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The Origins of the First World War (Origins of Modern Wars)

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The Origins of the First World War is a highly readable and enlightening tour of the world in mid-1914. Joll doesn't come at you from any particular political perspective and grants you access to all the arguments for the conflict. Nationalism, politics, military expansion, big business interests, imperialism along with conditions in each of the beligerents are examined in a free flowing easy style.

Joll does a very nice job in demolishing the Marxist line that WW1 was the result of imperialism and big business interests. By the end you are left convinced that, while the German naval expansions of 1912 were ultimately to blame for the process that led to war, each country got involved for entirely different reasons. There are good maps which give are easy to understand.

I do have some criticisms though. Each chapter is self contained but doesn't have any sub-headings or breaks. The editors could have spent a little time breaking up the text in each chapter to make the text a bit more readable. There isn't a great deal of attention to longer term history - such as the lingering impact left by the Crimean war and its peace treaty. But these are relatively minor quibbles about history writing that almost ranks as a work of art. Joll was a highly gifted historian.

The Origins of the First World War by James Joll was a concise but informative study of the major causes of the catastrophe that engulfed Europe and much of the world from 1914-1918. Joll began the book with a summary of the July Crisis of 1914 which was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. The rest of the chapters examined the major problems in Europe that made war inevitable. This review will examine each chapter and its importance in making World War I inevitable.
There were two major alliance systems in Europe in 1914: the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy and the Triple Entente which consisted of France, Great Britain, and Russia. The lesser powers in Europe sided with one alliance or another, and their loyalties changed when it suited them. Joll explained how those alliances were formed. It was surprising how weak they were, as Austria-Hungary was frequently at odds with both Germany and especially with Italy. Great Britain also had problems with both France and Russia in the colonial sphere. If it was not for these alliances, then the July Crisis would have either never resulted in a war or the war would have remained localized in the Balkan Penninsula.
I found the next chapter on armaments and strategy to be especially useful. While many nations were spending vast amounts of money preparing for war and conscripting their young men, other states such as Austria-Hungary were spending a relatively low percentage of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. I was surprised that France was investing far more of its resources preparing for the next war than Germany (the French had a three year conscription program).
There were several aspects of strategy that I found especially interesting. General Conrad von Hotzendorf of Austria-Hungary desperately wanted a war as soon as possible to unite the multi-ethnic nation and prevent Serbia from being able to incite the Slavic population. It was also interesting that both Austria-Hungary and Russia were both expanding into the Balkans, making a collision course inevitable. Finally, Germany and Austria-Hungary wanted a war in 1914 because Russia was in the midst of a vast building program (with French money) and they would be virtually unstoppable if the war was delayed until 1916 or 1917.
The chapter on domestic politics demonstrated that many of these nations viewed the war that arose from the July Crisis as a potential diversion from problems at home. The situation in Austria-Hungary has already been mentioned. The Russians believed that they could not back down from the conflict because they had failed to support the Slavic peoples in the Balkans twice before in 1878 and 1911; they would lose virtually all credibility if they backed down a third time in 1914. The Russians also hoped that a victorious war would enable them to achieve their dream of capturing Constantinople. According to Joll, the issue of Irish home rule was tearing the British apart, and they looked forward to a distraction on the Continent.
While France still coveted the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, they did not expect to liberate them anytime soon. Joll believed that the French would have preferred to delay the war until her Russian ally had completed her militarization program.
Imperial rivalries proved to be a minor cause of the war. The author wrote about both the Fashoda conflict and the Moroccan crises in detail. These crises proved how weak the two alliance systems were, as England and France nearly went to war over the former and Italy failed to support Germany in the latter. Nonetheless, nobody was willing to go to war over colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. The most important consequence of imperialism to the outbreak of World War I was that Russia was forced to turn west to the Balkans as an avenue for expansion after they were defeated by Japan in 1904-1905.
Joll's overall opinion of the mood of the Europeans towards war was ambiguous. While there were some ultra-nationalist groups in all countries, they were balanced out by Socialists who opposed war. The Socialists hoped that a general strike might prevent Europe from mobilizing for war in the summer of 1914. According to Joll, there were some strikes (especially in France), but this movement was essentially killed when a French nationalist assassinated Jean Jaures ended any possibility that the Socialists could prevent the war; in reality, nationalism proved more powerful that Socialism in 1914.
I was impressed by The Origins of the First World War. This book was clear and concise. It analyzed the major issues in enough detail to give the reader a clear idea as to why war was declared. Not only did one learn about the July Crisis that officially began the war but also the underlying causes that led to this crisis.

This is a concise and well written introduction to the history and historiography of the 1st World War. Joll does an excellent job of reviewing the opening of the war and the background of the European diplomatic system. He then presents a series of critical chapters reviewing the some of the proposed causes of the war including imperial rivalries, capitalist competition, and domestic political needs. Joll is judicious and evenhanded in his analysis and leaves readers with the conclusion that there was not one or even a few causes of the war. Instead, readers gain a clear picture of the complexities and instability of European society prior to the war.

I have read, and enjoyed this book, three times. As an amateur historian, and as someone who has studied the history of the period leading up to 1914, I am a little surprised at the lack of greater critical enthusiasm for Joll's book. To me, he does an outstanding job in describing all of the factors that could have, and ultimately did, lead to this most important of all modern wars (I consider WWII an extension and continuation of WWI). Since this conflict remains so seminal, and so difficult to comprehend, only a multi-faceted conceptual overview really does justice to the subject. However, it may make sense to complement this book with those of John Keegan, A.J.P. Taylor or Hew Strachan, all of whom take a narrative approach to understanding the war. Let's keep in mind that with the exception of Ivan Bloch, and very few others, NO ONE thought that WWI would become the conflagration that it did, and/or last for four years. Taylor's book, in his most cynical and perhaps too arbitrarily acerbic style, is excellent on this point.

Poetic coincidence, I began reading this book while waiting for a plane in Geneva Switzerland, home of the European UN, in the country nestled between France and Germany. Also as bit of humor TJ lent me this book as a pass through from one of his friends who studied it for a class. I mused at what he took note of versus what I marked as noteworthy. We had to have taken away two different verdicts. This is the third in my series of books where I am purposefully looking for answers to the cause of war. The first two, Rise and fall Of the Third Reich and Paris 1919, only threw clues and inferences. Also know I have a library of read material related to the subject but such material was not necessarily read to answer this single question. I was hoping, from the author's credentials as college professor and historian, to get something more absolute from this one. While I gained a lot of insight and can now start to draw my own conclusions I hate to say it but I am leaning towards the view of the French, which is always to be fearful of the German propensity for dominion. I am leaning with reservation because the French have yet to reach a level of national conscience that demonstrates peace for the right reason. This review will brush over the top of James Joll's work and I will make an attempt to connect dots and draw conclusions. Keep in mind I am on to reading on Bismarck and then the Crimean War, so I reserve the liberty to modify conclusions written herin.

This book addresses seven different overarching factors starting with the July crisis in 1914 that may have attributed to the cause of WWI. Of the seven factors the mood of 1914 strikes me as the most intriguing. The mood involves the dynamics between the people and their leaders. The most essential aspect of the relationship is the timing of an action, which may be the result of decisions made long before the action. Power politics versus humanity with a civilized world order looming in the balance. While all the countries involved in WWI experienced these dynamics, Germany, albeit with a considerable peace movement in its midst, appears to have demonstrated the most tangible aptitude towards war.
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Short, very short, look at the First World War. Overly dry and academic, even for a scholarly contribution. Too many other books out there to waste time on this one.