Customer Reviews

Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why

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The Publishers Weekly reviewer obviously did not read the book he or she reviewed; instead it launched into a series of anti-military statements that completely invalidate it. I cannot imagine how Amazon would willingly publish so obviously and willfully destructive review--it was non-objective and totally inaccurate--a Pub Weekly reviews on miltary subjects usually are.

Walter Boyne has given us a superb initial look at Operation Iraqi Freedom. Using his deep understanding of war in general and airpower in particular, he has taken what has so far appeared in the open press and has packaged it into a clear and concise narrative of this short but intense conflict.
Perhaps more importantly, he has detailed for us how the improvements that we made in our military forces post Desert Storm have given us the ability to dominate any military force. Precision guidance, information dominance, C4ISR, the close integration of SOF and conventional forces, the linking of ground forces to "on call" fighters, bombers, and massive AC-130 gunships are all highlighted by Boyne as he weaves their development and use into a larger narrative of the daily events of the conflict. It is a powerful story. And he looks at failure too, delving into incidents of fratricide and losses due to the terrible sand storms.
Many details are, of course, missing. Only time can correct that. But Walter Boyne has produced a useful work which helps to understand how we fought the second Gulf War. It is a bench mark for subsequent books.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right and Why; What Went Wrong and Why, by Walter J. Boyne is not a history written in academic isolation, or with a predetermined point of view. It is a definitive and accurate work written literally as the smoke of warfare was clearing from the battlefield. It was written at a time when the truth had not had the chance to undergo distortion by time, and distance.

This book offers a first look at one of the most successful military campaigns ever waged. Sudden, swift and successful, the results of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) discussed in this book stands in sharp contrast to the nightly reports of doom and gloom by the "taking heads" of Cable television. Author Boyne enumerates the successes that Cable TV failed to cover. With the exception of the embedded reporters, the failure of Cable television in general, to accurately access the ongoing conflict was based principally on the fact that many of the talking heads were retired officers from the first Persian Gulf War (PGW). For nearly a decade that followed the first PGW, budget cuts, and force reductions resulted in military planners, out of necessity, rewriting the book on how warfare should be conducted. OIF put this new book to the test. Here the author skillfully describes the innovative blending of huge procurement and logistical needs with a reduced military force using an arsenal of old, and new weapons systems, vastly improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with a high caliber, highly motivated, all-volunteer force to achieve a victory unparallel in warfare.

The author acknowledges that he is covering a short and specific time, from March 19 to April 9, 2003. Because he did not have a crystal ball, and much to his credit, he does not speculate on the problems of the dangerous peacekeeping that follows any combat.

This book is also a study of the basic issue of good versus evil. The contrasts in ethics, rules of engagement, and humanity of purpose of the "coalition of the willing" against a truly evil régime are striking. The evil is personified in the form of Saddam Hussein, who for more than three decades tortured, and murdered hundreds of thousands of his own people.
The swift "shock and awe" campaign in the air, and on the ground, left the Iraqi forces on a seriously less than equal basis early in the war. This greatly reduced the likelihood of a great many things going wrong. However, in war, things go wrong, like the looting of museums, and estates of the ruling class, and virtually anything of value by both the Ba'ath party, and ordinary Iraqi citizens, less than 24 hours after Baghdad was declared liberated. One diplomatic failure after another, many purposefully created to thwart the United States and its gathering coalition did not help gather support, or new coalition members. Another was the loss of valuable time and a "Northern Front" when Turkey forbad transit of the Army's Fourth Infantry (mechanized) Division. Boyne holds a critical eye to these, and other issues, but he also describes the many things that went right. The precision capabilities of the modern weapons systems, light years in improvements since the first PGW. The entire United States armed forces working truly in concert, thus insuring minimum collateral damage, and loss of life. With a single-minded purpose, the armed forces, perhaps for the first time in our history, combined with the true delegation of authority, and responsibility, from the President all the way down to the platoon leaders, and non-coms, allowed the ground forces to beome a blitzkrieg juggernaut, as the author calls them reaching Baghdad in three weeks.

Operation Iraqi Freedom will be debated, and studied for years to come. The author has laid the groundwork for future researchers by going to the true sources of information, from the current Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General John P. Jumper, four former Chiefs of Staff, to other military service leaders, and informed civilians, and scholars. The list alone is impressive with more that four dozen listed. In addition each chapter has a generous supply of endnotes. The serious researcher, and the armchair enthusiast, will find a wealth of information in the appendices. Every major weapons system, and munition used in OIF is listed, with its corresponding specifications.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right and Why; What Went Wrong and Why belongs on the bookshelf of every military historian, military history buff, and anyone interested in great story of American determination.

This book is a fine work. Obviously, publisher weekly's reviewer must be one of those individuals (without much of a life experience) that cannot stand the recent successes of our military in Iraq and elsewhere. Shameful.
More and possibly better work will follow, but for those who need a preliminary record of the iraqi battle, this book will do just that.

Walter Boyne's work in Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why is on target. As some other reviewers here have detailed Boyne's qualifications (and they are extensive and appropriate), we'll simply agree that he is the right author to synthesize the information thus far available on the conflict.

Concerns expressed about writing such a history so soon after the dust has settled are valid but in this case, should be put into proper perspective. Boyne's book is a history of operations. It examines what went right and wrong between March 19 and May 1, a period commonly acknowledged as the conventional phase of the conflict. Boyne details the US military's new "unconventional" approach to conventional warfare during this phase. It does not attempt to deal with the subsequent insurgency campaign which continues.

The book is best viewed as a "first-look" overview of the operations leading to the dissolution of uniformed Iraqi armed forces. It is also a primer on the doctrinal and technological changes developed since the first Iraqi conflict which allowed the campaign to be prosecuted in a new way.

Boyne is to be commended for presenting a complex subject in an interesting, readable way. One of the book's advantages is that it reflects the contemporary wisdom of the many credible sources Boyne taps to tell the story. These include those who helped design the military that went into the conflict. In this respect, it is invaluable to future historians.

It is certain that military planners worldwide are energetically analyzing what the US miltary accomplished in the major combat operations Boyne's book covers. It is also likely that many will turn to Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, as an informed introduction to the subject.

"Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why" is really two books in one. First, as the title implies, it is a treatise on a specific conflict - an in-depth presentation of how it all worked and an insightful analysis of how well it worked. Second, by way of extensive appendices that take up more than a third of the entire volume, it is a very comprehensive compendium of what it took to conduct that war in terms of materiel, weapons, logistics, people, methodologies, etc.

If it were not so readable, this would make a great textbook. As it is, it should be required reading for anyone interested in studying wars and what makes them tick, especially one that was waged so recently and so much in the public eye. As one could imagine, the great majority of what we read in the print media and saw on the TV screen was, because of the nature of the beast, the parts of the conflict that included the action, the damage and the more sensational aspects of what was going on.
A concern often raised about a book produced shortly after an event is how credible it can be as an analysis considering the recency of what occurred. There usually is a suspicion that it is a quick-reaction book dashed off in hopes of a fast buck by an author "writing off the top of his head." That concern was put to rest in this case by a thorough reading of what many readers overlook in their rush to get to the main text - the front matter of the book. Here I found the a wealth of information that established the book's bona fide's for me - the acknowledgements, foreword and preface.
The acknowledgements pointed out the author's people sources, a host of knowledgeable top military and civilian thinkers who provide the book with authenticity and authority.
The foreword helps a book in two ways: first by what it says about the book and, second, by the credibility of who wrote it - in this case former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, retired Gen. Ronald R. Fogelman who stated that the book reflects the contributions of all the elements of the coalition and the new, higher level of cooperation and interdependence of the forces involved. Fogelman also stated, "The United States and its coalition partners can be proud of their work In Operation Iraqi Freedom, and this book offers the first best look at how well they did their job."
The preface then gives the author the opportunity to establish his objectives, in this case to examine the efficacy of U.S. and coalition strategy, tactics, operational methods, weapon systems, and personnel during the period of armed conflict from March 19 through May 1, 2003. This author, Walter J. Boyne, has the extensive background as a career Air Force pilot and former director of the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, and has generated the many contacts needed to successfully produce a comprehensive study like this.
The book then goes on to do just that in full, but readable, detail. The background of the how, who and what leading up to this war are followed by the actions taken to pursue it to a quick victory and by an explanation of the new type of warfare that made it possible. Interspersed are short, side articles such as the fascinating "How Nations Go To War" that put this one war into perspective with all other conflicts fought until then. The author inserts at appropriate places, as the book's title implies, discussions about what went right and why and what went wrong and why - and lessons learned.
Operation Iraqi Freedom is not light reading and you can't get anything from skimming it. Plan to spend some time - from beginning to end - and you will end up with a better understanding of the story behind what you read and watched in the popular press. Highly recommended.

Arthur H. Sanfelici
Editor
Aviation History Magazine