Customer Reviews

Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War 1941-1945

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(6)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

The most interesting and useful part of this book for most people may be the first 113 pages that describe events preceding Pearl Harbor as Japan, starting with their annexation of Formosa in 1895, maneuvered for two generations toward war with the United States.

Published in 1991, author van der Vat pays no homage to "the greatest generation" who fought the war in the lower ranks but focuses on their parents' generation, men largely born before 1895, who, sometimes wisely and sometimes not, actually strategized the war and lead the U.S. to Victory (Roosevelt, King, Nimitz, Halsey, MacAuthur, et al). The profiles of significant senior Japanese officers will be new to many Americans. Also, the author makes a good case that the two pronged assault toward Japan, MacArthur through the Solomons and Philippines and Nimitz through the Marshalls, Marianas, etc., was a poor strategy that needlessly prolonged the war by dividing Allied resources.

Another interesting aspect is the fanatical, even suicidal, attitude of so many Japanese both before the war and during pitched battles. This lead the U.S. to conclude that the only way to get them to stop fighting, either on a remote atoll or on their home islands, was to apply ever greater firepower. It sounds in some ways like the philosophy and practice of the Islamic supremacists the U.S. is fighting in recent and current times.

A few interesting tidbits were new to me. For example, the famous Normandy D-Day landing was not the largest or even the second largest single-day U.S. amphibious assault of the war; the largest was on Luzon in the Philippines and the second largest was on Okinawa. The first B-29 raid of the war was against Japanese forces in Bangkok. The Japanese killed 250,000 Chinese civilians in reprisal for (very little) Chinese support of the 1942 Doolittle (Thirty Second Over Tokyo) air raid. And, things never change, a U.S. congressman blabbed in a press conference that during a "fact finding trip" to the Pacific Theater he learned that the Japanese were failing to sink U.S. submarines because they were setting their depth charges to explode at too shallow a depth; the Japanese picked this up and thereafter improved their ability to sink our subs... Finally the Japanese had a significant atomic weapons program dating from before 1942 and one of their principal development sites, captured and dismantled by the Russians, was in what is now North Korea (!?).

This 429-page book is recommended as a "refresher" for someone who is familiar with the general facts of WWII in the Pacific but is vague on the specifics or someone with no prior knowledge who wants to learn the details (units, ships, commanders) of the principal campaigns and battles.

The maps could be better and the photos are mostly well know from elsewhere.

When I decided to purchase a single volume book about WW2 in Pacific I narrowed my choice between two titles: this one and Costello's book. Since I didn't know anything about these books nor their authors I based my decision on Amazon reviews and the fact that Van der Vat was European which I though would add to his objectivity.

Now, I am not so sure I made the right decision and I'll probably go after Costello in the future. Why? Well, as I wrote in the title, "Pacific Campaign" is good book on introductory level, but I wanted more.

To be honest, Van der Vat gives us good introduction (which I wasn't particularly interested in), he describes all the important campaigns and offers his own view about some key characters and their acts which I commend. Maps are well done and serves their purpose. Van der Vat's writing style is very good and easy to read.

Unfortunately, I already read book with similar characteristics written by Croatian author so "Pacific Campaign" didn't give me any new information. I wanted more detailed descriptions, more study about the strategies of opposing sides, more data about the battles. When I read about the battles like Midway or Philippine Sea I want to know every ship that participated down to cruiser level.

I don't criticise Van der Vat for not having all I wanted, but I unless it would be your very first work about WW2 in Pacific I suggest some other book with more detailed approach.

In the movie "In Harm's Way" Kirk Douglas's character Commander Paul Eddington tells John Wayne's Captain Rockwell Torrey: "Old Rock of Ages, we've got ourselves another war. A gut bustin', mother-lovin' Navy war." This book is the literary equivalent.

A British military/naval affairs journalist who grew up in the Netherlands during the Nazi occupation, van der Vat brings experience and knowledge to the telling of this story. This book is significantly different from Ronald H. Spector's "Eagle Against the Sun" in that van der Vat focuses exclusively on the naval aspects of the war. As a result, he ignores air force air power, the use of ground power, and developments on the continent of Asia. Spector was much more "purple" or "joint" in that he looked at air, land, and sea power. Unlike Spector, who focused just on the American side of the conflict, van der Vat does a much better job of exploring the allied and the Japanese perspectives. Australians provided significant manpower against Japan in 1942 and 1943.

With those points made, what van der Vat knows, he knows very well. A couple of examples: he offers a very different take on the Battle of Savo Island. A major Japanese naval victory during the Guadalcanal campaign, van der Vat convincingly argues that the defeated Americans performed their mission despite losing more ships than the Japanese because they forced their enemy to retreat. He also has harsh words for Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. At the strategic level, Yamamoto's brilliant opening moves had turned into a number of inept decisions that worked against Japanese interests. The Americans might have been mistaken in killing Yamamoto, given how many mistakes he was making. Van der Vat's heroes are the American naval commanders. He does skimp on looking at the actions of junior officers and the lower ranks, but the focus of his book tends to favor the high ranking.

There are shortcomings. He offers more maps than Spector, but their quality leaves a lot to be desired. Van der Vat is primarily a specialist in European history and he makes a number of references back to the campaigns with which he is more familiar and his understanding of the events that brought the U.S.-Japan to war are rather thin. Finally, he skips through the ending of the war rather quickly.

Still, this is an informative book and makes for interesting reading.

The Pacific Campaign offers a very good overview of the complexities, personalities and actions in the Pacific. It does not break any new ground in what it offers to readers and, as a hefty primer, there is lots left out of its 400 pages.
Having said all of that, if you are looking for a good long overview of the sea campaign, then Van der Vat offers one of the best. Main themes in this book include:

- an appreciation of the role of intelligence in both the Navy and Army in winning the war.

- an American distain for concentrating their forces and going for a single defeat of the Japanese Navy close to home. Instead Van der Vat maintains that the US unneccesarily lengthened the war by splitting forces into two: one for an island hopping drive across the central Pacific; the other to assuage the vanity of a prima donna Douglas MacArthur in his New Guinea, Philippines campaign.

- a readiness to call into fault some popular icons on both side of the war, looking at Admiral Yamamoto as morally culpable in the expansion of Japanese seapower and, by definition, the criminal regime of Militaristic Japan. His feelings on MacArthur have already been noted.

- the American shunning of all other allies in this crusade in the Pacific and their sometimes utter disdain for her allies, especially the wastage of the Australian Army, tying up some of the finest infantry in the Pacific in useless rear area campaigns.

The narrative read well and fast at times. It does lack detail on some very important aspects of the campaign that I found a little annoying: a cursory look at the effectiveness of the Kamikaze, a lack of the detail on the carrier-based operations against Japan and by extension, the actions of the tactically significant British Carrier group in the Pacific.

This is a narrative of sea and not land battles, but there appears to be no real formula for deciding which land battles to decribe and those not to describe.

I enjoyed the read, I would probably read one of Van der Vat's other books in the future. But if you are looking for something new in Military History you are unlikely to find it here.

I found this book very interesting and has a good level of details, expecially if the scope of the subject is taken into consideration. After a couple of chapters about the evolution in the pre-war years of the two major powers (US and Japan) that fought WW2 in the pacific, the author basically takes you through every major engagement in this theater, up untill the end of the war.

The only major drawback is hidden in the title itself. Trying to cover such a long period of time and so many events sometimes it gets a little confusing.

In the end I would suggest this book if you are approaching the subject for the first time. Otherise get a more specific book.

Dan van der Vat's account of the Pacific theater of operations of the Second World War is a master piece of millitary history. Well written, it is both rich in detail and easy on the eyes. This book grabbed me in the first paragraph, something that is a must with a work of this scope. I didn't want to put this book down and was sorry the story was over when I was through; I wanted more. I came to know the leaders of both sides of the conflict. One must respect the cunningness of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku and the strategy of Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo while admiring the dertermination and indomitable spirit of Admirals Nimitz and Spruance. The graphic depictions of eyewitness accounts made this book haunting and unforgettable. Anyone with the slightest interest in the greatest naval war in history should read this book.

The Pacific Campaign offers a very good overview of the complexities, personalities and actions in the Pacific. It does not break any new ground in what it offers to readers and, as a hefty primer, there is lots left out of its 400 pages.

Having said all of that, if you are looking for a good long overview of the sea campaign, then Van der Vat offers one of the best. Main themes in this book include:

- an appreciation of the role of intelligence in both the Navy and Army in winning the war.

- an American distain for concentrating their forces and going for a single defeat of the Japanese Navy close to home. Instead Van der Vat maintains that the US unneccesarily lengthened the war by splitting forces into two: one for an island hopping drive across the central Pacific; the other to assuage the vanity of a prima donna Douglas MacArthur in his New Guinea, Philippines campaign.

- a readiness to call into fault some popular icons on both side of the war, looking at Admiral Yamamoto as morally culpable in the expansion of Japanese seapower and, by definition, the criminal regime of Militaristic Japan. His feelings on MacArthur have already been noted.

- the American shunning of all other allies in this crusade in the Pacific and their sometimes utter disdain for her allies, especially the wastage of the Australian Army, tying up some of the finest infantry in the Pacific in useless rear area campaigns.

The narrative read well and fast at times. It does lack detail on some very important aspects of the campaign that I found a little annoying: a cursory look at the effectiveness of the Kamikaze, a lack of the detail on the carrier-based operations against Japan and by extension, the actions of the tactically significant British Carrier group in the Pacific.

This is a narrative of sea and not land battles, but there appears to be no real formula for deciding which land battles to decribe and those not to describe.

I enjoyed the read, I would probably read one of Van der Vat's other books in the future. But if you are looking for something new in Military History you are unlikely to find it here.

I thought Van der Vat did a good job outlining the Pacific war- with a few criticisms. He was occasionally a bit heavy handed and moralistic in his assesments, rather than letting the facts speak for themselves. I thought he was overly critical of MacArthur (for example: referring to him striding ashore in the Philippines as 'an old ham'). For a single volume history of the Pacific John Toland's "The Rising Sun" is still the standard I gauge all others by. Having said that, Van der Vat did a fine job of assembling and outlining the salient points of the Pacific war and had some worthwhile comments. His writing style was good and the book read well. While not agreeing with all of his criticisms of MacArthur and the American effort I don't believe he was unfair in his assesments and they are worth considering. I do highly recommend it for any armchair historian interested in the Pacific war.

Good analysis of Pacific campagin with detail to back up explanations which current historians have not addressed or were scared to write. The failure of Japanese military to see their situation as it was may have contributed the most to the American victory. His 2 chapters on the underlying causes of the Pacific conflict and the perspective of Japan removes the sterro typed Japanese aggressor. He clearly faults military leadership for the complete embracure of Bushido to the great harm and destuction of the military command ability. Corrects and disputes with Smauel E. Morrison, author of The US Navy in WWII is especially interesting and caused me to go back to Morrisons books on the Pacific for review. This is a superb book with detail for the Professoral type interested in a new and clear view of the Pacfic war

Author Dan van der Vat assertion that the Iwo Jima flag raising was a media "put-up job" is beneath contempt. It is laughable he wants the reader to believe AP civilian photographer Joe Rosenthal requested combat Marines to climb back down Mount Suribachi to obtain a larger flag, and according to the author,for the sake of the camera, the Marines did so and then raised the flag. Rosenthal never made such a request. The actual comments of Joe Rosenthal regarding that day are available on the internet. "Flags of our Fathers," by James Bradley provides a credible account of the Iwo Jima flag raising.