Customer Reviews

On the Origins of War

5 star:		(8)
4 star:		(9)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This is a spectacular book and one that all Westerners need to read in the wake of the events of last September. Donald Kagan has become somewhat celebrated of late. His recent book (written with his son) "While America Sleeps" has been justly praised and arrived at an extremely apros pos moment in American and world history.

But it was this book, "On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace" that first brought Kagan to the attention of the world. Kagan is a classical historian - he is the Bass Professor of History, Classics and Western Civilisation at Yale. I have reviewed the first volume of what might justly be called his magnum opus ("The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War") elsewhere.

This is NOT a history of war; this is a history of how it is that people come to fight wars. And while people often refer to this book as "One the Origins of War", I think that would be to miss the point. For this book is more about the preservation of peace than anything else. Elsewhere I note that Kagan has been critiqued for not spending any time discussing the wars themselves -- and the aftermath of the wars. But this is ridiculous. This misses the entire point of what Kagan is trying to do here. If that is what you are looking for -- look elsewhere and do not fault Kagan for failing to provide it.

Drawing heavily upon his classical training, Kagan compares the origins of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) with those of the First World War. He then compares the origins of the Second Punic War (218-201 BC) with those of the Second World War. His final chapter deals with the Cuban Missile Crisis (and relies heavily on recently declassified Soviet and American documents).

There is a sort of systematic approach. In each case he examines the nature of the rivalry between the great powers in question. He then examines, in turn: (1) the nature of the peace that subsisted between the powers in question; (2) the manner in which the peace was "tested"; (3) the crisis that precipitated the eventual outbreak of war; and (4) the manner in which the war itself broke out - his wonderful chapter on the Peloponnesian War ends simply, "So the war came."

His thesis can be fairly summarised as follows: no peace keeps itself. Democracies have to be prepared to fight, to stand up for the peace. And their willingness to fight for the peace must be CREDIBLE.

As always, Kagan's style is lucid and compelling. This is a man who force of logic gives true meaning to the term "ineluctable". For his logic is relentless, his marshalling of the facts is awe-inspiring and his arguments lead inescapably and unavoidably (ineluctably) to their conclusion.

His final paragraph will offer eloquent testimony not only of the value of the book, but of the thesis:

"The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that it is not enough for the state that wishes to maintain peace and the status quo to have superior power. The crisis came because the more powerful state also had a leader [Kennedy] who failed to convince his opponent [Khrushchev] of his will to use its power for that purpose."

This book makes a most interesting companion to any of the works of Victor Davis Hanson (particularly "Carnage and Culture" or "The Soul of Battle") or Samuel Huntington ("The Clash of Civilisations") as well as to the more incisively written books of Robert Kaplan (such as "The Ends of the Earth").

If you are at all interested in international relations, politics, or war as subjects for study, why haven't you read this book? Kagan, without ever pressing home some pet thesis, lays out in detail the events leading up to four wars that were and one that wasn't. Aside from learning many lessons from these individual histories - states and individuals almost never truly want war, "honor" construed as a potential or actual presence in international affairs (deference, prestige, etc.) often winds up being crucial in triggering a conflict, wishful and idealistic thinking or a failure to recognize a threat to a rival nation's security or honor have often contributed mightily to growing conflicts, and many others - one will also get a vivid, in-depth account of some critical moments, accounts that are likely to stick in your mind better than a more general history. While some of Kagan's points may seem to lean toward the trivial when taken out of context and looked at in the clear light of day, it is the very fact that over many years and many events, a slow buildup toward war involves these very things - that at the time are much harder to see clearly - that contribute to movements that end in war. To see the many missteps in detail in these cases is fascinating. With the exceptions of Chamberlain and some of his cronies, and especially Kennedy, very few of the men in this book come off as anything approximating downright foolish; nevertheless, in these pages you will find many men, through many small mistakes, leading their nations to war.

Donald Kagan's "On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace" is a fabulous book with an important message. Derived from his popular undergraduate class at Yale, the book uses an eclectic mix of great power case studies to illuminate the importance of actively and energetically working to maintain great power peace is an international system that is inherently unstable and competitive.

Kagan's basic thesis is that war is a natural component of human society. Moreover, wars are just as likely to arise over intangible issues such as prestige, power, respect and honor as they are over more tangible concerns like land and natural resources. He demonstrates that attempts to avoid war through unilateral disarmament and conciliation -- although well intentioned -- are ultimately chimerical and doomed to failure. Kagan notes that many wars may be "unnecessary" and therefore avoidable, but war as an instrument of policy and change is permanent. Thus, the objective of statesmen should be to fight only those wars that are necessary, while maintaining a strong and credible defense to keep the peace. As Kagan writes "the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does."

As for the individual case studies, I found them to be a bit longer than necessary, but each one was well-crafted and powerfully argued. The book does assume a certain familiarity with the subject matter, so the content may be a little overwhelming for those less-steeped in military history or foreign affairs.

The chapter on the causes of the Peloponnesian War is a gem, but essentially a synopsis of Kagan's seminal work in that area. The piece on the origins of the First World War is forcefully argued and long enough to stand on its own as a monograph on that much-debated historical case study. Kagan revives the classic argument that the perceived ambiguity of a British response to a German invasion of Belgium and France is what set the stage for war, with the author arguing that war could have been avoided if London made their commitment to defend the Low Country clear and by introducing peace-time conscription to field a credible European land army. The chapter on the Second Punic War is crisp and compelling; that on the Second World War too long (he again blames the British for doing the most to "lose the peace"). The last case study was a bit surprising in that Kagan takes a classic diplomatic "success story" and lumps it in the same category as classic blunders like August 1914. In short, he argues that Kennedy's many mistakes, attempts at conciliation, and failure to understand his adversary is what put him in the crisis in the first place. Kagan contends that Kennedy was inclined to accept missiles in Cuba and it was only because of a coterie of strong-willed advisors, upcoming mid-term elections that threatened to overturn his slight Democratic edge in Congress, and a genuine fear of impeachment that compelled him to act. And the resolution of the conflict only came at the expense of the US removing missiles from Turkey in a quid pro quo with the Soviets.

The case studies, which focused exclusively on conflict between great powers and/or their alliance systems, don't apply to the current War on Terror, but the general thesis that tough decisions and sacrifice are required for larger catastrophes to be avoided is still valid and directly applicable. Whether you are a serious student of war and peace, or are simply looking to gain some insights into such issues, you'd be well-advised to put this book on your reading list.

Rather than a look at wars in themselves, this is a select history of the events leading up to four particular conflicts, and to one, the Cuban missle crisis, than did not result in direct aggression. The events leading to the disastrous Peloponesian War between Athens and Sparta, and the Second Punic War between Carthage and Rome are drawn from ancient history. The origins of 1st and 2nd World Wars serve as the modern counterpoint, as does, in a different fashion, the Cuban episdode during the Cold War.

Kagan ultimately finds Thucydides' ancient and eloquent appraisal to be relevant to moderns. That the author elects to not rely on examples from other times or places does not really hamper the thesis. The broader message that Kagan develops concerns the inclinations of large states in relation to one another. That this remains a major feature of the geopolitical landscape makes this book (regretably) relevant.

There are a lot of books that focus on battles in virtually all of the wars, but very few that actually focus on how wars came about. Usually, a book on the war spends a few pages discussing the origins in passing, then quickly moves on to the war itself. This book is very different, and focuses on how wars come about. The writing is terrific and the author's insights are very insightful. The sections of this book explaining the origins of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis are especially good. In addition to history readers, I would recommend this book to those looking for books on leadership and crisis management, because the author focuses on the decisions made by leaders on both sides of various conflicts and explains how those decisions, in light of the existing circumstances, led to an often unintended outcome.

I wish I went to Yale undergrad because this fine book is based on a course Kagan teaches in New Haven. I was amused by the previous review citing "ideological bias." I suspect that's because the reviewer disagrees with Kagan's conclusions on the Cuban Missile Crisis...Do yourself a favor: If you (like me) were fed the "13 days" RFK/Schlesinger/McNamara/Sorensen version of the CMC in High School or College, please read this book.

In, On the Origins of War, Donald Kagan both (1) makes a case study of the causes of Ancient Conficts, and more modern ones, and (2) gives his suggestions on how they could have been avoided. These Wars include the Punic Wars and WWII, the Peloponisian War and WWI, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

After the first war between Rome and Carthage, the Carthigians were given a free hand in Spain upto the Ebro River. When Rome noticed that Carthage was building a mighty army there, Rome gave advance notice that it would probably break its treaty with them, sent a group of ambassadors that insulted Hannibal, but failed to send troops to awe or suppress them.

Hannibal reacted by laying siege to an allied city. Rome, who could have reacted and attacked Hannibal in Spain, did nothing. For almost nine months, Hannibal lay siege to this city. Once his siege was successful, Hannibal turned his eyes, and his elephants, towards Rome. The second Punic Wars had begun.

After the first World War, the allies forced Germany to sign a treaty which blamed the entire war on them. The Germans were also forced to pay hugely disproportionate reparations, dismember their country, essentially disband their own army, and watch their ally Austria-Hungry be sliced into several new nations. Then, after doing almost everything possible to embitter the Germans, the allies disarmed. Slowly at first, but almost continually until WWII broke out, the Germans rearmed themselves.

Hitler accelerated this pace, but he essentially continued the policies of his predecessors. Like Hannibal before him, Hitler then began to attack allies or potential allies of his rival. Hitler attack on Poland, which started WWII, was only attacked after Austria has been "rejoined" with Germany and Czechoslovakia had been conquered.

Thus both the Romans and the Allies had been given advance notice that an enemy may be preparing to fight. Rome was given nine months, the Allies were given, at least, six years. Neither, however, seemed to recognize the threat which was coming. In Rome's case, part of this ignorance may have been due to overconfidence after winning the prior conflict. For the Allies, much of their ignorance was based on their horror over the results of the last war combined with an underappreciation for the anger which was swelling in Germany.

Now, could either of these wars have been avoided? Kagan seems to think so. He describes the different times and ways both wars could have be prevented. I tend to disagree, in part. My disagreement stems from the unexpected. Kagan, in part, states that if you insult a rival or opponent, you should be prepared for a reaction. However, people plan for things in the future, based on what happened in the past. This is why we study history.

Hannibal acted and fought in ways that were almost unheard of during that time. How could the Romans expect Hannibal to cross the Alps with his elephants, when nothing quite like that had occurred in the past. Hitler, as well, acted much more quickly then anyone at that time thought was possible. His own generals were ready to begin a coup starting from the "Sudenland" crisis to the invasion of Austria.

Still, agree or not, this book is interesting and insightful. The other sections, dealing with WWI, are also very well done. Personally, I didn't like the Cuban Missile Crisis section, but it was only a small part of the book. Overall, this book is very, very good. For those who question why we should study history, please read this book. For those of you who already enjoy history, "Origins of War" is a good addition to your library.

This book reads more like a drama than a history book. Kagan lays out the events leading up to several of the most influental conflicts in history and the reasons for the war. He counters several popular myths in his extensively well researched and documented histories.

I have read Thucydides and I wondered how anybody could write about the causes of that war anywhere near the quality of Thucydides. But Kagan did it. His chapter on the Peloponnesian War was so intersting that I read it and the World War One chapter twice! He really shows the reader how one event leads to the next to the next and finally to the outbreak. His thesis about how World War Two started was clearly proven. The Cuban Missile Crisis was another very interesting chapter. He reaveled details in such a way that I wondered how Kennedy can be considered such a great president. I thought the Second Punic War chapter could have had some more work, it was very short and was not as in depth as the other four chapters. His choices for the wars he used are excellent. It was great how he kept interlocking the Peloponnesian War and World War One and how he showed the many similarities between the Second Punic War and World War Two. His students must be so lucky to have him as a teacher. He proves his point in this enjoyable philosophy book.

Mr. Kagan compares the origins of four wars, the Peloponnesian War, the First World War, the second Punic War, the Second World War and a crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, that did not lead to war. Mr. Kagan main point is that most countries involved in these wars had no real want or need of war, and indeed, the steps taken by the leaders to avoid war often lead to war. He recommends an aggressive foreign policy approach in which potential adversaries clearly know your intentions.

His description of the Cuban Missile Crisis in particularly instructive. American's military strength is far greater than the Soviet Union but President. Kennedy is a very indecisive, always afraid of miscalculation. First, the Bay of Pigs was a flop and an embarrassment. President Kennedy then tries to show Khrushchev how tough he was in Vienna but comes across as very weak. Mr. Kennedy then takes no action on the Berlin Wall. Khrushchev is now certain that Kennedy can always be pushed and so sends missiles to Cuban. War was only avoided because of Americans "great military strength that brought safety in the crisis."

Highly recommended.