tanks had on the Wehrmacht.

I could go on "ad infinitum," but I digress....This study is a great addition to anyone's WWII library and especially their Eastern Front library. Panzer enthusiasts may not like the fact that Germany's doom in the east may have been sealed just two months and a week into the campaign, but there will certainly be enough material for argument and discourse from this ground-breaking study for years to come. Buy it!

David Stahel has written a very detailed book about the first few months of the German-Russian titanic clash of World War 2 Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories). The information is very specific and very detailed - I discovered many things at the divisional and regimental level that I did not know previously.

His prose is well crafted that keeps the pages turning as you proceed through list of divisions, corps, armies, and commanders.

The perspective is one of the new style of writers that does not seem to be a propagandist for either the German or Soviet camps. For example if you read a book by John Erickson you will receive information from the Russian perspective or Paul Carrell you will receive information that could have been written by OKH. Stahel does a nice job of keeping his focus neutral.

To me one of Stahels main points in "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East" is that you should revisit your opinions about the summer of 1941 in the East. In laborious detail Stahel attempts to persuade the reader that the astounding German victories at Minsk and Uman are more than offset by the delays at Smolensk and Yelna. After reading Stahel's account of the battles in June and July - I came out wondering if maybe Germany lost them?

The mind boggling victories yet to come at Vyazma, Kharkov, and in the Crimean would seem to say that the war's unfavorable conclusion for Germany was not a foregone conclusion at the end August 1941 as it seems that Stahel proposes.

I like books that make me think and challenge the generally accepted conclusions and David Stahel has done just that. I recommend the book.

David Stahel's book is indeed, as described above, a massive research work and a generally well written history of Operation Barbarossa into September 1941 and before the final German lunge in "Typhoon." It must be on the bookshelves of those interested in this massive struggle between two evil empires.

I don't think its useful here to go over the same material as in the very good and detailed reviews above, especially the first review, that lay out the books intent and coverage in much detail.

The auhor I believe certainly shows the overextension of the Wehrmact in Russia, the inadequate logistics system and the frightful casualties (on both sides). Though to my mind he does not adequately explain the rejuvenation of the Wehrmacht for what came after September. The huge encirclement battles at Kiev and Briansk-Viaz'ma. Or the fact that after 1941 the war continued for 3 more years in Russia. These are covered to some extent though in his conclusion.

To me the most startling event that Stahel describes - missing from all other books I have in great numbers on this subject - is the possible ramifications of the Atlantic Charter on Hitler which he backs up by primary references. This event as Stahel points out showed Hitler that the US, not yet in the war, and Britain were announcing their intent to destroy Nazi Germany. So Hitler then insisted on the encirclement of Kiev and the attempt to acquire the economic resources of the Ukraine for a prolonged war. As the auhor shows Hitler consistently believed Leningrad and the Ukraine should come first and then Moscow. Then there were weeks of doubts brilliantly described in detail by Stahel.In a way this startling evidence seems to justify Stolfi's argument of a Fuehrer under siege.

Stahel is also very compelling in his argument that the German generals were more intent on operational issues than strategic. How could they have ignored Clausewitz's judgement on the 1812 invasion (see Stahel's pg 449). But perhaps it was Hitler who limitted the generals from going beyond operational matters. Grand strategy, economics and politics were areas Hitler was forever saying his generals knew little about. He looked to them only for operational matters and they knew it. This was, as was the USSR, a 100% police state with 2 vengeful dictators. Even Zhukov was initially fired and moved about as he disagreed with Stalin. Halder and Brauchitisch would have been similarly treated and were eventually. Others like Gen Pavlov and others in the USSR were executed in 1941.

The author also touches on the conduct of the Germans, especially SS, police and brownshirt administrators in the captured territories. Perhaps here lies a major cause of German's defeat. Perhaps an independent Belarus and Ukraine in the first months proclaimed and welcomed by the Germans could have made a huge difference in the conduct of the war. Perhaps the support of those lands and peoples could have resolved many rear area logistics as well as reduced or eliminated the troublesome partisan issues.

I also thought the author went a bit overboard on his use of adverbs and adjectives for a serious historical book. But perhaps it enhances readability.

Initially, I had some doubts about the work while reading the authors introduction and the comments on those books of the same subject that already existed. His attacks on Stolfi seem to reach a level not neccesary in such a work. For example he accuses Stolfi of "factual errors". Specifically he sites Stolfi's ( Stolfi's pgs 54, 55)statement that Col-Gen Hoepner made certain statements about Pz Grp 4's operations after the war. Of course we all know Hoepner was executed for his part in the attempt to kill Hitler in July 1944. It is true Stolfi's writing could have been better and more exact but it is also true, if the reader reads the full paragraph in Stolfi, that it is quite clear he is attributing Hoepner's words to his Chief of Staff Oberst Beaulieu who did publish after the war and the paragraph is so footnoted as from Beaulieu's book. Further, he criticizes Stolfi for failing to discuss the "widespread German atrocities" but for what purpose should Stolfi had done that? His short book is about the military and operational aspects of the campaign. Stahel's book itself does mention the German atrocities while generally ignoring the battlefield atrocities of an equally murderous and odious Soviet regime. Perhaps he could have at least mentioned the atrocities committed against German soldiers on the battlefield. For example I have read a first hand experience from a German doctor who mentions the German aid personnel in his unit had to almost immediately take off their red cross on white bibs because they were targets for Sovirt snipers and soldiers.

There are a few very minor factual errors for example Stahel's referencing a report by a Soviet journalist who witnessed Russian 30 ton tanks overrunning German defenders and the German's inadequate antitank guns of 37 and 50mm. Stahel says the reporter called the Soviet tanks T28's but Stahel decided to change that to T34s based on the weight description of 30 tons. In fact they could have likely been the last model of the prewar T28 - the T28C developed in 1939 with armor roughly doubled to 80m and a overall weight being 32 tons. He also asserts the ineffectiveness of the German 50mm weapon but it certainly could stop both the T28C and the T34 although mostly under 500m using the APCR antitank round (admittedly provided in small numbers). However it could be effective against the sides of both tanks using APCBC. In addition there is his startling description of the capabilities of the BM13 "Katyusha" rocket launcher. Indeed a great weapon but it could not, as he asserts, " The new weapon delivered 320 132mm rockets in a ten second barrage." A single BM13 with 8 rails was fitted with but 16 rockets. Indeed when first used in July it was an experimental battery of only either 7 or 8 launchers under a Capt Flyorov and some sources indicated the weapon was the BM 8 (82mm rockets) and not the BM13 (132mm). Truly it was feared as I assume the German's close cousin the "Nebelwerfers" were feared.

Despite the above very minor criticisms this is an important, well researched and detailed account of the initial months of "Barbarossa." It is also well written and worth the expense as you will not find this book easily at you local library.

First ever review, I will hope to add and clarify this later.

The book is first class research, but then stretches to add a grandiose claim to this research, that Germany was basically defeated after the battle of Smolensk.

The book does little to prove this point, only telling the story from the German side. A hypothetical comparison of victory or defeat can only be done when a comparison is made between the two sides. This is just not done in this book. This is like thinking your local pro team is no good ... but compare them to a small college team. now they are world beaters in comparison! Strange that Stahel faults the German generals for not considering the Soviet strength, when he glosses over Soviet weaknesses.

Read Mawdsley's careful review of this work,where he is careful not to support the claim that victory was assured to the Soviets by the end of Smolensk. Instead, read Mawdsley's "Thunder in the East" a true 5 star work!

Far from losing the war after Smolensk, the Germans went on to inflict an overall 8-1 kill ratio in 1941 (p117 from Thunder...). Soviet manpower resources were in no way vast enough to stand this kind of loss rate. This kind of loss was not "bearable", as Stahel say's on p439, given a Soviet 2-1 or or 3-1 advantage in population. Less than 2-1 if this is accurate: [...]

Another problem with Stahel's claim is the hand-waving arguments made in discussing the Kiev pocket and Typhoon. The author credits Hitler with the correct decision regarding turning Guderian south, stating on p438 that Hitler's decision was "certainly the wiser alternative given both the Germna logistical constaints and the dreadful Soviet strategic deployment in the south".

I'm not sure, but look at a map. It would seem that Guderian's supplies would have to come from AGC, around the Pripyat marshes, and then south. Hardly a savings in distance!

Next, given the tremendous early success of Typhoon, no strong points are made regarding the ultimate question in 1941 ... what if after Smolensk the Germans kept going towards Moscow after a refit (like was done after Minsk).Yes, there would have been a terribly exposed right flank, but the Soviet record in mobile warfare in 1941 does not inspire confidence that they could redeploy from the south to successfully attack AGC. If the Russians did turn north, then we're left wondering how AGS would have made the Southwestern front pay for this. True, Viazma would not have occurred, but given Stalin's record in this phase of the campaign it seems likely that Soviet strength would have been smashed with poorly led and coordinated counter attacks against an even stronger German army with far better air support.

Even 1942 presented a chance for Germany to mortally cripple the Soviet Union. What if after the initial success of Case Blau Hitler had continued to stick with the plan? Instead of sending the bulk of the mobile forces into the Caucasus, the Germans instead motored into Stalingrad and put pressure on or even captured Voronezh? The Soviet Union would have been cut in two.

I did enjoy this book, my issue is with the poorly supported claim that after Smolensk the Germans were sure to be defeated. No, instead there seems to be a rush in some more recent books to cherry pick facts to move ever earlier the date for when Germany's defeat in the east was assured. I think Stalingrad, turning point, still deserves this place in history.

It should be an opportune time for a fresh narrative history of Operation Barbarossa. After nearly 70 years, Soviet archival material has become available, the distortions introduced by the Cold War have begun to fade, and the Oxford has made the work of the Research Institute for Military History (Germany and the Second World War) available in English. Alas, "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East" is not it, and the wait must continue. It does not supplant "Before Stalingrad" (D.M. Glantz, Tempus, 2003) or "War of Annihilation" (G.P. Megargee, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) as general histories of Operation Barbarossa, and adds little to them.

The basic problem is that its approach to Operation Barbarossa is completely anachronistic and is compounded by the use of a framework common to 21st century journalism. Put simply, it can be summarized as follows: 1) Operation Barbarossa was a failure, at least in the broadest sense of failing to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. 2) The failure must the fault of someone, who must be blamed. 3) The author decided that Franz Halder, the General Staff, and Army High Command must take the blame. The approach then taken is to construct the narrative by using facts and quotations selectively extracted from memoirs, diaries, and unit reports that can be interpreted to imply malfeasance or incompetence by Halder, the General Staff, and Army High Command.

Since the structure is built on fixing the villains of the piece at the start, it permits obvious contradictions to permeate the book. For example, Halder is criticized for both defying Hitler and for obeying Hitler. Well, which is it? Apparently it doesn't occur to the author that differences of opinion on how to proceed can exist in the leadership structure of large organizations. Another example: intelligence about the military strength of the Soviet Union (especially its mobilization capacity) was inadequate, and the General Staff is castigated for its poor performance in this area and that they were willfully optimistic. However, it is subsequently mentioned how the intelligence estimates of the USA and Great Britain predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union in a similar, short time period! Similarly, with respect to German optimism in July 1941, the author does not consider that it could have been justified by how the progress to date aligned with the pre-campaign estimates of Soviet strength and strategy. One needs only to look to the recent United States war in Iraq for a demonstration of this phenomenon, where the exceedingly optimistic claim that "major combat operations" were over was made early in the campaign. Another problem in the campaign was logistics. Traffic congestion, poor road conditions, and the attacks of by-passed Soviet units are cited as creating serious logistical problems in the opening weeks of the campaign, again in support of the general premise that the logistical planning was bungled. But a few paragraphs later, the desires of Hoth and von Bock for a much deeper envelopment are discussed. Clearly, they must not have thought their logistical situation did not preclude this option. Again, which is it? Was there a serious logistical problem or not? By-passed enemy formations were after all inherent to blitzkrieg, and even the fully motorized, logistically unconstrained US Army outran its supplies in the autumn of 1944. These types of inconsistencies and selective reading of the archival resources make this book very frustrating to read.

In terms of perspective on the Nazi Germany-Soviet Union war, although some mention is made of Soviet strategy, this book is basically is in the tradition of previous works written from the German prospective. In a number of instances, it follows "Germany and the Second World War", Vol. IV closely. For example:

"The `chief enemies in any attack' were space and climate; the utmost importance attached to the colossal extent of the territory" ("Germany and the Second World War", Vol. IV, 1998, Oxford, p. 260).

"The report concluded that the principal enemies in any attack were space and climate with the vastness of territory being of the utmost importance" ("Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East", p. 46).

The German perspective taken comes through clearly in the attribution of Germany's defeat not to the Red Army but rather to the loss of "the ability to win the war" (p. 259). This is almost certainly false; given the actual size of Soviet reserves and Stalin's ruthlessness in using them, Germany would have been hard pressed to defeat the Soviet Union even without logistical problems.

Near the end of the book, the author's motivation is clarified; he apparently believes that "Anglo-American readers" have much too high a regard for the German High Command, and he would like to disabuse them of it. This explains the polemical, journalistic approach. The most egregious contradiction in the book is also found near the end: after spending about 200 pages describing the contentious dispute between the Army High Command and Hitler over the priority of Moscow as an objective, it is stated that "From Brauchitsch down this was indeed Hitler's army" (p. 447)!

The best thing about the book is the jacket photograph, which shows Hitler appearing to be dazed and confused, as if he just realized he was in way over his head. For those desiring to read it, I would recommend waiting for the price to fall.

I've been studying the German/Russian War since I was in my teens. I was flabergasted about 20 years ago when I finally realised that the German Army Group Centre came to a complete halt during August, 1941. Why weren't they still pushing for Moscow, or for anywhere, for that matter?

This book answers the question, in masterful fashion, I may add. Barbarossa was doomed to fail. Hitler and his generals bought their own hype, always a dangerous thing to do. ("Shock and Awe!" "We will be greeted as liberators!") Contempt for their adversaries, melded with inept military intelligence, brought the "mighty" Wehrmacht to its knees, and not a moment too soon.

No question, the Red Army took horrendous losses in these early battles. But, just like Napoleon, the Nazis counted on destroying the Red Army west of the Dvina and Dniepr. It didn't happen. They pushed farther, just like Napoleon, to destroy the Russians around Smolensk. Again, it didn't happen. And Hitler cracked up with a panic attack on Aug. 18 when he realized the whole world was against him, and in the end, he would lose.

I entirely agree with the author that Smolensk was the turning point of the war. I don't often give full marks for anything, but this book deserves it. In addition, this is very well written; for an academic work it's a real page-turner. I literally could not put it down during the 3 days or so that I read it. Kudos.

Excellent, well-written exposition on the Battle of Smolensk in 1941. Many high-quality David Glantz maps. The author posits that Germany lost its war with the Soviets two months in, by failing to win in one campaign season. Wildly overconfident due to previous quick victories over Poland and France (and the Red Army's Winter War woes), Hitler underestimated Soviet fighting qualities, and how quickly Russia's immense size would consume limited German resources. Simply put, Germany bit off way more than it could chew. Handsome Cambridge University Press edition. Engagingly written. Excellent on the back and forth strategy arguments between Halder, Brauchitsch, Von Bock, Guderian, and Hitler. The author convincingly compares Smolensk 1941 to the Marne 1914, where Germany lost WWI by failing to achieve the quick victory it needed.

One of the best books on the Eastern front to date, if not the best. It provides a clear picture of why the German Army was not able to meet their planned goals much less take Moscow. Stahel spends a good deal of the book discussing the planning for Operation Barbarossa, while the second half of the book focuses on the invasion and the battle of Smolensk.

What is striking is the German high command's complete lack of honesty in dealing with the facts, and does not put the vaulted German General Staff in a very good light. Stahel's research shows much of the facts on the logistical difficulties were never even passed on to Hitler. Later as the campaign unfolds, Stahel shows how infighting between within the German Command, competing egos, combined with the logistical failures lead the Germans to head long disaster. This book is well written, and provides a lot of insight, it is a must read for the serious student of the war in the east.

This book is actually Stahel's doctoral dissertation and does an excellent job of advancing his thesis that Operation Barbarossa never really had a chance of knocking the USSR out of the war.

The book is divided into two sections, the planning of the operation and the actual attack, up to the end of September. First is the planning. Through archival documents Stahel gives a day-by-day account of the planning of operation Barbarossa. He has exhaustively researched the archives and conclusively shown that even as far back as the planning for Barbarossa the seeds of Germany's ultimate defeat were sown. Part of the problem was the fact that the Army and Hitler had widely divergent, and to some extent mutually exclusive, views on how to prosecute the war, with Hitler insisting upon the capture of Leningrad and the Ukraine, while the Army was focused on Moscow. Another problem was that the Army completely ignored the logistical shortcomings of the operation. In fact, General Staff planners knew going in that they couldn't actually supply their panzers all the way to Moscow.

Stahel's description of the divergence of opinion between the Army and Hitler on the operational goals of the operation and his account of Halder's duplicity is priceless! Halder knew Hitler's priorities were Leningrad and the Ukraine, but he instructed is staff to plan for operations against Moscow, assuming he'd be able to talk Hitler into it at some point!

The planning portion of the book ends with a succinct summary of the state of the German armed forces on the eve of Barbarossa. This summary highlights the manifold problems the Germans experienced. First, was the huge variety of makes and models of trucks and tanks with which the Germans were equipped. This variety led to hopelessly inadequate stockpiling of spare parts for the trucks and panzers (at one point AGC carried 3 million different stock numbers of spares for its vehicles!). Another problem described was the Luftwaffe's more or less continued wastage of aircraft and crews in operations against the RAF in both Western Europe and the Mediterranean theater, wastage which German industry was unable to make good.This wastage led to a gradual decline in Luftwaffe strength such that, by early August, the Luftwaffe could no longer achieve air supremacy over the Soviet Air Force, and in fact, could only achieve air superiority over limited sectors of the front for limited times.

Finally the actual composition of the German army was laid out. Stahel's premise is that Germany actually invaded the Soviet Union with two separate armies. A small, highly mobile, 20 division force of panzers and motorized infantry and a large, 100 division force of leg infantry that wasn't very different from the force that invaded in WWI. Only 20-odd of the 120+ German divisions invading the USSR were panzer or motorized, with the balance being infantry which marched at approximately the same rate as Napoleon's army 130 years before. In fact, the vaunted Wehrmacht depended primarily on 300,000 horses as the prime movers for its logistical system.

The second part of the book is a fairly straightforward account of the first couple of months of the war. The narrative is interesting with the German panzers achieving breakthroughs, and pocketing vast numbers of Soviet troops, but, lacking close infantry support (the poor foot sloggers are still marching up, far behind the panzers), are unable to completely close the pockets, allowing the escape of thousands or tens of thousands of Soviet troops to fight another day. Stahel also shows how the Panzers so far outran their infantry that tens or hundreds of thousands of armed enemy troops were left in their wake, in the netherworld between the advanced panzers and the trailing infantry. These armed troops formed the nucleus of many partisan units and caused a great deal of trouble, playing merry hell with efforts to resupply the advanced panzers with fuel and ammunition.

Also interesting is the almost continual expectation on the part of the panzer commanders, that "the next line of Soviet resistance is the last one", that once it is breached, the panzers will be in the Soviet rear area and will have operational freedom to disrupt the formation of further lines of resistance. As each line was breached, the panzers found another one. Stahel shows us how it gradually dawned on the German generals that there were far more Soviets than they had planned for, and that the German army would be forced to fight through the Russian winter. Stahel also illustrates how thoroughly the German planners had underestimated Soviet manpower reserves. In fact, because of the vast pool of manpower, at nearly every stage of the operation, the Red Army was actually gaining in strength (!) in absolute terms, to say nothing of comparatively with the steadily ground down Wehrmacht.

At any rate, this is simply an outstanding book. It makes a compelling case that the Nazis were probably doomed the moment they decided to invade Russia.

There are only two basic cautions I would issue, first, this book assumes a great deal of familiarity with WWII in general and the Nazi-Soviet war in particular. Readers who aren't familiar with this conflict could find themselves in over their heads. Second, this is actually a doctoral dissertation, and to some extent, it reads as such. It can be a bit dry in places, don't expect great writing. But in the end, its definitely worth the slog.