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PLENTY OF BLAME TO GO AROUND: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg

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I do not like to use "definitive", "settles the question" or "finial word" when reviewing books. Some questions will never be settled, someone will always have another thing to say and in time, even Coddington's book on Gettysburg could become second best. While I firmly believe the above to be true, I do not think that this book will see a superior treatment of this question for a very very long time.

"Has anyone seen JEB Stuart?" "Where is my cavalry?" were questions that Robert E. Lee often asks in the days preceding the Battle of Gettysburg. Stuart, commander of his cavalry, was missing separated from Lee by a Union army. Arriving at Gettysburg, his command exhausted by a grueling ride around the Union Army, complete with battles and numerous skirmishes. Stuart is greeted with an icy reception from Lee. The next day, on the East cavalry Field, his command is defeated and the Union right holds. Lee chose to ignore this and other actions by his subordinates during the battle, assuming full responsibility for Gettysburg.

In time, Gettysburg looms larger and larger in Civil War lore. One battle becomes the reason for the Confederacy's defeat. Right or wrong, this idea becomes the foundation of the story of the South's defeat. The story is accepted and endlessly repeated until it becomes an American tragedy. Years later, after Lee's death, questions raised in 1863 became accusations as the finger pointing begins. General Lee cannot be wrong at the most important battle of the war. The rank and file cannot be less than heroic. Somewhere, somehow a failure or a series of failures have to occur that undermine General Lee's perfect plan and cause the battle to be lost.

The authors first present a straightforward campaign history of Stuart's orders, decisions and the resulting actions. This history builds the foundation for the history of the controversy that is the second half of the book. Both sections are detailed, well written, intelligent and very readable. Systematically, the reader sees how Stuart's orders caused him to embark on what was potentially a risky idea. Movement of the Union army blocks expect routes, causing detours and delays leading to a series of battles. Wittenberg and Petruzzi can write about cavalry operations with authority and full knowledge. They impart a confidence in their work that comes with knowing the background and the ability to communicate the right level of detail. Again, Savas Beattie has taken the time and spent the money to give us the maps and illustrations needed to make this an enjoyable learning experience. The reader is able to follow the cavalry battles because of excellent well-placed maps coupled with very good writing.

The second part of the book is a history of how "Stuart lost the Battle of Gettysburg". I find the history of the history of the Civil War almost as much fun as the history of the war. This book combines both into one very readable volume, giving me two books for the price of one. The indictment and defense of JEB Stuart runs from the late 1870s on. Presenting both sides, for the most part in their own words, giving the reader a good perspective of what is happening. The 30-page conclusion is balanced, detailed and comprehensive. This book changed my thinking on the subject to "Plenty of Blame to Go Around".

To complete things, we have a driving tour. Civil War books do not get better than this!

Very early, not long after midnight in fact, on June 25, 1863, J.E.B. Stuart and his staff mounted up and began the most controversial ride any cavalrymen would make during the Civil War. The trip would take them within six miles of Georgetown, just outside of Washington. They would pass on, capture a significant Union supply train, cross the Potomac, tear up the C & O Canal, canter across Maryland, and enter Pennsylvania, where they would fight a couple of engagements and go so far north as Carlisle, outside Harrisburg, the state capital. There, on the evening of July 1, Stuart would get the order to rejoin the Confederate army at Gettysburg. When he finally faced his commander, Stuart heard these words: "General Stuart, where have you been?" After giving a response, Lee's disappointment was manifest. "I have not heard a word from you for days, and you the eyes and ears of my army."

All histories of the Gettysburg Campaign deal with Lee's question, where was Stuart? His attempt to again ride around the Union Army, as he had been able to do with relative impunity in 1862, is well known. The difficulties he created for Lee, who entered unfamiliar ground once he crossed the Potomac, have been widely discussed. But Stuart's ride has never received the full, detailed study it deserves until this book's recent release.

Both of the author's are well-respected authorities on Civil War cavalry, and as the title of the work implies, they conclude that Stuart was hardly alone in carrying the blame for his absence from Lee's army at such a crucial time. The book contains a thorough and well-written description of just where Stuart was, and of the orders and correspondence that were part of the decision-making process. All of the actions and engagements that Stuart's troopers participated in are well described, even the least known, such as the Battle of Hunterstown on July 2. (Since the subject is Stuart's ride to Gettysburg, the cavalry engagement on July 3 is not discussed.)

Nearly half of the book is devoted to "the controversy," to the debate that started shortly after Gettysburg was fought about how costly Stuart's absence was to the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee being the infallible figure he was to many in the South, Stuart was a logical and available scapegoat on which to hang blame for the lost battle, and later for the lost war. The authors fully set out their own conclusions, but give their readers plenty of facts so that you can reach your own about how much blame Stuart should have shouldered. They also provide plenty of great maps and pictures, as well as a terrific description of a driving tour you can take the next time you are near Gettysburg. Get the book. It's good.

Authors Wittenberg and Petruzzi have written a fine study on the exploits of J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, and their long road to the battlefield at Gettysburg.

It is a spellbinding account of what they went through from the crossing of the Potomac River, and then through the trials and tribulations and hardships they all encountered during those days of late June and early July, 1863.

As the title suggests, the book offers a full interpretation of those who were involved in the events of this part of the campaign, and the authors account is a fair and balanced look at the mistakes made, what was done right, and just how the word luck becomes a part of such a movement that took place over those days in early summer, 1863.

The research done is impeccable, and the authors have found nuggets that add to the story, and are for the first time included in this book. The book is filled with photos of those involved, and the maps included helps the student to follow the action as described in the narrative. The footnotes are a must read own their own, and helps to expand the tale of the journey that Stuart and his troopers found themselves in those few days.

The inclusion of Stuart's after battle report on his part in the Gettysburg Campaign adds to the book, and as one reads it, you can tell when he wrote it, he was already fielding questions about his "delay" in reuniting with the main body of Lee's Army.

The addition of a driving tour for those sites mentioned in the narrative completes the book, and is an a fine feature for those who wish to follow the roads Stuart and his men traversed on their way to Gettysburg. The authors include a photo of the Felty Barn, which was a landmark at the Battle of Hunterstown. Unfortunately, the barn was torn down recently, but am glad a photo of the place was taken before its demise.

Highly recommend this book, and know students of the Civil War will not be disappointed in reading this extraordinary story.

As the last of George Pickett's men limped off the battlefield on the evening of July 3rd, 1863 it was clear the Confederate Army, after three days of fighting, had been defeated. General Lee, as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, accepted all responsibility for the loss, but many, after the battle, blamed General J.E.B. Stuart instead. It has been 145 years since the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, and the controversy over who is to blame for the loss has never abated.

Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi have brought the case to trial in their book, "Plenty Of Blame To Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg." The first half of the book is an inquiry into the facts of the case, as the authors present General Lee's orders to Stuart as exhibits. Their careful and diligent research has turned up many witnesses, both Union and Confederate, who add their testimony, and together, they form a narrative of the events following Stuart's departure with his cavalry, their ride around the Federal Army and their arrival on the battlefield of Gettysburg on July 2nd.

The second half of the book enters the historiography of Stuart's ride into evidence, and breaks it down into three phases. In the first phase, immediately after the battle and war, those immediately involved in the Confederate high command, and those involved in the ride, begin the finger pointing and placing of blame. In the second, the controversy continues, and heats up, during the post war years, as the participants continue quarreling with one another. Finally, after the passing of the participants, the debate continued into the 20th & 21st centuries, when the historians took up the argument. In all three phases, JEB Stuart had his supporters and detractors. The authors have done a fine job, presenting the evidence and arguments on both sides of this complicated issue.

Was the infallible Robert E. Lee at fault for issuing vague orders to Stuart? Did Stuart disobey, either willfully or unintentionally, Lee's orders? The authors, in their conclusion, deliver their verdict and find there is no one single person entirely to blame for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg. There is enough fault for every one. Or, in other words, there's "plenty of blame to go around."

"Plenty Of Blame To Go Around" is the definitive history of Jeb Stuart's ride to Gettysburg. Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi's outstanding research has produced a book that is truly a joy to read.

Just when you thought you've read everything worth reading about Gettysburg, along comes this excellent book that examines one of the more fascinating and controversial aspects of the Gettysburg campaign.

As the title implies the authors find "Plenty of Blame to Go Around" regarding the Confederate loss at Gettysburg rather than simply subscribe to the simplistic version that Stuart failed Lee and either contributed to, or in fact caused the Confederate defeat. They examine Stuart's mission and actions in detail using a wealth of memoirs, letters and other primary sources previously untapped by other historians. They arrive at some sound conclusions, meticulously disecting the controversies and setting the record straight.

The book is richly illustrated with photographs of the participants (many of which I've not seen before) and excellent maps of the theater of operations. As there is no substitute for standing on the acutal ground where these events took place, the book includes a first rate driving tour with easily followed directions so the reader can spend a day following in the footsteps of history and gaining a better appreciation of what did, and what did not occur.

This is in my opinion the definitive work on Stuart's actions during the Gettysburg campaign and is a "must read" for any student of the Gettysburg battle or of Civil War Cavalry operations.

The critical military campaign that culminated in a battle at the crossroads community of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in July 1863 has spawned much debate and acrimony over the decades. Whose fault was it that the previously hapless Union Army of the Potomac had defeated the best field army in the Southern Confederacy, one that had consistently been victorious in the past?

Stuart was an easy target for culpability. The cavalry commander's separation from the main army subsequently led to complaints that Lee was unable to formulate effective strategy and tactics without his cavalry that served as his "eyes and ears."

Now, 143 years after the fact, Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi have collaborated to write "Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg." This is an intensely researched analysis of "Stuart's Ride" employing existing evidence and previously unavailable or overlooked documentation.

Jeb Stuart has not been without his supporters in this controversy. In the years immediately following the Civil War, John Mosby, one of his subordinates and a lawyer by training, wrote what amounted to legal briefs for public consumption to defend Stuart against all detractors. A modern historian, Mark Nesbitt, took up the cudgel and argued before the bar of public opinion in his treatise "Saber and Scapegoat: J.E.B. Stuart and the Gettysburg Controversy" that Stuart was falsely accused, and concluded that what went wrong at "Gettysburg was Lee's fault."

Despite Stuart's partisans, many historians have written that Stuart bears a heavy burden for Lee's defeat at Gettysburg.

"Plenty of Blame to Go Around" takes the reader step-by-step through the stages of Stuart's ride around the Union army after his path was blocked as the Yankees unexpectedly marched northward toward a Potomac River crossing.

The authors specify the accusations against Stuart made originally by fellow soldiers and journalists, and later by scholars who substantiated their judgment against Stuart by sheer weight of numbers. Mssrs. Wittenberg and Petruzzi continue with a discussion of the historiography of Stuart's ride including an analysis of how his few supporters and multitude of critics presented their cases. They also present their findings of the guilt or innocence of Jeb Stuart and his fellow officers of the Army of Northern Virginia. In addition, the authors give credit to the Union troops whose gallant performance during the Gettysburg Campaign led to a well-earned Northern victory and a devastating defeat for the invading army from the South.

Maps placed throughout the text orient the reader to routes taken and clashes encountered along the way. Useful appendices address Stuart's command during the ride, orders of battle of both armies at Gettysburg, Stuart's official campaign report, and, as a special bonus, a driving tour of Stuart's Ride to Gettysburg complete with illustrations of strategic points.

This work undoubtedly will reenergize debate among students of history living and deceased about one of the Civil War's most enduring controversies.

As a history of Stuart's epic ride, this book has no peer. As even-handed historiography of the critical aftermath, echoing for well over a century, it also has no peer. I have two trivial criticisms: 1) the title isn't quite accurate, I think -- however many people were in the decision loop during those critical days, Stuart surely must have realized, at some point, that he had brought his command far from where it should have been; and, 2) the authors interrupt their clear narrative flow with repeated biographical digressions that should have been drastically curtailed or relegated to the endnotes (or both). The authors make the all-important point that Lee and his corps commanders marching into Pennsylvania had sufficient cavalry available for their purposes in the four brigades left behind by Stuart, but they failed to utilize these brigades properly and the brigade commanders themselves demonstrated little initiative. The biggest problem was not the absence of Stuart's three cavalry brigades but of Stuart himself, with his intuitive flair for scouting and delivering accurate reports to Lee.

There have been many books and articles that have studied nearly all aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign, but an area often overlooked or underappreciated is the role that Stuart's Cavalry played in the Gettysburg Campaign. Too often, his entire expedition is summed up in a few short paragraphs that far too often end up with a summary dismissal of Stuart as a glory-riding egocentric cavalier who was off flitting about the countryside without a care in the world. Such was not the case. As the authors point out in this engrossing new study, Stuart's ride was anything but the joyride some authors have tried to portray.

As a resident of York County with access to many local accounts of Stuart's actions (a few of which are in this fascinating new study), it was clear to the residents of this area that Stuart was indeed trying to link up with the division of Jubal Early, which had departed York only hours before Stuart's exhausted brigades passed the roads Early had taken westward to Adams County. His progress retarded by the cumbersome wagon train, by strong Union actions at Hanover, and by the little-remembered clash at Westminster, Maryland, Stuart still was not far off from his intented goal - locating the Army of Northern Virginia, something that he might have accomplished on June 30 had not circumstances intervened.

The authors have carefully studied Stuart's campaign and offer many fresh new anecodotes and detailed information that is sure to be interesting to the fan of the Gettysburg Campaign. The book breaks new ground, and is well supported with primary sources, many of which have never before appeared in print.

Highly recommended!

As the title conveys, "Plenty of Blame to Go Around", the authors thoroughly study everyone's role in Stuart's controversial ride around the northwest moving Army of the Potomac ending up at Gettysburg late on the second day of that great battle. Most are well familiar with Stuart taking his three strongest cavalry brigades north east around the Army of the Potomac disappearing from June 25th to his eventual reunion with the ANV late July 2. With references to the shock battle of Brandy Station where Stuart desperately beat back surprise Union attack, the authors virtually start with Stuart''s orders both from Lee and Longstreet that combined with Mosby's advice, start Stuart on his eastward trek that was suppose to unite timely with General Ewell in Pennsylvania. The authors provide excellent detail of Stuart's dramatic ride that takes him far east of the Blue Ridge, across the Potomac near Washington, his capture of over 125 wagons, scare of Washington and his skirmishes and battles at Westminster, MD., Hanover, PA and at Carlisle. The overall question was did Stuart disobey his orders or were his orders vague allowing wide discretion? Did he lose the sight of his duty along with burdening himself with 125 wagons? Did he mishandle his troop leaving it worn out and ineffective? Did his cavalry survive on skill and superior force or luck? All these questions are answered by the authors in due time as they present evidence much the way notable authors studied the Little Big Horn that featured one of Stuart's Gettysburg adversaries, Custer. The authors utilize diaries, letters, reports, articles, from officers and soldiers along with those of the Union adversaries such Kilpatrick (Kilcavalry). Numerous key participants roles were evaluated from Lee, Longstreet, Mosby, Charles Marshall (who claimed that Stuart should have been shot), Walter Taylor (Lee's Adjt.) Grumble Jones, Beverly Robertson, Jubal Early, Wade Hampton and more. The authors offer direct and extensive sections of their controversial statements for you to read directly. Also included are the insights of several union commanders along with detail on the heroic fights by the doomed Farnsworth, Custer and Captain Charles Corbet. Towards the end of the book, the authors quote notable historians offering their views on the controversy printing key excepts from their books starting with relatively early works to the most recent books and authors up to the date of printing. With the views of participants and the historians, the final chapter allows the authors to narrow the arena of blame piece by piece until they formulate their own conclusions on whether Stuart was to blame or not to blame and if there was someone to blame, who was most responsible? The authors answer that question while certainly identifying everyone's faults who had any and at the end they specifically point their fingers at a party or parties. Without giving the answer away, one can debate the authors' case as I have but they lay out all the facts that enriches the book and provides you the basis for argument. One thing that does come out is that Lee depended on Stuart more than most anyone knew. Besides the excellent maps, the authors include in the appendices command organizational chart, Orders of Battle (Confederate and Union) Stuart's lengthy report, a driving tour of Stuart's battle sites including a photograph of the famous ditch/hedge jump that Stuart made to escape in Hanover and detailed notes. The book also features pictures of all the major participants both Union and Confederate with min-bios in the text.

Regardless of what one thinks of JEB Stuart, "Plenty of Blame to Go Around" is worth the time to read. The authors carefully analyze Stuart's part in the Gettysburg campaign using first hand accounts, secondary sources, and "color" commentary from beyond the written word. In regard to the later, I found it most helpful as the authors placed the realities of mounted warfare into the context of Stuart's actions. For instance few first hand accounts discuss how often horses were shod. Such was an action so common, they didn't think to mention it (as we wouldn't mention filling our gas tanks or changing oil in a narrative). Secondary accounts miss this important limitation when discussing what Stuart could or could not have accomplished. The authors here present this and other points that bear on the overall discussion. Interesting and very well written overall. The last few chapters deal directly with the "historiography" of Stuart's ride, and very professionally I might add. Clear distinction is made between the author's opinion and the secondary sources. In the end, the authors don't play their hand early with regard to conclusions. Facts are presented and different interpretations offered, then the authors make their conclusions.

Three points which prevent this from becoming a full five star submission in my opinion. First, the maps presented are not detailed enough to support the text. When I read an historical text, particularly military history, it is rather cumbersome to pull up a modern road map to place things in context of the terrain. Second, the "tour" section at the end should be more inclusive, and deal with more than just the Pennsylvania sites. Lastly, I would prefer the authors to have brought into the discussion more of the action in Loudoun Valley in the week preceding the start of Stuart's ride.