The Origins of Alliances (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) [Hardcover]

Stephen M. Walt (Author)

Product Details

• Hardcover: 336 pages
• Publisher: Cornell Univ Pr (November 1987)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801420547
• ISBN-13: 978-0801420542
• Product Dimensions: 9.8 x 6.8 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.5 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,540,759 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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14 of 15 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars How Perceptions Matter in Alliance Formation?, April 13, 2002

By 

"abant" (Virginia, USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Origins of Alliances (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Paperback)

Balance of power theory is one of the basic pillars of (neo)realist theory of international relations. It basically argues that states balance against the rising power since it creates a vital problem for their security. Since states are living in anarchical self-help world they should balance against the rising state(s). In this sense, Stephen M. Walt's The Origins of Alliances challenges this theory. Walt criticizes balance of power theory in arguing that states balance against perceived threats rather than only powers. He examines his theory under the light of the Middle East alliances from 1955 to 1979. His case is composed of thirty-six separate bilateral and multilateral alliance commitments and eighty-six national decisions. After the examination of these alliance structures he argues that balance of threat thesis provides a better grasp on alliance formation in the Middle East than variables of ideology, foreign aid, and political penetration. On the other hand, he holds also geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions as important elements in alliance politics. Walt also claims that aggregate power (including population, individual and military capabilities, technical prowess), geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggregate intentions all affect the level of threat. Moreover, he observes balancing is more common than bandwagoning behavior in reference to the Middle East alliances in this period.He also states that weak states as compared to strong states are more likely to bandwagon rather than balance against rising powers. In general, Walt's The Origins of Alliances is an important study in demonstrating the role of perceptions in alliance politics and international relations in general well beyond material capabilities and power structures.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Balance of Threat, March 15, 2008

By 

E. Gartman (Rockville, MD USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Origins of Alliances (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Paperback)

Traditional Realist theory argues that states balance against overwhelming power, regardless of a state's intentions. This balance-of-power dictum has been a staple of realist theorists from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz and more recently, John Mearsheimer. Stephen Walt however takes a different view. He argues that intentions, in the form of threats, matter as much as raw power. Threats are composed of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Walt believes that threats explain balancing behavior better than power. To support his claim, he uses examples from the Middle East from 1955 to 1979. He finds that the aggressive ideologies of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser and the Syrian Ba'athists explain balancing behavior against them as much as power considerations do. It's an interesting argument, but the scope and brevity of the examples leave room for refutation. Moreover, Walt deliberately chose the Middle East instead of Europe to test his theory, but it would be more useful if he based his theories on larger powers with better established governments. In fact, the best example of balance of threat explaining state behavior better than balance of power came after this book was first published in 1987. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, according to a straight interpretation of balance of power, the European states, as well as Japan, should have balanced against the overwhelming power of the United States. Indeed, Kenneth Waltz wrote in 1993 that America's unipolar moment would be over "in the blink of an eye." He repeated these claims in 2002. Similarly, Mearsheimer predicted the United States would withdraw its forces from Europe. Yet none of this has come to pass. The United States remains in Europe, despite the rift over the Iraq war. The reason can best be explained by balance of threat: The European states view each other as greater threats than the US, due to their geographic proximity to each other. Conversely, the Europeans do not see the US as a threat due its remoteness. Clearly the US has no interest in acquiring territory in Europe. Rather it is there to prevent wars that might affect it. It is my hope that Walt issues an updated edition of this book, using Europe and the US since the Cold War as case studies.