Customer Reviews

The Pacific War Encyclopedia

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Highly enjoyable encyclopedia on WWII in the Pacific. Lots of unusual and interesting information about the Pacific War. Presented in encyclopedia format similar to the Oxford Companion on WWII. Contains entries covering battles, geography, logistics and military hardware. You'll find interesting tidbits on things like typical magazine loads for various classes of A/C carriers, discussions on aircrew training and tactics and economic factors. This book covers a lot of ground and highlights some of the areas that are overlooked by other books. The only thing I was disappointed with was the brevity of some of the entries. I would have preferred a thicker volume with more intensive coverage (and a consequently higher $). This book is a good value and worthwile for anyone with an interest in history and especially WWII.

I generally agree with the review by "A Reader". This book is a compendium of numbers and lists as well as fascinating info from this step-child of the WWII theaters. The book seems to give a lot more ink to Australian/Canadian/British forces in the Pacific than any other I have read, i.e. it appears to be a book written by and maybe mostly for our Aussie, Brit, & Canadian cousins - not TOO much, just more than I expected. That was not info that I needed for purposes of researching my Grandfather's service in the Paciifc Theater with the U.S. Army. Also, it did not go into great detail about each island hop in the campaigns as I was hoping, but it does offer lots of information that I have never seen in print elsewhere. Overall, a must for any Pacific War library.

I had only a minimal knowledge of the PTO, my interest being overwhelmingly with the ETO, and when I first bought this book, it sat on my shelf for nearly a year before I really looked at it. At first I thought I could read two pages a night, and I'd have the thing read in a year. Imagine my surprise when I averaged 10 pages a night! It really opened my eyes to this side of WWII, and one of the biggest things that struck me was the huge industrial output of the US, especially in ship building. The expansion of the USN was monumental, and the book also gave me an extensive overview of this and all other aspects of the Pacific War. Personalities, aircraft and ship types, numbers, tactics, propaganda, casualties, everything I wanted to know. After finishing it, it gave me an urge to further my understanding of this conflict, which I'm still undertaking today. I can't recommend this book too highly!

A top read!

I did read this book and I found it very informative and I would rate it 5 stars.

I still criticize Messers Dunnigan and Nofi for being Marine Corps apologists.

They cover the Smith versus Smith controversy in a section called The War of the Smiths. That title is not accurate in that MG Ralph Smith never engaged in any war of words with HM Smith. The only belligerent in that so called war was HM Smith who was trying to rescue his damaged reputation.

Dunnigan and Nofi admit HM Smith did not know what the 27th ID was facing on Saipan. Then they blame Ralph Smith. Their comment was that Ralph Smith was a poor communicator who did not adequately inform HM Smith of what he was facing. As Corps Commander, HM Smith had a duty to know what was facing his corps before he committed it to battle. He can not be excused for not knowing by shifting that responsibility to a subordinate commander, which, in my opinion, Dunnigan and Nofi did.

The 27th ID went into line on the night of 22 June 1944. It took over positions which had been held by the 4th Marine Division. The offensive jumped off on 23 June 1944. Ralph Smith did not have much opportunity to conduct a proper reconnaissance. V Amphibious Corps did not have a clear picture of the situation. Before handing over positions to 27th ID, 4th Marine Division had pulled its lines back by several hundred yards. VAC set the line of departure for 23 June as 4th Marine Division's pre withdrawl front line.

In any event, 4th Marine Division had held those positions for a number of days before the 27th ID went into line. Commander of the 4th Marine Division was MG Harry Schmidt. MG Schmidt did have more of an opportunity to gather intelligence about the Japanese in that area than did Ralph Smith.

My question for the authors is, if any subordinate should have been responsible for informing HM Smith of the situation in the area, why should it have been Ralph Smith and not Harry Schmidt.