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Overlord's Eagles: Operations of the United States Army Air Forces in the Invasion of Normandy in World War II

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The planning for the invasion of Normandy began in 1943 and was surprisingly complete when General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as Supreme Commander. Still Eisenhower and his team put their stamp on the plans. The complexity of the American effort in Europe during World War II I difficult to grasp in its entirety. All the armed services underwent tremendous expansion in a very short time. Civilians one day, soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen the next, ultimately 17 million American men and some women were immersed in a military culture. The nation's civilians turned out instruments of war in quantities unimaginable by friends and enemies.

The United States as a democracy always strove to minimize casualties. Free societies vote out the politicians who kill their sons, husbands, brothers and fathers. As well, the Americans favored technology as a means to destroy their enemies: the United States rode to war in machines, not on horses or horse drawn carts as much of the German army did.

The air arm was a part of the Army (with the obvious exception of the naval and marine air forces). There was a strategic component, ultimately fielding thousands of heavy bombers over Germany and a tactical arm that in the end could throw thousands of fighters and fighter-bombers against the enemy,

This fascinating study focuses on the operations of the United States Army Air Forces in the invasion of Normandy, a period that by Sullivan's estimation runs from from 1943 through late 1944.

This is an exhaustively well researched history. Sullivan demolishes many myths along the way about the 8th Air Force campaign in Europe, often characterized as inent on destroying German industry, when in fact it was designed to destroy the German Air Force. Indeed the story of how the Air Force Generals warred amongst themselves before finally producing a long-range fighter (P-51) is extremely detailed and contains much I did not know before. The tensions between the British Royal Air Force and the Americans are reasonably well known, but Sullivan explores them more deeply than other historians and turns up more than a few nuggets. The British do not come off well in this history, which is neither a surprise nor news.

Sullivan examines the politics of the campaign to bomb railroad facilities in the run up to Normandy. This was a hugely expensive campaign in terms of men and materiel, whose effectiveness is still argued about today. The IX and XIX Tactical Air Forces conducted an interdiction campaign after this which many argue was far more effective in hampering German military activities. Sullivan, it is clear, favors this view, but he spends a great deal of time examining the after-action reports offered up by both British and American command staffs justifying the transport campaign which killed tens of thousands of French and Belgian citizens.

Much of what Sullivan writes about, in fact, is a catalog of errors, tragic errors that resulted in the deaths of many Americans, in unnecessary combat, through accidental "friendly fire" bombings and prolonging the war. But such errors are a reality of war and Sullivan also describes the constant search by Americans for more effective ways to destroy the enemy.

The tone is somewhat scholarly, but Sullivan's writing style is not stilted. This is a marvelous history of the Allied air war through the Normandy invasion and belongs on the shelf of every military history buff. In a relatively short book - less than 200 pages - Sullivan virtually covers the entire Normandy campaign as it involved the US Army Air Forces. Quite an achievement and very well done.

Jerry

Prior to the D-Day landings, American and British air units conducted massive air ops to ensure a successful landing in Normandy. Central to that efforts was a bombing campaign designed to smash French and Belgian rail centers. Highly contentious at the time, the 'Transportation Plan' has only grown in controversy with the passage of time. John J. Sullivan examines the development and implementation that air campaign, and other Allied pre-invasion air missions, in this 1997 McFarland & Company volume. While scholarly in nature, OVERLORD'S EAGLES makes for fascinating reading.

The Transportation Plan aimed "to paralyze railways from western Germany to (Normandy so that) major reinforcement by rail would be virtually impossible." The Eighth AF and the RAF's Bomber Command would be the main agents of destruction. The Plan was bitterly opposed by many British and American air and ground commanders and politicians including Churchill himself. They felt the logic behind the attacks was faulty, that the attacks would result in horrendous French and Belgian civilian casualties, that an Interdiction campaign would be much more effective, etc. In the end, Eisenhower sanctioned the attacks, in large part because he believed they were a necessary tool to achieve success in the Normandy landings.

As conclusively documented in OVERLORD'S EAGLES however, the plan's critics were right. The attacks did NOT disrupt German anti-invasion rail movement but did result in over 4,600 civilian deaths not to mention wasted effort by the Americans and Brits and aircrew losses. Using a wealth of documentation including reports, memorandums, letters, diaries, etc., Sullivan details how the Plan's supporters - Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Zuckerman, etc. - "cooked the figures" and won Eisenhower's approval through superior gamesmanship rather than irrefutable logic and data. Their subsequent claims regarding the effectiveness of the attacks were as inaccurate as their original justifications for the attacks.

Sullivan also examines and evaluates other aspects of the Allied air effort prior to D-Day including bridge strikes, 'choke-point' strikes, attacks on GAF airfields and V-1 sites, strikes on German refineries, the ill-fated 'Operation Cobra' carpet bombings, fighter-bomber and medium bomber ops, etc.

As borne out in Sullivan's book, the conduct of the Normandy air offensive was often corrupted by ego, personal prejudices, antipathy and misunderstandings between American air and ground commanders/British and American commanders, mutual unwillingness to objectively evaluate options and so on. While generally successful, better results could have been achieved if top commanders had left much of their personal baggage at the door! Likewise, during and after the war, various participants including Bradley, Zuckerman, etc. made self-serving and/or inaccurate statements regarding that offensive, clouding the historical record.

Thankfully, OVERLORD'S EAGLES does a bang-up job of comprehensively and accurately summarizing the myriad details of all that air activity. It is an eye-opening account of how USAF/RAF air operations were ACTUALLY developed and conducted in the run-up to D-Day. Highly recommended.