Customer Reviews

Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975

5 star:		(11)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

One can now add this interesting and informative book to the growing list of recent tomes adding to our understanding of how we can so inextricably drawn into the unfortunate miasma called Vietnam. Certainly, according to able historian A. J. Langguth, there is more than enough culpability in the stream of administrations stretching back as far as the Eisenhower years to add to the coals on the slowly spreading conflagration it eventually became. According to the author, there is little doubt that the Vietnam War wound up being the single most divisive war since the Civil war more than 100 years before. The reasons it split the country into two angry and warring camps were related to its very causes, namely the arrogance and hubris of the WWII generation of those believing in their un power and invulnerability, the so called "best and brightest" that David Halberstam described so beautifully in his book of the same name.

Langguth employs a treasure-trove of new material to examine the way sin which the various administrations made decisions leading us along the deceptive path that led to ever deeper and deeper involvement in Vietnam. And although Eisenhower had warned about the dangers of relying on the wisdom and purposes of the rising clique of the "military-industrial'' complex, he made decisions that facilitated the further extension of policy into Vietnam by the young and relatively unwary president who followed him. Yet it was through Kennedy's reliance on old cold warriors for advice and counsel that led him into a deepening commitment. Indeed, increasingly Kennedy fell under the charismatic influence of defense Secretary Robert McNamara charismatic appeals to escalate the conflict, using euphemistic ideas such as like statistical control and other cost-benefit analysis techniques to seemingly rationalize the process of making decisions into a business decision mentality, rather than recognizing it was men's lives and deaths they were discussing. In such a way, the movement down the path toward ever greater engagement in Vietnam can be viewed as a series of series of tragic mistakes, a series of decision points involving misinterpretations of what was happening and what it meant.

Of course, later in the war, a number of mistakes were made as the domestic political considerations in terms of the associated political advantage or liability of any particular military decision added further complications to the decision making process. Finally, attempts to win the war through the use of propaganda and manipulation of the facts released to the American public disregarded the evidence in favor of further distortions. This had the terrible and politically indefensible policy of leaving the American soldiers at risk in order to gain political advantage both across the negotiating table with the Hanoi regime as well as lying about the conduct and progress of the war to the American public. In essence, the political superstructure here at home became more and more concerned with the self-contained political universe they operated in, and more and more oblivious to the realities of the situation on the ground for American forces in Vietnam. Indeed, they often seemed to being engaging in a willful denial of the basic realities of the military situation and the cultural facts of life in South Vietnam.

This is a very carefully written and quite comprehensive book, one in which the author clearly demonstrates a true appreciation for the unintended consequence and irony of the war. This is easily the best of a spate of recent books published on the subject, and ranks favorably on the same shelf as Stanley Karnow's masterful presentation of the war's overall history in "Vietnam: A History". It also shares an appreciation for the complexities of the war and the ways in which our descent into the madness was triggered by the arrogance, stupidity, and callousness of American politicians. In this sense it share s the perspective of two other fairly recent books, "American Tragedy" by David Kaiser, and "Choosing War" by Frederik Logevall.

This work shows exactly how the United states gradually became involved in Vietnam from the details on up. Other reviews have commented on Langguth's objectivity and accuracy. I will mention the most lasting impression this book left on me:
Most of us have the perception that the great men of power throughout history are made of something different from ourselves. We only see them on the world's stage, made up and prepared; speeches rehearsed; ceremony and station lending gravity to their every word and action. We don't think of them sleepless; with a bit of popcorn stuck in their teeth; complaining to their wives; or any of the other everyday situations that even these men of power experience. And so we assume their minds are always bent to grand designs. We think they hold a certain wisdom that lets them maneuver through politics and war, making decisions based on facts or morality.
Langguth's tale tells a different story. Decisions that cost tens of thousands of lives and reshape the world are made by men as sweaty and itchy as you and I. Wars are started because of ego, petty squabbles, and job security. Elections! How many have died so that one man could keep his job? So we see Kennedy and Johnson and Nixon, and all the well-dressed men around them, chewing their lips and eyeing one and other with mistrust, stabbing one and other in the back, lying and cheating, making mistakes.
Wars are started all because we make the mistake of investing such power in mere humans.

I lived through that war and now I see from this book how so many US politicians put their political/election interests above what needed to be done. Langguth clearly spells it out, and I kept reading and reading. The photographs were great. I wish there were a few more maps. And Kissinger!! -- what a terrible manipulative "advisor" repeatedly going after his own glory for the history books; sucking up to the presidents one day and laughing at them behind their backs the next. And then the book shows the military deliberately giving wrong information to the White House. No wonder it was a mess. And the people and soldiers suffered terribly. This book is really valuable. Special thanks to the author. Now I want to read more books about this tragic war.

Vietnam has been covered extensively in the contemporary press - so a bit of perspective is always useful. While Langguth is no historian, he has mapped the territory with diligence, and this volume needs to be considered as a journalistic tour-de-force. Langguth makes no apology for the subsequent behaviour of the Vietnamese regime post-1975. Any discussion on the history of Vietnam until April 1975 should not be confused with the post-1975 phase. Having said all this....

The book is great - the overall feeling is one of dismay and betrayal when you look at the course of events outlined by Langguth. As the author concludes, the American leadership let down both the Vietnamese people and the American people. Re-election politics governed the behaviour of Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon - both in terms of ignoring the reality on the ground as well as in terms of committing American air and ground forces. The latter had the effect of taking American lives, which is when the war became truly unpopular (and took thousands of Vietnamese lives). People like George Ball and McGeorge Bundy came around to the view that the war had no merits or interest for America early on, and there was no way they could express these views without losing the ear of the President they served.

I have read quite a bit of Kissinger, and for someone who has a lot of respect for Kissinger, Langguth's views on him come as a surprise. The view that emerges is that Kissinger essentially implemented the starting point of the negotiations arrived at by Harriman and Le Duc Tho in 1968 under Johnson. This is where the dismay comes in - five years later, the end-result was the same, and Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Langguth's representation of decisionmaking at the highest levels in the US makes for fascinating reading. The style of decision-making is collegial or chaotic depending on the president, and the impact of the president's style on the process comes out very well. Kennedy's youthful style and intellect, Johnson's homespun political smarts, and Nixon's insecure and paranoid approach - have their impact on the outcome and this is accentuated by the author. Johnson's earthy humour makes you laugh.. The internecine politicking between the members of the Cabinet would be useful education for any student of American politics. It would help understand why a man like Colin Powell continues to serve an admininstration that clearly has little time for him.

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject.

It's amazing how many people give this book poor reviews because "the author's not hard enough on North Vietnam."

Look at the title: "OUR Vietnam." He's not as interested in the fact that a Communist regime behaved murderously and tyrannically; one rather expects that. Langguth is interested more in how *we* failed *ourselves*, and the South Vietnam we claimed to be serving, in Vietnam.

It's not a comprehensive history -- I wish someone would write one; Karnow's book is good but insufficiently in-depth -- but it's an excellent treatment of how we got in and how we blew it, if indeed those aren't the same thing.

This book is a must-read for anyone wanting an in-depth history/ chronology of the Vietnam war. It's primarily a political history, documenting the motivations and actions of leaders and those who advised them, and then how those decisions played out on the ground.
One early event from the book is telling: in May 1962, McNamara was making his first trip to Vietnam for a detailed briefing on the situation, particularly on Communist strength. There were, in fact, an estimated 40,000 in local Communist battalions and identifiable guerrilla units. His briefers tightened their criteria, and reduced that to 20,000 - 25,000. THAT number had to be reduced, and was cut to 17,500. By the time McNamara arrived in Vietnam, he was told the number was 16,305. The night before the briefing, the colonel doing the briefing removed one-third of "enemy-controlled areas" from McNamara's briefing map.
This book details not only how our government deceived the public, but also itself -- and goes into the motivations of the South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, and their relations with China, Soviet Union, and the French.

I do not see "lack of analysis" as a fault of this book, as a previous reviewer did. The book does a great job of presenting what each actor said, wrote, and did -- in plenty of detail so that the reader can think for him/herself. For instance, Langguth spells out exactly how Jack Kennedy SAID privately that he was planning on pulling out of Vietnam in his second term. Would that have happened? Would it have been prevented by Congress, and the need for conservatives' support on domestic issues? Did Kennedy really mean what he said? That's all interesting, but it's essentially speculation outside the scope of the book.
I do think the book would have benefited from somehow presenting an overview of the war along with the detailed "novel" approach, which trusts the reader with independent knowledge of the war. Also, the binding in my library copy was weak.

This is a great read. A good overview for those of us who were kids while the war was underway.

Simply one of the best volumes you could read for a detailed, and often disheartening, overview of the War in Vietnam. All the bloated egos are here, as are the heroic. Johnson's manipulating of the phantom second attack on the destroyer Maddox in the Tonkin Gulf, and Nixon's interference in the peace process, all apparently to influence the outcome of national elections here at home, are thoroughly dissected. Of particular note is the unmasking of that pompous and deceitful windbag, Henry Kissnger, whose receiving the Nobel Peace Prize was at best, a sham. Combine this volume with the works of Neil Sheehan and William Prochnau among others, and you will have a clearer understanding of the tragedy that was Vietnam.

In 1968 "The New York Times" wrote, and recently reminded us when Norman Mailer published his, that A. J. Langguth has still produced the best novel about Christ as a man: "Jesus Christs." Along with two other fine novels, his Saki biography and extraordinarily readable but precise histories of the Revolutionay War in "Patriots" and the Roman Wars in "A Noise of War," Langguth served his productive half-century preparation with a steady series of always well-reviewed, diverse, but not well-enough known books. Luckily, all that led to the last decade when he reconstructed his Vietnam years as reporter and "Times" Saigon bureau chief, adding to exhaustive research and his experiences multiple trips back to Southeast Asia to find and interview, many of the participants - including former adversaries from the North, who for the first time bring their slant to this kicked-about conflict. Langguth's diamond-aromatic-orderly prose makes the war read like a compelling novel of that tragic time. It tips the scale on the previous Viet War greats: Frances FitzGerald, David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, Stanley Karnow - all of whom he credits. Why do our writers understand and show so much more than the politicians who make the messes?

The narrative of this book concentrates on the behind-the-scene maneuvering of politicians on all sides of the Vietnam War. Using widely available materials as well as information from his interviews of Americans, Vietnamese, Chinese, the author spun an irresistible story of the movers and shakers and their war-, and sometimes, peace-making efforts. I'd have given a five were it not for a number of issues:

- the author often used the Vietnamese first name as last name, including in the references. Some Vietnamese words were misspelled (for example, Chien Vich Phuong Hoang - the Phoenix program - should be Chien Dich Phuong Hoang.)

- the author interpersed the maneuverings of L. B. Johnson, H. Kissinger, Le Duan, Nguyen Cao Ky with individual stories of people who actually carried out their policies. Most South Vietnamese references are through published autobiographies or personal accounts of events, as opposed to author interviews. Therefore the story of the South Vietnam tends to be personalized by the Americans, the Vietnamese Communists, lacking personal views of pro-Republic of Vietnam individuals at similar levels. There are a few, but some of them, such as Tran Kim Tuyen, who was one time a SVN power broker, played little part in the South Vietnam for a long time. It's regrettable, because the author did try to be balanced.