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The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy)

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Do you want to brought up to speed on the state of the art in philosophical discussions of free will? Do you want to give yourself a top-flight graduate course on this exciting philosophical topic? Then read Robert Kane's The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. This book might be the single best book to study if one wants a comprehensive overview of most of the controversies unfolding in debates about free will and moral responsibility. The essays are all outstanding. Each is penned by one of the leading figures in the field, and each combines an effort to teach at a very advanced level with a novel contribution to the literature pitched from the perspective of the author. For example, in the section devoted to compatibilism (the view that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism), Kane includes four essays, one by Bernard Berofsky, another by Ishtiyaque Haji, a third by Paul Russell, and a forth by Daniel Dennett and Christopher Taylor. Each essay is detailed, crisp, completely informed, and clear as a bell. Each also advances the author's own views. Reading through this section, one can learn exactly what is now taking place in the arena of compatibilism. The same can be said about the section devoted to libertarianism (the thesis that some persons act from a sort of free will that requires the falsity of determinism). In this section, Kane includes probably the four finest philosophers currently defending this topic, Tim O'Connor, Randy Clarke, Carl Ginet, and Kane himself.

In all, there are eight sections to Kane's collection with a total of 25 essays. The sections are devoted to the following topics: 1) theological issues as they pertain to free will, 2) theories of physics and the free will problem, 3) the consequence argument (a highly influential argument for the thesis that determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise), 4) compatibilism, 5) the relevance of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility (some philosophers think that the freedom to act otherwise is not required for moral responsibility), 6) libertarian views, 7) non-standard views about the relationship between free will, moral responsibility and determinism (such as the view that no one has free will or moral responsibility regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism), and finally, 8) neuroscientific influences on our understanding of the free will topic. An impressive range of topics indeed.

I have been publishing and writing on the topics of free will and moral responsibility for over 10 years now and I simply know of no single collection that even approximates the impressive quality and breadth of Kane's handbook. It is an outstanding book.

So far forth, the editors of the Oxford Handbook series have managed to put together products which both the neophyte and the fully-informed scholar will find beneficial. Robert Kane has certainly done his part to keep up the trend.

All of the essays in this volume are written by philosophers who have made significant individual contributions to the contemporary discussion about human freedom. Most of the authors have also produced influential works in related fields (philosophy of mind, action theory and moral psychology), and many of them are thoroughly conversant with the relevant empirical research in physics and neuroscience. Indeed, parts II and VIII of the book are dedicated, respectively, to the interplay between the problems of free will and quantum physics/chaos theory on the one hand, and recent work in neuroscience on the other. The result is a compilation of essays written with the sort of texture and philosophical sensitivity that repays careful (re-)reading, and brimming with suggestive ideas that could well move the debate into some relatively unexplored terrain. (We should expect nothing less from a volume edited by Kane, who has himself long advocated the importance of approaching the ancient problem of free will from novel directions.) What's more, the collection includes essays from several philosophers whose own books on free will are, though quite important and valuable, somewhat cost prohibitive. (Anyone living on a graduate student's salary who's tried to pick up a copy of Pereboom's or Clarke's or Double's or Strawson's books will know what I mean.) So the expense of the present volume is, when seen in that light, thoroughly justifiable. In fact it's a steal! Or so I've tried to convince my wife.

Finally, with his characteristic combination of clarity and rigor, Kane provides a lengthy introduction to the book that will help both the professional philosopher and the new-comer find their bearings in this complex debate with as little intellectual turmoil as can reasonably be hoped for. The book is a good one, highly recommended.

I first encountered Bob Kane's skill with the daedal discipline of free will in his book *The Significance of Free Will.* At that time, I realized that Kane had an almost suspicious talent for articulating my own objections, and then articulating a response that would often satisfy me more than my own.

While such a talent may be a bit threatening for readers aiming to claim their own victories, Kane's affability and enthusiasm always leave the reader not only with the necessary knowledge, but with a sense of pride in having participated in his well-authenticated jaunts.

This work, in particular, highlights Kane's skills as both an original author and an editor with an honest eye for the best arguments of his opponents. It will certainly become a staple, if it has not already, for professional scholars of free will and curious by-standers alike. The *Oxford Handbook of Free Will* draws together balanced selections from the most relevant authors in the field, and-despite its depth-manages to cover a range broad enough that the book would be equally well placed on the shelves of theologians, philosophers, and physicians.

My main criticism is that the compilation elides some selections that, to me, seem indispensable. Then again, such a problem *should* be inevitable for a field as factious as free will, and is blunted by Kane's need to balance his equations.

The Oxford group has again demonstrated their wisdom in selecting Kane as the editor of this volume. Compared to its competitors in the prosy pantheon of free-will texts, this selection will leave you energized to gnaw through the next puzzle (rather than feeling deflated by the fact that there remain more arguments to be broached).

-Christian P. Erickson, M.D.
christianerickson@alumni.duke.edu