Customer Reviews

Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Duel)

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This thin volume, containing a mere 73 pages of text, is a mini-encylopedia of information, insight, and analysis on these two feared weapons of World War II: the German Panther and Soviet T-34 tanks.

The book provides an excellent (if not unparalleled for a book of this size and cost) review of the design, development, strengths, and flaws of each of these fighting vehicles. It discloses the politics (as well as the favoritism and nepotism) that hindered the design and development of each vehicle, with the result that both were initially knowingly sent into battle with major weaknesses. (Indeed, the Panzers were sent to the front despite the refusal of Heinz Guderian, Inspector for Panzer Troops, to certify them as combat ready. Guderian was over-ridden by a Nazi bureaucrat working under Speer who was anxious to please Hitler and had promised Hitler that Panzers in sufficient numbers would be available for Operation Citadel (the attack on the Kursk salient) by May 1943. Despite this promise, the attack was repeatedly delayed while the Panzers (and Tigers) underwent further testing and refinement until Hitler finally ordered that Operation Citadel would begin on July 5th no matter what.)

The book also ably discusses in detail the specifications for each tank during the period covered (June-December 1943), with excellent line drawings of the main guns (75 mm for the Panther, 76mm for the T-34), and additional drawings of each vehicle from one side, the front, and the rear. (There are no drawings of the interiors of either vehicle, but there are some interesting ones of the views offered to the gunner of the Panther and the commander/gunner of the T-34 as he looked through the sights of his gun, as well as a two-page spread of a battle scene between these tanks from the German point of view.) An interesting chapter on the training of the crews for each tank is also included.

A third of the book contains a well-written discussion and analysis of five major engagements between these two vehicles in 1943, including Kursk and Kharkov, that includes first-hand perspectives of veterans of the conflicts.

All in all, an engaging and well-written look at these two fighting machines, one in its infancy and the other in its prime (at least until the advent of the Panther). The Panthers had a far greater kill ratio over the T-34s but the Panthers were far less reliable mechanically and far less mobile than the T-34s. (The Germans lost far more Panthers to mechanical breakdowns and hasty retreats than they did in actual combat as Hitler had a standing order to destroy any Panthers that might fall into enemy hands.) In the last six months of 1943 the Soviets could build 1,300 T-34s a month, while the Germans could only produce 200 Panthers a month in the same period. (I.e., for each Panzer the Germans built, the Soviets were able to build more than six T-34s in the same amount of time.)

Very good book. However, the Panther's achilles heal was actually the thickness of her side armor(50mm). Her mechanical problems were remedied soon after the battle of Kursk. But whatever she may have given up in armor,her powerful KwK/42 (L/70) 7.5cm main gun more than made up for it. This gun actually had more penetrating power than the main gun on the Tiger I . The Panther could engage and destroy frontal plate armor on all T-34 versions at 2,000 meters while the Soviet counterpart had to get to 500 meters to do the same to the Panther. It was the combined tactics of the Soviets to outnumber the Panzers five and six to one and then "get in close" regardless of losses that ultimately doomed the Panther and all the great german tanks . This is an advantage in numerical superiority and not mechanical superiority. One on One, the Panther was the most deadly tank of WWII. I would respectfully disagree with the outcome of the Author.

I enjoyed this book and learned a great deal from it. As a 1970's era wargamer, I always saw the Panther as superior, given the higher combat factors assigned it in the famous wargame Panzerblitz. Yet the author makes a convincing case that the T-34's outstanding mobility counted for far more than the Panther's admittedly impressive firepower. While a Panther could usually best a T-34 in a one-on-one encounter, Panthers were always outnumbered. Panthers were also seriously unreliable, at least in 1943. This made a big difference, meaning the Soviets could transfer entire tank corps over distances greater than 100 kilometers, while the Germans had to haul Panthers any significant distance by railroad. The T-34's advantage in operational mobility was extremely helpful, and maybe even decisive, as the tide turned in Russia during 1943. When the Germans tried to retreat with Panthers under their own power over long distances, breakdowns were frequent. As a result, more Panthers were blown up to prevent capture than were lost in combat.

This finely detailed book made the Russian front interesting to me despite a preference for other parts of World War II. It gives details on the design history of these two tanks, as well as insight into crew training and day-to-day life. The author also gives a detailed analysis of a duel in the Kursk campaign. Graphic quality is very good. Few of the Osprey books are as well-researched as this one. Whether you are a casual reader interested in tanks or a serious student of armored warfare, this title is a "must read."

"Panther vs. T-34" gives readers the story of the epic showdown between two legendary tanks. The Russian T-34 met the German panther for the first time in the brutal battles in Southern Russia and the Ukraine. By the end of 1943, the flawed but powerful panthers had destroyed droves of Soviet tanks, but ultimately Soviet strenght prevailed. The book is thin, but contains quite a bit of information in a very readable form. The production of the vechicles is described as are the armored battles in which they faced each other. Additional features include brief descriptions of tank commanders and two interesting computer generated images of the tanks targeting one another. The book has numerous photos of the vechicles, including some I haven't noticed in other books. There is only one piece of artwork depicting an engagement, but it is very well done (much more detailed than the one featured in the "Duel" book featuring the firefly and tiger I). Overall, I recommend it to anyone interested in World War II armored vechiles or the epic tragedy called the Eastern Front.

An excellent overview of both machines in 1943. I was quite impressed with the quality of the writing & art work. What impressed me even further was the inclusion of a bibliography. Many Osprey titles suffer from the lack of one; which leads the reader to wonder where the author got his information. Not this one though, Dr.Forczyk has obviously researched his subject carefully.

A must for anyone interested in the history of these two AFVs.

I found the author's premise thought provoking and interesting, but in the end, a bit hollow. He contends that the Panther was a failed design when compared to the basic T-34, and therefore a waste of resources that the Third Reich could ill afford.

So the Panther was not "the best tank of WWII". Fair enough. But to make the book more interesting for WWII wonks, Mr. Forczyk could have discussed potential alternatives available to the German military in lieu of the Panther. Just a few more pages on this issue would have been fun.

He also seems to give short shrift to the fact that the German armored forces' qualitative advantages in training, radios, guns, and gun sights througout 1943 led to significant losses in the ranks of the Red Army which could have been avoided had the Soviets upgraded to the T-35/85 six months earlier. Given the number of tanks the Soviet Union built in 1944, it's difficult to believe that an earlier upgrade would have appreciably slowed overall production.

My father was the radio-operator in a Panther tank during 1943 untill the end of the war. He has engaged many T-34's in battle and he stated that ONLY through sheer numbers they lost it from the T-34. The turret of the T-34 had to be turned by hand instead of mechanical power with the Panther. The Panther had, as already stated, much more firepower to destroy the T-34 on greater range than the other way round. T-34 lacked radio communication in the beginning of their apperance (later they had radio) and the crew had not sufficient training in combat, therefore loosing many T-34.s and crew. Look at the numbers of T-34's the Russions lost in comparison with the amount of Panthers. My father was engaged at the battle of Maciecow in Polland and there they shot 125 T-34's with their division, without losing ONE single Panther. Read the book he participated in: Standartenführer Johan Mühlenkampf and you can hear his own account. The T-34 lost the battle with the Panther if they were 1 on 1 anytime. Yeah, they should have used diesel engines, but mobility itself doesn't make a tank the better one of the two. I agree with; Good book, incorrect outcome

I don't think it is fair to compare German 45 tons Pz.V Panther with Russian 31 tons T-34/76 Model 43. By Soviet standards Pz.V was heavy and Pz.VI Tiger was super heavy armored vehicles. It would be more accurate to compare Panther with Russian IS-2(JS-2) and/or T-34 with German Pz.IV. The latter comparison would be more interesting since there are several different modifications of the each tank had been built during conflict from the begging and to the very end.

It is arguable should Germans focus on Pz.IV mass production and further improvements rather than rushing newer Panthers into the battle. From the middle of 1942 Pz.IVF2 was at least a match for the T-34 and with a better tank crew training it definitely gives Germans an advantage over the Soviets on the battlefield at the equal numerical opposition. On the other hand newer heavies and super heavies placed an immense strain on logistics. Moreover, once a Panther or Tiger had been committed for the counter strike far ahead of the support and repair echelons, the chances of recovery if it broke down or was damaged were less than reasonable. On another side from the middle 1943 Russians assured of a constant general advance which could guarantee the recovery of their tanks within normal operational circumstances.

One-on-one somewhere in the open step of South Ukraine Panther would be a deadly opponent for T-34 considering its tremendous firepower, excellent crew training and front armor protection. However, operating among wooden area and small villages Panther could be easily ambushed or outmaneuvered by experienced T-34 crew with a good chance of success. I truly believed that accurate comparison of one battle tank with another should be made considering multiple parameters: fire power, armor protection, mobility, reliability, suitability for the mass production and quick repair of the damaged machines within the primitive conditions. By looking on the subject under such perspective T-34 would be easily considered the best tank of WWII overall. Yes, Panther had much better firepower, King Tiger had much better armor protection, Sherman was much more technological, but combination of them is what makes real difference!

On a page 63 it could be proposed slightly different continuation of T-34 engagement sequence against a Panther: ...Commander sees a brief spark as his second round strikes the Panther's gun mantlet and ricochets into the roof of the hull penetrating the thin armor, killing the driver and causing a fire. The fire was quickly localized, however the crew has to abandon the damaged armor vehicle and retreat respecting Russian massive tank attack. The Panther needs to be destroyed by the crew using special internal explosive charge. Such "ricochets" German crews discovered unfortunately for themselves only during the initial battle engagements. This serious problem in the design was addressed with introduction of the "beard" in the latter more reliable and probably the best version of the Pz.V, Panther G.

On the front cover of the book there is an art work of Russian T-34/76 (Model 43) medium tank without a commander's cupola that was very common in the 1943 model and with auxiliary detachable fuel tanks on sides of the hull for the extensive range. By the summer of 1943 when the T-34 and Panther finally met on the battlefield almost all T-34s were finally granted a command hatch (as described in the book) and it was very risky to go into the battle with spare fuel tanks aside unless Russians were caught by surprise. Again, on a page 34 there is a drawing of T-34/76 Model 41 instead of Model 43 lacking a modified hexagonal turret with commander's cupola.

"Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Duel)", by Robert Forczyk, is a book in the Osprey Duel format that compares the German Panther tank to the Soviet T-34 tank in 1943. The duel format is typically 80 pages long, and presents an analysis of the factors ... human, mechanical, and tactical ... of the two weapons systems being compared, describes how the weapons were developed and utilized, and includes drawings, photographs, and illustrations. Mr Forczyk does an outstanding job of setting the stage and presenting relevant data, anecdotes, and analysis of the tanks within a limited page count. I own a few books on the Panther tank and on Soviet tank development, and he summarizes in just a few pages what the other books took chapters to do, and provides interesting and well developed analysis and conclusions.

Mr Forczyk states that the T-34 was the superior tank in 1943, basically because it was an outstanding design that had been refined over the course of several years and available in great quantities, while the Panther, particularly in 1943, was rushed into production and had several key weaknesses, the most serious of which was its extreme mechanical unreliability. I have no argument with the author's conclusions; given the situation Germany faced in 1943, there probably was no correct answer available to the Germans that would have enabled them to "win" the duel.

As a long-winded aside to the above, the author criticizes the Germans for expending scare resources for an expensive and unproven tank like the Panther. The Panzer IV, by mid-late 1942, was upgraded and refined to the point that it was a rough match for the T-34. However, it was rapidly nearing the end of its capability to be further improved. With regards to armored forces, then, the Germans had only a few choices. They could either greatly increase the number of Panzer IV's and tank destroyers based on existing platforms, or they could attempt to produce smaller numbers of more technologically advanced tanks and tank destroyers, and try to win through having a superior weapon system. The Americans took the former approach with its Sherman tank ... although the much better Pershing was waiting in the wings, it was decided that the Sherman was "good enough" to get the job done, and rather than disrupt existing production lines, the Pershing was delayed. If the Germans had managed to somehow double the number of Panzer IV's produced in the early months of 1943 rather than producing Panthers, it is still doubtful that this would have allowed the Germans to hold on much longer in the Ukraine, and would have left them much worse off with regards to armored battles in 1944 when more effective Soviet tanks began arriving in quantity. But neither was producing the initially unreliable Panther an effective answer either ... history bears this out.

To have any hope of finishing the war with a stalemate ... the best the outcome Germans could hope for by 1943 ... they would have had to first stop the Russians, and it is unlikely that any combination of weapons that they had the industrial capacity to produce in 1943 could have done this. Producing more Panzer IV's in 1943 rather than the Panther would probably have been more effective in the short run, albeit at the cost of putting even more stress on the German's fuel situation (abysmal) and hurting their efforts for 1944 and beyond. The bottom line is that the Americans and Soviets, through virtue of their superior production capabilities, could live with a tank arguably inferior to the Panther on an individual basis, and still win through attrition, if need be.

I highly recommend this book.

This is a fine effort for it's type. The problem with this series is that it implies that combat between machines in WWII was some kind of joust. It wasn't. This emphasis, even when the broad brush is well handled as it is here, encourages military history buffs to think of battle the way one thinks of a boxing match. Mechanized war as it morphed throughout WWII was very complex and the tank was only one part of the picture. Obviously numbers counted (even "Duel" authors get that right). The biggest variable, and the most complex, was how forces suited the environment for the defense or offense. It wasn't Hitler's idea have the Panzer arm fight on the defensive after Kursk, but that's what happened. That factor alone vindicated the production of the Panther and Tiger. A very different picture arises when you put them on the offense. The Germans knew how to make takes and how to use them: end of story. But the feared Panther/Tiger became much more mortal when moving through the ugly terrain of the Ardennes where American mines, American AFVs in ambush position, American bazooka teams and American artillery were firing over open sights. That's of course what happened at Kursk. Anyway, tanks were bishops or rooks: didn't cut a lot of mustard by themselves without artillery, mechanized infantry (and towed anti-tank guns), the logistic system to keep all mechanized units moving smoothly and airpower. As long as German tanks could sit and wait for the enemy, their lethal guns were exactly that. If the situation was different, so was the suitability of the high quality, low number equation forced upon the Wehrmacht. The problem for the Germans was that as their enemy got better (I'd argue that good Soviet units were overall the equal to German Panzer units by mid-44 and better led) standing off and shooting Shermans or T-34s was not going to win wars. Lucky for us.