Customer Reviews

Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America's Disastrous Relationship with France

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1 star:		(29)

 

 

Students of diplomatic history will find familiar material here. Their previous reading will have included scattered accounts of French perfidy in the New World and placed them on their guard against the myth of untarnished Franco-American amity. For the non-specialist, however, Miller and Molesky have performed an invaluable service by marshalling the salient facts into one book - and a most engaging and well-written one at that. Their demolition of the aforementioned myth is complete (but restrained) as they guide us through 300 years of French misadventures with the United States.

To be sure, the familiar facts of Franco-American friendship and assistance are recounted and form the background of the narrative. As these are well known they are explored in detail only when necessary (and perhaps when charity warrants that the authors not make France look as bad as it might deserve). The book, naturally, accentuates the negative but is hardly a litany of complaints. Facts are facts - and any student of Franco-American relations should understand how American friendships and alliances with France have been colored by deception, rivalry, and even open (though undeclared) war on the part of the French. The book's thesis may seem provocative - but by the time the narrative reaches the First World War most readers should be thoroughly convinced of its truth. Diplomatic history may seem like a musty and pedantic business to most Americans but Miller and Molesky's well-paced argument and enlightening revelations successfully elicit the dialectical agility required to think of France as (often simultaneously) ally and enemy.

Not, of course, an enemy of the Nazi or Soviet sort, but a persistent one nonetheless. Beginning with French massacres of New England colonists in the early 18th Century, the authors show us the transformation of colonial particularism into a more unified American identity as the several colonies propose a system of united defense against the French military encroachments that would come to be known as the French and Indian War of 1754. French aid during the Revolutionary War is accurately viewed in the light of balance-of-power struggles and France's wish to weaken its traditional rival Great Britain. The story of French assistance at Yorktown (which is not omitted, as the Publisher's Weekly reviewer mistakenly claims) is supplemented by an account of France's arrogant and often incompetent military "support" prior to and following that battle - an account that would strike many Americans as ridiculously comical if it didn't at the same time demonstrate how French hauteur and stupidity nearly aborted the nascent American republic in its struggle with Britain.

America's first naval victory, against France in the Quasi War of 1798-1800, is highlighted. Napoleon's sale of the Louisiana Territory to the United States is placed in its proper context and his chicanery in getting America to declare war on Britain (rather than France) in 1812 is detailed. Napoleon III's designs on weakening the US by supporting the South in the Civil War, his Mexican adventure, and his follies in general are well-handled by the authors. American military aid to France in the First and Second World Wars is juxtaposed against French's self-defeating nationalist intransigence during and after these conflicts. The authors take note of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa during which French Vichy troops mercilessly attacked the Americans who were coming to liberate them. (Tip of the hat to the authors: I have not noticed an account of this episode in any of the other major histories of Franco-American relations.)

Vietnam, the Cold War (during the latter stages of which France proved to be a considerable help to the US - a fact which has not escaped the authors), and Iraq - all these conflicts are dealt with expertly by Miller and Molesky. Two things need to be added, however. When diplomatic historians come to write a full account of the origins of the war in Iraq they will note the diplomatic struggle that took place between the United States and France before George W. Bush even came to office. France's open non-compliance with the system of U.N.-imposed sanctions (something it was joined in by Russia and China) will be seen as one of the causes of American and British intervention. By subverting the diplomatically achieved system of sanctions France narrowed American options and rendered a more forceful treatment of Saddam Hussein likely. Finally, the "multi-polar world" favored by France today rests on the kind of thinking behind the balance-of-power system of "Old Europe" - a system more conducive to conflict and instability than the benign hegemony exercised by the United States today. Some may question whether this hegemony is currently "benign". But one thing is certain. As long as the United States holds such power in the world France cannot attain what its national pride most desires: a hegemony, or partial hegemony of its own.

An excellent read.

When reviewing a book, it usually helps if the reviewer has an accurate idea of what the book is about. Looking at most of the negative reviews below tells us more about the reviewers and their prejudices and less about the book they've supposedly read (although some admit that they haven't even bothered to read it). To begin with, most of these reviewers seem to think that the book pretends to be a complete history of Franco-American relations. If they look closely they'll find that the book itself has no such pretensions. It is a book about the antagonistic aspects of French and American relations. That's all. Why write such a book rather than a complete history? Well, there's a myth out there in the journalistic ether that holds that the Franco-American relationship was a centuries-old concert of amity and alliance -- that is, until George W. Bush, by going to war in Iraq, managed to produce an unprecedented rift with our "oldest ally". In a matter of months, he had supposedly soured, damaged, and nearly destroyed America's 200-year-old friendship with France. Actually, Bush did nothing of the sort. His administration is hardly the first to have had problems with France. There have been earlier and more serious rifts -- and even military hostilities: Franco-American friendship hadn't even lasted 20 years before the two nations went to war in 1797. One has to wonder why most of our journalists couldn't bring themselves to formulate their remarks in a more historically-informed way. Specifically, one has to wonder why they couldn't simply say that France and the United States had re-entered one of their periodic antagonisms. One explanation is that some of them are simply ignorant of the facts. Hence the need for a book like this.

But don't take it from me (or even from Miller and Molesky). Here to enlighten us is Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, author of "France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present Day" (Chicago, 1978):

"The quarrels [between France and the United States] have left their mark across two centuries of history. They began in 1782 with the peace negotiations, grew under France's National Convention, of which President Washington was decidedly not an admirer, reached a climax with the 'undeclared war' [the so-called Quasi-War], and continued from Jefferson to Jackson over the indemnities relating to the privateer war. They flared up again under Napoleon III over his Mexican adventure, then again early in the Third Republic over the Spanish-American War. The Dreyfus affair triggered off a campaign of censure in the American press. Then, after the friendly intermission of 1917-18, the conflict became more intense than ever, first over the treaty, in which Wilson was seen as being dominated by the 'cynical' Clemenceau, and then over the war-debt problem. After the fall of France in 1940 we find an amused contempt for de Gaulle the "prima donna" and later for the defects of the Fourth Republic, plus a certain disgruntlement over France's 25 percent Communist vote. Then, finally, under de Gaulle, there came the American exasperation at his 'ingratitude.' Meanwhile, on the French side, there were all those who formed the currents of anti-American feeling . . . : communists, neutralists, colonialists, and Gaullists." (Duroselle, p. 246.)

It would be preposterous, of course, to claim that Duroselle produced such a summary because he had a "neo-conservative" axe to grind. Yet Duroselle's paragraph could also serve as an accurate summary of Miller and Molesky's book, a book that has been (unjustly) derided as a repository of "les idées les plus extrêmes des néoconservateurs américains." It should be kept in mind that the facts of Franco-American animosity are not exactly a partisan invention. They are in the history books for all to see and need to be recollected rather than defended. On the other hand, it is precisely the myth of an abiding Franco-American amity that calls for critical scrutiny and justification in the face of recurrent historical tensions.

In short, the authors of "Our Oldest Enemy" do nothing more than remind us that friction with France has been quite common in American history. As such, it is rather ironic that Bernard-Henri Lévy should choose to admonish Miller and Molesky for their supposed "essentialism". In fact, their book is nothing less than a thorough debunking of the naïve essentialism implicit in the idea that there has been an enduring essence of Franco-American political friendship. Some readers, for whatever reason, may not wish to be disabused of this myth. I would recommend the book to them nonetheless.

Let me preface this by saying that I largely agree with the book's overall premise, that French political elites have an irrational fear of American political hegemony. That said, I am extremely disappointed in the book's opening chapter.

The authors' treatment of the wars between the British and French North American colonies is extremely one-sided and misleading. They would have you believe that the British colonists were a passive bunch who acted in self-defense against French aggressors and their vicious Indian allies. This is laughable in light of the facts that 1) the British colonies had literally 20 times the population of the French ones; 2) the British made it their explicit goal to conquer the French territories, as they had done to New Netherland and 3) the British made good on their claim, invading and conquering New France in 1759.

The authors mention the Deerfield massacre of 1704 while conveniently overlooking similar slaughters that occurred in Quebec, Port Royal and Montreal at the hands of the British. They also gloss over the expulsion of 10,000 Acadians from their colony (now Nova Scotia), something the French never did in territories they captured.

The authors acknowledge that the French made far more native allies than the British, but never pause to examine why this was the case. Whereas the British effectively wanted to create a reconstituted European state and push the natives out of the way, the predominantly fur-trading French colonists attempted to assimilate themselves into Native culture as much as the opposite. When the British attempted to expand their colonies, they met the fierce opposition of Native tribes, who did not want to see their French allies evicted. The authors ignore these details and instead treat the Native Americans as almost sub-human, even comparing them to weapons of mass destruction. And to top it off, they chide the French colonial rulers for "exploiting" the natives! This is ridiculous.

There is no reason for such a lopsided account of these events. I'm afraid that the authors' personal biases have clouded their judgment when it comes to covering the colonial wars.

The reviews of this book swing between such extremes that I decided to do a little research of my own to see just what is going on here.

The Library Journal charged that Miller and Molesky ignore the academic studies published by Henry Blumenthal and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. So I looked up Blumenthal's "A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871" and found the following: "Contrary to popular notions, the relations between the two countries were not friendly. Usual references to the historic Franco-American friendship from the times of Lafayette to the present conveniently ignore crucial issues and petty incidents which led to a growing estrangement between Paris and Washington in the last century . . . Franco-American alienation in the mid-nineteenth century gradually developed and deepened as the result of a multitude of conflicting policies and viewpoints." And in his "France and the United States: Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789-1914" Blumenthal notes that "the celebrated friendship between France and the United States has been a historical myth." This is precisely Miller and Molesky's thesis. So, far from running afoul of Blumenthal's seminal works, Miller and Molesky are precisely on the same page. Duroselle's "France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present", while noting many of the "crucial issues and petty incidents" mentioned by Blumenthal, tends to whitewash the actions and motivations of French statesmen when discussing their questionable antagonisms to the US. Duroselle's book is also a summary history and typically glosses over Franco-American frictions rather than exploring them in detail. Thus, there was probably a good reason for Miller and Molesky to ignore a book that wasn't exactly impartial or exhaustive.

The problem, it seems to me, is that reviewers who are hostile to this book totally misunderstand what the book tries to (and does) achieve. The book is NOT a complete history of Franco-American relations and has no pretensions to historical exhaustiveness. Nor is it an attack on France by a couple of angry partisans. What it IS, is an exposure of the MYTH that France and the United States were essentially allies for 200 years before George Bush stumbled into town and shot up the Baghdad corral. This "myth" is incredibly easy to refute and Miller and Molesky marshal an impressive body of evidence (spanning 300 years) to do just that. But they have by no means tried to prove that France has NEVER been our ally (or that it can't be again). What they have given us is the antagonistic side of Franco-American history - a side that is surprising, enlightening, sometimes shocking, and quite relevant to today's frictions between France and the United States. We should consider ourselves fortunate that France's worst intentions with regard to the US were never realized - otherwise we might think of it today as a positively hostile nation rather than simply an occasional thorn in our side.

If you're looking for a complete introduction to the history of Franco-American relations I would recommend that you do the following: read Duroselle's "France and the United States" and then read Miller and Molesky's "Our Oldest Enemy" as a corrective to Duroselle's whitewashing of French antagonism and perfidy. Or read "Our Oldest Enemy" first. It's a gripping and eye-opening reassessment of "our oldest ally".

Next is French disloyalty during the War of Independence. France merely "helped" America because of tactical ease to stymie England's expansion and prevent British concessions after Saratoga, but France menacingly plotted to not comply with or disobey American strategy against the English in some of the most decisive battles!!!! This ruse was schemed by Vergennes, Foreign Affairs Minister, when he drafted two treaties with Benjamin Franklin to solidify the alliance. The first palpable "assistance" came from stuffy D'Estaing (inexperienced in navy matters) who arrived stalled, dearly permitting the English to consolidate at New York in July 1778. Henceforth, D'Estaing mismanaged an opportunity to rout the English by placing his heaviest guns on Sandy Hook--island with view of NY harbor where English ships consolidated--the English took it for themselves. D'Estaing followed with other tactical misdeeds at Newport, St. Lucia, and Savannah. Another infamous citation was naval officer Landais who during John Paul Jones' battle with the Serapis fired on Jones' ship, almost costing him victory.

Miller's book is a thorough and sober look at U.S.'s relationship with France. While the title is provocative, Miller makes his case with detailed examples in support of his case for a reassessment of the relationship.

Not the "French bashing" book that many of Miller's critics (and some of his supporters) expect, there is much to like in this book for members of just about any political persuasion or geopolitical worldview. Do yourself a favor and read this book for yourself.

I am no right winger, and I certainly won't like a book because Donald Rumsfeld approves of its thesis. And I don't think this book will change the mind of a Francophile...but it might just take someone a bit suspicious of French motives and make him or her DEEPLY suspicious.

What I really liked about this book is how it pretty much read like an American history book, tautly written and well, except through the lens of French interaction with the U.S. In other words, it's fascinating how bound up the French have been in key moments in American history: The War for Independence, the World Wars, the Cold War, Vietnam, the War on Terror. The Louisiana Purchase, which doubled our nation's size, is attributed here to Napoleon's selling a stock high, knowing that he lacked the reach and funds to defend French holdings in the New World.

Face it: The authors' idea that the French, whose global empire once included most of West Africa, Quebec, the Mississippi Valley, and pieces of Southeast Asia and South America, are now resentful also-rans is damn near irrefutable. For so opinionated a thesis to appear during so politically correct a time is downright refreshing! America's global policy is far from perfect, but I'll take it over French follies any day. I am left of center on most issues, and I would never subscribe to "The National Review," but good writing is good writing. compelling history is compelling history, and having a strong clear opinion bolstered by endless facts is a good thing. Let someone write a book marshalling the evidence that the French have been our good buddies for 250 years; slim as a pamphlet that one will be.

This book, with its strong opinions and clear descriptions of historical personages, just flies by. Devour it in a few days then enter the debate.

There's a wonderful bit of dialogue in the classic British TV series, "Yes, Minister", in which Jim Hacker, the Minister for Administrative Affair, is wondering aloud why Britain needs nuclear weapons. "Anyway,", he says, to Sir Humphrey Appleby, "the Americans will always protect us from the Russians, won't they?" "Who's talking about the Russians?," Sir Humphrey responds, "It's to protect us from the French!" Hacker is confused- "But they're our allies!" Sir Humprey is nonplussed; "Well, they might be now; but they were our mortal enemies for centuries, and old leopards don't change their spots."

That exchange always gets a great laugh in England, more so than in the US, where we grew up with the myth of the French as allies who helped us out during the Revolutionary War. But with the exception of Lafayatte and one or two individuals, France's only interest during that time was in how they could exploit the Revolution as part of the war they'd been waging against the British both in Europe and in the American colonies. Indeed, the ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Paris, which ended the conflict, when the French were already waging an undeclared war against the US, issuing Letters of Marque to privateers enlisted in the war against the new country. These privateers captured or sank hundreds of American ships.

Things did not improve much in later years. In the first World War, the French generals used American troops as cattle fodder, sending them against German fortifications while they held back their own troops. In WWII, the French resistance collapsed in three days, and rather than moving the French government to North Africa, where they had significant land and sea forces and could have fought alongside the British, they moved their headquarters to Vichy, where they became enthusiastic participants in the German war effort, supplying the Wermacht with arms and clothing. They were enthusiastic participants in Hitler's Final Solution, too, shipping 72,000 French Jews to Auschwitz without being prodded to do so by the Germans. Many French soldiers volunteered to fight alongside Germans, and their was an entire French division of the SS. And General Charles DeGaulle,, self-declared leader of the Free French, often worked against the interests of the Allied commanders who were supplying and supporting his forces in the interest of positioning himself as the post-war leader of France. DeGaulle's headquarters was said to be so penetrated by German spies that the fastest way to get a message to the Germans was to send it to DeGaulle, marked "Top Secret."

After the war, the French continued to thwart the efforts of the Allied powers. DeGaulle played the future NATO powers against the Soviets, determined to get as much as possible out of each. Paris meanwhile became a favorite training place for future dictators, with both Ho Chi Minh and Pol Pot learning their political philosophy from the French Communist Party (PCF) and anti-American French intellectuals. After giving up their own struggle against the NVA and the Viet Cong, and managing to involve the US in that war, the French were happy to become vocal supporters of North Vietnam. Throughout the 60s and on into the 21st Century the French could be counted on to fail to support the US and their Western European neighbors, whether it was denying the US permission to flyover and attack Lybia, resulting in increased US fatalities, or supplying Iraq with the materials for its nuclear weapons program.

And that's just scratching the surface. If all this strikes you as heavy-handed and perhaps one sided, be advised that I'm just giving you a sample of what's contained in this book. If you still think of France as our oldest ally, you really ought to read this book.

Speaking as someone who is fluent in French and has lived in France for over two years, I was very impressed with how well this book succinctly and accurately recounts the history of Franco-American relations. Like many people, I have a love-hate relationship with the French. The food, culture, and language are second-to-none; other than my home state of Vermont, I can not imagine living anywhere else. Yet it is undeniable that the French are extremely chauvinistic and have a major complex about their loss of status and influence in the world. It is also true that their "friendship" with the U.S. has almost always been a relationship of convenience in which the French were pursuing a crafty counter-policy under the table.

France helped America win its independence from England, but only to stymie the Brits. Once the war was won, the French did everything they could to weaken the young American republic, with an eye on conquering it later. Rebuffed at that point, France tried again during the U.S. Civil War, supporting the Confederates, and toppling the Mexican government. In more recent times, France has attempted to boost its standing by harnessing international organizations for its own purposes -- quitting NATO when it was not allowed to run things, turning the UN Security Council into a three-ring soap-opera circus, and using the EU as a means of exerting control over the entire European continent. The French have an unrelenting quest for power, and are arrogant enough to believe they deserve it.

And it's not like Americans are the only ones who view the French this way: the British, Germans, and almost everyone else in the world have the same view of them because, well, it's true. Heck, even Howard Dean once said of France: "The French will always do exactly the opposite of what the United States wants regardless of what happens, so [the U.S. and France] are never going to have a consistent policy." Yep, that pretty much sums it up.

As usual, buyers should ignore the trolls who have posted virulently negative reviews here. Most of them see defending the French as their duty in a proxy war against the Bush administration. Based on their comments, most of them have not even read the book. Ditto for many of the left-of-center professional critics quoted above. As for me, I will drink my fine French wine and enjoy France's many cultural delights, while at the same time proudly presenting my middle finger to French foreign policy and national duplicity.

The book is well written. Perhaps it has left out situations where France has been more accomodating or friendly to the US, but it is hard to think of any. I was surprised that that the Authors did not follow up on the thought that part of their rivalry with us is in sync with their competition with the British and their pique over the fact that English is the language of the world these days.

I recommend the book. I enjoyed reading a lot of the details about circumstances that I know about in general, and learning new incidents.