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Palestine: A Twice-Promised Land? Vol. 1: The British, the Arabs, and Zionism, 1915-1920

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This book thoroughly examines the correspondence between Britain's Lord Kitchener and Sir Henry McMahon and Sherif Hussein of Mecca. The dominant theme of those letters relates to "Arab independence," a loose phrase that has caused a great deal of misunderstanding.

Friedman found McMahon's original Arabic October 24, 1915 letter as well as its retranslation into English by the Cairo British office from November 1919. By comparing these two letters, he makes it clear that both the Arab and British understood that Palestine was NOT to be included in the British pledge.

Hussein actually welcomed the return of the Jewish people to Palestine, as did his son Emir Feisal, who believed that Arab-Jewish cooperation would be a boon to Arab independence, and prevent European interference.

This evidence is bolstered by Friedman's presentation of a Sept. 16, 1916 note from Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, to Sir James Rodd, ambassador in Rome. It confirms an earlier correspondence in which Grey had authorized Sir Reginald Wingate in the Sudan to assure Sherif Hussein that any terms of peace would place "the Arabian peninsula and its Mohammeden Holy Places in the hands of an independent Sovereign Moslem State."

Friedman shows other proof as well. Arnold Toynbee, who attended the January and February 1919 Peace Conference, testified that the Emir Feisal specifically excluded Palestine and Lebanon from Arab national aspirations. Friedman also shows how Toynbee later created the myth of a twice promised land, although he knew perfectly well that Palestine had never been promised to the Arabs, that it had been promised only to the Jewish people.

Friedman fully examines the terms of the Weizmann-Feisal Agreement of 1919. Regarding Zionist aspirations in Palestine, Feisal said: "[The] Arabs admit the moral claims of the Zionists. They regard the Jews as kinsmen whose just claims they will be glad to see satisfied."

Feisal added, "No true Arab can be suspicious of Jewish nationalism....and I do say to the Jews--welcome back home.... Dr. Weizmann's ideals are ours."

Friedman's second volume, forthcoming, will cover 1920 through 1939, and the creation of the historical myth. Alyssa A. Lappen

The author, a Professor of History, provides an extremely readable, detailed analysis of the contentious issue surrounding allegations, that during World War 1, the British Government made conflicting promises to the Jews, Arabs and French in relation to areas of the Middle East - especially Palestine.

Accusations which are shown to still have implications to the present day.

As already stated, this book thoroughly examines the correspondence between Britain's Lord Kitchener and Sir Henry McMahon and Sherif Hussein of Mecca.

Through a systematic examination of documents, archival evidence, references, memoirs and other relevant sources, the book reveals how charges of deception and fraudulence directed at the British pertaining to these pivotal issues are groundless.

Replete with extensive and definitive documentary references and direct quotations, the reader is shown that authentic documents of the time demonstrate that Palestine was not included in the area over which Great Britain was prepared to acknowledge independence for the Arabs, and that Arab leaders such as Sharif Hussein were fully aware of this fact.

The essence of this study being that the British promised Palestine to the Jews and not to the Arabs.

One notable reference is that to McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915 to the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, the contents of which are shown to have never been relevant to Palestine.

Amongst many pertinent issues revealed by this investigation is that any alleged Arab opposition to Zionism only became prominent in the late 1920s and during the 1930s and that British statesmen in fact had good reason to believe that the two Semitic nations would cohabit harmoniously.

References being cited which show that leading Arabs were not perturbed by the Balfour Declaration and even allegedly agreed enthusiastically to Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Some notable people of the period even shown to be on record as stating that the process surrounding the rebirth of a Jewish homeland would substantially improve the standard of living of the existing Arab/Jewish population in Palestine.

I would recommend this study to anyone who is interested in the history of events surrounding the re-birth of the Jewish state of Israel and parallel events in relation to Palestine and the Ottoman Empire.

The information provided in this work is not only highly relevant, but perhaps essential to any accurate understanding of the history surrounding such pivotal issues in the region's history.

Thank you for your time.

Other recommended studies include;

"Israel and Palestine; Assault on the Law of Nations" by Professor Julius Stone,

"A History of Palestine, 634-1099" by Professor Moshe Gil,

"Empires Of The Sands; The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789 1923" by Inari & Efraim Karsh.

"From Time Immemorial; The Origins of the Arab Jewish Conflict Over Palestine" by Joan Peters.

"A Peace To End All Peace; The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace" by David Fromkin.

"The Palestine War 1948" by Efraim Karsh.

The reviewer, Ray Jones, see below, fabricates evidence in his review of Isaiah Friedman's otherwise excellent book.

Mr. Jones, if that is his real name, says, "The other problem that his [Friedman's]claim has is that the British themselves didn't buy into it. A secret memorandum prepared for the Paris Peace conference by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office said..."With regard to Palestine, His Majesty's Government are committed by Sir Henry McMahon's letter to the Sherif on October 24, 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence ... but they have stated their policy regarding the Palestine Holy Place and Zionist colonization in their message to him of January 4, 1918."..."The whole of Palestine ... lies within the limits which His Majesty's Government have pledged themselves to Sherif Husain that they will recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs.""

First, the memo wasn't secret. It was a mere recommendation directed to the British War Cabinet Office, written by Dr. Arnold Toynbee, in November 1918.
In Isaiah Freedman's, The Question of Palestine, pp 88-90, Friedman demolishes Toynbees's suggestion, by using contemporaneous, documentary evidence, including, but limited to, an October 26, 1916 letter from Sir Henry McMahon to Sir Edward Grey.
In fact, Professors Toynbee and Friedman had a scholarly debate in 1970 on this very issue in the Journal of Contemporary History!

Shame on you Ray Jones.

As Jonathan Schanzer stated: Did London promise Palestine to both the Arabs and the Jews during World War I? The documents involved-including the Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915), the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), the Balfour Declaration (1917), the Anglo-French Declaration (1918), the Weizmann-Feisal agreement (1919), and the King-Crane Commission report (1922) - have generated a whole cottage industry of historical research. But Friedman argues that these texts are of little use in of themselves. Only when seen in the context of a full, panoramic view of history, and with a critical eye toward the personal interactions of the main actors, can they help decipher Anglo-Arab-Zionist relations.

Friedman proceeds to debunk the myth that the Arabs of the Middle East were staunch allies of the British during World War I-a British precondition for granting Arab independence after the war. Rather, he argues that the Arabs were at best too disorganized to launch an effective attack. At worst, many sympathized with or aided the enemy. Friedman shows how the Syrians and Palestinian Arabs aided the Germans and Turks during the war and shows that the famous "Arab revolt" led by T.E. Lawrence was an exaggeration of Arab power, for tribal rivalries prevented it from effectively attacking Ottoman forces. The Arabs, in other words, didn't live up to their end of the bargain.

Friedman also notes that while the sharif of Mecca posed as the spokesman of the "Arab nation" in an effort to bolster his power after the war, British documents repeatedly point to the fact that "no such entity existed." Again, the Arabs fell short of their promises. Finally, his close look at the Husayn-McMahon correspondence shows that the land of Palestine was never promised to any Arab leader. Therefore, he concludes, the whole sequence of diplomatic documents amounted not to English perfidy but Arab disappointment. In sum, the author thoroughly destroys virtually all historical Arab claims to modern Israel based on this body of literature.

The author sets out with a political agenda to prove that the british made no promises during the first world war that were in conflict with the promise made to european jews for a jewish national home in the middle east. The author does not however deal with the deeper question of by what right the British could promise territories in the middle east to people in the first place. And how territories like Palestine could be disposed of without any consultation of the people who lived there.

Contrary to the theory of the book and others, the promise of a jewish national home in palestine by the league of nations aroused immediate concern among the large arab population. A delegation of Palestinians who attempted to travel to Paris in 1919 for the peace conference were refused permission to travel by the British. Quiet political demands and talk turned into riots in palestine starting after outright military rule ended in 1920. There were riots in both 1920 and 1921. Palestinians also sent a delegation to London in 1921 to press their claim that the Balfour declaration was inconsistant with article 22 of the League of Nations Charter. But reading this book, a person would assume that those things never happened.

At the same time that Woodrow Wilson was running around the world talking up democracy and the right of self-determination in places like Poland, he and the europeans were telling Palestinians that such things were not allowed in their case.

Friedman twists and selectively quotes sources to make his political points. As an example, in 1918 the Hogarth Message to Sherif Hussein stated that "Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population." Political freedom being taken to mean that the arab population would have self-government.

Friedman gets around every problem by claiming that every time arab is used, it means all arabs except those who happen to live in palestine. But that only works so far. Friedman also treats Sherif Hussein as if somehow he was the undisputed king over every arab and that he had authority to negotiate the future of the lands.

At the core of his case is the McMahon letter of 1915. Though he plays all sorts of games with it, he can in the end add nothing to the disputes over it that have existed since 1919. The language of the letter is vague, Palestine is not mentioned by name, and no "arab" documentation accepting that Palestine is to be excluded from Arab Rule is produced.

The other problem that his claim has is that the British themselves didn't buy into it. A secret memorandum prepared for the Paris Peace conference by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office said:

"With regard to Palestine, His Majesty's Government are committed by Sir Henry McMahon's letter to the Sherif on October 24, 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence ... but they have stated their policy regarding the Palestine Holy Place and Zionist colonization in their message to him of January 4, 1918."..."The whole of Palestine ... lies within the limits which His Majesty's Government have pledged themselves to Sherif Husain that they will recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs."

Friedman also fails to show a convincing trail of documents that prove that the British had the Balfour declaration in mind in 1915 when McMahon was talking to Hussein. The Balfour declaration was not made until 1917! Worse yet for making the case, the British government changed between 1915 and 1917. Balfour was not even in power when the promises of 1915 were made.

In point of fact, the British never kept even a single promise. They took Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine as colonies where they would have absolute political and economic control. Syria was given to the French. In not one place, including Palestine, was any sort of freedom given or any promise kept. So given that the british kept exactly none of their word and none of their agreements, what can anyone expect to find in the language ambiguties of the Mcmahon correspondence?

The Weizmann-Feisal Agreement of 1919 is also examined in the book. Feisal, in the agreement, accepted a jewish homeland in Palestine. But what authority Feisal had to make an agreement of this sort is not explained by the book. Feisal was the self-appointed king of syria, but not recognized as such by the British who had already given his kingdom to the French. Feisal ended his days as a British puppet-king of occupied Iraq. A figurehead supported by british troops who did what he was told.

The proper people for Weizmann to negotiate with in 1919 would have been the Palestinian delegation. But as noted before, the British disallowed them from even attending the conference.

In the end, the book fails to make a case for its political claims and fails to present any new material on the subject which has been studied by generations of scholars since 1919.