Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution [Paperback]

Francis Fukuyama (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: May 1, 2003 | ISBN-10: 0312421710 | ISBN-13: 978-0312421717

A decade after his now-famous pronouncement of “the end of history,” Francis Fukuyama argues that as a result of biomedical advances, we are facing the possibility of a future in which our humanity itself will be altered beyond recognition. Fukuyama sketches a brief history of man’s changing understanding of human nature: from Plato and Aristotle to the modernity’s utopians and dictators who sought to remake mankind for ideological ends. Fukuyama argues that the ability to manipulate the DNA of all of one person’s descendants will have profound, and potentially terrible, consequences for our political order, even if undertaken with the best of intentions. In Our Posthuman Future, one of our greatest social philosophers begins to describe the potential effects of genetic exploration on the foundation of liberal democracy: the belief that human beings are equal by nature.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

Maybe we have a future after all: Our Posthuman Future is political historian Francis Fukuyama's reconsideration of his 1989 announcement that history had reached an end. He claims that science, particularly genome studies, offers radical changes, possibly more profound than anything since the development of language, in the way we think about human nature. He makes his case thoroughly and eloquently, rarely dipping into philosophical or critical jargon and consistently maintaining an informal tone.

Fukuyama is deeply concerned about the erosion of the foundations of liberal democracy under pressure from new concepts of humans and human rights, and most readers will find some room for agreement. Ultimately, he argues for strong international regulation of human biotechnology and thoughtfully disposes of the most compelling counterarguments. While readers might not agree that we're at risk of creating Huxley's Brave New World, it's hard to deny that things are changing quickly and that perhaps we ought to consider the changes before they're irrevocable. --Rob Lightner --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Publishers Weekly

Fukuyama (The End of History and the Last Man; Trust) is no stranger to controversial theses, and here he advances two: that there are sound nonreligious reasons to put limits on biotechnology, and that such limits can be enforced. Fukuyama argues that "the most significant threat" from biotechnology is "the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a `posthuman' stage of history." The most obvious way that might happen is through the achievement of genetically engineered "designer babies," but he presents other, imminent routes as well: research on the genetic basis of behavior; neuropharmacology, which has already begun to reshape human behavior through drugs like Prozac and Ritalin; and the prolongation of life, to the extent that society might come "to resemble a giant nursing home." Fukuyama then draws on Aristotle and the concept of "natural right" to argue against unfettered development of biotechnology. His claim is that a substantive human nature exists, that basic ethical principles and political rights such as equality are based on judgments about that nature, and therefore that human dignity itself could be lost if human nature is altered. Finally, he argues that state power, possibly in the form of new regulatory institutions, should be used to regulate biotechnology, and that pessimism about the ability of the global community to do this is unwarranted. Throughout, Fukuyama avoids ideological straitjackets and articulates a position that is neither Luddite nor laissez-faire. The result is a well-written, carefully reasoned assessment of the perils and promise of biotechnology, and of the possible safeguards against its misuse. (Apr.) Forecast: As the FSG publicity material notes, Fukuyama famously declared in the wake of communism's collapse that "the major alternatives to liberal democracy" had "exhausted themselves." This less dramatic assessment should still win a hearing, if not among scientists then among a public concerned about science's growing power.
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 272 pages
• Publisher: Picador (May 1, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0312421710
• ISBN-13: 978-0312421717
• Product Dimensions: 5.5 x 1 x 8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 3.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (39 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #170,676 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #89 in Books > Medical Books > Basic Sciences > Biotechnology

More About the Author

Francis Fukuyama is Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), resident in FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. His book, The End of History and the Last Man, was published by Free Press in 1992 and has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His most recent books are America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, and Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap between Latin America and the United States. His latest book, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution will be published in April 2011.

Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation from 1979-1980, then again from 1983-89, and from 1995-96. In 1981-82 and in 1989 he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State, the first time as a regular member specializing in Middle East affairs, and then as Deputy Director for European political-military affairs. In 1981-82 he was also a member of the US delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President's Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004.

Dr. Fukuyama is chairman of the editorial board of The American Interest, which he helped to found in 2005. He holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), and Kansai University (Japan). He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Directors of the National Endowment for Democracy, and member of the advisory boards for the Journal of Democracy, the Inter-American Dialogue, and The New America Foundation. He is a member of the American Political Science Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Pacific Council for International Affairs. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

March 2011

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

32 of 32 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars A Disappointment July 5, 2002

By Zachary Hale

Format:Hardcover

I have to admit that I went into this book with great expectations about it from both reviews I had read and the interesting "Our Posthuman Future" title. However, the book was disappointing, and Fukuyama provides no insight that is not readily available in other texts. He attempts with his "Human Nature," "Human Rights," and "Human Dignity" chapters to assert that a system of natural rights is necessary for the future and that such as system concords with reality. However, he fails in his attempt to prove his metaphysic and in the end seems to profess a quasi-religious commitment to a romantic notion of humanity.

He seems to think that the genetic potential is such that we could change our "human nature" and thus threaten our humanness. This is a legitimate fear, but Fukuyama fails to analyze adequately why this is so and what possible implications that might have. He rejects reproductive cloning on the basis that it creates an unnatural family life, but his warrants are not very distinguishable from an adopted child or from a child that looks like their mother or father. His analysis can at times be extremely superficial as if he is just expecting some sort of a confirmation bias since `everyone disagrees with cloning anyway.'

All in all, this is well researched as far as technologies go, but Fukuyama's attempt to establish a philosophical justification for his policy recommendations fails miserably. One of the biggest issues I have with his recommendation is that he calls for "institutions that can discriminate between good and bad use of biotechnology" and for a "regulatory framework to separate legitimate and illegitimate uses." He further elucidates that this means that one must "distinguish between therapy and enhancement." To be fair, Fukuyama does realize that this is an extremely difficult thing to do; but then he just brushes the concern off with some justification that it must be done anyways and that it is possible since doctors and agencies are currently able to determine legitimate therapeutic uses for Ritalin. However, what F.F. fails to realize (which he does assert in other parts, but there is no cross-application here) is that genetic manipulation is much more permanent that psychopharmacology is, and that the potential uses of prescreening and later germ-line engineering extend far beyond the potential that drugs have. The potential in this realm is an eradication of a certain trait deemed a "disorder" or a "health-risk," questionable in its own right but also possibly costly to the future of our societies. It is at least possible that some people's genius lie in their abnormality and thus genetic technology risks a normalizing far more profound than institutional structures could ever provide. Fukuyama only lightly addresses so-called "postmodern" critics like Michel Foucault in regards to the dubiousness of making distinctions between the normal and the pathological. He seems rather poorly read on the subject.... I'm not accusing him of that necessarily, its just that he didn't give such concerns the attention they truly deserve. These are concerns that will have profound implications on the future of society.

In the end, I am left disappointed. The title of the work seemed to me to infer that this would be a much more critical perspective of the implications of biotechnology on social structures, ontology, and knowledge. But instead, the book turns out to be a rather popular-based analysis of technologies and a moderate policy proposal justified by an inadequately discussed moral system of risk to natural right. The most interesting parts of the entire work are the quotes (from Nietzsche and others) at the beginning of certain chapters.

36 of 40 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars A Commendable Failure April 8, 2003

By A Customer

Format:Hardcover

This is a book with many virtues and one fatal flaw. Among the former are a clear, lucid style and an impressive overview of the state of the art in contemporary genetic science and the moral debates that they have provoked. This book is highly recommended to those who are relatively new to these issues and want a superb, layman's introduction.

But the book's central argument is embarrassingly weak. Fukuyama relies on Aristotle to support his central claim that morality ought to be grounded in an essential conception of human nature, the substance of which he sketches in the core chapters of the book. Scientific techniques should be regulated by the state, he argues, so that they do not threaten this nature, and thereby constitute an assault on human dignity.

The flaw here is what 20th Century philosophers have labelled "the naturalistic fallacy": deriving a statement of value from a statement(s) of fact(s). In a word, facts tell us nothing about what is valuable. Fukuyama confronts this objection head-on by denying that the naturalistic fallacy really is a fallacy. (The "naturalistic fallacy fallacy"!) I admire his intellectual gusto in doing so, although he had little choice if he wanted his argument to have some chance of success. But he just isn't a good enough philosopher to pull it off. He doesn't even come remotely close. The fact that many philosophers (eg. Kant, Rawls) who accept that this is a fallacy have made claims about human nature--this is Fukuyama's main counter-argument--may be true, but it simply goes to show that they were inconsistent; it doesn't touch the naturalistic fallacy. That is the (weak) heart of his counter-argument. This isn't a minor problem for Fukuyama. His whole argument pivots on it. One can almost hear the rest of his book come crashing down around mid-way, as he earnestly rides into battle against the naturalistic fallacy armed with the flimsiest of weapons and fails to make even a small dent in it. All of the prescriptive aspects of the book fall with this failure, which makes the book overall a failure. (A disturbing conclusion, when one considers that Fukuyama is on a national committee on bioethics advising the US government!) But the copious descriptive parts of the book are very well executed and impressively well-informed, making it a commendable failure. You will learn a lot about modern science from this book, and nothing about what (ethically) to do about it.

36 of 43 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Vital and interesting but not convincing November 12, 2002

By Dennis Littrell HALL OF FAMETOP 500 REVIEWERVINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover

I was very impressed with the depth and scope of Fukuyama's examination of the call to regulate biotechnology and especially with the fairness of his presentation and tone. His subject is a particularly contentious one, and one of enormous importance for all of us since the effect of biotechnology on human beings includes the possibility of not only changing our very nature, but of an actual step-by-step termination of humans as we are now constituted.

Ultimately this is what Professor Fukuyama is worried about and why he argues so strongly for the regulation of the biotech industry regardless of the effect such regulation might have on scientific progress and even at the risk of creating a biotech gap between the United States and other nations actively pursuing such research.

However, I don't think Fukuyama was completely successful in making his case; indeed I am not worried about "us" becoming something else or losing what he refers to as our "human essence."

"And what is that human essence that we might be in danger of losing?" he asks on page 101. "For a religious person, it might have to do with the divine gift or spark that all human beings are born with. From a secular perspective, it would have to do with human nature: the species-typical characteristics shared by all human beings qua human beings. That is ultimately what is at stake in the biotech revolution."

He doesn't define these "species-typical characteristics." Instead he goes on to say that there is "an intimate connection between human nature and human notions of rights, justice, and morality." He then argues the case for basing human rights on human nature, sometimes called the "naturalistic fallacy," thereby putting himself in the hands of those who would know what human nature is. Alas, there is no agreement on that subject, which is why, as Fukuyama notes, the term "natural rights" has been replaced with "human rights whose provenance does not depend on a theory of nature." (p. 101)

On page149 he changes his tack somewhat and argues that the biotechnological revolution is a threat to our sense of "dignity and recognition." He says this "is not economic: what we desire is not money but that other human beings respect us in the way we think we deserve."

Here I would point out that "recognition" and having "dignity" in the eyes of others is adaptive in a Darwinian sense. People that the tribe regard as lacking dignity and recognition get fewer reproductive tries and have a tough time of it socially and economically. Having dignity is like saving face: something we must do to maintain psychological equilibrium and our position in society.

On page 218 he comes around to concluding that "human nature is very plastic... But it is not infinitely malleable, and the elements that remain constant--particularly our species-typical gamut of emotional responses--constitute a safe harbor that allows us to connect, potentially, with all other human beings."

This seems to imply that what he has finally found as our "essence" is our emotional nature. He might be right (heaven help us if he is) but I think our ability to adapt to change and to order our environment to our advantage through our culture and technology is really the essence of what it means to be human.

The curious thing about this book is how really persuasive, reasonable and informative Fukuyama is when he is NOT arguing for the regulation of biotechnology. Here are some interesting observations:

"In the future, virtually everything that the popular imagination envisions genetic engineering accomplishing is much more likely to be accomplished sooner through neuropharmacology." (p. 52)

"There is a disconcerting symmetry between Prozac and Ritalin. The former is prescribed heavily for depressed women lacking in self-esteem; it gives them more of the alpha-male feeling that comes with high serotonin levels. Ritalin, on the other hand, is prescribed largely for young boys who do not want to sit still in class because nature never designed them to behave that way." (pp. 51-52)

"Developed countries" are finding that "the pool of available military manpower" is shrinking as their population ages. "The willingness of people in such societies to tolerate battle casualties among their young may fall as well." He sees a world "divided...between a North whose political tone is set by elderly women, and a South driven by...super-empowered angry young men." (p. 63)

Finally on page 172 he writes, "This protracted discussion of human dignity is intended to answer the following question: What is it that we want to protect from any future advances in biotechnology? The answer is, we want to protect the full range of our complex, evolved natures against attempts at self-modification."

My question is why? Are we so perfectly constituted as to make change undesirable? Our "evolved natures" are just that, something that has evolved and is evolving and will go on evolving. The creature that was "us" five million years ago has changed into the "us" of today. Would it be somehow preferable to have somehow stopped change five million years ago? If not, what makes Fukuyama think that we should attempt that now? He writes from the position of a humanist, but his unstated assumptions are similar to the religious notion that we are somehow the final product of a Creator and therefore not to be tampered with.

Evolution is now proceeding with an enormous rapidity driven not by natural selection but by culture. Our artifacts and our science and yes our biotechnology are part of the culture that is shaping us. We can't escape from that fact, and we cannot deny our nature as creatures that create, even though some of our creations may be dangerous. Being creative is also part of the essence of being human.