Panic: The Social Construction of the Street Gang Problem deals with the "discovery" of the street gang problem in the United States during the 1980s. In these pages, authors Richard McCorkle and Terance Miethe argue that gangs are a major social threatnot only because of the increased concrete threat, but because of their impact on the world around us. The result has been increased crime, a proliferation of inefficient anti-gang policies, and the squandering of millions of taxpayer dollars.
Panic: The Social Construction of the Street Gang Problem focuses on the events, organizations, and processes that surrounded the gang panic during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period during which gangs expanded greatly in American cities. This book provides critical insights into the discovery of the gang problem throughout the country and will encourage others to re-examine the nature of the gang threat in any jurisdiction.
Criminal justice policy is rarely founded on a bedrock of facts. It is far more likely to be assembled amidst a swirl of distorted media images, interest group claims, polling figures, and political posturing. Not surprising, policy outcomes often appear unreasoned and generally fail to make much of a dent in the crime problem. Examples abound:
* Federal legislation is passed providing funding for 100,000 new police officers, though no one knows what calculations, if any, were performed to arrive at this figure. (Why not, for example, 500,000 new police?) Assuming that number was not simply pulled out of the air, several decades of research have demonstrated we cannot reduce crime by putting more officers on the street.
* We pass laws providing harsher penalties for crack cocaine offenses than powder cocaine offenses-even though the substances are pharmacologically indistinguishable.
* Though statistics show that most of those admitted to prisons have either been sentenced for drug use or a crime directly related to their addiction, we provide drug treatment for only 1 in 10 prisoners during incarceration.
* The "three strikes and you're out" provisions, intended to provide long or life imprisonment for repeat offenders, inevitably incarcerate individuals well beyond the age when they would be a threat to society.
* To expedite executions and maximize deterrence, jurisdictions across the country have ruled to limit the number of appeals in death penalty cases. Seemingly ignored, however, is the disturbing number of death row inmates exonerated during their appellate processes over the past two decades, or the lack of any evidence that a swifter application of the death sentence might be more likely to deter a potential murderer.
The list goes on.
To some extent, groundless and ineffectual crime policies should be expected: policy agendas and initiatives are, after all, affected more by politics than careful thought or empirical evidence. The policymaking process is driven by the activities of certain groups or organizations attempting to bring some aspect of the crime problem to public awareness. Assertions made in the process may or may not correspond to the facts. This does not necessarily involve deliberate distortion or exaggeration. The social reality of crime is extremely complex; perceptions are filtered and shaped by political ideologies, organizational cultures and interests, and situational imperatives. It is most certainly the case, however, that those groups or organizations motivated to have "discovered" some aspect of the crime problem are also those that stand to profit most. For having succeeded in placing the problem on the policy agenda, their policy initiatives will be adopted, providing the additional resources to address the condition. But given that those initiatives were based on distorted claims, they will have a minimal impact on the overall crime problem.
This book deals with the "discovery" of the street gang problem in the United States during the 1980s. In these pages we argue that gangs came to be defined as a major social problem, not because of any actual increased threat, but because of the claims and activities of certain organizations, including (and primarily) law enforcement, the media, and members of the academic community. The result has been a proliferation of ineffectual gang policies, idle criminal statutes, and a squandering of taxpayer dollars. Although it speaks broadly to the issue, this book focuses on events, organizations, and processes that surrounded the gang panic in Nevada during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since the policy process in Nevada is not unlike that in other states, this book will provide critical insights into the discovery of the gang problem in other parts of the country and, hopefully, impress others to reexamine the nature of the gang threat in other jurisdictions. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research reported in this book was funded by National Institute of Justice grant #94-IJ-CX-0053.
We wish to thank the following reviewers: Dr. Ronald J. Graham, Fresno City College, Fresno, California; George Knox, Chicago State University, Chicago Illinois; Bruce Scott, Mineral Area College, Park Hills, Missouri; Tom O'Connor, North Carolina Wesleyan College, Rocky Mount, North Carolina; Jerry Loar, Waiters State Community College, Morristown, Tennessee; and Roger Levesque. Indiana University, Bloomington. Indiana.