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13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Insightful book., June 21, 2004
This review is from: Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Hardcover)
This insightful book covered the initial year of the German invasion of Soviet Russia. I thought the book was pretty well written and the author was able to go beyond the basic assessment as he tries with certain success, what went wrong and what went right during the initial seven months of this campaign. The author made it clear that it took a lot more then bad weather, Hitler's interferences and over extension of German forces to cost Germany any chance for victory during this period. He seem to be in the mind that German overall military leadership remains badly divided and also gives credits to the Russian willingness to trade space for time as they took the initial devastating losses and converted that time into a defensive position where they could launch a set of massive counter offensives. It seem that Germans were fixated into short term goals and objectives while the Russians were gearing for the long haul. The author give a fair and pretty perceptive views of the strategic and tactical situation during this initial seven month period of the Operation Barbarossa. Its appears to be well researched and I enjoyed the book coverage of the leading military commanders of the campaign. I thought this book proves to be quite thoughtful and interesting to read.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Author displays great insight and knowledge of the war, February 9, 2010
I wanted to read this book for several reasons. Operation Barbarossa is a favorite of mine. Second reason is that the book was published in 1984 and wanted to compare it with two recent works. David Glantz's "Barbarossa- Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941" was published in 2001 and David Stahel's "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East" which was published in 2009. These two books have different formats but are excellent in their own right and combined there is not much missing from the operational focus of the campaign. I'm glad to say that Mr Fugate's book is a worthy rival that falls just behind the other two books.
The author has taken a deep interest in Russia and its people, especially during this tumultuous period of between and during the wars, and devoted a lot of time studying it. His book is objective but there is a bias toward the Russian side.
This book is divided into eight chapters with the middle five devoted to the operational aspects of the campaign. The coverage is good and is comparable to Mr Glantz's book. The book under review is made even better with the addition of those three other chapters for it gives background info to give better meaning to the book. The first chapter is devoted to the near term history of the Russian Army, its war doctrine, the defensive strategy and its "preparedness" in June 1941. The author considers this an important aspect of the war and is very deliberate in its explanation. The author admits that his narration in this chapter is partially based on circumstantial evidence but when his work is compared to the newer books, you'll find a competent accounting. If you study Map # 1 in Glantz's book, it clearly shows troop dispositions in three defense zones as described in this book. The first first zone is on the border while the second zone is at the Dniepr River and the last zone is on a line in front of Moscow. This is the foundation that Mr Fugate uses to explain Stalin's battle plan and then builds on it. The author is quite deliberate in his explanation and this chapter is the largest chapter in the book.
The second chapter delivers the German side with special emphasis given to the planning of Operation Barbarossa and broadens the account to include the wrangling between the principles and the determined effort by Halder to make Moscow the main objective. The short comings of the plan as well as in the blitzkrieg technique are elaborately described. David Stahel in his new book also goes to great lengths describing this planning process, the short comings of he plan as well as Halder's manuverings to deceive Hitler to get his own way and the two books are remarkably similar. To me this is another indication Mr Fugate knows the war.
The last chapter of the book deals with the author's comments and analysis. He covers many issues of the German offensive but will mention only couple key points. After the huge German victory at Kiev, it was decided to resume its advance toward Moscow in September. The author believes that was a major mistake that dramatically lowered the German's chances of winning the war. When the Germans didn't stop after their victories at Vyazma and Bryansk and set up a defensive line at Rzhev-Bryansk-Vyazma-Orel for the winter, the Germans lost all chance of winning the war. They would have been better off in moving to Rostov and into the Caucasus. At the time the Russians weren't prepared in the Caucasus and all of their deep reserves were in the Moscow sector. I know this can be argued against but it does have merit.
Another hot topic discussed is the poor long term strategy by Hitler and his OKH. The generals "knew" the war would be short and didn't evolve the plan beyond 1941. Paulus tried to warn them of this short sightedness plus the huge distances involved in reaching Moscow with regards to the logistics of resupplying millions of men such a long ways off.
There are 46 maps and a number of useful tables to help with the narrative. Comparing some of these maps and tables with comparable information with David Glantz's book shows minor discrepancies. There were a few reserve armies missing in the disposition maps and the casualty figures were a little off but it wasn't an extreme difference.
The author provides an impressive Bibliography of primary and secondary sources if further reading is desired. There is also an extensive array of footnotes if you feel corroboration is needed. There was a photo gallery of German and Russian officers.
Overall I was very impressed with this study and highly recommend it to anyone wanting to know about the operational aspects of Operation Barbarossa, the prior planning and insight on how these early events will impact later years.
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6 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Speculative History, July 11, 2006
This review is from: Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Hardcover)
Much of this outdated book is based on pure speculation. Written in the mid-seventies when accurate Soviet source material was scarce, Fugate presumes the 1941 Red Army was not the stumbling colossus of post-war German Myth, but actually a cunning and devious foe who had a secret plan to destroy the Germans all along.
As we now know, Fugate was pretty much 100% wrong here. Recent research has shown that no matter how devious Stalin, Zhukov and Timoshenko might've been, the Red Army was a disorganized, ill-trained, ill-equipped mess. He overestimates Soviet capabilities at Smolensk-Yelnia (a theme he develops again in the 90's re-write of this book "Thunder On The Dnepr") and he claims the Germans had absolutely no idea of what they were doing invading the USSR.
However, the book does have some interesting (but again, speculative) insights into the conflicts among the various German High Command personalities who all squabbled among themselves over the best way to conquer Russia. Fugate portrays Guderian as an arrogant primma donna, and seems to think Hitler's concept in Aug '41 had the best oppurtunity to win the war...(ahem, cough).
Oddly, this is almost the only book in English which covers the Army Group Center vs. Western Direction Smolensk operation(s) (approx July 5 to Sept 25 1941) in any detail. This pivotal campaign has, for some weird reason or another, eluded close scrutiny from historians. There exsists no comprehensive, detailed book on Smolensk in any language as far as I know, except perhaps Eremenko's memoirs. At least Fugate has attempted to write one. We are badly in need of new and detailed research.
Fugate unfortunately writes in a ponderous, rambling style (like many Russian writers, actually); I have attempted to read this book cover to cover since 1980, and have only forced myself in 2002.
'A' for effort and research, 'D' for conclusions = 3 stars
Pick up a cheap used copy, but check out Glantz's Stumbling Colossus for a far more accurate picture.
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