Customer Reviews

The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone

5 star:		(18)
4 star:		(8)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(8)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

My highest complement for a book used to be how many pens I broke on it. This book leaps into a new category. I actually had to read it three times, short as it is. It is brilliant, with paragraphs of such substance that multiple readings are needed to "unzip" the implications. This is not an undergraduate text although it could certainly be used as such, to open deep discussions.

Among the strategic thoughts that I found most valuable were these: 1) a plenitude of information leads to a poverty of attention; 2) in the absence of time or means to actually review real-world information, politics becomes a contest of competitive credibility (with the Internet changing the rules of the game somewhat); 3) Japan has vital lessons to teach Islamic nations--that one can adapt to the new world while maintaining a unique culture; 4) we are failing to adapt our democratic processes to the challenges of the Earth as well as the opportunities of the Internet.

This last merits special attention. I found in this book an intellectual and political argument for restoring democratic meaning to our national policies. From its evaluation of the pernicious effect of special interest groups on foreign policy; to its explanation ("When the majority are indifferent, they leave the battlefields of foreign policy to those with special interests."); to its prescription for healthy policies: a combination of national discussion (not just polling), with a proper respect for the opinions of others (e.g. foreigners), the author clearly sets himself apart from those who would devise national policies in secret meetings with a few preferred pals.

Throughout the book, but not given any special chapter as I would have preferred, the author is clearly cognizant of the enormous non-traditional challenges facing the community of nations--not just terrorism and crime, but fundamentals such as water and energy shortages, disease, genocide, proliferation, trade injustices, etcetera.

Operationally, the book is slightly disappointing. Despite the fact that the author has served as both the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (and perhaps left the operational bit to his Vice Chairman, Greg Treverton, whose book, "Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information" I recommend be read in conjunction with this one), and as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, I did not see two things in this book that would have bridged the gap from strategic reflection to operational implementation:

1) How must we change the manner in which our nation handles information? What should our national information strategy be, to include not only a vast new program for properly collecting, processing, and understanding foreign language materials that are openly available, for but improving our K-12 and undergraduate education with respect to foreign affairs?

2) How must we change the manner in which our nation authorizes, appropriates, allocates, and obligates the taxpayer budget? While noting that we spend 16 times as much on military hard power as we do on diplomatic soft power, the author left this issue largely on a single page.

On the topic of values and accountability the author excelled. Although I would disagree that values by themselves are the foundation of national power ("knowing" the world, in my view, is the other side of the coin of the realm), the author sounds very much like Noam Chomsky with a social make-over--we have to be honest on human rights and other core values, and not act nor permit our corporations to act in ways that are antithetical to our true national commitment to decency and honesty. The section on new forms of accountability and transparency being made possible by changing in information tools and practices are valuable--admitting non-governmental organizations to all bodies; accelerating the release of records into the public domain, and so on.

We learn from this book that the author is an avid admirer of The Economist, that he thrives on Op-Ed reading (I have never seen a more comprehensive use of Op-Eds in the notes), and that he is largely accepting of the World Trade Organization and other multi-lateral groups, most of which have not yet accommodated themselves to the new world of citizen-centered policymaking. As good as the notes are, the book would have benefited from a bibliography. The index is acceptable.

If we part ways on any one thing, it would be that I am less sanguine about any foreign policy, however much it might use "soft power," being successful if it persists with the notion that we can cajole and seduce the world into wanting what we want. We've done that with Hollywood, and McDonalds, and chlorine-based plastics, and it is not working to our advantage. It may be that America must first recognize its own demons, adjust its global goals accordingly, and interact with the world rather than striving for a grander version of the "Office of Strategic Influence" that recently got laughed into oblivion. We appear to agree that the U.S. Information Agency must be restored as our two-way channel between our people and all others. I would dramatically expand USIA to also provide for a Global Knowledge Foundation and a Digital Marshall Plan on the one hand, and the education of all women on the other (Cf O'Hanlon's "A Half-Penny on the Federal Dollar").

This book opens the great conversation, and in doing so, renders a valuable service. Missing from the public conversation is the Department of State. Both the politically-appointed and the professionally-trained leadership of the diplomatic service appear to have been cowed into silence by a mis-placed coda that confuses abject compliance with loyalty to the larger national interest. If this book can draw State back into the public service, into a public debate on the urgency of protecting and expanding our most important soft power tools, then the author's ultimate impact on the future of American security and prosperity will be inestimable.

Not since Roman Empire has any nation had so much economic, cultural and military power, yet that power alone will not be sufficient to solve the world's problems.

Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, presents a three-pronged strategy for maintaining the United States' standing in the world while reducing its vulnerability in the years to come.

He argues this power will last far into the 21st Century, but only if we learn to exercise it wisely. Power in this new century will rest on a mix of what he defines as "hard" and "soft" resources. The greatest mistake we can make as a world power is to allow ourselves to become the victim of one-dimensional analysis, believing that investment in military power alone with ensure our strength.

Paying attention to "soft" power, the former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and Assistant Defense Secretary in the Clinton Administration argues, will co-opt people rather than coerce them. Military and economic power can be used to influence or threaten other people and country's positions once they are taken. Soft power however, rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes preferences.

It is the ability to entice and attract. It stems, in large part, from our values -- the policies we follow inside our country and the way we handle ourselves abroad. It recognizes that power in the information age is less tangible and coercive.

There is also a benefit to not going it alone. While an inequality of power, he says, has often led to peace, because there is no point in declaring war on a more powerful state, it causes some countries to chafe.

Effective global governance requires a powerful state to take the lead. By encouraging or nourishing regional pockets of strength and acting with restraint or in combination with others, the impact of American power is softened. Whether other countries unite to balance American power depends as much on how the United States behaves as the power resources of the potential challengers.

The key to maintaining American supremacy in the years ahead, Nye argues, will rest in our ability to share power as well as to lead.

I rated this book at 4 stars because it is a thorough primer; in other words, it is a solid summary of arguments for and against an increased application of soft power. While most contemporary geo-political texts tend to be long on problems and short on solutions, Dean Nye consistently applies his solution throughout the text.

Having said that, it seems to me that this book was compiled hastily. Based on extrinsic research, I concur with most of Dean Nye's conclusions. However, his premises are often shallow - or at best, weakly articulated. For example, Dean Nye relies on passing reference to Antonio Gramsci in support of one of the basic premises of soft power - the ability to shape the political preferences of other nations. There is neither a cite to Gramsci's work, nor an explanation of why Gramsci's observations are more relevant than a more contemporary political theorist.

Finally, I suspect that reviews which interpret this as a text arguing the merits of "multilateralism v. unilateralism" may have missed the larger picture. Since even a unilateral regime can be a leading "soft power", it seems that the theory implicates more about an American approach to international relationships than it does about American policy, per se.

Compare George Mitchell's book, "Making Peace" about the American role in the negotiation of the Belfast Accords and Louise Diamond's primer "Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace" as potential illustrations of the practical application of soft power techniques in international relations.

The Paradox of American Power is about a crucial question, why the world's only superpower can't go it alone? In his work, Joseph S. Nye makes a well-done analysis of the U.S foreign policy in the age of information revolution and globalization. He has several crucial insights in regard to American foreign policy centering on diverging perspectives of unilateralism and multilateralism. As Nye frequently points out in his study, the uni-multi debate is one of the most crucial issues for the U.S foreign policy now and years to come. Nye basically suggests that the United States should not act unilaterally in world affairs even if it is the world's only superpower. He makes the point that a multilateral pattern of foreign policy will be the best option not only for stability of international system but also for American national interests. The author argues that unilateralism is a danger for the U.S foreign policy since it has a considerable tendency to harm U.S relations with the rest of the world. In this respect, Nye recommends, the United States should follow a multilateral foreign policy, in which it takes place in international institutions and participates in multilateral treaties. Otherwise, Nye says, the United States will face a serious resentment and balancing behavior by the others. In this respect, he draws attention towards the recent U.S unilateralist acts such as dispension with the UN and rejection of several multilateral treaties including the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and treaty on establishing International Court of Justice.

Joseph S. Nye extensively talks about the reasons why the US can't go it alone. The changing global landscape in the age of information revolution and globalization, Nye says, is the primary reason for why it can't go it alone. A unilateral drive will lead to significant opposition by the rest of the world and it will considerably undermine its "soft power'. Nye gives significant attention towards "soft power" while he also holds military and economic power important. For this reason, he criticizes sovereignists who only consider "hard power" and champion unilateralism as the number one foreign policy pattern for the US.

The Paradox of American Power seems to be remaining in the center of many foreign policy debates since it well touches upon a significant issue of U.S foreign policy now and years and even decades to come. The uni-multi debate, which constitutes the core of this book, makes it quite relevant for both students of American foreign policy and scholars of global politics. This elegant book is recommended for the informed public alike.

This inciteful book by Joseph Nye explains how international responsibility by the United States is in the best interests of the United States. Nye's book clarifies the future of international relations.

Nye starts by explaining soft power, the ability to persuade others want to do what you want them, as opposed the hard power, the ability to force others to do what you want them to. Nye mentions the information revolution, the spread of information further and faster. Nye also talks about globalization, the growing interconnections of the world, and NGOs, Non Governmental Organizations and their relation to soft power.

Nye also examines various domestic factors and points out America's problem with converting power into influence. He also mentions popular indifference toward foreign policy which leaves foreign policy to be made by special interest groups which do not have the same interests as the national interest, which is what the citizens, after proper deliberation, say it is.

Nye points out that we should not ignore the interest of the international community in favor of purely national interest, and that the two are not necessarily incompatible.
Nye suggests a strategy based on global public needs, and rules of prudence for humanitarian intervention. He also charts a middle path between unilateralism and multilateralism.

Nye finishes by quoting a controversial former Secretary of State, "The test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms." The problem is that in the 21st century powerful men and women will be less limited than before.

Although 40 people have reviewed Nye's book thus far, no one has directly quoted Nye's clearest expression on what the PARADOX of American power is. What is the paradox about America's power? The thesis is at the end of the 1st chapter. "The paradox of America power at the end of this millennium is that it is too great to be challenged by any other state, yet not great enough to solve problems such as global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. America needs the help and respect of other nations" (pg. 40; Nye borrows this, adeptly, from Sebastian Mallaby).
In order to earn the "help and respect of other nations" America needs, what Nye calls, "soft power." "Soft power rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others" (pg. 9). Soft power is needed now more than ever, because hard power (e.g. military force) is becoming less relevant in this technological revolution the world is undergoing. "Today the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest" (pg. 5).
Soft power and the information age are the two topics Nye deals with primarily and skillfully. There are 2 nice quotations which summarize these topics well:
On Soft Power -
"The countries that are likely to gain soft power in an information age are (1) those whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy), (2) those with the most access to multiple channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed, and (3) those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance" (pg. 69).
On the Information Age -
"...power in a global information age is distributed like a three-dimensional chess game. The top military board is unipolar, with the United States far outstripping all other states, but the middle economic board is multipolar, with the United States, Europe, and Japan accounting for two-thirds of world product, and the bottom board of transnational relations that cross borders outside the control of governments has a widely dispersed structure of power" (pg. 140).

When I bought this book I expected it to basically be a review of the first few years of the Bush 2 Presidency as it related to foreign affairs and all the things that the author thought the President did incorrectly. To give the author credit, in today's publishing world where the more partisan and anti whoever your book is the more it sells this author took the high road and just discussed the state of the world and Americans place in it. The author spends the first part of the book talking about the current level of power in the world with some very insightful and interesting reveries of some of the other countries out there vying to replace the U.S. as the top dog. His view of power, both hard and soft, is clearly stated and a nice primer for understanding politics on the world stage.

As you may have guessed by the title of the book, who the author is and the dust jacket, that the author believes that the U.S. needs to stop acting as if we can go it alone and the rest of the world be dammed. He gives a nice overview of the number of treaties and conventions that the Bush administration has chosen to get out of or not enter into, and the possible effects this go it alone attitude will have on issues of importance to America. He ties in the war on terror and how the U.S. needs friends and allies across the globe to help keep us safe. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq and the spread thin nature of American forces, the author was correct in his predictions that it is difficult if not impossible for American to go it alone in any large scale operations without significant sacrifices at home. He also talks about how our economy can be hurt with too much isolationistic actions.

Overall this is a solid book that gives the reader a nice overview of the current world situation from a more moderate point of view. I did not get the impression the author was all that liberal, just that the current administration policies are so conservative that moderate views seem liberal in comparison. My only complaint about the book is that the author is a college professor and to be fair he does seem to write like one. This is not a book meant for half attention or someone that wants a light diversion. If you are interested in world politics then this is an interesting book that you can learn something from.

"Americans are so powerful because they can `inspire the dreams and the desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and because, for these same reason, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies,'" said Hubert Védrine, former French Foreign Minister, as quoted from the book.

In the Paradox of American Power, Joseph Nye Jr. argues that the American foreign policy machine should flex America's soft power (described by Mr. Védrine above) muscles and ease off our diplomacy by force - whether economic or military. American soft power is the greatest asset we have. It is one thing to force other nations to do what the US would like them to do, however it is another, causing little resentment, to inspire other nations to do what they would not normally do he argues. Nye charges that the US should lead the international community to design a system founded on our fundamental values that is universally accepted by the world. Our fight against an international community is counterproductive and damages are credibility and our ability to lead. Nye cites anti-colonialism and antislavery movement as international ideals of the past, and notes today's as environmentalism and feminism.

The book is a short but eventful read. Nye presents his argument with smooth prose and a measured reasoning. One might not necessarily need this work on his bookshelf at home, but it is required reading for all who have an interest in international relations and all the decision-makers in Foggy Bottom.

The paradox of American Power, argues Joseph Nye Jr., is that it is too powerful to be defeated militarily yet not powerful enough to meet all of its global challenges by itself. Nye expands this argument in a series of well-researched essays that are as deeply practical as they are intelligent. Few people are probably as uniquely qualified to examine the nature and problems of American power as he is. Nye is the Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and was Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Clinton Administration. This man is no ideologue and he knows what he's talking about.

Nye's argument is largely a refutation of the simplemindedness demonstrated by a clique of policy makers whom he refers to as the new unilateralists or hegemonists but who are more popularly known today as neoconservatives. Because these people are infatuated with military aggression, argues Nye, they fail to understand that power is a complex phenomenon best understood in terms of its "hard" and "soft" components. Hard power consists of military and economic leverage while soft power contains less obvious but no less significant components such as cultural appeal, universally respected values, opportunities, and policies that are tied to global interest as much as national gain. Nye correctly argues that the great empires of the past including the United States ruled through a skillful application of both hard and soft power. To jettison our soft power because our leaders are so enamored of hard power, argues Nye, is a colossal blunder.

Nye also argues that power is distributed on different levels some of which require cooperation with other nations and some of which don't. He elaborates by describing American power in terms of a three level chessboard. On the top level of the chessboard, which constitutes military power, the United States is preeminent and can act unilaterally. The middle level, which constitutes economic power, however is multi-polar. In this area the United States must act in concert with a select group of other players such as Japan, China, France, Germany, India, and others. The bottom level of the chessboard constitutes trans-national issues that occur with no regard to national boundaries. In these areas, which include international finance and the actions of stateless organizations, including terrorists, the United States can only act in an inclusive global fashion. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Nye criticized the Bush Regime for its nearly exclusive focus on the first level of the chessboard and described its policy makers as one-dimensional thinkers in a three dimensional chess game.

Nye reinforces his argument by explaining the impact that contextual developments such as the information revolution and globalization have on American power. The information revolution, argues Nye, circumvents borders and challenges state sovereignty and control. America is both a product and a beneficiary of globalization, according to Nye, but must use its soft power to shape the evolution of globalization in a manner that endows it with universal appeal. Failure to do so could have disastrous consequences.

In his chapter entitled "The Home Front" Nye begins with the ominous observation that instead of being defeated by the barbarians, Rome rotted from within. "People lost confidence their culture and institutions, elites battled for control, corruption increased, and the economy failed to grow adequately." Terrorists cannot defeat the United States, argues Nye, unless it rots from within. More importantly, Nye points out that disastrous fiscal policies that drive up deficit spending that destroy time honored American social services can dramatically erode American hard and soft power. Deficit spending inevitably generates a recession and a severe recession will likely result in the flight of foreign investment capital thereby weakening America's hard power. But also as deficit spending destroys social services and opportunities, it also chips away at America's global appeal-a blow to our soft power.

In his concluding chapter, entitled "Redefining the National Interest" Nye calls upon the United States to pursue multilateral policies that foster badly needed international cooperation. Although Nye acknowledges that the multilateral approach provides America with less freedom to act at will than the unilateral approach, he also points out that it is better suited to dealing with the transnational issues that constitute some of our greatest challenges in the Twenty-first Century. Nye concludes that the United States should develop a combined policy that: (1) protects our traditional vital interests, (2) addresses the global public good, and (3) promotes human rights and democracy abroad.

Although this book was published in late 2002, it practically reads like a post mortem of the Bush Regime's disastrous foreign policies with respect to the Middle East, North Korea, Europe, and Iraq, which have arguably reduced both our hard and soft power. My hope is that more people will become familiar with Nye's arguments and will subsequently judge their leaders not by the entertainment value of their speech acts, but by whether or not their policies properly address the national interest.

Since the fall of communism, it has been a truism that the US is the world's only superpower. But what exactly does that mean anymore? We have the world's strongest military, but do not (and should not) use it without the backing of the American people and the international community. We have the world's largest and strongest economy, but it is strikingly dependent on the stability of international markets (which in turn are dependent on the stability of local economies around the world). We cannot defend our economic interests (for example, the Middle Eastern oil supplies necessary to our economy) without friendly countries who allow us to base military forces there. Terrorism, drugs, global warming, international financial markets and development issues all present problems to which we cannot dictate solutions. Instead, we must participate in some kind of global cooperative effort that seeks the good of all. At the same time, we cannot allow a single self-interested country to impede actions we view as essential to our security, and the American polity will not tolerate "undue" intrusions on US sovereignty. In this world, how should the US, with all of its military, economic and even (sometimes) moral force, go about securing peace, prosperity and human rights for the greatest number of people?

I was hoping that Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, would bring some real insight to these questions about how the US should determine and conduct its foreign policy. Unfortunately, in this short volume he provides mostly platitudes, almost no analysis, and little or nothing in the way of answers. Nye's analysis draws on several "insights." First, no one likes a bully. The US must therefore guard and enhance its "soft power" to set agendas and persuade others. Alas, no advice is offered as to how we do this. Nor does Nye explore in any concrete way how an emphasis on preserving our soft power would affect our policy choices. Second, other nations and groups have soft power too. I'm not sure that Nye actually makes any use of this insight, although one would think that it might play a role in addressing some of the concerns about democratic process in international institutions. Third, there are problems we can't solve ourselves. If we need others to help us with some of our problems, we have to expect that they will want us to help them with some of their problems in return.

Nye ends up by giving us a strategy to promote public goods and listing factors that should be considered in deciding whether to undertake a humanitarian intervention or whether to use unilateral or multilateral tactics. These provide useful checklists, but they are not really developed enough to give particularly useful guidance for developing policy.

Overall, a disappointment. I am giving it two stars only because I agree with most of what Nye has to say. If you already believe a multilateral approach to a foreign policy focused on public goods is necessary, you will probably find few new insights here. If you think the US can go it alone, I doubt that you will be persuaded otherwise by this book.