Customer Reviews

Operation Compass 1940: Wavell's Whirlwind Offensive (Praeger Illustrated Military History)

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

While realizing the 95-page space limitation of the Osprey Campaign series, this volume on the initial British offensive in North Africa could have been much better. Jon Latimer, the author, is a serving officer with the Royal Welch Fusiliers (TA). Latimer brings military experience to this volume, which is useful, but it is not enough. He has culled together the best available references to produce a useful synthesis, but he does not go far enough.

Latimer is to be applauded for mentioning the roles of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, the Reggia Aeoronautica (Italian Air Force), intelligence and various aspects of equipment. Some of his information, such as the high quality of British intelligence versus the poor quality of Italian intelligence is very contentious. Despite valuable signals intelligence, the British were actually quite weak in tactical reconnaissance and they knew it; thus they began to form the Long Range Desert Groups in late 1940. A few months later, Rommel and the Afrika Korps would amply demonstrate how weak the British really were in reconnaissance.

The biggest flaw in this volume are the maps. First, all three of the 3-D maps are presented "upside down" with south pointing to the top of the page. This is disconcerting to readers familiar with North African terrain and odd for an army officer. Second, there are not enough maps to fully support the Battle of the Camps and the attack on Bardia.

Oddly, the author neglects the main commanders Wavell and O'Connor (there is only one very poor photo of O'connor in the volume, but a better shot of Wilson, who had no command role in the campaign). Operation Compass was O'Connor's show and he deserves better treatment, even in a short volume. The author might have mentioned that O'Connor had quite a lot of experience with the Italians, having served in Italy in the First World War (where he was decorated for valor). Nor does the author mention that O'Connor was captured by Rommel's vanguard just two months after his great victory at Beda Fomm. Field Marshal Wavell is also slighted, no mention of losing an eye in the First World War, extensive staff experience in Russia and the Mideast, etc.

There are some egregious editing problems in this volume as well. The photo on page 61, supposedly of the Italian cruiser San Giorgio, is actually a well-known photo of the burning German pocket battleship Graph Spee. The author's tendency to use modern military vernacular, referring to units as "3 and 7H" instead of 3rd and 8th Hussars, should have been curbed. There are also odd word choices such as "scudding rain" and awkward sentences.

This volume is a good introduction to Operation Compass, but it certainly could have packed in more detail. The author frequently mentions logistic problems but never clarifies. In the section on opposing armies, the author might have explained how much motor transport was available and the difficulty of desert logistics.

Finally, it amazes me that a military author would not attempt a bit more analysis of the classic victory at Beda Fomm. Perhaps because the victory was so complete, the author feels that no analysis is necessary. Perhaps, because Italian performance was so terrible, analysis also seems moot. However given the rather poor performance of British desert operations in the remainder of 1941, the author might have tried to answer: what did the British learn from this campaign and more important, what did they retain? Is it possible that lacking serious resistance from the Italians, the British gained an exaggerated opinion of their own capabilities which would work against them once the Afrika Korps arrived? This questions might at least have been raised for thought, if not for answer.

Histories of the North African campaign too often start with the appearance of the Afrika Korps in April 1941. That does a disservice to the British: their victory over the Italians in 1940 was an amazing achievement that deserves more attention. Jon Latimer provides us with just that.

Although not up to the standard of some of the more recent Osprey Campaign books, Latimer does a good, solid job. He points out the shortcomings of the Italian army -- the leaders, shortage of modern and effective weaponry, inadequate logistics and poor intelligence -- which negated the courage of the soldiers. By comparison the British were much better off in each of these areas.

Latimer follows this up with the actual battles, showing how (despite a smaller force) the British concentrated superior numbers at the point of attack and then exploited victories to the full. The maps do a good job of illustrating the actions, although one showing in detail one of the attacks on the Italian camps at the start of the campaign would have been very useful. The careening pursuit across western Cyrenaica, ending in the decisive battle of Beda Fomm is very ably described and compares with anything Rommel achieved.

The main drawback, as mentioned by another reviewer, is analysis. Except for the obligatory comment that the British missed their chance to drive the Italians completely out of North Africa, we are left to draw our own conclusions. There are some interesting ones to draw. The British 7th Armored Division was used strictly to exploit victories achieved by other forces, rather than as a versatile combat unit like the panzer divisions. Organization shortcomings (too many tanks, not enough infantry and supporting arms) were already making themselves felt. At least one tank charge was shot to pieces by Italian artillery, something that would be repeated all too often in 1941-42.

Despite this shortcoming, Latimer does an admirable job of covering the first British North African campaign. I would buy this book again in a heartbeat.

There are few books which dare even touch on the desert campaigns of the second world war, and those that do usually slight the role of the British, and that of the Italians. This book gives a great and simple to follow account of the battle which started the whole mess in North Africa, the battle that started the domino effect that would lead to every major power, axis and allies, pouring all their resources into what was ultimately useless territory. The only thing I felt the book lacked was background as to why Italy sought to invade Egypt, and why Britain was so woefully unprepared to meet the attack. There also isnt a lot of perspective as to what else was going on during this campaign, such as the Italian invasion of Somalia, Kenya, Greece, Yugoslavia, etc. But as a study of the campaign itself, this book offers a great description of an important but overshadowed group of battles.