Liberté? Egalité? Fraternité? Or just plain gall?
In this provocative and brilliantly researched history of how the French have dealt with the United States, John J. Miller and Mark Molesky demonstrate that the cherished idea of French friendship has little basis in reality. Despite the myth of the “sister republics,” the French have always been our rivals, and have harmed and obstructed our interests more often than not.
This history of French hostility goes back to 1704, when a group of French and Indians massacred American settlers in Deerfield, Massachusetts. The authors also debunk the myth of French aid during the Revolution: contrary to popular notions, the French did not enter the war until very late and were mainly interested in hurting their rivals, the British. After the war, the French continued to see themselves as major players in the Western hemisphere and shaped their policies to limit the growth and power of the new nation. The notorious XYZ affair, involving French efforts to undermine the government of George Washington, led to an undeclared naval war with France in 1798. During the Civil War, the French supported the Confederacy and installed a puppet emperor in Mexico.
In the twentieth century, Americans clashed with the French repreatedly. The French victory over President Wilson at Versailles imposed a short-sighted and punitive settlement on Germany that paved the way for the rise of fascism in the 1930s. During World War II, Vichy French troops killed hundreds of American soldiers in North Africa, and diehard French fascist units fought against the Allies in the rubble of Berlin. During the Cold War, Charles DeGaulle yanked France out of NATO and obstructed our efforts to roll back Soviet expansion.
The legacy of French imperial power has been no less disastrous. The French left Haiti in a shambles, got us into Vietnam, and educated many of the world’s worst tyrants at their elite universities, including Pol Pot, the genocidal Cambodian dictator. The fascist Baath regimes in Iraq and Syria are another legacy of failed French colonialism.
Americans have been particularly irritated by French cultural arrogance—their crusades against American movies, McDonalds, Disney, and the exclusion of American words from their language have always rubbed us the wrong way. This irritation has now blossomed into outrage. Our Oldest Enemy shows why that outrage is justified.
Our Oldest Enemy
and over one million other books are available for Amazon Kindle. Learn more
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Browse our Bookshelf Favorites store for big savings on popular fiction, nonfiction, children's books, and more. |
Book Description
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
National Review reporter Miller (The Unmaking of Americans) and Harvard lecturer Molesky focus quite single-mindedly on destroying what they say is the "myth" of the historical friendship between the United States and France. In doing so, they give short shrift to a few vital facts: for instance, while focusing on the French and Indian massacre of British colonists at Deerfield, Mass., in 1704, they overlook the importance of the French fleet in George Washington's great victory at Yorktown. Miller and Molesky also dismiss French policy as having a cynical underside of national self-interest, willfully overlooking the fact that all governments act out of self-interest. Thus, they call French trade barriers during the Cold War ingratitude for American aid in WWII. They accuse the French, who dare to look down on American culture, of their own "sordid cultural exports," such as the avant-garde, with its strain of nihilism. And, as the authors see it, the French, with the debacle at Dien Bien Phu, are responsible for America's quagmire in Vietnam. As one might guess, driving this revisionism is France's refusal to support the United States in its late invasion of Iraq The authors' ire, and their carefully selected and unnuanced slices of history, will convince only the already converted.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
From Booklist
Lafayette, the Statue of Liberty, D-Day-- such symbolic shorthand for a historical alliance between France and America crumbles in the caustic viewpoint expressed by this historical review of their relationship. Miller, of the conservative National Review,^B and Molesky, a Harvard history lecturer, argue that animosity rather than amity has been the two countries' normal state of affairs, extending from the French and Indian War to the post-World War II pattern of frequent French diplomatic opposition to American foreign policy. The authors reflect on the sources of French anti-Americanism, maintaining it is, in part, because of France's resentment of its own decline as a great power and its cultural contempt for America as crass and materialistic. What may seem like the long-gone past, such as Napoleon III's pro-South policy in the Civil War, is presented as a seamless continuum to the present, representing the French proclivity for hampering the American "hyperpower," as one foreign minister recently called the U.S. Gratifying to a nationalist sensibility, Miller and Molesky's editorialized jaunt through history is fluid and opinionated. Gilbert Taylor
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
Product Details
Would you like to update product info or give feedback on images? |
More About the Authors
Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.
Customer Reviews
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
82 of 111 people found the following review helpful
By Pete
Format:Hardcover
Students of diplomatic history will find familiar material here. Their previous reading will have included scattered accounts of French perfidy in the New World and placed them on their guard against the myth of untarnished Franco-American amity. For the non-specialist, however, Miller and Molesky have performed an invaluable service by marshalling the salient facts into one book - and a most engaging and well-written one at that. Their demolition of the aforementioned myth is complete (but restrained) as they guide us through 300 years of French misadventures with the United States.
To be sure, the familiar facts of Franco-American friendship and assistance are recounted and form the background of the narrative. As these are well known they are explored in detail only when necessary (and perhaps when charity warrants that the authors not make France look as bad as it might deserve). The book, naturally, accentuates the negative but is hardly a litany of complaints. Facts are facts - and any student of Franco-American relations should understand how American friendships and alliances with France have been colored by deception, rivalry, and even open (though undeclared) war on the part of the French. The book's thesis may seem provocative - but by the time the narrative reaches the First World War most readers should be thoroughly convinced of its truth. Diplomatic history may seem like a musty and pedantic business to most Americans but Miller and Molesky's well-paced argument and enlightening revelations successfully elicit the dialectical agility required to think of France as (often simultaneously) ally and enemy.
Not, of course, an enemy of the Nazi or Soviet sort, but a persistent one nonetheless. Beginning with French massacres of New England colonists in the early 18th Century, the authors show us the transformation of colonial particularism into a more unified American identity as the several colonies propose a system of united defense against the French military encroachments that would come to be known as the French and Indian War of 1754. French aid during the Revolutionary War is accurately viewed in the light of balance-of-power struggles and France's wish to weaken its traditional rival Great Britain. The story of French assistance at Yorktown (which is not omitted, as the Publisher's Weekly reviewer mistakenly claims) is supplemented by an account of France's arrogant and often incompetent military "support" prior to and following that battle - an account that would strike many Americans as ridiculously comical if it didn't at the same time demonstrate how French hauteur and stupidity nearly aborted the nascent American republic in its struggle with Britain.
America's first naval victory, against France in the Quasi War of 1798-1800, is highlighted. Napoleon's sale of the Louisiana Territory to the United States is placed in its proper context and his chicanery in getting America to declare war on Britain (rather than France) in 1812 is detailed. Napoleon III's designs on weakening the US by supporting the South in the Civil War, his Mexican adventure, and his follies in general are well-handled by the authors. American military aid to France in the First and Second World Wars is juxtaposed against French's self-defeating nationalist intransigence during and after these conflicts. The authors take note of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa during which French Vichy troops mercilessly attacked the Americans who were coming to liberate them. (Tip of the hat to the authors: I have not noticed an account of this episode in any of the other major histories of Franco-American relations.)
Vietnam, the Cold War (during the latter stages of which France proved to be a considerable help to the US - a fact which has not escaped the authors), and Iraq - all these conflicts are dealt with expertly by Miller and Molesky. Two things need to be added, however. When diplomatic historians come to write a full account of the origins of the war in Iraq they will note the diplomatic struggle that took place between the United States and France before George W. Bush even came to office. France's open non-compliance with the system of U.N.-imposed sanctions (something it was joined in by Russia and China) will be seen as one of the causes of American and British intervention. By subverting the diplomatically achieved system of sanctions France narrowed American options and rendered a more forceful treatment of Saddam Hussein likely. Finally, the "multi-polar world" favored by France today rests on the kind of thinking behind the balance-of-power system of "Old Europe" - a system more conducive to conflict and instability than the benign hegemony exercised by the United States today. Some may question whether this hegemony is currently "benign". But one thing is certain. As long as the United States holds such power in the world France cannot attain what its national pride most desires: a hegemony, or partial hegemony of its own.
An excellent read.
To be sure, the familiar facts of Franco-American friendship and assistance are recounted and form the background of the narrative. As these are well known they are explored in detail only when necessary (and perhaps when charity warrants that the authors not make France look as bad as it might deserve). The book, naturally, accentuates the negative but is hardly a litany of complaints. Facts are facts - and any student of Franco-American relations should understand how American friendships and alliances with France have been colored by deception, rivalry, and even open (though undeclared) war on the part of the French. The book's thesis may seem provocative - but by the time the narrative reaches the First World War most readers should be thoroughly convinced of its truth. Diplomatic history may seem like a musty and pedantic business to most Americans but Miller and Molesky's well-paced argument and enlightening revelations successfully elicit the dialectical agility required to think of France as (often simultaneously) ally and enemy.
Not, of course, an enemy of the Nazi or Soviet sort, but a persistent one nonetheless. Beginning with French massacres of New England colonists in the early 18th Century, the authors show us the transformation of colonial particularism into a more unified American identity as the several colonies propose a system of united defense against the French military encroachments that would come to be known as the French and Indian War of 1754. French aid during the Revolutionary War is accurately viewed in the light of balance-of-power struggles and France's wish to weaken its traditional rival Great Britain. The story of French assistance at Yorktown (which is not omitted, as the Publisher's Weekly reviewer mistakenly claims) is supplemented by an account of France's arrogant and often incompetent military "support" prior to and following that battle - an account that would strike many Americans as ridiculously comical if it didn't at the same time demonstrate how French hauteur and stupidity nearly aborted the nascent American republic in its struggle with Britain.
America's first naval victory, against France in the Quasi War of 1798-1800, is highlighted. Napoleon's sale of the Louisiana Territory to the United States is placed in its proper context and his chicanery in getting America to declare war on Britain (rather than France) in 1812 is detailed. Napoleon III's designs on weakening the US by supporting the South in the Civil War, his Mexican adventure, and his follies in general are well-handled by the authors. American military aid to France in the First and Second World Wars is juxtaposed against French's self-defeating nationalist intransigence during and after these conflicts. The authors take note of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa during which French Vichy troops mercilessly attacked the Americans who were coming to liberate them. (Tip of the hat to the authors: I have not noticed an account of this episode in any of the other major histories of Franco-American relations.)
Vietnam, the Cold War (during the latter stages of which France proved to be a considerable help to the US - a fact which has not escaped the authors), and Iraq - all these conflicts are dealt with expertly by Miller and Molesky. Two things need to be added, however. When diplomatic historians come to write a full account of the origins of the war in Iraq they will note the diplomatic struggle that took place between the United States and France before George W. Bush even came to office. France's open non-compliance with the system of U.N.-imposed sanctions (something it was joined in by Russia and China) will be seen as one of the causes of American and British intervention. By subverting the diplomatically achieved system of sanctions France narrowed American options and rendered a more forceful treatment of Saddam Hussein likely. Finally, the "multi-polar world" favored by France today rests on the kind of thinking behind the balance-of-power system of "Old Europe" - a system more conducive to conflict and instability than the benign hegemony exercised by the United States today. Some may question whether this hegemony is currently "benign". But one thing is certain. As long as the United States holds such power in the world France cannot attain what its national pride most desires: a hegemony, or partial hegemony of its own.
An excellent read.
18 of 23 people found the following review helpful
By Pierre
Format:Hardcover
When reviewing a book, it usually helps if the reviewer has an accurate idea of what the book is about. Looking at most of the negative reviews below tells us more about the reviewers and their prejudices and less about the book they've supposedly read (although some admit that they haven't even bothered to read it). To begin with, most of these reviewers seem to think that the book pretends to be a complete history of Franco-American relations. If they look closely they'll find that the book itself has no such pretensions. It is a book about the antagonistic aspects of French and American relations. That's all. Why write such a book rather than a complete history? Well, there's a myth out there in the journalistic ether that holds that the Franco-American relationship was a centuries-old concert of amity and alliance -- that is, until George W. Bush, by going to war in Iraq, managed to produce an unprecedented rift with our "oldest ally". In a matter of months, he had supposedly soured, damaged, and nearly destroyed America's 200-year-old friendship with France. Actually, Bush did nothing of the sort. His administration is hardly the first to have had problems with France. There have been earlier and more serious rifts -- and even military hostilities: Franco-American friendship hadn't even lasted 20 years before the two nations went to war in 1797. One has to wonder why most of our journalists couldn't bring themselves to formulate their remarks in a more historically-informed way. Specifically, one has to wonder why they couldn't simply say that France and the United States had re-entered one of their periodic antagonisms. One explanation is that some of them are simply ignorant of the facts. Hence the need for a book like this.
But don't take it from me (or even from Miller and Molesky). Here to enlighten us is Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, author of "France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present Day" (Chicago, 1978):
"The quarrels [between France and the United States] have left their mark across two centuries of history. They began in 1782 with the peace negotiations, grew under France's National Convention, of which President Washington was decidedly not an admirer, reached a climax with the 'undeclared war' [the so-called Quasi-War], and continued from Jefferson to Jackson over the indemnities relating to the privateer war. They flared up again under Napoleon III over his Mexican adventure, then again early in the Third Republic over the Spanish-American War. The Dreyfus affair triggered off a campaign of censure in the American press. Then, after the friendly intermission of 1917-18, the conflict became more intense than ever, first over the treaty, in which Wilson was seen as being dominated by the 'cynical' Clemenceau, and then over the war-debt problem. After the fall of France in 1940 we find an amused contempt for de Gaulle the "prima donna" and later for the defects of the Fourth Republic, plus a certain disgruntlement over France's 25 percent Communist vote. Then, finally, under de Gaulle, there came the American exasperation at his 'ingratitude.' Meanwhile, on the French side, there were all those who formed the currents of anti-American feeling . . . : communists, neutralists, colonialists, and Gaullists." (Duroselle, p. 246.)
It would be preposterous, of course, to claim that Duroselle produced such a summary because he had a "neo-conservative" axe to grind. Yet Duroselle's paragraph could also serve as an accurate summary of Miller and Molesky's book, a book that has been (unjustly) derided as a repository of "les idées les plus extręmes des néoconservateurs américains." It should be kept in mind that the facts of Franco-American animosity are not exactly a partisan invention. They are in the history books for all to see and need to be recollected rather than defended. On the other hand, it is precisely the myth of an abiding Franco-American amity that calls for critical scrutiny and justification in the face of recurrent historical tensions.
In short, the authors of "Our Oldest Enemy" do nothing more than remind us that friction with France has been quite common in American history. As such, it is rather ironic that Bernard-Henri Lévy should choose to admonish Miller and Molesky for their supposed "essentialism". In fact, their book is nothing less than a thorough debunking of the naďve essentialism implicit in the idea that there has been an enduring essence of Franco-American political friendship. Some readers, for whatever reason, may not wish to be disabused of this myth. I would recommend the book to them nonetheless.
But don't take it from me (or even from Miller and Molesky). Here to enlighten us is Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, author of "France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present Day" (Chicago, 1978):
"The quarrels [between France and the United States] have left their mark across two centuries of history. They began in 1782 with the peace negotiations, grew under France's National Convention, of which President Washington was decidedly not an admirer, reached a climax with the 'undeclared war' [the so-called Quasi-War], and continued from Jefferson to Jackson over the indemnities relating to the privateer war. They flared up again under Napoleon III over his Mexican adventure, then again early in the Third Republic over the Spanish-American War. The Dreyfus affair triggered off a campaign of censure in the American press. Then, after the friendly intermission of 1917-18, the conflict became more intense than ever, first over the treaty, in which Wilson was seen as being dominated by the 'cynical' Clemenceau, and then over the war-debt problem. After the fall of France in 1940 we find an amused contempt for de Gaulle the "prima donna" and later for the defects of the Fourth Republic, plus a certain disgruntlement over France's 25 percent Communist vote. Then, finally, under de Gaulle, there came the American exasperation at his 'ingratitude.' Meanwhile, on the French side, there were all those who formed the currents of anti-American feeling . . . : communists, neutralists, colonialists, and Gaullists." (Duroselle, p. 246.)
It would be preposterous, of course, to claim that Duroselle produced such a summary because he had a "neo-conservative" axe to grind. Yet Duroselle's paragraph could also serve as an accurate summary of Miller and Molesky's book, a book that has been (unjustly) derided as a repository of "les idées les plus extręmes des néoconservateurs américains." It should be kept in mind that the facts of Franco-American animosity are not exactly a partisan invention. They are in the history books for all to see and need to be recollected rather than defended. On the other hand, it is precisely the myth of an abiding Franco-American amity that calls for critical scrutiny and justification in the face of recurrent historical tensions.
In short, the authors of "Our Oldest Enemy" do nothing more than remind us that friction with France has been quite common in American history. As such, it is rather ironic that Bernard-Henri Lévy should choose to admonish Miller and Molesky for their supposed "essentialism". In fact, their book is nothing less than a thorough debunking of the naďve essentialism implicit in the idea that there has been an enduring essence of Franco-American political friendship. Some readers, for whatever reason, may not wish to be disabused of this myth. I would recommend the book to them nonetheless.
30 of 40 people found the following review helpful
By Edmund Weil
Format:Hardcover
The reviews of this book swing between such extremes that I decided to do a little research of my own to see just what is going on here.
The Library Journal charged that Miller and Molesky ignore the academic studies published by Henry Blumenthal and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. So I looked up Blumenthal's "A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871" and found the following: "Contrary to popular notions, the relations between the two countries were not friendly. Usual references to the historic Franco-American friendship from the times of Lafayette to the present conveniently ignore crucial issues and petty incidents which led to a growing estrangement between Paris and Washington in the last century . . . Franco-American alienation in the mid-nineteenth century gradually developed and deepened as the result of a multitude of conflicting policies and viewpoints." And in his "France and the United States: Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789-1914" Blumenthal notes that "the celebrated friendship between France and the United States has been a historical myth." This is precisely Miller and Molesky's thesis. So, far from running afoul of Blumenthal's seminal works, Miller and Molesky are precisely on the same page. Duroselle's "France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present", while noting many of the "crucial issues and petty incidents" mentioned by Blumenthal, tends to whitewash the actions and motivations of French statesmen when discussing their questionable antagonisms to the US. Duroselle's book is also a summary history and typically glosses over Franco-American frictions rather than exploring them in detail. Thus, there was probably a good reason for Miller and Molesky to ignore a book that wasn't exactly impartial or exhaustive.
The problem, it seems to me, is that reviewers who are hostile to this book totally misunderstand what the book tries to (and does) achieve. The book is NOT a complete history of Franco-American relations and has no pretensions to historical exhaustiveness. Nor is it an attack on France by a couple of angry partisans. What it IS, is an exposure of the MYTH that France and the United States were essentially allies for 200 years before George Bush stumbled into town and shot up the Baghdad corral. This "myth" is incredibly easy to refute and Miller and Molesky marshal an impressive body of evidence (spanning 300 years) to do just that. But they have by no means tried to prove that France has NEVER been our ally (or that it can't be again). What they have given us is the antagonistic side of Franco-American history - a side that is surprising, enlightening, sometimes shocking, and quite relevant to today's frictions between France and the United States. We should consider ourselves fortunate that France's worst intentions with regard to the US were never realized - otherwise we might think of it today as a positively hostile nation rather than simply an occasional thorn in our side.
If you're looking for a complete introduction to the history of Franco-American relations I would recommend that you do the following: read Duroselle's "France and the United States" and then read Miller and Molesky's "Our Oldest Enemy" as a corrective to Duroselle's whitewashing of French antagonism and perfidy. Or read "Our Oldest Enemy" first. It's a gripping and eye-opening reassessment of "our oldest ally".
The Library Journal charged that Miller and Molesky ignore the academic studies published by Henry Blumenthal and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. So I looked up Blumenthal's "A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871" and found the following: "Contrary to popular notions, the relations between the two countries were not friendly. Usual references to the historic Franco-American friendship from the times of Lafayette to the present conveniently ignore crucial issues and petty incidents which led to a growing estrangement between Paris and Washington in the last century . . . Franco-American alienation in the mid-nineteenth century gradually developed and deepened as the result of a multitude of conflicting policies and viewpoints." And in his "France and the United States: Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789-1914" Blumenthal notes that "the celebrated friendship between France and the United States has been a historical myth." This is precisely Miller and Molesky's thesis. So, far from running afoul of Blumenthal's seminal works, Miller and Molesky are precisely on the same page. Duroselle's "France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present", while noting many of the "crucial issues and petty incidents" mentioned by Blumenthal, tends to whitewash the actions and motivations of French statesmen when discussing their questionable antagonisms to the US. Duroselle's book is also a summary history and typically glosses over Franco-American frictions rather than exploring them in detail. Thus, there was probably a good reason for Miller and Molesky to ignore a book that wasn't exactly impartial or exhaustive.
The problem, it seems to me, is that reviewers who are hostile to this book totally misunderstand what the book tries to (and does) achieve. The book is NOT a complete history of Franco-American relations and has no pretensions to historical exhaustiveness. Nor is it an attack on France by a couple of angry partisans. What it IS, is an exposure of the MYTH that France and the United States were essentially allies for 200 years before George Bush stumbled into town and shot up the Baghdad corral. This "myth" is incredibly easy to refute and Miller and Molesky marshal an impressive body of evidence (spanning 300 years) to do just that. But they have by no means tried to prove that France has NEVER been our ally (or that it can't be again). What they have given us is the antagonistic side of Franco-American history - a side that is surprising, enlightening, sometimes shocking, and quite relevant to today's frictions between France and the United States. We should consider ourselves fortunate that France's worst intentions with regard to the US were never realized - otherwise we might think of it today as a positively hostile nation rather than simply an occasional thorn in our side.
If you're looking for a complete introduction to the history of Franco-American relations I would recommend that you do the following: read Duroselle's "France and the United States" and then read Miller and Molesky's "Our Oldest Enemy" as a corrective to Duroselle's whitewashing of French antagonism and perfidy. Or read "Our Oldest Enemy" first. It's a gripping and eye-opening reassessment of "our oldest ally".
Most Recent Customer Reviews
4.0 out of 5 stars
OLDEST PUZZLE
It appears so many who are attacking this book don't understand and haven't ever asked the fundamental questions. One may or may not like the French nation, of course. Read more
Published 15 months ago by Severin Olson
5.0 out of 5 stars
Correcting the Record
There's a wonderful bit of dialogue in the classic British TV series, "Yes, Minister", in which Jim Hacker, the Minister for Administrative Affair, is wondering aloud why Britain... Read more
Published on June 18, 2010 by Michael J. Edelman
4.0 out of 5 stars
Is It Possible To Be Unfair To Perfidious Gaul? Surprisingly, Yes!
Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America's Disastrous Relationship with France was the first of several France-bashing books to come out in the aftermath of France's most recent stab... Read more
Published on April 12, 2008 by fredtownward
5.0 out of 5 stars
Fun, Interesting--A great read!
This book was a lot of fun. I was impressed by its thoroughness and how well it was written. There are plenty of details, insight, and interesting events. Read more
Published on April 11, 2008 by T. Severino
1.0 out of 5 stars
propaganda at its fullest
As an American living in France for the third time, I have to admit... I couldn't stomach this book enough to read the entire thing. Read more
Published on March 6, 2007 by dcp
1.0 out of 5 stars
A thesis based on resentment and bigotry
Bottom line is, the USA would not even exist if it had not been for France. Our founding fathers got the schematic for the constitution from a Frenchman named Montesquie, and 3/4... Read more
Published on February 16, 2007 by L. Peyronnin
3.0 out of 5 stars
Not Bad, Not Great
I learned a lot form this book, but it is rather one-sided (I guess that's its point) and would have liked more debate. Read more
Published on September 29, 2006 by T. Vedder
5.0 out of 5 stars
Accurate Book -- Good Read
Speaking as someone who is fluent in French and has lived in France for over two years, I was very impressed with how well this book succinctly and accurately recounts the history... Read more
Published on August 22, 2006 by btgiv
1.0 out of 5 stars
Unbelievably inane waste of time ....
Reading this book caused me to pause frequently and wonder how anyone could commit such haf-truth, historically misinterpreted and totally uninformed nonsense into a book. Read more
Published on March 26, 2006 by Steven Salier
1.0 out of 5 stars
Our Oldest Enemy
Are you a fairly conservative American, sympathetic to the US's foreign policy objectives, and frustrated by the cultural arrogance that accompanies France's efforts to undermine... Read more
Published on February 10, 2006 by Mark Talbert
