Customer Reviews

Panzer Leader

5 star:		(27)
4 star:		(15)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(0)
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This book will be of great interest to any military historian. Guderian takes us through the development of the Panzer force both in its formation and tactics and its implementation in the battlefield in the Polish, French and Russian campaigns. There are detailed accounts of his involvement in those campaigns and at times I got a little lost in the geographic references and the poor sketch maps did little to compensate. However,the book is more than that. The book contains an incredible insight into the German High command, Hitler and his cronies and their disasterous blunders such as at Dunkirk and the gross under estimation of Soviet Russia in terms of fighting ability and technology. What I found of special interest was of the recollections of meetings and arguments with Hitler and Guderian's refusal to bow to the Furher's will power. Guderian was dismissed after the failure of the German army at the gates of Moscow in 1941 but his talents could not even be overlooked by Hitler and after further set backs were encountered was recalled to service in 1943. The Allies were fortunate that Guderian's talents were hindered by Hitler's "YES" men, overwise the war could have taken a different course. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in World War Two from a German stand point.

General Guderian's book is certainly not for the WWII reader who wants a style like that of Ambrose or Ryan, but it does deliver on sheer content and insight from one of the greatest military minds of the second world war. Guderian is quite humble in his writing considering he was the primary driving force behind development of Germany's Blitzkreig warfare. Had this been written by a personality such as Montgomery I'm sure the feel would have been much different. His descriptions of campaigns in the west and east are often quite moving, but equally as often dry and matter of fact. His writings are not as "moving" or personal as those of Rommel (see The Rommel Papers), but they are full of important information and insights. In particular his closing chapter touches nicely on his feelings of the German High Command, it's members, and leaders of the Nazi party. If you want history as told by a leading member of the German High Command this book will not disappoint. If you want edge of your seat story telling this might not be your cup of tea.

For anyone who is intersted in armored warfare this is a must read, because Guderian is without a doubt a pioneer of 20th century armor tactics and the father of Germany's Panzer Forces. It was him and military thinkers like him that brought about the concept of mass armored formation as a separate military arm in oppose the spreading out tanks all over as infantry support. The book describes the development of the German Panzer Forces from infancy to full develoment as well its implementation during the WWII. The book is treasure of technical information from the most well knowned to the most obsecure tanks developed in Germany, analyzing both weakness' and strengths of different models. Guderian also gives a very detailed story of the German offensive in Russia of 1941 (until he was dismissed) and he picks up the story in 1943 after his reinstatement to active military duty and describes the events up to very end of the war. Even though the General was man integrity his view of the of the war (recorded at the end) is described from the German point of view and can't help to be a bit biased. Guderain's absolute defence of the honor of the German army leaves the reader a bit skeptical in view of what we know about German atrocities on the eastern front. However none of these faults (that's why i gave it 4 stars) takes away from the richness of information this text provides on development and implementation of massed armor forces for first time in history of warfare. If you are interested in the history of the German-Soviet conflict I would look for a more balanced source eleswhere and leave this book for the armor enthusiest or a reader of military biographies.

Coming in to Panzer Leader, I didn't know much about the Eastern Front. After reading it, I had a great grip on what happened and why. Guderian writes in short, succinct, declarative prose, which makes reading a breeze. Readers not interested in the fine details may be put off by the sheer depth of Guderian's account, but those passages are dense only because of the sheer volume of information Guderian relays, not his writing style. German high command gets the once over, and particularly interesting are Guderian's character sketches of Hitler and Goering. I do not know enough about Guderian to judge his flat denial of any knowledge pertaining to the Final Solution or the Einsatztruppe, but from a sheer military point of view you can't do any better than Panzer Leader. Guderian walks the reader through the conquests of Poland and France, and through Army Group Center's involvement in Operation Barbarossa. He never hesitates to point out where he disagreed with the General Staff, and describes in detail his frustration with the OKH and OKW. Especially interesting are the early parts of the book where Guderian describes his efforts to get tanks accepted by German command as a viable force on the battlefield, and the subsequent formation of Panzer Divisions. This is easily one of the best books I have ever read, and definitely one of the most informative. I learned a TON reading this, and loved every page of it. Those not interested in military history will probably find it dense and hard to get through, though. I'm giving it 5 stars despite that drawback - this book is simply indispensable to military history enthusiasts and WWII buffs.

"Panzer Leader," written by a former Colonel-General of the Wehrmacht, Heinz Guderian, is a fascinating book. It is fascinating in its own right in that it describes Guderian's efforts to create and operate effective all-arms formations including armor, armored infantry and towed (later self-propelled) artillery in spite of the opposition from the more traditional elements of the Wehrmacht. With Hitler's keen interest and help, Guderian succeeded in creating such formations in "Panzerdivisionen" - armored divisions. The subsquent successes which Guderian had as a commander of such formations in Poland, France and Russia make an exciting and informed reading. However, the book is also fascinating because of the falsehood contained in it. Principally, there are two major "untruths" which often escape notice from the casual reader. The first falsehood is the credit which Guderian attributes to the late Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart as the "founder" of Blitzkrieg "doctrine." Guderian was jailed after the Second World War by the Allied authorities in the West, and it was Sir Liddell Hart who championed his (and other jailed German generals') cause. He brought them gifts and attempted to convince the authorities to free them, and eventually became the editor of their memoirs in the West. Sir Lidell Hart had been indeed an innovator of military doctrine in the 1920's, but he had, by 1930's, rejected the concept of armored warfare as viable. In any case, his reputation had fallen during the war, and this he attempted to salvage rather successfully with the help of the grateful ex-German generals after the war. Hence, Guderian inserted the line crediting Sir Liddell Hart as the founder of Blitzkrieg idea in the English edition of the book (it does not appear in the German edition) which was then edited by Sir Liddell Hart himself. Guderian really deserves the credit for integrating armor, motorized infantry and motorized artillery into an all-arms fighting formation known as Panzer Divisions. Second major "irregularity" of the book concerns the infamous "Commissar Order." Prior to launching Case Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Union, Hitler directed that German forces to eliminate Soviet political officers (and eventually other "undesirables" including Jews) among the captured Soviet POWs. Guderian claims in the book that he did not distribute this order to units under his command, the Second Panzer Group (later the Second Panzer Army) and that hence the order was not carried out in his command. This is an outright lie as was later effectively rebutted by the books written by Professor Omer Bartov. In fact, the Commissar Order was carried out in the Second Panzer Group. There are other smaller problems. While the account of the war in the book is largely accurate, Guderian often fails to mention that his mistakes were at times reponsible for the failure of military operations under his command. Instead he blames Hitler who, though he shares a large part of the blame, did not make the mistakes alone. This book was instrumental during the earlier years of the Cold War in implanting the idea that the "Shield of the Wehrmacht" was "untainted" - that it was Hitler and the SS who were responsible for the military failures and the atrocities and that the German army's honor and operational brilliance remained untainted. The book was welcomed in the West because it helped to buttress the argument for the rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany, and because it pointed a way to defeat the Russian "Slavic-Asiatic" hordes with West European operational and tactical brilliance. We now have a more accurate portrayal of the war available. Nonetheless, the book is useful in that it provides an insight into why the Panzer Division was such an effective instrument of war. The books shows that it was the operational and tactical brilliance of integrating all arms and allowing the unit to deal flexibly with all forms of enemies while maintaining the momentum of operation which made the German armored units so formidable, not the superior number of German tanks during the early years as Sir Churchill inaccurately pointed out in his writings. At the same time, the reader must understand the context of the book and what it does not contain and what it falsifies. For the shield of the Wehrmacht was tainted with the blood of its victims and occassional military blunders by its commanders. So long as that understanding is present, the book makes an interesting and fascinating military history reading. James J. Na

If you were to make a list of the truly outstanding commanders of the Second World War, Heinz Guderian's name would have to be on it. He was a bold and energetic leader of armor who won many of Germany's most brilliant victories in Poland, France and Russia. More than that, however, he was a pioneer of tank warfare, almost single-handedly responsible for the creation of Hitler's legendary panzer arm, and a tireless proponent of its proper use. If he had never been born, it is entirely possible that WWII would have unfolded in a completely different manner than it did. How many other generals can make that claim?

PANZER LEADER is Guderian's account of his long career as a soldier - first for the German Empire during WWI, second during the Weimar period, and last under the Third Reich. Since the story of Guderian and the story of the panzers are interwoven, he traces the evolution of the tank arm from its humble beginnings after 1918 (outdated armored cars used as flour trucks) to the height of its success during the conquest of France in 1940, and the "cauldron" victories in Russia in 1941, with his own fortunes rising at the same time. Likewise, the failure to defeat the USSR marks the end of Guderian's combat career; sacked by Hitler, he languishes for a year before being recalled as "Inspector General of Armored Troops." This in turn paves the way for his appointment as Chief of the General Staff (No. 2 in the Army hierarchy under Hitler) in 1944, a post he held until the near-end of the war, which gave him a "God's-eye view" of the Eastern Front.

PANZER LEADER is more entertainingly written than many German memoirs, superior in readability to the works of Manstein or Kesselring, and certainly easier to digest than the War Diaries of Bock or Halder. Guderian is blunt, occasionally sarcastic and often humorous in his tale-telling. Although proud to be a Prussian officer, his is also a maverick who never let rank or tradition intimidate him or frustrate his plans: one of his contemporaries, General Hermann Balck, once said that "Guderian only had to see a superior officer and he'd have him gored and writhing on the horn of his ideas." His combative personality led to great tensions with some of his superiors (Kluge, for example) but it also endeared him to his men: he was one of those rare leaders who pushed himself as hard as the "lowliest" private in his command, and he lacked the vindictive streak that somewhat tainted Rommel. In addition to his courage and soldierly qualities, however, he was also true visionary in that he not only translated radical theory into practice, he also worked hard to make grandiose schemes into reality.

It is a huge mistake, however, to take Guderian's memoirs at face-value, for he was a key figure what the Germans refer to today as "the period of self-justification", i.e. the years immediately following the defeat, when surviving Wehrmacht officers tried to place blame for Germany's downfall solely on Hitler, while simultaneously claiming credit for the victories of '39 - '41 (and claiming ignorance of the "security measures" of Himmler & Co.) PANZER LEADER is thus riddled with strategic omissions, questionable claims, and circumlocution that would do a modern-day politician proud. I'll give a few examples here:

A. Guderian places the blame for the notorious "stop order", which probably saved the British Army in France from being captured entire by the Germans, on Hitler, and to some extent on Goering. Fair enough, but he downplays the fact that it was his idol, Rundstedt, who convinced Hitler the panzers were at the end of their mechanical rope and needed to be overhauled and repaired.
B. Guderian's chapter "July 20 and its sequel" is a disgrace. He completely omits his key role in crushing the Stauffenberg plot, as well as his place on the Court of Honor, which stripped military plotters of their rank and protection so they could be handed over to the People's Court of Roland Freisler and hanged with piano wire. He also makes no mention of his oft-quoted comment, upon taking over the General Staff in 1944, that under his command, "there would be no room for anyone who wasn't a National Socialist in outlook." (Likewise, no mention of his comment, "I'm all for racial purity." at a staff conference.)
C. Read his account of the argument he had with Hitler in January or February of 1945 over the issue of evacuating Courland in the Baltic; Guderian claims that Hitler became so enraged by this discussion that he, Guderian, was "very nearly the victim of a physical assault." Then read Albert Speer's (INSIDE THE THIRD REICH) version of this same incident...if Speer is to be believed, it was Hitler who nearly got the black eye.
D. Guderian rails against Hitler for appointing SS chief Himmler as an Army Group Commander in late 1944. But in Gerhard Engel's war diary (published as AT THE HEART OF THE REICH), Engel, Hitler's Army adjudant, records that in 1938, Guderian actually agitated to have either Goering or Himmler named Commander-in-Chief of the Army, "so as to unite the Army with National Socialism." One doesn't hear too much about Guderian's enthusiasm for National Socialism in PANZER LEADER.

The book has other flaws as well. Guderian's tendency, in the later stages of the work, to simply recount events in the manner of a news-ticker, rather than trying to inject any real feeling or overview into them, is tedious, and he occasionally omits interesting little facts, such as the bitter rivalry he had with General v. Schell, or the fact that his beautiful wife played a role in his peacetime success by providing a sweet side to his sourness. Overall, however, he does well, and it is very difficult to put the book down without feelings of intense admiration for his remarkable soldier.

It was tough to say whether this book deserved three or four stars, but since I didn't call Manstein or Mellenthin on their omissions in my reviews of their books, I have to give it four, and I'll close by saying that regardless of its flaws, it's an absolutely indispensable addition to your WW2 collection.

Guderian was a German Panzer expert, & wrote a book in 1938 about Panzer tactics theories ("Achtung Panzer!)". This book is his 2nd & is his life story. He was both a field commander (a Panzer Division, a Panzer Corps, & then a Panzer Army) from 1939-1943, in Poland-France-Russia. Fired in Dec 1943 by Hitler, he was later (1944) re-hired to be one of Hitler's constant advisors until the last days of the war. Many referrences on battles. He comments about German tactics & military objectives which contributed to Germany's defeat. Unfortunately, the book lacks sufficient geographic battle maps. Despite this, I still VERY HIGHLY RECOMMENDED THIS BOOK by a man who was BOTH a Field Commander & a General Staff Officer who advised Hitler, reviewing both Western, Eastern, & Italian Front operations.

Heinz Guderian's account of the development of the German armor forces between the wars and the accompanying strategy is one of the major readings in anyone's understanding of armored warfare.

Guderian helped to develop the concept of blitzkrieg, a concept similar to Liddel Hart's of the massing armored forces in conjuction with air power and artillery. Guderian was the prime architect of the invasion of France and after being relieved by Hitler was then called back to service as Inspector of Panzer Forces in 1943.

Guderian's theories are still in effect today in slightly different manifestations and are mainly used by the US Army's Armored Warfare doctrine. As a witness to modern armor tactics in Desert Storm and the 3rd Infantry Divisions drive north into Iraq in 2003- complete with German style 'reconnaissance in force' forays, I'd go so far as to say the the Army's Armored operational doctrine is a direct descendent of both Guderian and Von Manstein.

Guderian's Panzer Leader is without a doubt, a required read for anyone interested in the military history of WWII.

Apart from von Manstein, Guderian is arguably to most able and important of the German commanders. He has also shown himself to be a great author and his book contains great insight into why the Germans lost the war, or at least why they lost it so fast, after their strong initial success. He also does a great study of Hitler and other members of the Nasi leadership towards the end of the book which could have only been given by one like Guderian who was there with the various individuals.

The most interesting part of this book is his accounts of the various times that he and Hitler fought over matters of strategic and even tactical issues. He made it very clear that Hitler was very buried into the workings of even the divisional level of the war, which no doubt drove his commanders crazy, and lead to many of them resigning or being dismissed..

Again, the book as a great read, as well written as any other, but not quite as focused on the military formations and maneuvers the way von Manstein's book was. I highly recommend it.

Heinz Guderian was more or less the founder of the German Panzerwaffe, or Armored warfare theory. He contributed indirectly to the creation of a new type of warfare and directly to its implementation, namely the blitzkrieg. This theory, of combined arms fighting, would smash the defenses of Poland, Norway, France and almost Russia. It only failed in the latter example, despite a string of overwhelming victories, by the vastness of the country and the decision by Germanys supreme commander - Hitler. This is really what the book is all about. Don't get me wrong, it's truly an outstanding biography about the Second World War and a person that contributed to the rise and fall of Germany. Guderian was without doubt of one the most sympathetic and charismatic officers and individuals in the Wehrmacht. An old fashioned gentleman, schooled in not only the arts of war but of society as a whole by a small piece of land in northeastern Europe - Prussia. A devout catholic, his enrollment in the armed forces would propel him through ranks and fame throughout Prussia and Germany.

He was present when Hitler saw, and claimed, the capability of armored tactics and led his units during the invasion of Poland. His real success as a military commander though, would not come until the invasion of France and the penetration of the Ardennes and of course - the French battleline. During Barbarossa, the invasion of the Sovietunion, he led the Second Panzer Group (later to become the 2nd Panzer Army) to the very gates of Moscow.

His book takes from the beginning of the war to the last battle of Berlin, in which the dreams of the Third Reich comes to an end by the combined pressure of the allies and the Red Army. His telling of the fighting capabilities of the Wehrmacht and the enemy feels correct and informative. It's a gripping story as the war in the west and east unfolds. His insights in the problems that faced Germany, the ruthlessness of it politics and the sorrows of war bear a personal and resourceful objective view of events that torched Europe and the world. He reasons and analysis the war, the people involved and also the different countries with great respect and objectivity. Although it bear the same scars of war as many of his fellow generals (Manstein, Hausser, Speer) - that Hitler was responsible for the failings of the strategy and the innocence of the armed forces regarding the Jew-issue and the treatment of prisoners and the population in the occupied areas - it feels more genuine and understanding. His portray of Hitler doubtless makes one wonder what in fact could have happened, in the military field, if the German General Staff had been allowed to control their operations. It's a great book about the tactics and operations of the greatest conflict in modern history.

However, Guderian faces the same historic dilemma suffered by his comrades-in-arms in the German Army, SS or other branches of Germanys war machine. He cannot accept the collective guilt that, unavoidably, surrounds the members of a military that contributed to the destruction of Europe and the genocide of the Jew community. It doesn't really matter if you didn't commit any atrocities by yourself or the one closest to you. One that fails to intervene is in many ways just as guilty as the one committing the crime. You still share the guilt of what happened, regardless. I'm convinced that Guderian was in many ways the most sympathetic and understanding of the combatants in the war, but still I think he (like every other higher officer) knew or silently understood what was going on the home front and behind the battleline. He was a smart and educated man, who must have recognized the danger of the Jew prosecution and the infamous commissar-order. I would think that readers would be (even) more impressed if the fighting commanders or other (like Speer) took responsibility for what really happened.

Nonetheless, it is a great book for everyone interested in tactics and military history, written by a man in its midst. I highly recommend it.